As the deadline for his ultimatum draws near, President Trump must make a weighty decision whether or not to significantly escalate the military campaign, and target strategic national infrastructure in Iran to defeat it, thereby ending the conflict relatively quickly.

The Iranian regime, despite the grievous blows it has sustained, is exhibiting growing confidence to keep going. It seems to believe it has powerful playing chips at its disposal, namely impacting the global energy market and Gulf States, that will help it stand firm, and force the United States into a convenient war-ending agreement.

Israel’s military accomplishments are remarkable and, in collaboration with the United States, could considerably reduce the magnitude of the threat posed by Iran. Yet Israel must also prepare for the possibility of a U.S-Iran deal or President Trump’s announcement of a unilateral ceasefire, either of which would leave the Iranian regime weakened but intact, driving Tehran’s presumable desire to rebuild its capabilities, and vigorously pursue a nuclear weapon. All the while, Hizballah is firing relentlessly on thenorthern border, forcing Israel to continue attacking it to deflate its capabilities, as it realizes that ridding Lebanon of this terror organization is a long-term goal requiring a comprehensive combined military and diplomatic plan.

Five weeks into the campaign, and in view of President Trump’s threat that Iran’s refusal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by the deadline set would unleash “hellfire”, we seek to point to 10 key insights that could affect war-ending outlines:

1.  The military achievements of both Israel and the United States are highly impressive, contributing to the weakening of Iran’s multidimensional capabilities, as well as those of its proxies across the Middle East. At the same time, government actions must be taken to translate these military feats into strategic accomplishments that would lay the foundation for a more comfortable state security reality for Israel.

2.  Israel’s profound operational collaboration with the United States, which directly follows the 12-Day War (Operation Rising Lion), reflects the depth of the strategic alliance and special relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, the decision whether to continue or end this campaign will be made by President Trump. Moreover, there seem to be gaps between the two nations on endgame objectives, first and foremost with regard to the future of the Iranian regime.

3.  Despite reports of internal rifts, the Iranian regime, led by the Revolutionary Guards, is projecting confidence and exhibiting high survivability. It appears to be willing to continue with this conflict, inter alia by taking strong actions against Israel and the Gulf States, to ensure the Islamic Republic’s survival and existence.

4.  The Iranian regime believes it is successfully implementing its strategy of preventing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, while causing considerable detriment to the Gulf States in an effort to create chaos and a global energy crisis.

5. The ongoing threat posed to the State of Israel by Hizballah demands ridding Lebanon of this terror organization for the long run. It has been proven time and again that the Lebanese government cannot impose its will on Hizballah or its sovereignty over Lebanon. Thus, a fundamental solution is required, one that is based on a combination of significantly weakening the Iranian regime’s capabilities and forming a military-diplomatic plan designed to expel Hizballah while enabling the Lebanese government to exercise its sovereignty in Lebanon. Israel must consider, though, that if the war will end due to the signing of a U.S.-Iran agreement, Tehran would be likely to demand that the ceasefire apply to the northern front too to ensure Hizballah’s survival.

6.  The Gulf States are unable to form a united front, and are disinclined to use force against Iran despite the military power at their disposal. Therefore, Israel and the United States find themselves alone in their offensive campaign against Iran.

7. This state of affairs is further honed in view of the increasingly deepening fracture lines between the United States and both NATO and EU member states. The latter are disinclined to partake in the efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz despite their dependence on oil and gas from the Gulf. Moreover, some European countries are engaging in an active policy preventing the United States from using their territories to target Iran. These developments could have far-reaching implications on the strategic security ties between Europe and Washington, the nature of the conflict resolution in Ukraine, as well as U.S.-Russia relations, as the latter may emerge from this crisis with political and economic gains. The American permission given to Russia to export oil for a limited period of time even to Cuba is one indication of this.

8.  The war is providing Israel with the opportunity to deepen its collaboration and the Abraham Accords with the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, while rebuilding its ties with Jordan and Egypt. However, Israel should also consider the possibility that, following the war, President Trump will be more inclined to enhance the Gulf States’ advanced military capabilities, perhaps beyond what he has previously agreed to do, to the point of risking Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME).

9. Another central objective in itself must be forming a comprehensive plan for the expulsion of Hamas from Gaza and creation of an alternative regime in collaboration with the United States and the moderate Arab states.

10. The war with Iran is an extraordinary demonstration of the remarkable capabilities the IDF, the intelligence services, and the defense industries possess. All of these require a quality education system, and rely on Israel being Jewish, democratic, and liberal. Any harm caused to these pillars will pose a threat weakening Israel’s overall strategic power.