Will the Gaps Between the U.S. and Iran Lead to Resumed Fighting?

The campaign against Iran has reached its strategically decisive point following the announcement of a ceasefire and talks between the United States and Iran and between Israel and Lebanon. For now, the Iranian regime is feeling confident, and, as we see it, the reasons for that are varied. Tehran believes it has successfully contended with the efforts to oust it; the attacks against Israel and the Gulf states have caused considerable detriment to these countries’ energy infrastructure; and it has been wise enough to create a significant economic bargaining chip by closing the Strait of Hormuz, as well as reserving the option of having the Houthis close the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Furthermore, Hizballah has managed to cause damage to Israel without facing the existential risk of having its presence in Lebanon eliminated, despite the harsh blows this terror organization has sustained at Israel’s hands. Moreover, despite its importance, the beginning of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon will not lead to any impact on Hizballah’s capabilities, certainly not in the immediate future. The reason being that the Lebanese government is weak and incapable of taking effective steps against Hizballah, which is currently the strongest military force in Lebanon.

It seems that, despite the remarkable blows delivered to Iran by both the IDF and U.S. military, none of the original objectives, particularly in nuclear and SSM, have been fully achieved. Thus, the regime can rebuild these capabilities relatively quickly if it will indeed survive. Moreover, the U.S. administration is reluctant to name the toppling of the regime as a goal, probably since it realizes that it is not achievable in the immediate future.

The Naval Blockade – Who Will Last the Longest?

In view of the naval blockade imposed by President Trump on the Strait of Hormuz, the war is shifting, and its outcomes will be impacted by the patience exhibited by each side. From Iran’s perspective, it seems to believe that the pressure exerted on President Trump to end the war, coupled with the damage caused to the global economy, will not enable the blockade to last very long. This means that, as far as Iran is concerned, although the blockade will impact its economy considerably, as billions of dollars’ worth of income will be lost each month, it will probably be able to survive, and contend with its losses. America, however, sees President Trump presenting the exact opposite viewpoint. He claims the decision to impose a maritime blockade aimed to worsen the Iranian regime’s economic plight in an effort to force it to relax its rigid stance at the negotiating table.

An Agreement as the Preferred Course of Action

President Trump is striving to advance an agreement as his preferred alternative for ending the war, and avoid being drawn into a prolonged intense campaign. The latter could have a hefty political, economic, and military toll on America, as well as project onto Trump’s own legacy. The reasons for that are numerous, led by the effect on the U.S. economy, as manifest in the price of gas soaring to 4 dollars per gallon; the increasing pressure exerted by certain circles within the Republican Party that fear the possible impact of an enduring war on the mid-term elections; the breach of the commitment to end wars, not start new ones; and the realization that Iran can probably still cause significant detriment to the Gulf states’ energy infrastructure, including the concern that the Houthis will enter the campaign and threaten the freedom of navigation in Bab al-Mandab Strait. Be that as it may, we believe that President Trump will be disinclined to advance a partial agreement that will not provide a fundamental solution to essential issues, primarily the nuclear project.

Implications for Israel

We believe that both sides would prefer to find a formula that would enable the resolution of the conflict by way of an agreement. However, the gaps between them are emerging as unbridgeable at present, especially with regard to the nuclear program. The latter is a pillar of the Iranian strategic perception striving to preserve a foundation for the future development of nuclear weapons as an insurance policy against similar attacks against it. President Trump, however, is determined to prevent that. Thus, if neither side will be willing to concede, the tension will exacerbate, possibly evolving into a deep crisis to the point of resumed fighting.

The reports on the U.S. administration’s willingness to suspend the nuclear program for 20 years reflects Israel’s need to prepare for the reality of an agreement that could leave the threat intact for the long range. Thus, Israel should try to ensure its threshold terms to any agreement formed with the United States government. At the same time, it should prepare, from both political and military perspectives, to a scenario whereby the war will end soon with no clearcut decisive outcome. This implies the need to form a plan for continually contending with the Iranian regime, inter alia by destabilizing it. Israel should therefore examine ways of deepening its various partnerships, with an emphasis on defense, with the Gulf states that have felt the magnitude of the Iranian threat firsthand.

Furthermore, in view of the understanding that, once the war ends, the Gulf states will strive to bolster their defense capabilities against the threat posed by Iran, Israel must ensure that such a development will not challenge the IDF’s qualitative military edge (QME). The reason being that the U.S. administration could show some willingness to provide them with advanced weapon systems as part of their effort to build a solution against Iran.

It is noteworthy that there are also other arenas in which Israel has failed to reach a decisive outcome, primarily Gaza. Six months after the deal for the return of all the hostages, it is clear that Hamas is successfully reestablishing its control of the area west of the Yellow Line. Israel’s overarching goal should be to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. To do so, it should collaborate with the U.S. administration and Arab states to form an alternative government, and advance the Gaza Strip’s demilitarization.