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The combined threats that Israel faces internally and externally are aggravating rapidly in a way that could prove detrimental to its strategic power, and project onto its state security freedom of action.

One month after the government was formed, Israel is now facing combined multidimensional threats that emanate from the interactions between negative internal processes and its ability to address growing external challenges. First and foremost, it is up against the risk of its internal cohesion and economic resilience being chipped away, as well as the possibility of a sharp and rapid deterioration in its relations with the Palestinian Authority, and the aggravating threat posed by Iran.

The new Israeli government was required, from its first day in office, to address a series of challenges projecting onto Israel’s national security and resilience. It has not even been given 100 hours of grace; instead, within 24 hours of being sworn in, the UN General Assembly had resolved to request the International Court of Justice to examine the “ongoing Israeli occupation”. Meanwhile, President Biden has conveyed implicit warnings when reiterating that he expects the incoming government to maintain the two-state principle, and protect the values Israel shares with the United States. The immediate harsh responses, in both the West and Muslim Arab world, to Minister Ben Gvir’s visit to Temple Mount, which emerged as a provocative step, is writing on the wall indicating what the future would hold should Israel alter the status quo in this sensitive and explosive compound. Furthermore, the growing national resilience challenges may also affect the government's ability to deal with the security threats.

The new Israeli government is entering office at a low starting point in view of the many concerns across the world and region with regard to its policies on a wide range of issues

The new Israeli government forming will need to come up with a quick response for the strategic challenges it faces in both regional and international arenas, while realizing that its true test will, before all else, be its actions on the ground.

The new government that will soon be formed will grapple with a complex strategic reality, as well as a series of political and security challenges on the internal, regional, and international fronts. In view of the combustibility and urgency of these challenges, the government is required to formulate a comprehensive strategy and systemic solution as soon as possible, This by adopting a cautious approach that will prevent manifestations of violence and the undermining of strategic assets and partnerships, primarily the one with the United States, and Israel’s ties with the Sunni countries.

The focus on politics and the internal schism have grown over the last three years, fueling the domestic rifts and leading to a "fire extinguishing" policy that centers solely on urgent matters, while avoiding thorough exploration of issues and the formulation of an overall strategy designed to address the fundamental challenges and problems faced by Israel and Israeli society.

The next few weeks leading up to the elections, at the heart of which are the Jewish High Holidays, harbor potential for explosivity due to the convergence of several processes and events: The continuing security escalation in the West Bank, particularly in northern Samaria, which is aggravating; the expected start of gas production in Karish rig against the backdrop of Nasrallah’s threats; the security deterioration that could develop around Temple Mount during the Jewish High Holidays, which may project onto other focal points in the Palestinian arenas, as well as on the internal Israeli one. At the same time, in the absence of an agreement, Iran’s nuclear programs continue to progress, and the ball for renewed negotiations is in its court. From a broader perspective, President Putin announced a partial military mobilization and intends to escalate the activities in Ukraine.

The Tehran and Jeddah summits are an expression of the great powers’ range of strategies for coping with the world security and economic crisis, projecting clout, and promoting interests that exceed the specific Middle Eastern context. Nevertheless, this region is becoming increasingly more instrumental to the great powers’ national security interests as the conflict between the West and Russia exacerbates.

The international and regional system is undergoing shocking dynamics that destabilize world order and pose a growing risk of local escalation to Israel, alongside the opportunity to enhance strategic collaborations in the region. This complexity is further underscored by Israel’s ongoing political crisis, and preparations for the upcoming elections.

The absence of an overall Israeli strategy vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue, beyond the current "conflict management" policy that uses "sticks and carrots", reduces Israel's ability to take action, limiting it to the operative and reactive space, and playing into the hands of Hamas in the Palestinian arena.

The United States' national security set of priorities, as well as the broadening scope of threats to its security and status, could compromise American deterrence in the Middle East in view of Washington's focus on Russia, China and North Korea. This state of affairs could lead to greater Iranian boldness in the region when targeting Israel and the Gulf states, as well as to overall regional destabilization.

The assessment shared by most military experts on the eve of the war in Ukraine was that Russia would be quick to achieve decisive victory in view of the power relations tipping so substantially in its favor. The campaign in Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014), and effective military involvement in Syria (2015) had established the basic assumption that the Russian military force reigned supreme, and that a conflict between the two countries would yield predictable and inevitable outcomes.

Russia seeks to be a gamechanger in Europe, and redesign the world order formed after the Cold War had ended.

The United States, which orchestrates the western coalition, is taking actions that fall short of direct war against Russia, while employing unprecedented political and economic measures.

What is the strategic midgame score and what are the Implications for Israel?

The crisis in the Ukraine is exacerbating, and evolving into the severest one between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. Its outcomes would have implications on world order, the strategic competition between the United States and China, as well as the Middle Eastern architecture.

The strategic reality is changing and requires a policy-security initiative that would address the threats and opportunities it brings with it.

As Israel welcomes 2022, it is grappling with intensifying strategic challenges for its national security, primarily the Iranian nuclear and regional threats, as well as the explosiveness of the Palestinian issue in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel is at a strategic crossroads in view of Iran's plodding negotiations with the great powers, and the need to curb the progress made by the Iranian nuclear program.

Although Israel is currently experiencing a lull in its security reality, the challenges to its national defense are mounting. Israel’s adversaries have been focusing more on building force and less on using it, and are avoiding escalating the friction in view of the high price that would be exacted from them, to say nothing of their own serious internal problems that also need to be addressed. At the same time, in view of these processes involving mounting challenges and force buildup, the strategic threat to Israel’s security is growing

The strategic competition between Israel and Iran, parallel to a new American administration taking the helm, have constituted core meta-forces shaping the Middle Eastern arena in the past year. Along with this, the volatile state of the Palestinian arena in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria; Hezbollah’s progress in force design and particularly progress on its precision project; the end of the civil war in Syria and entrenchment of the Iranian and Russian presence in Syria; regional competition over energy resources and influence in the Mediterranean Basin; the deep economic crisis in Lebanon; the Covid pandemic; escalating regional economic crisis; and the return globally of the Jihadist challenge with the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan underscore the scope of change in the region, and its implications for Israel’s national security.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan is a formative event whose projection strategically will reverberate for many years to come.

Israel faces several threats that are changing and forming which represent potential for escalation in varying ranges in time.

The new Israeli government has inherited a country that is "spinning" with respect to its abilities to cope with the multidimensional crisis it is currently in. These are the five key challenges and threats requiring an immediate response alongside recommendations for overcoming them.

The campaign in Gaza is emerging as a seminal event with strategic implications that reflect on multiple arenas and issues that far exceed the parties' military balance.
Here are 10 insights on the conflict with Hamas.

An exacerbation in a series of strategic challenges Israel is currently facing has been noted recently while the local leadership is in deep political crisis, stalling to craft a policy vis à vis the emerging reality

In the shadow of an unprecedented political crisis, Israel lacks clear strategy with respect to a series of imminent security-related and political challenges it is currently facing.

Israel is facing a series of strategic reality-shaping challenges. However, it is in the midst of an ongoing political crisis and holding off on taking the urgent necessary steps to craft a comprehensive coherent policy for addressing the developments and threats that may cast a heavy shadow on its national security and resilience.

A bleak strategic horizon is being painted in recent weeks due to some developments that could pose a challenge to Israel's national security. These processes require guidance and collaboration across the board to deliver an urgent, coordinated response that is aligned with Israel's interests.

The imminent strategic challenges we face are taking place in four arenas.

Building trust as well as close and coordinated working relations with the Biden Administration, while restoring Israel's status in the United States as a bi-partisan consensus are top Israeli interests. Potential for tension and friction between the two countries focuses on three key issues: Iran, the Palestinians, and the great power competition (China and Russia).

On the eve of another election campaign, Israel is in a wild "spin" with regard to its abilities to cope with the multidimensional crisis it is in, and the complex challenges it faces. Its inability to make and implement necessary decisions has uncovered dangerous gaps in governance.

Following are the key challenges and threats requiring urgent solving, as well as recommendations for addressing them.

Just when the Biden administration will be forming its policies, including its Middle Eastern one, Israel will be spending crucial months in a domestic whirlwind; too busy looking inwardly, and trying to solve its own issues, to impact any processes taking place in Washington, or receiving the attention it needs from the incoming administration.

Several core issues are on the agenda of the U.S. Middle Eastern policy and its relations with Israel, which could potentially cause tension between the two allies.

The unstable and volatile Middle East continues to provide fast-paced dramatic headlines. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh – a "knowledge hub" and leader of the Iranian nuclear weapon project – has the media's complete attention these days. The operation pushed aside important events and profound trends that demonstrate how the extreme and radical forces in the region – both on the Shiite and Sunni axes – continue to fight for their control and status and have yet to be eradicated.

On January 20, Democrat president elect, Joe Biden, will enter the oval office. The change in leadership will undoubtedly lead to significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy in both style and essence.

For Israel, the new administration represents a series of significant opportunities as well as challenges.

The new Jewish year finds Israel grappling with several demanding unmet challenges. At the same time, there have also been some positive developments that should be retained and leveraged to create new opportunities.

Events in recent weeks have exposed in force the thread that links serious failures that have characterized the actions of the Israeli government on two fateful issues – Coronavirus and the Annexation

Current Israeli policy only ‘draws fire’ and deflects international attention - which, in any case, is limited in the shadow of the Coronavirus crisis -away from the expanding Iranian nuclear threat.

Recently, two policy and security issues have been prominent where Israel, ‘with its own hands’, is liable to cause a strategic blow to its own national security: Unilateral annexation and screening of Chinese investments.

This document focuses on a number of aspects of national security and policy recommendations.

The following document focuses on the key challenges and the response to them.

Failures that characterized management of the Coronavirus crisis cloud the ability to meet the paramount imperative of return to normalcy.

Parallel to this, in the long term, Israel is liable to bring down on itself a heavy national calamity if it opts for the annexation plan and chooses to take it forward.

The new Israeli government’s character is a cause of much concern in Jordan, as it could lead to a change in Israeli policy with regard to Jerusalem’s holy sites in such a manner as to harm Jordan’s status there. In an interview for CNN just before the new Israeli government was sworn in, King Abdullah II had voiced his apprehension. He claimed there is “concern” in the kingdom about those in Israel trying to push for changes to his custodianship of the Muslim and Christian holy sites. He added that Jordan has certain “red lines”, and would be willing to contend with those who attempt to cross them. Jordan’s strong condemnation of Minister Ben Gvir’s visit to Temple Mount, and its promotion of a discussion on the matter in the UN Security Council, reflect the Hashemite Kingdom’s tremendous sensitivity to any action taken by Israel in this regard.

In recent weeks, worrying indications from Jordan have been accumulating, requiring special attention by Israeli decisionmakers. At present, there is a combination between internal turmoil within the Hashemite Kingdom due to longstanding fundamental issues, and renewed tension in the relations between the two countries due, primarily, to Jordan’s concern over steps that the new Israeli government might take in the context of Temple Mount.

Hizballah is threatening to harm Israel to win points domestically while being deterred by the power of the IDF strikes • The agreement is good for Israel and Lebanon alike, and is the best solution for Hizballah and the region • Missing this opportunity would be a cause for regret for both Israel and its citizens •

The scope and severity of the threats faced by Jordan seem to have increased this past year: the global economic crisis in view of the pandemic and war in Ukraine; soaring energy and basic food product prices; visible cracks in royal family relations; the aggravated threat posed by the Iranian proxies on the borders; fear of escalation in the Palestinian arena that would impact Jordan's own security, and more.

The last two weeks were split between two extremes: the Negev Summit – an unprecedented meeting between Arab foreign ministers and the U.S. Secretary of State on Israeli soil designed to tighten collaborations between Israel and countries in the region as well as jointly address shared challenges; and the devastating terror attack in the city of Hadera that joined those carried out the previous week in Be`er-Sheva and Bnei-Brak, attesting to an exacerbating domestic challenge. Thus, while Israel's strategic situation in the regional sphere improves, domestic challenges intensify.

The Negev Summit in Sde Boker expresses a regional sense of urgency in the Arab world in view of the scope and severity of the threats it faces, the weakness of U.S. support, and Washington's reduced deterrence in the international arena and Middle East. The expected return to the nuclear deal between Iran and the great powers, which would transform the former into a legitimate regional power undermining the stability of Sunni regimes directly or via proxies, intensifies this sense of urgency, as well as the need to develop a regional security strategy that would regulate political and military collaborations, while anchoring U.S. commitment to the security of states in the region.

The crisis in Ukraine broke out when the Middle East was experiencing growing tension in view of what many perceived as a decline in the United States' status as it strove to resolve crises via diplomacy (at the center of which was the issue of Iranian nuclear) and refrain from military intervention (as manifest in Afghanistan), as well as increased boldness among regional parties, primarily Iran, who feel that their latitude has grown due to the emerging geopolitical state of affairs.

Libya is once again on the verge of political chaos that could deteriorate into another round of the ongoing civil war. The political crisis between the Tripoli Government of National Accord (GNA) in western Libya and the opposing political forces in the east, headed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar, has escalated in recent weeks in view of the interim government's failure to hold the elections in December 2021 as planned, as well as the heated debate on the prime minister's legitimacy to continue in his position. The political system is divided and split, whereas the international arena is inattentive in view of the aggravating crisis in the Ukraine.

The rhetorical fist fight between Hizballah and Saudi Arabia has escalated in recent weeks, reflecting the growing regional competition between Iran and its proxies, and the pro-American Middle Eastern camp headed by Saudi Arabia, but it also serves as a concrete display of the aggravating competition over Lebanon. The economic and political crisis in Lebanon is experiencing is being viewed as a strategic opportunity for the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan to create impact levers designed to reduce Iranian influence and weaken Hizballah in both the regional and internal Lebanese systems by providing financial and energy assistance to Beirut. This step aligns with the Israeli interest, despite its low expected value in view of the central role played by Hizballah in the domestic Lebanese arena, and Iranian clout there.

The civil war in Yemen is nearing its seventh year, and there is no end in sight. The Houthi rebels' drone attack in Abu Dhabi, and the seizure of the UAE-flagged ship in the Red Sea constitute severe developments with strategic regional repercussions. From an Israeli perspective, this strike demonstrates the growing threat posed by the Iran-backed proxies, as well as the need to promote regional security and military collaboration to curb Iranian aggression.

The Egyptian strategy is managing to maneuver between the United States and Russia despite the growing tension between the great powers in the global arena. Closer security and political ties with Israel alongside a lead role in the mediation on the Palestinian issue serve as a strategic asset that is being leveraged by the Egyptian regime to fortify its status in Washington. Cairo is also deepening its strategic relations with Russia as the latter is increasing its influence in Egypt, primarily by means of the civil nuclear project.

In his book 1984, English writer George Orwell coined the term "doublethink", which pertains to the ability to simultaneously accept two mutually contradictory approaches, beliefs or ideas as correct. The slogans used in the book – "war is peace", "freedom is slavery", and "ignorance is strength" – are manifestations of this notion. Orwell used this method to demonstrate how conflicting ideas could be incorporated into a single "coherent" political perception.

The U.S. administration has adopted a policy whereby its involvement in the Middle East has lessened while its focus has shifted to the strategic rivalry with Russia and China. Subsequently, the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, pursuit of a renewed nuclear deal with Iran, increasing debate over the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria, and the cracks in the wall of sanctions Washington had imposed on Assad's regime (the Caesar Act) are all leading to the shaping of a dynamic regional architecture that impacts the alliances and bilateral relations between countries due to the growing concern over a shift in U.S. policy in the region.

For the first time during President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s tenure Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has been invited for an official visit to Egypt. The invite of Prime Minister Naftali Bennet was a public gesture that underscored progress in strategic connections and cooperation between the countries facing challenges and sensitive issues in the security-diplomatic realm.

In recent months, Israel has been grappling with three key areas of security-related tension: the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Iran (particularly in the context of the Gulf region). The tension in each had evolved against a separate backdrop; however, the common denominator between all three is over-boldness on the part of Israel's enemies – who define themselves as members of the "resilience camp" – and their cautious attempt to reshape the rules of the game when addressing Israel.

Contributed by Hussein Ibish as part of collaboration between the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) and the institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

In August 2020, both Israel and the United States achieved a significant diplomatic breakthrough with the announcement of the Abraham Accords, which initiated diplomatic normalization between Israel and both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Later, Sudan and Morocco joined the agreement. Yet after a year, the biggest prize in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, remains tantalizingly poised between joining the accords or deciding it is not worth the many risks involved. There are numerous factors pulling Riyadh to embark on the process to normalize relations with Israel and at least as many pushing it back. For now, it appears that Saudi leaders are most comfortable keeping their options open without firmly deciding to move in either direction.

The tension between Turkey on the one hand and Egypt, Greece and Cyprus on the other over the Eastern Mediterranean Basin continues, despite Ankara's efforts to ease the stress with Cairo and Athens. In response, Egypt is tightening its strategic collaboration with Greece and Cyprus to deter Turkey, going as far as to signal that it will not hesitate to take military action in view of the threat to its state security interests in this area.

A decade after it had played the role of trailblazer of the Arab Spring, Tunisia is once again experiencing severe domestic turmoil, demonstrating that the process that erupted ten years ago is far from over, and continues to change the regional profile.

The summit held by the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (June 2021), while designed to promote strategic collaboration between the three states, also holds promise of a future ambitious perception whereby this cooperation model will be expanded to other countries in the Levant. Emphasis was placed on economic and state security collaboration, including energy and electricity mega-projects, as well as free passage between the three countries. Yet the emerging agreement, if signed, is expected to have long-range political and security implications for the regional arena as well as Israel.

Since the nationwide protests in Lebanon in October 2019 that broke out due to the tough economic situation there, the macro-economic data reflecting the deterioration in its state of affairs seem to have turned into tangible phenomena reflecting the collapse of Lebanese state institutions and infrastructure.

Egypt is identifying an opportunity to promote its strategic goals regionally as well as in Washington: The reconciliation agreement with Qatar, ceasefire in Libya, change in Turkish oppositional policy toward Cairo, and implications of the campaign in the Gaza Strip on Egypt's status have all led to forming an active strategy for the promotion of its state and security goals, as well as strengthening its domestic grip.

Operation Guardian of the Walls established Cairo's worth in the U.S. administration's eyes, and the understanding that it is the only element in the complex regional system that is capable of mediating between the parties and bringing about a lasting ceasefire. As a result, President Biden spoke to el-Sisi for the first time since he entered office, and formally thanked him for leading the parties to declare a ceasefire.

It is becoming quite clear that President Erdogan's "charm offensive", designed to mitigate tension and friction with both western and regional countries, is failing to meet its objectives, and that the Turkish president continues to pay the price of the loud aggressive foreign policy he has been leading for the past two years. This trend was demonstrated well recently by President Biden's dramatic recognition of the Armenian genocide.

My initial working assumption is that in Israel, there exists a wall-to-wall consensus, 72 years after declaring independence, that seeks an end to the conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world, which in large part has yet to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

On the eve of the shift in U.S. administration, the Middle East – from Rabat to Tehran – is in the midst of preparing for president-elect Joe Biden to enter the White House, and the possible changes in U.S. Middle Eastern policy he will make. Most actors seek to hedge risks, and keep some "bargaining chips" in hand, against which to demand considerations when he will enter office. However, some of them are making proactive steps or avoiding others to gain credit with Biden and his staff.

When President Biden will enter the White House, a pile of urgent foreign issues will be waiting for him on his Oval Office desk. As the title of his piece in Foreign Affairs earlier this year – "Why America must lead again" – demonstrated, Biden attributes great importance to foreign policy. He has even chosen to announce his national security appointments to the cabinet before any others, including finance and health, presumably in order to convey a message.

In recent years, the United Arab Emirates (henceforth, the UAE) has been bolstering its influence in the Middle East, and in the Arab world in particular. This constitutes a peak in a trend that had transformed the UAE from an oil emirate on the margins of the Arab world, into an influential entity in the hubs of the action and a host of disputes within the Arab and Muslim world where the UAE possesses strong affiliations with key players in the international arena.

The scope of the damage and the aftershock that the explosion in Beirut's port caused is unprecedented. Over 170 persons were killed, some 6,000 injured, 300,000 were left homeless, and the cost of rebuilding the port and the surrounding circle of destruction is expected to reach billions of dollars. The explosion not only demolished part of the Lebanese capital; it also smashed what remained of Lebanon's economy and its governing institutions, which were already in a shambles. The explosion ignited a third wave of demonstrations in Lebanon since October 2019 that rapidly led to the resignation of the Hassan Diab government a mere seven months after it took office. In the wake of the resignation, Lebanon reverted back to the familiar political limbo of attempts to reach agreement among the heads of the country's ethnic-religious factions for appointment of a new prime minister.

In recent weeks, Libya has become the focus of attention in the Middle East, due to dramatic developments in the crisis in the country. These strategic developments, have broken the stagnation that has characterized fighting on the ground over the past year, heralding a deep change in the situation and in the nature of outside intervention in the Libyan arena.

A week after the attack on Saudi Arabia's critical oil infrastructures, the Saudi and American response to Iran's aggression appears to be hesitant.

Following the attacks on the oil facilities in Abqaiq & Khurais, Saudi Arabia announced that it is suspending the half of its daily oil production – 5.7mbd (million barrels per-day) that account for 5% of global daily production.

Contrary to the "silly season" metaphor, the passing summer in the Middle East featured considerable developments and strategic shifts – ranging from the Persian Gulf through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, on to Sudan.

The fall of its last stronghold in Eastern Syria near the town of Baghouz ended ISIS as a territorial entity, but not as a terror threat. This milestone also underscored the end of the civil war and insurgency in Syria in Assad's regime favor and that his rule is firm and there to stay.

Do the dramatic events in Sudan and Algeria reflect a new phase of the "Arab Spring" (or "regional upheaval" as Israeli experts preferred to call it)? Can we expect a new round of revolutions sparked by public protest in face of the core economic, social, governance, and demographic challenges, to which the regimes in the region are far from offering solutions? Under what circumstances does the likelihood of deep trends bursting out increase? It seems that the answers to these questions are different across the various arenas.

Nine months after the parliamentary elections in Lebanon, and following a prolonged political crisis and bargaining ordeal, the caretaker prime minister, Saad Hariri, announced the formation of a new unity government comprising, as always, 30 ministers.

Two isolated developments – the removal of Palestinian Authority officials from the Egypt-Gaza crossing and the rumors that Iran is planning to withdraw from the JCPOA – appear to be not so dramatic. However, these developments are actually potential early-warning indicators for what might challenge Israel in the near future.

2018 Herzliya Conference

2018 Herzliya Conference

2018 Herzliya Conference

2018 Herzliya Conference

2018 Herzliya Conference

The 17th Herzliya Conference

The 17th Herzliya Conference

The 17th Herzliya Conference

The 16th Herzliya Conference

The 16th Herzliya Conference

The 16th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper | 15th Herzliya Conference

Presentation from the 15th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009 | Published by the Hudson Institute

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009 | Published by the Hudson Institute

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009

The Case of Iran and the Palestinian Radical Organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

Current Trends In Islamist Ideology P.87 2007 Herzliya Conference

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

2007 Herzliya Conference | This article answers the following fundamental questions: What are the sources of the conflict between radical Islam and the West? What are the directions that this conflict may take? What proposals can academicis offer to defuse the conflict? The article will also provide recommendations for policy planners including practical advice regarding Muslims in the West, women empowerment, media, and the younger generation . The article, besides answering the question "Why this phenomenon has arisen", asks also the question "why not"? Why is it that in similar societies, with similar social, economical and political conditions, such anti-Western antagonism was not created? The authors suggest four main components that contrast Arab Jihad from Non-Arab radical societies.

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Volume 3 Published by the Hudson Institute February 2006

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative s. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks. Can it fill the role of a moderate opposition which assists in advancing democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism? This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years in between 2003 – 2005.

Fiqh al Aqalliyyat is an Islamic doctrine, aimed for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, especially in the Western world. This doctrine's target is to allow and ease the Muslim law in a way that will enable Muslim minorities to integrate into the society without the fear assimilation. The doctrine leans on two basic concepts: The first one is "Allamiyat al Islam" – the world embracing Islam. The Muslim faith believes that the Prophet Muhammad's should be ruling over the entire world. A perception of that kind redefines the traditional Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb outlooks, for it claims that the entire world is, or will be soon Muslim. This goal is proposed to be achieved through Da'wa (invitation, call out, propaganda) in hopes of turning the Non Muslim civilizations into a a unified Muslim world.

he rise of the modern Islamist jihad movement in the last two decades of the 20th century has coincided with the rise of a growing body of fatwas that declare jihad as a legal religious obligation, and define clear guidelines for the waging of jihad. These fatwas therefore provide moral and legal sanction for acts of terrorism. They relate to a broad-range of issues including the definition and identification of the battle space in which jihad is to be undertaken; the necessary conditions for jihad; the identity of the “infidels” whom jihad must be waged against; who must participate in jihad and how; what are the legitimate means and who are the legitimate targets of jihad; the legitimacy of suicide attacks and other issues.

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The conflict between Islam and the West is often described as a clash of values. Some Islamic thinkers, such as the famous Egyptian Sayyd Quttb see Western technology and spreading Western culture, as "intellectual and spiritual colonialism." Islamic fear comes from the breakdown of the traditional sources of social authority, an outcome of the Westernization of the youth. Western values, spread all over via media and technology, bring contradictory messages to the traditional Islamic worldview and their families remain unprotected by these barrages of a new world. The three most important and vulnerable issues are family values, the status of women, and the elders authority. This article provides a comparative outlook of 31 topics, all connected to the status of women, from the spectrum of Western pluralistic perception, to the harsh Islamistic attitudes. The comparison demonstrates how long can thediscrepancy between the two poles can be, and the significant distance between its two edges. Partial list of the 31 topics, overviewed in the article: Dress, Mobility, Virginity, Age differences, Culture of Shame, Loyalty in Marriage, Sexual Discourse, Female Genital Mutilation, Rape Victims, Divorce, Inheritance, Etc.

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers | This paper was prepared and published about a month before the death of Arafat. It is based on a series of meetings with senior Israelis and Palestinians with in-depth knowledge of Palestinian society and politics. It proposes that the end of the Arafat era will also be the fall of the Old Guard leadership in the Palestinian national movement. The author inferred – as it turned out correctly – that Arafat would not nominate a successor even upon his death bed and that "black horses" – anonymous local Fatah and other leaders, will emerge out of the vacuum, to form the backbone of a new multi-polar leadership. If strong leadership does not take the reins after Arafat exits the stage, Dr. Bar foresees that Hamas may emerge as the only force on the ground with the power and structures necessary to appeal to the general public. In fact, it would seem that the younger generation of Hamas will be less than inclined to allow the representation of the Palestinian people to remain in the hands of Arafat's successors and will demand a piece of the leadership cake. Dr. Bar concludes that Israel will not benefit from the absence of efficient Palestinian leadership and therefore should take advantage of existing levers in order to influence the emergence of a future Palestinian leadership.

Lately Jordanian involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been discussed in Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian circles. Potential ideas for such involvement include: Jordanian trusteeship during an interim settlement, various levels of a link – federation or confederation - between Jordan and future Palestinian State in the framework of a final status agreement, Jordan as a “Motherland” for Palestinian “cantons” and a “Benelux” paradigm for a Jordanian-Palestinian- Israeli relationship.

The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002

The new Israeli government has been facing the Iranian challenge since its first day in office due to the aggravating threat it poses to Israel. This threat is based on extreme ideology calling for Israel’s annihilation, alongside the development of capabilities designed to put this vision to practice, primarily the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the development of long-range missiles. In view of this challenge, we are required to explore what the government must do to curb Iran.

Recent months have been marked by the tightening of the strategic axis between Russia and Iran, and a considerable leap in military cooperation between them. U.S. officials have gone as far as to define the emerging military ties as “unprecedented” and “a full-scale defense partnership”, posing a threat to Iran’s neighbors. This trend further aggravates the strategic and security challenges Israel faces in view of the growing multidimensional threat (nuclear, missiles, terrorism) posed by Iran.

The continuous dragging of heels in the nuclear talks, and the military aid to Russia harbor potential for aggravating the Iranian threat to Israel on two central tracks – the development of the nuclear program, and improvement of offensive capabilities. The massive aid Iran provides to Russia with the supply of Shahed 136 attack drones and training for the operation thereof, as well as the possibility of supplying SSM and other warfare within the next few weeks significantly augment the Russian army’s force, and serves as a crucial component in the attacks recently carried out in Ukraine against military and infrastructure targets.

Israel is at a strategic crossroads in view of Iran's plodding negotiations with the great powers, and the need to curb the progress made by the Iranian nuclear program.

Iran could become the only existential threat to Israel. Israel must prevent Iran from obtaining operational military nuclear capabilities while preparing for a conflict in Lebanon designed to defeat Hizballah and promote the establishment of a moderate regime. These two objectives are closely linked as Israel needs decisive military capabilities if Hizballah should decide to take action against it under the scenario of a strike in Iran. Moreover, in view of the progress made in Hizballah's force buildup efforts, it is becoming increasingly more likely for the scenario of a military conflict on multiple fronts to come true. Strategic freedom of action is needed to broaden the military activity sphere in the Middle East, to be obtained by strengthening the alliance with the United States, and expanding the collaboration with anti-Iranian parties in the region. In order to persevere with these efforts, Israel should avoid conflicts that would divert resources away from countering Iran.

Iran is commonly thought to have three supreme goals when developing nuclear weapons: deterrence; helping to achieve regional hegemony objectives; and uniting the Iranian nation around an issue that is practically in consensus. Beyond these strategic reasonings, the objectives of the nuclear program itself should be examined, particularly in its current stage (August 2021) of rapid development.

In recent months, Israel has been grappling with three key areas of security-related tension: the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Iran (particularly in the context of the Gulf region). The tension in each had evolved against a separate backdrop; however, the common denominator between all three is over-boldness on the part of Israel's enemies – who define themselves as members of the "resilience camp" – and their cautious attempt to reshape the rules of the game when addressing Israel.

Ebrahim Raisi, a 60-year-old conservative cleric born in Mashhad, has been elected by a majority vote as Iran's president. Raisi won about 62% of the votes (some 18 million). The next runner-up, lagging far behind, was another conservative candidate, Mohsen Rezaee, who won 3.4 million votes. The voter turnout in these elections, seen as gauging the level of legitimacy the regime is given, was 48.7% (compared to 73% in the last elections, held in 2017) – the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic, although the pandemic probably played a part in this outcome too. Approximately 3.7 million votes were disqualified (blank / invalid protest votes), thus, in effect, Raisi was only supported by about 30% of eligible voters.

The negotiations between Iran and the great powers in Vienna is unveiling a worrying trend: the United States increasingly seems to be taking action out of a sense of urgency and a weak position in the conflict with Iran over its expanding nuclear program and aggressive policy across the region. This dynamic is placing Israel in a strategic crossroad, where one route leads to a confrontational policy vis à vis the Biden Administration, and the other deepens the bilateral collaboration with it in an attempt to reach understandings that will ensure Israel's strategic interests and national security.

The Biden administration did not even get a grace period from Iran. It had barely entered office before the two countries engaged in a dialogue combining political moves ("words") with the use of military force ("swords").

The Biden Administration's approach to Iran is emerging as the Archimedean point that will define U.S. Middle Eastern policy in general, and shape its relations with its local allies, certainly with Israel. These days, Israel is reportedly preparing for starting a dialogue with the incoming administration on Iran. The following document seeks to lay the relevant knowledge foundation in this area, based on which a list of recommendations will be provided for conduct vis a vis the new U.S. administration in an effort to improve the chances of impacting its policy, and aligning it with Israel's interests.

To all appearances, it seems that Iran is going for the nuclear bomb. The Islamic Republic does not even try to hide it. Some will say that it merely threatens the West - first and foremost President Biden - to force them to return to the nuclear agreement abandoned by the US during the Trump administration, possibly under better terms for Iran. Either or, now is the time, at the beginning of 2021 and change of the administrations in Washington to look back and see how we ended up where we are and more than that – where do we go from here?

Of the few foreign affair issues discussed by the U.S. presidential candidates during their campaign, the most prominent was grappling with the challenges posed by Iran in both nuclear and the Middle East.

The most dramatic impact on the evolving crisis with Iran, particularly in its nuclear aspect, can be attributed to an event that will take place outside the Middle East: the U.S. elections.

Current Israeli policy only ‘draws fire’ and deflects international attention - which, in any case, is limited in the shadow of the Coronavirus crisis -away from the expanding Iranian nuclear threat.

In the wake of the targeted killing of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani in January of this year, there has been a noticeable reduction in the scope and force of Iranian military actions designed to put counter pressure on the United States and its allies, and to deter them. Despite an incident of harassment of American vessels in the Persian Gulf in April and sporadic attacks of militias in Iraq, Iran has ceased sabotage operations against tankers in the region, has not renewed attacks on oil infrastructure (such as those carried out against Saudi Arabia in September), and a relative drop in friction has been apparent in Iraq, as well.

The United States is the only superpower that holds the clout necessary to create effective pressure and leverage—political and military—to rein-in Iran's nuclear program and restrain its detrimental policies in the region.

The question of regime change has accompanied the Islamic Revolution ever since it seized power in Iran back in 1979. This rests on the assessment of many that there is no way to bring about change in the detrimental policies of the regime in Teheran deriving from ideological, religious and revolutionary motivations - short of regime change.

Despite the catastrophe with which it is dealing due to the spread out of control of the Coronavirus pandemic, the Iranian regime continues to build its strategic capabilities in the nuclear realm and surface-to-surface missiles, and to pursue its malign activities across the Middle East.

Against the backdrop of escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, London seeks to put together a European-led maritime protection force. Simultaneously, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, was tasked to establish an international coalition to secure freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab.

Generating and evaluating the plausibility of scenarios of the evolving crisis between the U.S. and Iran requires assessing the policies and objectives of both parties.

This week's events demonstrated that Trump's "maximum pressure" policy is indeed producing pressure. Iran's announcement that it is suspending certain commitments it undertook as part of the 2015 nuclear deal, its inflammatory threats, and its possible involvement in attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf – reflect real growing pressure in Teheran.

Iran marked the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. As in every year, the events commemorating the revolution started with the "Ten Days of Fajr" marking the period between the return of the Imam Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran from exile in Paris (February 1) to the proclamation of the revolution (February 10). During the ten days, the regime traditionally glorifies the principles of the revolution and its achievements, including military ones. This year, the regime presented an "appropriate Iranian answer" to the international sanctions – a large underground facility for manufacturing advanced missiles and a new ballistic missile named "Dezful".

Authorities in Belgium, France, and Denmark arrested several Iranian operatives, including an Iranian diplomat, in a plot to plant a bomb to disrupt a political rally of the Iranian opposition in Paris, France and to assassinate an opposition leader in Denmark. Time has come for European leaders to acknowledge the Iranian/Hezbollah terrorist threat looming high in the continent and act accordingly.

Iran and Russia – now the dominant remaining P5+1+EU party to the JCPOA – share a mutual vital interest in its preservation and survival. For Iran, the JCPOA, and its executive order, UNSC 2231, promise a strategic transformation through accrued wealth, investment in infrastructures, unfettered access to procurement of state of the art weapons systems, and a quantum leap in both defensive and up to date offensive accurate and reliable missile capabilities (ballistic, cruise and BMD) – culminating in strategic immunity to attack, and to retaliation. The timeline for the realization of this central goal of the JCPOA is envisaged to occur well ahead of the full resumption of the nuclear effort. For Russia, its position as the lead supplier of armaments to Iran, and its envisaged supply of missile technologies and hardware after “Transition Day”, provide it with multiple leverages. First, politically, it will allow Russia to influence Iranian actions, and consequently to reap the benefits of a broader regional prominence, to the detriment of competitors, especially the U.S. Secondly, it will guarantee Russia’s access to the lucrative Iranian weapons and missile markets – to the exclusion of other competitors such as China and Europe. The preservation of the JCPOA is also a Russian interest because Russia does not want a nuclear armed Iran any more than the other parties concerned, while its facilitating clauses guarantee Russia the dominant role in Iran’s strategic posture as its lead foreign partner.

On Friday, 26 February 2016, the IAEA issued its periodic (February, May, August / September & November) report on the “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”1 , for the upcoming 6-9 March 2016 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The report updates the information provided in the special inspection report of 16 January 2016, which verified that Iran had concluded implementing its commitments under the provisions of the JCPOA, thus facilitating the declaration of “Implementation Day” effective immediately. The January report highlighted that Iran had reduced the number of centrifuges installed down to the ceiling allowed it in the JCPOA; had dismantled, or “removed”, the remainder, including their associated operating equipment for continuous monitoring by the Agency; had exported out of Iran (to Russia) its entire stock of enriched uranium in excess of the 300 kg allowed by the JCPOA (from almost 12 tons); and had dismantled the core of the Arak heavy water reactor and taken the steps outlined in the JCPOA to make it irreversibly unusable (by filling it with concrete). The gist of the current report is that Iran continues, since the 16 January 2016 report, to be in full compliance with its commitments to the JCPOA.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The long awaited Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in regard to the Iranian nuclear crisis is a detailed document outlining the actions to be taken by Iran on the one side, and the EU3+3, sometimes called the P5+1, on the other to resolve the impasse. The document including its annexes comprises over a hundred pages – 159 pages in the rough draft copy immediately available. On the side of Iran's commitments, it involves a detailed program for the dismantlement of the lion's share of Iran's nuclear capabilities to date; on the side of the EU3+3, or the E3/EU+3 as they are called in the document, it involves for the most significant part an eventual rescinding of virtually all of the sanctions imposed on Iran, as the IAEA confirms Iranian compliance – or "implementation" – with the major steps regarding dismantlement of its nuclear capabilities.

The 15th Herzliya Conference

The Framework Agreement announced by the P5+1+EU and Iran on April 2nd in Lausanne sets out, in relatively great detail, the building blocks for reaching a full comprehensive agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis by the specified deadline of June 30th . Moreover, U.S. President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry made it clear over the past few weeks that the conclusion of a Framework Agreement was a necessary condition for the continuation of negotiations, and that the deadlines would not be extended without it. The US administration pointedly stated that the June 30 th deadline could not be extended without a framework agreement, implying that, if such a framework agreement were reached, an extension of the final deadline may be possible.

On Thursday, 19 February 2015, the IAEA issued its periodic report on the "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," for the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 2-6 March 2015. The report updates the information provided in the previous periodic inspection report from 7 November 2014, and interim report from 20 January 2015.

The 14th Herzliya Conference

Insights from ​The 2014 Herzliya Simulation Game: The Day after a Deal with Iran – Regional & Global Implications at the 14th Annual Herzliya Conference June 8 - 11, 2014

The 14th Herzliya Conference

The 14th Herzliya Conference

The 14th Herzliya Conference

The 14th Herzliya Conference

The 14th Herzliya Conference Working Paper

The recent agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has attracted unprecedented criticism of the US from its two main Middle East allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. While the prospect of broad Saudi-Israeli coordination in confronting Iran is dubious, the US should not take these important allies’ disaffection lightly.

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

Herzliya Analitical Note.

Herzliya Analitical Note.

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the post of President of Iran, his statements since coming into office, as well as his behavior on the domestic, regional and international fronts, have brought to the fore once more the possibility that Iran will resume an aggressive policy driven by the principle of export of the revolution, an approach that appeared to have been dropped from the Iranian agenda during the past decade, at least in its more radical expressions – terrorism and subversion.

This essay examines the assertion, widespread in both media and academia, that the Islamic Republic of Iran – and especially the current government under Ahmadinejad – is actuated by a powerful, Shī‘ite-based messianism. Much evidence appears at first glance to support this assessment: not only the statements and actions of the new, charismatic president, many of which reference the imminent return of the Hidden Imām, but also, and more fundamentally, the widespread perception of Shī‘ism – the state religion of Iran and spiritual force behind the Islamic Revolution – as an endemically and fervently apocalyptic creed. These two factors have combined with the pervasive impression created by many analysts that Iran’s rulers live on the brink of the Eschaton, and seek to expedite its arrival by initiating a worldwide cataclysm

This study examines the characteristics of the Islamic regime in Iran as they pertain to its decision-making process and defense doctrine. Bar presents the Islamic regime in Iran as an enigma - a combination of an ideological revolutionary regime based on dogmatic religious principles, with a remarkable adaptability and realpolitik perception. Iran's defense and security policy, according to Bar, derives from a concatenation of geo-political, cultural, and religious factors. The Iranian self-image is of a nation heir to an ancient civilization which precedes Islam, but suffering from a sense of strategic disadvantage, victimization, isolation and historic injustice. These result in a siege mentality and a tendency to accept and entertain conspiracy theories in which Iran is a loner in a world of foreigners scheming to deprive it of its lawful rights and exploit it. Iran's dependence on oil exports only exacerbates its sense of national vulnerability and oppression by the West. As for Iran's decision-making process, Bar describes it as basically rational and pragmatic. Iran sees its security environment as one of instability and hostility, and the US is perceived as the chief ideological and strategic enemy but is also the object of popular admiration for its material success. Israel and the Jewish people are also viewed with both extreme hostility and high regard. Iran's perception of Israel as a threat is a main source of its security interests in Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Iran is resolved to achieve nuclear capability, which is the only non-conventional capability that can deter the US. Achieving this capability is perceived not only as a strategic exigency but also as a well-deserved membership card to a select club to which Iran deserves to belong.

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers | This study attempts to decipher the Iranian negotiation code by analysis of key elements of Iranian worldviews, beliefs, communication conventions, social behavior, and cultural norms. According to Bar, the Iranian negotiating culture is deeply rooted in the Iranian national psyche, linguistic conventions, cultural habits and religious conventions. An analysis of the Iranian tendency towards mistrust and conspiracy theories suggests that arguments in the course of negotiations should be based on clear short-term incentives and threats, and not on incremental long-term confidence building. Negotiations, according to Bar, must achieve an acceptance by the Iranian side of the brute facts, rather than an understanding of the merits of the other side. It seems that Iranians have frequently seen back channels and secret negotiations as giving the other side an advantage.

Jerusalem is the focus of a soaring wave of escalation in the Palestinian system in recent weeks. The tension in Jerusalem affects the other foci in the Palestinian system, while also being affected by them, particularly the ongoing conflict in northern Samaria.

An ongoing rise in tension has been apparent in the Palestinian system in recent weeks, and seems to stem from three interrelated sources of crisis that impact one another:

Since its establishment – shortly after the 1967 Six Day War – the status of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has been extraordinary: It is primarily based on military officials (including its leadership), but subject to the Minister of Defense and focuses on civilian issues, most of which pertain to the life of the Palestinian population in the territories. This greatly reflects the ongoing Israeli decision to remain indecisive on the territories, and the desire to retain complete control in these areas while ensuring that the needs of the Palestinian public are met.

Last month, the UN Special Committee on Politics and Decolonization, who is not known for being a huge supporter of Israel as it is, resolved to request of the International Court in the Hague to inquire into the ongoing Israeli occupation in West Bank territories. What this resolution means is that the court will be able to determine, upon completing its inquiry, that Israel’s ongoing occupation of West Bank territories is an unlawful de facto annexation of these territories according to international law.

The growing discussion in both Israeli and Palestinian arenas on “the morning after Abu Mazen” primarily focuses on the possibility of violent intra-Palestinian successor struggles developing, leading to the destabilization of the Ramallah administration, as well as to security threats posed against Israel, namely waves of terrorism, and Hamas’ utilization of the possible vacuum and chaos to establish impact, possibly even control, over some areas of the West Bank or, indeed, the region as a whole.

The last two weeks were split between two extremes: the Negev Summit – an unprecedented meeting between Arab foreign ministers and the U.S. Secretary of State on Israeli soil designed to tighten collaborations between Israel and countries in the region as well as jointly address shared challenges; and the devastating terror attack in the city of Hadera that joined those carried out the previous week in Be`er-Sheva and Bnei-Brak, attesting to an exacerbating domestic challenge. Thus, while Israel's strategic situation in the regional sphere improves, domestic challenges intensify.

The wave of terror attacks washing over Israel in recent weeks is similar in character to previous ones, yet also has some unique attributes compared to the past. Unlike former waves, this one broke out for no specific reason (explosive arenas such as the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem were relatively calm this time), and seems to have evolved against the following combined backdrop: The effect of the incitement that has been ongoing in the Palestinian arena on the younger generation (an effort advanced primarily by Hamas); the "contagiousness" effect that often follows terror attacks; and a certain measure of the general tension cast by the month of Ramadan among Palestinians in recent years, as demonstrably witnessed during Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021.

The PLO's Central Council convened earlier this month, and made several dramatic announcements at the end of its conference. Such an event would usually have resonated in both Israel and the Palestinian system; and, indeed, the decisions taken during it were staggering, and may very well impact the PA's relationship with Israel, as well as the future of Palestinian leadership.

Sheikh Raed Salah, leader of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, is the embodiment of radical extreme in political Islam in Israel in particular, and in the Israeli Arab public sphere in general. The basic principle to which Salah adheres is the "autonomous society" or "oppositional society" (al-Mujtama al-`Issami), i.e., encouraging the Arab public to differentiate itself from the ruling establishment and Jewish society, while objecting to integration into official capacities (with the exception of the municipal level) as well as denying Israel's right to exist, albeit without taking violent action against it.

As he sees it, Yahya Sinwar is moving closer to realizing the goal he set for himself on the eve of Operation "Guardian of the Walls" (10-21 May) - to change the rules of the equation vis-à-vis Israel. In this context, he has thus far succeeded in actualizing maximum achievements with minimum damage.

In recent months, Israel has been grappling with three key areas of security-related tension: the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Iran (particularly in the context of the Gulf region). The tension in each had evolved against a separate backdrop; however, the common denominator between all three is over-boldness on the part of Israel's enemies – who define themselves as members of the "resilience camp" – and their cautious attempt to reshape the rules of the game when addressing Israel.

More than Two months after Operation "Guardian of the Walls" - which many in Israel hoped would be a seminal event in its relations with Hamas - the two parties seem to be quietly crawling back to the same reality that preceded 6pm on May 10th, when Hamas launched rockets at Jerusalem, thereby starting a military campaign that lasted nearly two weeks.

The Palestinian system was up in arms recently over the death of Nizar Banat, a human rights activist from the Hebron area, who was arrested by the Palestinian security apparatuses after criticizing the Palestinian Authority. Banat was severely beaten while arrested, and subsequently died.

Operation "Guardian of the Walls" has undermined many basic assumptions, both Israel's and Hamas' • The relative stability in the West Bank is perceived by Hamas as one of its strategic failures • Israel needs some steps that will improve civil conditions in the West Bank

Operation Guardian of the Walls established Cairo's worth in the U.S. administration's eyes, and the understanding that it is the only element in the complex regional system that is capable of mediating between the parties and bringing about a lasting ceasefire. As a result, President Biden spoke to el-Sisi for the first time since he entered office, and formally thanked him for leading the parties to declare a ceasefire.

Operation "Guardian of the Walls" (May 10-21) is the fourth broad military campaign waged between Israel and Hamas within the last 12 years. Unlike past campaigns, Operation "Guardian of the Walls" broke out in the absence of security deterioration in the Gaza Strip and was initiated by Hamas.

During the 11 days of fighting in Gaza, Moscow preferred to observe the goings-on in the Middle East from afar, while hinting that the geographic vicinity to Russia could, in future, lead to a change in direction. Russia condemned the violence, urged both parties to reach a ceasefire, criticized Israel for "disproportionate use of force", and called for Hamas to stop firing at Israeli city centers. It even offered its mediation services (knowing well that this position is strongly occupied by Egypt). What Russia did not do during Operation Guardian of the Walls was roll up its sleeves and dive in headlong.

Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) seems to have escaped with little damage from the postponement of the elections for which the Palestinian system has been preparing for over six months. Although Hamas expressed severe criticism, it is doubtful whether it will successfully promote a popular Intifada against the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, the public has not protested against the PA, and the international community has only feebly responded to Abu Mazen's announcement that he has put an end to this democratic process, the likes of which have not been experienced by the Palestinians in 15 years.

On February 5, 2021, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, in a three-judge panel, decided to recognize the court's jurisdiction to rule on issues emanating from "the situation in Palestine". This decision is the culmination of the international legal involvement in the Palestinian issue.

After one and a half decades of failed attempts to promote an inner Palestinian reconciliation that would enable elections, it is clear that the last few weeks have seen actual change in this area. For the first time in years, dates have been set for parliamentary, presidential, and PLO institutional elections, with interest and anticipation growing in the Palestinian system.

Earlier this month, most political, economic and security-related news that would otherwise have topped the Palestinian agenda were pushed aside by a seemingly unimportant event – some youngsters holding a rave at a religious site. The dance party had upset the entire Palestinian system, and continues to elicit emotional responses on various levels of discourse.

The presidential elections in the U.S. were perceived by the Palestinians as the final hope capable of saving them from their present strategic low point. And indeed, prior to the elections – and, in fact, at this time too – the Palestinians are grappling with a multidimensional crisis: the peace negotiations have been in a deep freeze for years; the possibility of achieving the independent state goal is constantly receding; the internal rift between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is deepening; the Arab and international arenas' interest in and attention to the Palestinian issue are lessening – whether due to despair of a prolonged conflict, or because their focus has shifted to issues perceived as more severe; and the disintegration of what, for many years, were the Palestinian problem's underlying assumptions, primarily the demand that normalization between Israel and the Arab world, or the change in Jerusalem's status, only be achieved once the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been resolved.

A week ago we marked twenty years to the breaking out of the Second Intifada, or as the Palestinians call it – the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It is one of the most important crossroads in modern Palestinian history, certainly in the last three decades. Seven years after the signing of the Oslo Accords – which many in Israel and around the world viewed as the Palestinians' historical decision to embark upon a peace process and cast their eyes toward their soon-to-be state – the _Palestinians retreated back to the trenches of battle.

The security tensions on the border with Gaza in the past two weeks have surfaced after ten months of relative calm in this sector that began with 'understandings' (or 'accommodations') reached between Israel and Hamas at the end of 2019 that were never embodied in a document, nor were they officially affirmed by either of the sides. Current security tensions have been manifested in widespread renewal of terror balloons (that cause brush fires and damage to orchards and fields under cultivation in the western Negev facing Gaza.

On 1 July – the date set for implementation of the annexation in Judea and Samaria – has past without practical steps being taken to do so and without dramatic events inside or outside the Palestinian arena. Thus Israel has entered a hazy period rife with instability in the context of the Palestinian arena that contributes to overall tensions in the country that have come in the wake of the Cronavirus crisis and the economic depression.

The grave crisis between Israel and the Palestinian Authority over the annexation question is accompanied of escalation in the Palestinian arena. In this framework, interest is rising in the Tanzim - the Fateh movement's frameworks of personnel in the field.

Discourse in Israel on the question of 'the day after' Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) – The Palestinian Authority Chairman since 2005 - has been shrouded for a number of years in concern about what events can be expected with the departure of the Palestinian president, and what will be the ramifications for Israel.

The Coronavirus crisis throws into relief years-long fundamental problems regarding Israeli control in East Jerusalem. In this frame of reference, the Israeli-Palestinian cleavage line in the city—that embodies the gap between realities of civic life in the two parts of the city—has sharpened, accompanied by an ongoing struggle between Israel and the Palestinian Authority over influence in East Jerusalem.

The Coronavirus crisis outbreak came at a particularly sensitive time in Israeli-Palestinian Authority relations. On the eve of the crisis, tensions between the two sides worsened against the backdrop of ongoing crisis in the diplomatic realm, heightened discourse in Israel regarding future annexation of territory in the West Bank, mutual economic boycotts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and outbreaks from time to time of waves of terrorism. These currents brought to the surface the question whether a broad wave of violence in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) was liable to occur that would challenge the prevailing state of affairs.

In recent years, both branches of the Palestinian arena – Gaza and the West Bank – are subject to a standing strategic alert of Israel’s defense establishment, warning of an outbreak of violence and heighted security risks. 

An extraordinary phenomenon – the outburst of public protests against the repressive regime of Hamas in several locations simultaneously – from the northern end of the Gaza Strip to the south – focusing on the economic hardship (“we want to live”) is a rare event. Similar previous protests, with less media exposure, were limited to demonstrations targeting the shortage of electricity supply in Gaza.

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

Comparative Strategy Vol. 26 Issue 5

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers | This document is a
compendium of the extant peace plans for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document includes an analysis of the various peace plans: interim plans, permanent status plans, “two states” and “one state” solutions, “Jordanian options” and plans for territorial swaps. The document contains comparative tables of the various plans, illustrative maps and tables forecasting the Jewish and non-Jewish populations in Israel and Palestine in the event that the plans are implemented.

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

This paper was prepared and published about a month before the death of Arafat. It is based on a series of meetings with senior Israelis and Palestinians with in-depth knowledge of Palestinian society and politics. It proposes that the end of the Arafat era will also be the fall of the Old Guard leadership in the Palestinian national movement. The author inferred – as it turned out correctly – that Arafat would not nominate a successor even upon his death bed and that "black horses" – anonymous local Fatah and other leaders, will emerge out of the vacuum, to form the backbone of a new multi-polar leadership. If strong leadership does not take the reins after Arafat exits the stage, Dr. Bar foresees that Hamas may emerge as the only force on the ground with the power and structures necessary to appeal to the general public. In fact, it would seem that the younger generation of Hamas will be less than inclined to allow the representation of the Palestinian people to remain in the hands of Arafat's successors and will demand a piece of the leadership cake. Dr. Bar concludes that Israel will not benefit from the absence of efficient Palestinian leadership and therefore should take advantage of existing levers in order to influence the emergence of a future Palestinian leadership.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003
When PA leader Yasser Arafat eventually leaves the stage, a new chapter will be opened in Palestinian political history will entail new realities and bring to the fore new forces and fresh dynamics. First and foremost, Arafat's departure will signal a changing of the guards from the "old guard" Diaspora leadership of the PLO to the "young guard" leadership from the West Bank and Gaza. However, how effective will this new generation of leaders be? The present trend towards internal fragmentation of the Palestinian Authority, exacerbated by Israeli security measures may devoid any future political leadership of true control on the ground – control which will devolve to a multitude of local warlords – each in his own territory. Under such circumstances, Israel will lack a clear Palestinian interlocutor both for deterrence and for political negotiations, and will have to invest more assets vis-à-vis a plethora of local elements. At the end of the day, however, building a viable Palestinian leadership, which will both desire Peace and stability and be capable of working towards these goals, calls for economic reforms within the PA, toppling the monopolies and injecting into the system new local economic forces. In such an endeavor, Israel may find allies in the Western world and among Israel's moderate Arab neighbors.

This paper presents eight possible ways of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. It is organized by presenting each outcome followed by the benefits and dangers. In some cases the methods are not totally mutually exclusive, but they do present different ways of dealing with the issue. The possible ways are as follows: the road map; incrementalism; Gaza first; Unilateral disengagement; permanent status now; trusteeship; imposed peace; status quo. The conclusion contains presentation of the preferred solutions of some of the various actors in the conflict.

Recent months have been marked by the tightening of the strategic axis between Russia and Iran, and a considerable leap in military cooperation between them. U.S. officials have gone as far as to define the emerging military ties as “unprecedented” and “a full-scale defense partnership”, posing a threat to Iran’s neighbors. This trend further aggravates the strategic and security challenges Israel faces in view of the growing multidimensional threat (nuclear, missiles, terrorism) posed by Iran.

Approximately ten months into the war in Ukraine, it is clear that neither party is capable of achieving decisive victory militarily, and, instead, both seem to be making every effort to improve their positions in preparation for winter months. Both sides realize that this season, during which the ability to carry out offensive maneuvers is limited, may dictate the course of the campaign in 2023. The present paper aims to describe Russia and Ukraine’s strategies, and examine whether the conditions for promoting an arrangement that would resolve this conflict have matured.

In recent days the Ukrainian army has managed to make significant achievements, successfully reclaiming many territories in north-eastern Ukraine near Kharkiv that some Ukrainian parties estimate to be in excess of 6000 square kilometers following its surprising counterattack in this area. The successful regaining of Ukrainian control over several territories within days (some of which are of strategic importance serving as logistics centers), which spurred a frantic withdrawal of Russian forces from the region, indicates the extent of Russia’s surprise, and constitutes the Ukrainian army’s most significant accomplishment since it curbed the attack against Kiev early on in the war.

Approximately five months ago, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told the U.S. Senate that Putin could use his nuclear arsenal if he perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime. The recent developments in the war, primarily Ukraine’s successful counterattack, and the Russian annexation of the four regions, as well as Moscow’s warnings during it, are feeding the West’s fear of the realization of such a scenario. The aim of the present paper is to examine the reasons that led Putin to declare the annexation and mobilize reserve troops – two steps he has refrained from taking for some time – and how they will affect the rest of the campaign.

The war raging in Ukraine for the past four months is the severest and most dangerous global crisis since the Cuba missile crisis six decades ago. At present neither party seems capable of decisive victory, and both are preparing for a long and bloody war of attrition (according to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, one that could last years) that would lead to an exacerbation in the inter-power conflict as well as the deepening of the economic crisis.

The war in Ukraine in recent weeks has demonstrated both parties' inability to achieve a decisive military or economic outcome, and it is clear that the conflict has taken the course of a long and bloody war of attrition, in which President Putin continues to hold the cards with regard to the length and intensity of the military confrontation.
The aim of the present paper is to examine the implications of how the war has evolved on the strategic cards available to Putin, versus the strategic distresses he must face, how they would impact his willingness to continue fighting, and projections for Israel.

The images of atrocitier in Ukraine about the brutal murders committed by Russian soldiers have deepen Russia's isolation and has reinforced allegations of war crimes. These developments have the potential to affect the continued fighting and the willingness of each side to reach a settlement, despite reports of some progress being made in the positions of the parties.

12 days into the invasion to Ukraine, and despite the information gaps and disinformation on the situation on the ground, it seems that the developments in the international arena and the progress of the fighting in the field are inconsistent with President Putin's preliminary assessments and expectations. The strategic distress and operative difficulties seem to have led Putin to issue the publicized directive given to the defense minister and Chief of General Staff to raise the alert level of the nuclear array in an attempt to convey a message to the West with regard to the boundaries of intervention in the crisis on their part in view of the use of Russian military force having been taken to the next level, which lead to destruction and numerous casualties.

Two weeks into the campaign in Ukraine, this event is unfolding into one of historic proportions, shocking the global architecture that remained intact in its current form since the end of the Cold War. The implications of this crisis are expected to resonate for a long time, potentially leading to the dropping of a "new iron curtain" that will split the world into two political, cultural, and economic poles, at least. Whether Putin achieves his heavy-handed objectives or Moscow is hit by the unprecedented sanctions imposed on it, leading to concessions on its part, life as it was prior to February 24 will never be the same again.

Despite the historical animosity and competition between Russia and China, it seems that the two countries have reached a strategic decision to deepen the cooperation in order to shape a new world order, and neutralize what they perceive as Washington's increased interference in their "back yard". President Putin has demonstrated this perception when stating that "the partnership has no limits and there are no 'forbidden' areas of cooperation".

The tension in the Ukrainian crisis has increased dramatically and it seems that the international arena faces the most severe crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia, which enjoys an unprecedented support from China, tries to undermine the foundations of the world order and to create new security arrangements in Europe and especially in its backyard.

Some 200 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz, one of the founders of modern theory of war, had already coined the phrase "war is the continuation of politics by other means". It seems that President Putin's conduct since rising to power, and particularly over the past few weeks, is a practical display demonstrating this very perception. Time after time the Russian leader is proving his willingness to use force in order to promote his country's strategic objectives domestically and internationally. The invasion of Georgia in 2008, the takeover of Crimea in 2014, the use of force in Syria since 2015, and the deployment of forces in Kazakhstan this past month, alongside cyber activity against governmental institutions in various countries (such as Estonia and the Ukraine), and attempted assassinations against local opposition leaders, are tangible manifestations of his approach. His conduct vis-à-vis the West and Ukraine during the current crisis can also be viewed through the same prism – creating the option for an imminent, concrete military threat.

The Egyptian strategy is managing to maneuver between the United States and Russia despite the growing tension between the great powers in the global arena. Closer security and political ties with Israel alongside a lead role in the mediation on the Palestinian issue serve as a strategic asset that is being leveraged by the Egyptian regime to fortify its status in Washington. Cairo is also deepening its strategic relations with Russia as the latter is increasing its influence in Egypt, primarily by means of the civil nuclear project.

A time for talking, not actionThe last few weeks have seen the exchange of deterring messages continue between Russia and the United States. The Russian leadership is actively ingraining the narrative that the West has been lying since the 1990s, deceiving Russia while NATO expanded eastwards, an issue Moscow views as a matter of "life and death". Thus, it claimed that, in the event that the security guarantees it has demanded will be rejected, Russia will not hesitate to take the necessary steps to ensure its safety. The U.S., by contrast, is issuing warning of a very severe response to any aggressive Russian measure – imposing highly painful and extraordinarily forceful economic sanctions.

In recent weeks, Russia has been engaging in an aggressive policy vis-à-vis the United States in several simultaneous arenas and domains, reflecting the complex perception of Russian foreign policy in the Putin era. While Russia views itself as a great power and is willing to challenge American dominance, it is also displaying defensive aggression, in light of its concern over U.S. intentions, and those of its allies, to expand toward its borders.

In light of the Biden-Putin summit, much attention has been given to the national security challenges posed by Russia to both the United states and Israel. The policy paper is the result of a collaboration between experts from the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center in Washington DC, and the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at the IDC Herzliya

In late June, the Chinese embassy in Moscow issued an update on a video conference held between the presidents of the two countries on June 28, 2021, during which Presidents Xi and Putin agreed to extend the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. signed on July 16, 2001 (hereinafter: the treaty).

The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation approved by President Putin on July 2, 2021 (hereinafter: the 2021 strategy) is a fundamental document that outlines Russia's national security policy in its broadest terms, including fortifying its capabilities both domestically and externally. The document aims to define and underscore the challenges that Russia is expected to address in the long range, while protecting its strategic values and priorities against attempts to limit its actions or even jeopardize them by external players, such as "the United States and its allies".

Russian media has recently announced that Egypt had started to receive the advanced Russian Sukhoi fighter aircraft, SU-35, ordered two years ago. The transaction is shrouded in great vagueness for, throughout this time, most items relating to it originated in Russia. The Russian media has been reporting on the progress made in this transaction from the time it was signed until the aircraft were being transferred to Egyptian bases, whereas the Egyptian media has remained silent, not even confirming the details.

It has not been long since the first meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin was held, and the tensions between Russia and NATO are already reaching new heights, this time in the Black Sea. Since Russia annexed Crimea, it has been incessantly active in the Black Sea, often carrying out naval maneuvers on its own or in collaboration with other countries, such as Egypt. This time it was NATO that held a comprehensive naval exercise known as Sea Breeze in the Black Sea.

During the 11 days of fighting in Gaza, Moscow preferred to observe the goings-on in the Middle East from afar, while hinting that the geographic vicinity to Russia could, in future, lead to a change in direction. Russia condemned the violence, urged both parties to reach a ceasefire, criticized Israel for "disproportionate use of force", and called for Hamas to stop firing at Israeli city centers. It even offered its mediation services (knowing well that this position is strongly occupied by Egypt). What Russia did not do during Operation Guardian of the Walls was roll up its sleeves and dive in headlong.

The first summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin took place in Geneva just days ago. The two leaders recently stated that they believed the bilateral relations between the United States and Russia were at an all-time low, and neither was optimistic about the possibility of any breakthrough during the summit. Russia would have to deal with a determined president who is highly aware of human rights, and has formerly identified Russia as one of the key threats to his country. By contrast, in the Kremlin, the United States will find a president who's been in office for 21 years, is oppositional to the West, determined to advance the Russian policy and establish Russian impact worldwide, if possible, at the United States' expense. The two leaders will attempt to mark the boundaries of their clout, strive for collaboration on important topics such as the climate crisis, fight against COVID-19, and oversight of weapons of mass destruction.

The tremendous tension that had been felt on the Russian-Ukrainian border over the past few weeks has dissipated entirely due to Russia's decision to withdraw the forces it had deployed there. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny's deteriorating health has now stabilized after the regime decided to hospitalize him, and allow external physicians to examine him (in exchange for which Navalny has agreed to desist from his 22-day hunger strike). Following some harsh blows and personal attacks, Presidents Biden and Putin have exchanged compliments in light of the Russian leader's participation in the climate summit to which Biden had invited him, and his support in minimizing greenhouse gas emissions. The two presidents are now beginning to discuss the possibility of a summit in approximately two months. Russia is using numerous sticks and plenty of carrots as it pursues its goals while navigating in a rapidly changing world. From Washington to Prague, it is not always greeted warmly, which is exactly why Russia intends to make the most of its presence and impact in the areas which it dominates.

Are U.S.-Russia relations heading toward a powerful blowup in coming months? After an exchange of hostile messages in the media (President Biden was asked by an ABC reporter whether President Putin was a murderer and his answer was affirmative), imposing of further sanctions on Moscow, issuing of a special intelligence report on Russian intervention in the 2020 elections, and return of Russian ambassador to the United States, such a blowup seems inevitable. The new U.S. administration has assumed power with the determination to take action against the Russian impact in various areas – from intervention in the elections, through cyberattacks, to human rights violation – assertively and forcefully.

Exactly as promised, U.S. President Joe Biden began his term in office by significantly leveraging human rights domestically and globally. This pair of words, human rights, rarely uttered during Donald Trump's term in office, is now inserted into every conversation held by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and features in almost every speech given by the president himself...

After four blissful years with Trump at the White House, Russia is starting to grow accustomed to a new reality and president. This one has well-formed opinions about Russian leadership, and is determined to lead an entirely different policy than that of his predecessor.

The past year hasn't been easy for Russia globally or in the Middle-East: U.S. sanctions continued to stifle its economy; the landslide in the oil markets took its toll on state profits; the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny shocked the world; and to top it all off, Democrats leader Joe Biden won the U.S. presidential elections, which means more tensions are on the cards for Russia-U.S. relations.

After three years of discussions and planning, during which the regime in Khartoum was replaced, the Russian seaport in Sudan is finally underway. The new agreement signed between Moscow and Khartoum is a distinct manifestation of Russia's successful policy in the Middle East as the Trump era draws to a close. The plan was not incepted yesterday, this topic was already discussed with Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president deposed during the 2019 coup d'état. However, the current regime's decision to advance this idea attests to Russia's ability not only to reach understandings with Khartoum, but with its sponsors in the Arab world as well, primarily the UAE, and possibly the United States too.

Among the many warm wishes and congratulations directed at President Elect Joe Biden, it was hard not to notice whose was missing: Russian leader, Vladimir Putin's. Moscow, much like Beijing, chose to wait with their felicitations until a later date – and this deafening silence bears no good news. The Russian media and local commentators, however, did not ignore Biden's win, although most correspondents preferred to focus on mocking the president elect's mental capabilities.

- Five years of Russian presence in Syria: Political and military achievements versus a tough economic reality with no solution in sight

- The US scores more points in the Gulf, while Russia looks on but refuses to give up

- All eyes on Iraq: With the US on its way out, Russia is going in, full steam ahead

Two years after the United States' surprise announcement on withdrawal of American forces from Syria, American oil companies are establishing themselves in the northeast sector of the country and signed agreements with the Kurdish leadership (the Syrian Democratic Forces) - much to the displeasure of the Russians. Moscow has succeeded in gaining control of most of Syrian territory on behalf of Bashar Assad's regime, but in the meantime, the oil fields in the northeast of the country remain beyond the reach of Assad and his allies. From Russia's perspective, this constitutes a major vulnerability/weak point on the path to achieving the Kremlin's objectives in Syria: Control of all Syrian territory; weakening all the other players; and control of Syria's natural resources such as natural gas, oil and phosphates. In addition, northeast Syria is an important transportation hub that serves as the conduit for transport of Syrian natural gas to Europe and is a strategic geographical crossroad of Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey and Syria, which remains beyond Russia's reach.

President Putin strengthened his position by putting the countdown of the political system back to 'zero' with passage of the requisite amendments in the Russian constitution that now allow him to stay at the helm until 2036. Such a distant horizon allows Putin to focus on Russia's long-term foreign policy objectives. Russia is determined to continue to bolster its position in the Middle East, by establishing anchor points in the region that challenge the west. While Russia's economic challenges remain in place, in contrast with other rulers who are elected for a given period of time in office to realize their ambitions, Russia's leadership has the privilege to pursue its long-term strategy at a slower tempo, patiently but steadfastly. One should view Russian policy in the Middle East not necessarily from a here-and-now perspective, but rather as a part of the realization of long=term strategy.

Russia continues to expand its presence and influence in Syria in the air, on land and sea, the interest being to curtail Iranian influence in Syria. The Russian requirement to achieve more control over Syrian territory comes days before the American Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act takes affect, which imposes significant sanction on Syria and its partners. Parallel to this, Moscow is signaling its desire to become an influential player in the Palestinian arena as well, aspiring to consummate the controversial airplane deal with Egypt, and is broadcasting a message of deterrence to the west through adoption of a new document vis-à-vis use of atomic weapons, even in the event Russia is attacked 'only' with conventional weapons.

Even under the shadow of the Coronavirus, Russia is losing no time, and continues to implement its policies in the Middle East. In Egypt, Russian experts confirm that work on the building the first German-Egyptian-Russian nuclear power plant at El Dabaa continues on schedule; in Syria Russia continues the expansion of the port of Tartus and to conduct military exercises in the Mediterranean--in essence, building itself as a naval power with a prominent presence in the Med. Moscow also takes care to maintain the fragile cease fire in Idlib, and to curb Assad—the balance in relations with Ankara being much more important to Russia at this time than Assad's desires.

The Coronavirus arrived in Syria, a country devastated by war with a huge refugee population. The pandemic has already had its effect. The Syrian Lira has crashed to an unprecedented low; in a number of cities, long lines form outside bakeries and hospitals that were not destroyed during the civil war; and basic equipment is in short supply. This new crisis in the socioeconomic realm constitutes a significant challenge for Moscow, as well, which up until now has successfully maximized its military capabilities in Syria and gained a military victory on behalf of its protégé, Bashar Assad. In the meantime, it appears that despite the Coronavirus and the economic challenge, Russia continues to build up its military capabilities in Syria.

The year 2020 has put troublesome challenges before Russia as it seeks to expand its influence in the Middle East. Up until now, Moscow has made many achievements, both thanks to a pointed and clear strategy vis-à-vis the region, and due to the lack of such a strategy by other players. Russia views the Middle East as a both convenient and natural environment for its operations: The region is close to its borders and sensitive from a strategic and international perspective.

- Egypt: Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu promised to "boost the strength of the Egyptian Armed Forces' defense capabilities" – the contacts for purchasing the 35-SU fighter jets continue, despite the threat of American sanctions – Putin might visit Egypt in 2020.

- Syria: Russia has established a helicopter base in the northern Syrian city of Qamishli.

- Libya: "Wagner" mercenaries try to tilt Libya war in favor of General Haftar.

- Abu-Dhabi: Russia presents it's state-of-the-art fighter jets during Dubai air salon, offering UAE and other countries opportunities to produce certain components for the Su-57 as part of potential sales.

U.S.-Israeli Perspectives and Opportunities for Cooperation | Joint Study with Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

President Putin and President El-Sisisigned an agreement on comprehensive cooperation and strategic partnership following a summit in Sochi. The two presidents have also discussed regional issues, economic cooperation and the implementation of joint projects.

On the backdrop of the recent downing of the Russian electronic warfare and early warning aircraft by a Syrian air defense missile, bringing the death of 15 Russian servicemen, the Russian-Israeli-Syrian knot is further tangled to a new and dangerous degree. One we haven’t seen since the deep Soviet involvement in the Israeli-Arab affairs in the sixties and the seventies of the 20th century.

Russian leaders are aware that the all-out support to the Alawite regime in Syria and its present alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and the Shiite militias should be balanced by a parallel effort to improve and strengthen relations with the Sunni Arab states, which represent the majority of the Middle East in demographics, economy and geopolitical stature.

Iran and Russia – now the dominant remaining P5+1+EU party to the JCPOA – share a mutual vital interest in its preservation and survival. For Iran, the JCPOA, and its executive order, UNSC 2231, promise a strategic transformation through accrued wealth, investment in infrastructures, unfettered access to procurement of state of the art weapons systems, and a quantum leap in both defensive and up to date offensive accurate and reliable missile capabilities (ballistic, cruise and BMD) – culminating in strategic immunity to attack, and to retaliation. The timeline for the realization of this central goal of the JCPOA is envisaged to occur well ahead of the full resumption of the nuclear effort.

The historic perspective tells us that the Soviet Union, and later Russia, have not been successful in providing the necessary strategic umbrella to their allied radical Arab regimes during their wars against Israel and the Russian weapons systems have suffered disgraceful defeats at the hands of the Israeli military. Although today’s global strategic environment is missing the ideological zest of the Cold War era, it is interesting to compare the then Soviet regional behavior with Russia’s present challenges in Syria, as the Israeli-Iranian direct confrontation threatens to involve the Russian interests there.

It was the first joint Russia-Egypt anti-terrorism military exercise, based on earlier agreements between Russia and Egypt. In June 2015, Russian and Egyptian navy forces conducted their first ever joint naval drills in the Mediterranean Sea near Alexandria.

Egypt and Russia signed an agreement, on November 19, 2015, under which Russia will build and finance Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, in a ceremony attended by President Abdel Fattah El Sisi.

This memo1 illuminates how various factions of the Russian strategic community perceive non strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), their role in national security, their potential use, and their modernization paths. The study offers an alternative and novel argument about the notion of Russian regional nuclear deterrence, and puts forth practical and theoretical implications.

It is hard to ignore the dramatic processes being led rapidly and persistently by the new Israeli government since it was elected, despite the broad scope of the demonstrations within Israeli society, and objection voiced by most countries around the world, including the United States, Europe, and many others. All the Israeli media outlets have compared recent events in Israel to countries where similar processes have been taking place, such as Russia, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. However, beyond the headlines, it seems that these processes have not been thoroughly examined, nor was an in-depth comparison made to discern the actual similarity between the Israeli developments and those that have occurred in said countries, particularly with regard to the final outcome, as well as its effect on the structure and conduct of the local regime. The present paper therefore seeks to compare and contrast the key steps being led by the Israeli government in recent months with those carried out primarily in Hungary, Turkey, and Poland, but also in Russia, even though the latter was never a true democracy.

The debate over Israel’s national and religious character began many years prior to its establishment, and has continued, and even radicalized, since then. All the great minds behind Zionism and the establishment of the Jewish nation state, including Herzl, Jabotinsky, Wolffsohn, and Kalischer, wrote about its religious character. Since all Zionist philosophers and its implementers were secular Jews, it was only natural for them all to envision the Jewish nation state as secular, where freedom of religion and freedom from religion would be available to every citizen according to their faith.

Is the “reform” in the legal system, as presented by incoming Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, a genuine professional reform? Does it truly constitute a revolution in the field or is it a form of governmental coup executed by the government itself? The governmental justification for implementing this alleged reform is to strengthen democracy and governance, but these may not necessarily be the direct outcomes of the steps planned by the new Israeli government.

Now that the process of forming the new Israeli government has been completed, the public and media discourse on the future of Israel seem to become increasingly shallower. The human brain is consistent in its tendency to simplify complicated issues, render deep discussions superficial, and provide us with an immediate clear, simple, and seemingly understandable snapshot of the complex reality that we face. It does so to keep our physical and mental systems from having to work so strenuously that we exhaust ourselves. At a time of political turmoil in Israel’s governing system, and against the backdrop of the new government formed, it would be better and more appropriate to conduct an in-depth analysis of the future, instead of sufficing with quick, intuitive thinking.

The outcomes of the recent Israeli election campaign have been analyzed from nearly every possible angle. However, it seems that, ultimately, they are only being tested by a single dimension – the perspective of the political rightwing or that of the political leftwing. All articles and viewpoints provided by the media analyze all that is good for Netanyahu and the rightwing, and bad for the leftwing. Various minority groups are raising their loud concerns over their prospects under the new regime, some of which are more justified than others. But hardly anyone is discussing the implications of the election outcomes and coalition negotiations on Israel as a democratic, sovereign, and free state that, even after 74 years of independence, remains reliant upon its strategic ties with superpowers such as the United States and some EU member states, regardless of political affiliation.

Now that the fifth election campaign in three and a half years has ended with the cautious hope of a term that will last longer than a year or two, the key challenge that the Israeli government now faces, as did all the administrations that preceded it, should be discussed: The challenge of restoring the civil and social systems in Israel, while regaining governmental stability and governance.

MK Bezalel Smotrich’s recent speech, during which he deemed it worthy to connect the Israel Security Agency (ISA), formerly known as the Shin Bet, to the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, going as far as to blame the defense organization for allegedly encouraging the killer to commit this heinous crime, received relatively little criticism from either coalition or opposition leaders in Israel, including the incumbent prime minister and prime minister elect. Several clarifications must be made in this context: Smotrich’s statements are extremely harsh, highly extreme, and very far-fetched, not to mention delusional and unsupported; however, they are not surprising in the least. These opinions are based on Smotrich’s extreme, messianic worldview. One that does not regard the ISA as a state security organization that ensures Israel’s safety, but as one that actively inhibits the vision of the future Halakhic state of Judah. From this perspective, his statements come as no surprise, and, unfortunately, even faithfully represent his position, and the views held by many among his constituency. Smotrich and his voters are not bothered in the least by the absence of any correlation between his statements and the facts on the ground, or the findings of the various commissions of inquiry; they nevertheless construct an alternative reality, delegitimizing the ISA as Israel’s national security agency. The important point here is that Smotrich is no longer just some random man on the street making unfounded accusations. He is a public elected official, an incumbent minister, and future senior member of the new government. As such, the words he utters while standing at the Knesset podium gain an air of legitimacy, perhaps even seeming as truths in the eyes and ears of some of his believers and voters. A matter of even graver concern in this context is the fact that most other elected public officials have completely ignored his speech, failing to express their disagreement with his utterances. Particularly the present and future prime ministers, who did not even bother to condemn or oppose Smotrich’s statements. These are the ISA’s direct superiors. The organization in charge of the prime minister elect’s protection did not receive direct support from him by way of countering these inciting and false proclamations.

The Israeli media and most government officials enjoy and prefer to engage in Israel’s national security challenges as a top priority. The Iranian nuclear threat, the issue of the Palestinians, Hamas and Hizballah’s threats, world cyber challenges, and more. While all of these issues are absolutely true and genuine, the Israeli government seems to be almost entirely overlooking threats that are no less strategic that are being posed from social and civilian directions, and are rooted in the collapse of Israel’s civil systems. The present paper will focus on the need for and importance of linking Israel’s national security challenges and its social and political struggles, while attempting to discern how the latter directly, and negatively, impact the former. Those in politics and the media aim to address the visible “here and now” issues; however, the need to examine the current state of affairs from a more national and strategic bird’s eye view to identify ungovernability and the absence of rule of law as a crucial and influential factor in both internal and external counterterrorism is becoming increasingly more important.

The economic crisis in the wake of the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic and the steps to combat it that the world faces - and the Israeli economy within it, present a challenge unprecedented in the modern age. Economists recognize the fact that business cycles of expansion and contraction are part of the realities of our lives, and that different shocks have the force to cause shifts in the economy from periods of prosperity to periods of recession, and vice-versa. To understand business cycles, theoretic models have been developed, and parallel to them policy tools to stabilize the economy; however, the recession which we are in the midst of is fundamentally different from what we are familiar with. Economic activity has stopped not due to some fundamental economic problem that needs to be addressed—such as a flaw in the financial markets as in 2008-2009. Rather, it was stopped by governmental act to shut-down economic activity in order to flatten the curve of contagion and safeguard—as much as possible—the public's health. In economic terms, curtailment is on the side of supply. 

The 17th Herzliya Conference

The 16th Herzliya Conference

The 15th Herzliya Conference

National Security Balance - The Civilian Quantitative Dimension

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 13th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

The 12th Herzliya Conference 2012

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

Presentation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Presentation from the Herzliya Conference 2009

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

Working Paper | 2006 Herzliya Conference

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 4th Herzliya Conference Paper

The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002 | The plan determines fiscal consolidation as the main goal for Israel and proposes an economic policy, designed for the achievement of its objectives over the next ten years. The main objectives of the consolidation are: reduction of government expenditure relative to GDP; reduction of government intervention in the economy and a general enhancement of efficiency in the provision of public services; reduction of the public debt relative to GDP; reduction of the employment share in the public sector; maintenance of economic stability by means of a low fiscal deficit in the state budget; and reduction of the tax burden. The goals of the plan were determined on the basis of analysis of existing parameters in the countries, which Israel aspires to emulate. The goal set for the main parameters of the economy is convergence with the European average, subject to appropriate adjustments.

Taskforce Members: Dr. Rafi Melnick, Head of Taskforce; Lea Achdut; Dr. Zalman Shiffer; Thomas Steiner; Dr. Michel Strawczynski;

Taskforce Members: Eli Ayalon, Head of taskforce; Doron Kochavi; Yair Seroussi; Ilana Treston; Yehuda Zisappel;

Taskforce Members: Prof. Yehezkel Dror, Head of Taskforce; Yitzhak Elner; Col. (Res.) Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto; Pro. Uriel Reichman; Prof. Amnon Rubinstein;

The Biden Administration’s foreign policy over the next two years will, to a large extent, be shaped by the principles published in the National Security Strategy (NSS), which lists the administration’s challenges and policies on a wide range of domestic as well as international topics. It will also be affected by the midterm elections for Congress, during which the Democrats triumphed almost unprecedentedly for a ruling party, showing that, despite the economic hardships, the American public has placed its trust in the way led by President Biden, founded on support for democratic processes and liberal values. The present paper aims to present the U.S. administration’s views and policies on key foreign policy issues, alongside some recommendations for the incoming Israeli government.

Firstly, the majority of British people do not have strong views either way. It is a mistake to believe the strong passions of a vocal minority of activists reflect a national consensus or consciousness. It is true that when Israel is involved in high profile conflicts presented through the prism of the media public engagement grows. The visual imagery on TV screens of women and children injured or killed in Gaza or Lebanon stirs the sensibilities of the usually disinterested and neutral. Imagery accompanied sometimes by a journalistic and Editorial David and Goliath narrative which omits the starting point for the conflict, the use of civilians as human shields by Hamas and Hizbollah terrorists, or the DNA of terrorists organisations who are funded by Iran and do not believe Israel has a legitimate right to exist. Many British Jews and supporters of Israel believe the BBC in their general coverage of Israel and most specifically in their reporting of conflicts have consistently fuelled anti Israeli sentiment and bias. This suspicion has been reeenforced by the BBCs long standing refusal to publish their independently commissioned report into the Corporations coverage of Israel. The truth is the Director General of the BBC does not sit at his desk directing coverage inherently hostile to Israel. But too many news journalists and Editors have failed in their basic duty of impartiality and through political bias or emotional attachment to the plight of the Palestinians have fanned the flames of anti Zionism, the major source of contemporary anti semitism.

The FBI’s announcement that it will investigate the killing of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, Al-Jazeera's referral to the International Criminal Court to Investigate the matter, statements pertaining to U.S. warnings about the actions to be taken by the new government, and the resolution of the UN Special Committee on Politics and Decolonization to approve the Palestinian proposal, and seeks the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Hague on “the ongoing Israeli occupation” all serve as warning signs against the minefield that Israel is facing in both international and regional arenas.

The war raging in Ukraine for the past four months is the severest and most dangerous global crisis since the Cuba missile crisis six decades ago. At present neither party seems capable of decisive victory, and both are preparing for a long and bloody war of attrition (according to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, one that could last years) that would lead to an exacerbation in the inter-power conflict as well as the deepening of the economic crisis.

The United States' national security set of priorities, as well as the broadening scope of threats to its security and status, could compromise American deterrence in the Middle East in view of Washington's focus on Russia, China and North Korea. This state of affairs could lead to greater Iranian boldness in the region when targeting Israel and the Gulf states, as well as to overall regional destabilization.

Two weeks into the campaign in Ukraine, this event is unfolding into one of historic proportions, shocking the global architecture that remained intact in its current form since the end of the Cold War. The implications of this crisis are expected to resonate for a long time, potentially leading to the dropping of a "new iron curtain" that will split the world into two political, cultural, and economic poles, at least. Whether Putin achieves his heavy-handed objectives or Moscow is hit by the unprecedented sanctions imposed on it, leading to concessions on its part, life as it was prior to February 24 will never be the same again.

Russia seeks to be a gamechanger in Europe, and redesign the world order formed after the Cold War had ended.

The United States, which orchestrates the western coalition, is taking actions that fall short of direct war against Russia, while employing unprecedented political and economic measures.

What is the strategic midgame score and what are the Implications for Israel?

The power transition in the United States one year ago naturally caused a multitude of changes in the administration's domestic and foreign policies, as well as in the new government's conduct. A year later, President Biden seems to have presented a mixed balance sheet of achievements and failures in the internal arena, alongside damage to the international U.S. image of power and deterrence, against the backdrop of the probable option that majority be lost in the midterm elections in Congress.

The Egyptian strategy is managing to maneuver between the United States and Russia despite the growing tension between the great powers in the global arena. Closer security and political ties with Israel alongside a lead role in the mediation on the Palestinian issue serve as a strategic asset that is being leveraged by the Egyptian regime to fortify its status in Washington. Cairo is also deepening its strategic relations with Russia as the latter is increasing its influence in Egypt, primarily by means of the civil nuclear project.

In late June, the Chinese embassy in Moscow issued an update on a video conference held between the presidents of the two countries on June 28, 2021, during which Presidents Xi and Putin agreed to extend the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. signed on July 16, 2001 (hereinafter: the treaty).

Israel will not be able to continue developing its relations with China irrespective of the U.S.-China rivalry. The growing likelihood of economic decoupling between the two great powers will make it ever more difficult for Israel to remain on the sidelines.

Against the backdrop of escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, London seeks to put together a European-led maritime protection force. Simultaneously, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, was tasked to establish an international coalition to secure freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab.

The summit in Vietnam’s capital between President Trump and Chairman Kim ended in a resounding failure. The two leaders, who travelled thousands of kilometers for the meeting did not even bother to complete the summit’s program as they quickly realized that the gaps between them are too wide and that further talks are futile at this point.

Three international conferences that took place virtually simultaneously – in Warsaw, Munich, and Sochi – revealed the evolving international agenda, including on Middle East issues. The conferences exposed the isolation of the U.S. and the weakness of President Trump’s unilateral foreign policy that was broadly criticized (including Senators and House Representatives from both parties in Munich).

Venezuela's beleaguered Nicolás Maduro vowed to be the sole president opposing defiantly a return to "coups" and "gringo interventions" of the 20th Century. This was Maduro's response to the most serious challenge to his rule after the leader of the opposition, Juan Guaidó, declared himself interim legitimate president.

The past week has demonstrated the growing importance of missiles in the regional and global strategic balances.

Two great powers are now challenging the position of the United States as the leading power in the world system. As a powerful economic power with global ambitions, China has invested billions of dollars to increase its soft power. Due to recent failures in its conduct in democratic countries, China has turned to authoritative influence around the world, or a policy of sharp power. The policy of sharp power is based on subversion and intimidation, threats and pressure, while taking advantage of the open characteristics of democracy and the slow reaction of it in order to gain political influence and manipulate the target audience by distorting the information that reaches it. This policy is combined with China’s global economic expansion in the global arena based on acquired marine power; following this policy China takes control of commercial ports around the world through their acquisition or construction, as a basis for its one belt one road initiative.

The 17th Herzliya Conference

The 15th Herzliya Conference

On Thursday, 19 February 2015, the IAEA issued its periodic report on the "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," for the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 2-6 March 2015. The report updates the information provided in the previous periodic inspection report from 7 November 2014, and interim report from 20 January 2015.

Israel’s National Security

Israel’s National Security

Elite decision-making analysis focuses on the choices made by the leadership, whether conceived as individuals, groups, or coalitions representing nation states. There are various directions for approaching this rather broad topic. This chapter will focus on the decision-making models and biases used to explain the decisions of political leaders with a particular focus on foreign-policy decisions. The approaches covered here are applicable to many domestic decisions as well—for example, on public policy reforms, budgetary decisions, elite decisions concerning political appointments, personnel decisions, and so on (see, e.g., Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In the area of political behaviour most decisions focus on candidate evaluation and voters’ response. Consequently, we highlight in this chapter the topic of leadership as it pertains to foreign policy. Throughout, we summarize some of the key debates and criticisms of the various approaches. We conclude with a detailed discussion of the rational–cognitive debate as well as some thoughts for future progress in decision-making analysis.

The 13th Herzliya Conference

Lessons from Oil@USD250 – The 2012 Herzliya Game | The 12th Herzliya Conference

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

Transcript from the Herzliya Conference session on international law Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010.

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010.

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009 | Published by the Hudson Institute

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The ICP agreement, signed on October 2006, between Israel and NATO, created a strategic opening for anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic community. Indeed, well placed Israeli echelons, considered to be the political and military elites have been showing increasing interest in NATO. However, an internal Israeli debate over the future of relations with NATO has yet to take place. Israel could and should begin this debate at highest levels in order to seize the opportunity. Israel seems to have a tradition of bilateral foreign relations management with few and limited experience with multilateral activity in this field. At the same time it holds solid, long lasting relations with several key members of the Euro-Atlantic community; still, Israel is absent from strategic forums of this community, where policy and decision making is made. Naturally, a country will find a great interest and match with countries in its own region; Israel, however, is deprived from these benefits after trying to initiate multilateral-regional forums, which have been turned down more than once. Other initiatives, such as the Madrid based multilateral track, the EU-led Barcelona process, and the NATO's Mediterranean dialogue have showed no real meaningful results for Israel; therefore, some senior Israeli officials still ignore the benefits of multilaterism. srael will find NATO countries as natural partners, a group of like minded countries. The Euro Atlantic community has been crucial in the shaping of the international policy since World War II; the US is constantly encouraging a higher European profile in the Middle East; The threats created by the Middle East concern the EA community now more that ever; and relations between Europe and Israel will only add to what already makes Israel today a strategic asset for the US in the Middle East. It appears that in order to cope with the 21st century's threats, NATO must undertake a major conceptual transformation. Some, such as former Spanish president Aznar say, that NATO should accept the role of the security provider for the entire Western world. Israel and the European Atlantic community are natural allies; both sides can gain advantages and achievements of this alliance.

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute. Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series No. 1 Paper No. 3, December 27, 2006. | Under modern international law civilians are protected from any harm during acts of war. This ruling has its roots in the European Just War tradition, which required that non-combatants should not be harmed. Islamic law of war contains rules that seem similar to that tradition, including a requirement to refrain from killing non-combatants. There is no theoretical basis to this requirement, nor is there a technical term designating non-combatants. What one finds in Islamic law books are lists of humans who are not to be killed during war or in captivity. The definition of “participating in the fighting”, was expanded: not only fighting and spying, but even the mere ability to give advice during war was considered as “participation". Thus the prohibition of killing non-combatants was greatly restricted. It was not applied to all enemy citizens not involved in the fighting against the Muslims, but only to certain categories of people, included in specific lists. More importantly, no legal responsibility was brought up against any Muslim who did harm a non-combatant.

Israeli membership in NATO has advantages and disadvantages

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

Due to the growing significance of Asia in the global economy, Israel should try to develop closer ties to the region, to balance the already close ties with the US as well as with Europe. Taiwan and Israel established representative offices in Tel Aviv and Taipei some 10 years ago, and should try to strengthen the relation between them in several perspectives: economic and technological, political, social, diplomatic, and security.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

A summary of a conference held, dealing with the present and future relationship between Israel and the European Union. The conference addressed the relations of the European Union and Israel from commonalities to partnership building through discussing four main themes: Europe and Israel’s common heritage as building blocks of the relationship; Role of instrumentalities: Furthering economic and technological cooperation. Israeli companies enjoy a high degree of competitiveness in the global market, which Europe can use in dealing with global competition. On the other hand, Europe serves as a major market to Israeli companies; Political and diplomatic hindrances and interests, including involvement, though on a low scale, of Europe in the peace process, and cooperation in dealing with common security interests, especially after September 11; Future of EU-Israel relations. Two optional directions to the future of the relationship are regarded unsatisfactory – leaving things as are on the one hand, and accepting Israel as a full member in the European Union on the one. The preferred path is increasing the level of discussion and cooperation, as well as considering including Israel in the European monetary union.A summary of a conference held, dealing with the present and future relationship between Israel and the European Union. The conference addressed the relations of the European Union and Israel from commonalities to partnership building through discussing four main themes: Europe and Israel’s common heritage as building blocks of the relationship; Role of instrumentalities: Furthering economic and technological cooperation. Israeli companies enjoy a high degree of competitiveness in the global market, which Europe can use in dealing with global competition. On the other hand, Europe serves as a major market to Israeli companies; Political and diplomatic hindrances and interests, including involvement, though on a low scale, of Europe in the peace process, and cooperation in dealing with common security interests, especially after September 11; Future of EU-Israel relations. Two optional directions to the future of the relationship are regarded unsatisfactory – leaving things as are on the one hand, and accepting Israel as a full member in the European Union on the one. The preferred path is increasing the level of discussion and cooperation, as well as considering including Israel in the European monetary union.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

Financial market development fosters growth by improving utilization of capital. The report illustrates this claim empirically for a group of countries. Governments can help development of financial markets by: Protecting investor rights, which leads to more investments and thus to prosperity; Facilitating competition and by this raising the productivity; Enforcing disclosure, i.e. improving the transparency of financial reports.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

The report sketches the present situation of the global oil market, with special references to the US and Saudi Arabia, and proposes some possible change scenarios. It presents US interests versus Saudi's and the different global-oil-market dynamics each of them would like to see, while discussing each parts costs and benefits from either changing the present situation or leaving it as is. The report particularly discusses the possibility of changing the policy of oil-production quotas, with all the affects this move will have on OPEC and the non-OPEC suppliers. It ends with a presentation of the new powers in the global oil market – Russia and China, and presents their interests and possible influence.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

The paper discusses the many aspects of multi-ethnicity which has become predominant nowadays: the state's end vision, i.e. assimilation/homogenization, separatism or pluralism; coexistence which requires a need to balance equality, diversity and interdependence/cooperation; areas under consideration internationally: governance and participatory practices, constitutions, equality issues, law and order, education, housing, language and media. The paper also present questions designed to help auditing structures and processes. In addition, it presents some examples of government institutions promoting coexistence while discussing in more details the case of Australia as an example of a transition from exclusion to multiculturalism.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

The research examines possibilities to diversifying Israel's strategic relations, which were so far characterized by US exclusivity. Four countries that can serve as potential candidates to expanding Israel's relation, in addition and not instead of the U.S., were examined: Russia, India, Taiwan and Turkey. Each case was tested according to a few criteria: stability of common political, economical, military and cultural interests, the bases to a strategic relation, moral criteria, the "life expectancy" of the regimes in these countries, implications on Israel's other foreign relations, most importantly – with the US, and economic compatibility. The analysis indicates some potential room to diversify Israel's strategic relations, when the highest potential lies in the relation with turkey, whereas India is also a possible candidate. On the other hand, the relation with Russia is problematic on Israel's side while the relation with Taiwan might introduce opposition from china.

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

The paper surveys the United Nations' policy towards Israel since the Second World War and shows how an anti-Israeli approach consolidated and gained strength along the years. This approach has been exemplified in a series of pro-Palestinian decisions, condemning Israeli policy, accepted by the general assembly, whereas no anti-Semitism condemnation was released. This approach positions the UN as the Palestinians' defender, while completely ignoring Israel's security concerns. The United States, which over the years regarded the UN assembly as a powerless body, should realize that it can no longer play a double game – ignoring the assembly on the one hand, and playing a central role in the Security Council, on the other.

Working Paper - The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002

Seminar Report of the Deterrence Task Force of the Second Herzliya Conference | Chair: Lt. Gen. (Res.) Amnon Lipkin-Shahak.

The elections for the 25th Knesset are regarded, and rightfully so, as one of the most important electoral campaigns in Israeli history. These elections seem to have led to the victory that has finally ended the political chaos that Israel has been enduring for the past three and a half years, enabling a government with identity, fundamental principles, and clear political objectives to be formed.

According to opinion polls conducted in recent weeks, Arab Israeli citizens’ voter turnout in the upcoming elections is expected to be 37%–40%, the lowest since the state’s establishment. For comparison’s sake, in the last elections, that boasted an unprecedentedly low voter turnout among Israeli Arabs, 44.6% of such eligible voters had indeed cast their ballot.

The question of the “experiment” is at the core of the political, public and media discourse in Israel in recent weeks. That is, an analysis of the current government’s expectancy and extent of failure or success, since it was based on an unprecedented collaboration between rivals across the political spectrum all rallying round shared interests, most of which were civilian-public ones, while setting aside or bridging the deep ravines between them, particularly those pertaining to national identity and religious affairs.

The last two weeks were split between two extremes: the Negev Summit – an unprecedented meeting between Arab foreign ministers and the U.S. Secretary of State on Israeli soil designed to tighten collaborations between Israel and countries in the region as well as jointly address shared challenges; and the devastating terror attack in the city of Hadera that joined those carried out the previous week in Be`er-Sheva and Bnei-Brak, attesting to an exacerbating domestic challenge. Thus, while Israel's strategic situation in the regional sphere improves, domestic challenges intensify.

The 25th General Conference of the Southern Branch of the Islamic movement in Israel was held on 22 January and, during it, a new chairman was elected. Elections are held once every four years – in accordance with the movement's internal bylaws – and, this time, 514 of the 610 eligible voters participated in them.

A multidimensional crisis that could evolve into a broad Jewish-Arab confrontation and project onto the state of affairs in the Palestinian system

The violent clashes earlier amonth ago in the Negev (Southern area of Israel) between local Bedouin civilians and Israeli security forces, which were accompanied by road blocking, vandalism and damage to vehicles, are the severest display of friction involving the Arab public since the events of May 2021 that broke out against the backdrop of Operation "Guardian of the Walls".

Sheikh Raed Salah, leader of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, is the embodiment of radical extreme in political Islam in Israel in particular, and in the Israeli Arab public sphere in general. The basic principle to which Salah adheres is the "autonomous society" or "oppositional society" (al-Mujtama al-`Issami), i.e., encouraging the Arab public to differentiate itself from the ruling establishment and Jewish society, while objecting to integration into official capacities (with the exception of the municipal level) as well as denying Israel's right to exist, albeit without taking violent action against it.

Crime and violence in Israeli Arab society have exacerbated in recent years, and attempts have been made to discern the roots and fundamental reasons for this phenomenon, as it gradually turning into a strategic challenge. This exploration is crucial as a precise definition of the characteristics of this phenomenon is sought in order to accurately resolve it.

The question of whether to deploy the SHABAK (Shin-Bet) - Israel Internal Security Agency - in the war on crime and gun violence in Israeli Arab society has topped the Arab agenda in Israel in recent weeks. This topic touches on the most burning issues for Israel’s Arab population, making it a strategic challenge for Israel as a whole because it exemplifies the collapse of governance and the loss of the ability to enforce public law and order in various hotbeds of crime in Israel’s Arab society.

One cannot overstate the importance of The United Arab List's (RA`AM) integration into the new governing coalition in Israel. It is a historical turning point both in terms of the status of Israeli Arab public and of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. The United Arab List has shattered the longstanding taboo in Arab politics whereby "sitting on the fence" is preferred to integrating into the "Zionist" governance space, which, to date, has excluded Arabs from the decision-making table as well as from national resource allocation. Abbas' decision may draw the line between old Arab politics that struggled to change to new, flexible and practical politics.

The 24th Knesset elections (March 2021) are a historical crossroad in the history of the Israeli Arab public. This event embodies a basic contrast: a substantial drop in voter turnout among Arab citizens on the one hand, and on the other – a peak with regard to Arabs' involvement in Israeli politics, and their effect on it.

The United Arab List (RAAM) represents the southern faction of the Islamic Movement and has been widely discussed in Israeli political, public, and media discourse in recent months. It has been receiving significant attention not only in the Arab society, but also in the Jewish one, whose acquaintance with it has been fairly limited until now. This development reflects greater integration of Arab politics in Israeli ones, and the former's more profound impact on the latter, alongside Jewish society's growing familiarity with the diversity, and, at times, opposing poles, characteristic of the Israeli Arab public's politics and culture.

10 recommendations for the Israeli government

Crime and violence in Israeli Arab society is gradually increasing, becoming a strategic challenge manifest on several levels: governmental, political, socio-economic, and security. For some time now, this issue is no longer merely criminal, but characterized by incremental weakening of regime governance in Arab society.

Earlier this month, most political, economic and security-related news that would otherwise have topped the Palestinian agenda were pushed aside by a seemingly unimportant event – some youngsters holding a rave at a religious site. The dance party had upset the entire Palestinian system, and continues to elicit emotional responses on various levels of discourse.

The Arab political system in Israel has been experiencing a significant uproar in recent weeks that is crossing over considerably (and rather unusually) to the Israeli Jewish public. At the heart of this storm is the strengthening of ties between Likud and the United Arab List – the Arab party representing the southern branch of the Islamic Movement in the Knesset, headed by MK Mansour Abbas. Abbas claims that, thanks to these relations, he has successfully extended Plan 922 – an economic development plan for the Arab sector – by another year, and deepened the government's commitment to address crime and violence – a top priority for the Arab public in Israel.

The past year is emerging as one of the most important periods shaping the history of the Arab public in Israel. During a relatively short period, this public has undergone a change in conduct, particularly in regard to its relationships with governing institutions, both due to external developments, and in the wake of maturation of certain fundamental internal processes over a number of years.

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The U.S. administration is sharpening its messages for the Israeli government, warning of the possible repercussions of promoting the judiciary reform and steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians on the bilateral relations. In fact, a direct link has emerged between the government’s continuing advancement of changes to the justice system and the higher frequency and growing intensity of messages conveyed by senior U.S. officials on this topic – from general statements on the importance of preserving shared democratic values to express warning on possible implications if harm will come to them.

Since the new Israeli government was formed, the U.S. administration has been conveying public messages whereby it expects it to protect the shared democratic values that have formed the basis for the strategic alliance between the two countries for the past 70 years. Israel also has to avoid unilateral steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians, primarily expanding settlements, and altering the status quo in the holy sites, while maintaining the two-state principle (despite the realization that, at present, the chances of promoting a solution are impractical).

President Biden’s upcoming visit to the Middle East was conceived out of necessity due to the U.S. administration’s strategic troubles: An energy and food crisis leading to a sharp rise in oil prices (the price of fuel has reached an all-time high in the United States), and a severe shortage in grains; the inflation rate breaking a forty-year record (the inflation rate in the United States has reached 8.6%), and the growing fear of an acute recession; an ongoing crisis of trust with the Gulf states and their disinclination to close ranks with the western sanctions against Russia, while also advancing their relations with China; and a growing concern that, without significant change, the Democratic Party could suffer a sharp blow in the midterm elections.

The power transition in the United States one year ago naturally caused a multitude of changes in the administration's domestic and foreign policies, as well as in the new government's conduct. A year later, President Biden seems to have presented a mixed balance sheet of achievements and failures in the internal arena, alongside damage to the international U.S. image of power and deterrence, against the backdrop of the probable option that majority be lost in the midterm elections in Congress.

The United States and Israel are engaged in final preparations for Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's visit to Washington, during which he will meet with President Joe Biden. This visit is fateful, and its outcomes will have a profound impact on Israel-U.S. relations, as well as on Israel's ability to cope with the exacerbating strategic challenges it is facing, first among which is the issue of Iranian nuclear progress.

The recent escalation in Gaza has once again unveiled Israel's deteriorated status in the United States. During the events, the Democratic Party and its constituency, including its Jewish voters, were more critical of Israel than before, and the same was true even in Congress - Israel's most prominent stronghold of support.

Shavit's initial working assumption is that in Israel, there exists a wall-to-wall consensus, 72 years after declaring independence, that seeks an end to the conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world, which in large part has yet to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Building trust as well as close and coordinated working relations with the Biden Administration, while restoring Israel's status in the United States as a bi-partisan consensus are top Israeli interests. Potential for tension and friction between the two countries focuses on three key issues: Iran, the Palestinians, and the great power competition (China and Russia).

On February 4, President Biden delivered his first speech on foreign policy during a symbolic visit to the State Department. Prior to it, he held a virtual talk with young diplomats starting their foreign service, during which the U.S. President promised to give them his full support. Secretary of State Blinken, who hosted Biden, and Kamala Harris, who joined him, stated that the U.S. intends to lead with value-based diplomacy and the restoration of alliances, as well as to shape reality on a global level, instead of merely reacting to events. They also underscored the close affiliation between U.S. domestic power and its power globally.

We need to manage a calculated policy of respectable and respectful negotiations with the United States, and avoid public confrontation and insults, as they cause tremendous damage and have no desirable effect

The 14th Herzliya Conference

The 14th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

מסמך עבודה מכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (הבינתחומי הרצליה).
The emergence of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship in the second half of the twentieth century is a singular event in modern international affairs. It is based on a dynamic and interdependent triangle of strategic cooperation, moral affinity, and Jewish power. However, while momentous developments took place elsewhere, the U.S.-Israeli special relationship fell into a "maintenance" mode. In the wake of U.S.-inspired plans for political and strategic change in the Greater Middle East (GME), the time has come for reconsideration. Israel should package a new set of initiatives under the concept of the S.R.I – Special Relations Initiative of 2005, in order to re-energize and refocus the Special Relationship, for the benefit of both sides. The author suggests some concrete actions in order to achieve this goal.

The 4th Herzliya Conference

For years the prevailing Israeli attitude towards the UN was UM-SHMUM. Yes it’s biased, but who cares. For an equal number of years, the US attitude towards the UN - though it has varied
somewhat between administrations - has been to think it was a place easily manipulated, where the General Assembly was an irrelevant talking shop and everything that really mattered occurred
in the Security Council over which it retained control.

Seminar Report of the Deterrence Task Force of the Second Herzliya Conference | Chair: Lt. Gen. (Res.) Amnon Lipkin-Shahak.

The assessment shared by most military experts on the eve of the war in Ukraine was that Russia would be quick to achieve decisive victory in view of the power relations tipping so substantially in its favor. The campaign in Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014), and effective military involvement in Syria (2015) had established the basic assumption that the Russian military force reigned supreme, and that a conflict between the two countries would yield predictable and inevitable outcomes.

The normalization agreement expected to be signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a historical strategic achievement, even a dramatic one. As a result, a tangled set of 'under-the-table' relationships will be transformed into a 'marriage' visible to all. The UAE is a first-rate polity in an array of fields, and the two countries can be expected to gain a lot from establishment of formal diplomatic relations between them.

Security is the supreme value. There is no need for annexation because our position is well known, and if we annex for declaration sake, in practice this will undermine Israel's position and diminish capability in practice.

The 14th Herzliya Conference

The 14th Herzliya Conference

Working Paper - The 12th Herzliya Conference

The 11th Herzliya Conference

The 11th Herzliya Conference

The 11th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

Herzliya Report - The 10th Herzliya Conference

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010

A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2009

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

Comparative Strategy Vol. 26 Issue 5

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

“The Power of Weakness” vs. “The Weakness of Power”
Asymmetrical Deterrence

The 8th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2008

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

This article deals with Israel's deteriorating status in the global community's media , and seeks to provide policy recommendations to fight back in what has become the war zone of world media and public opinion. Israel suffers a global success of in the demonization of it's conflicts.; A radical disorientation exists especially in Europe; Europe's vulnerability towards the Islamic threat has caused a policy of avoiding confrontation, which has encouraged more aggressive behavior of Muslims; And the Western media ethically failed when it began publishing unauthenticated materials. Israel seems to ignore these processes, loosing freedom of action and its right to proclaim moral justification. Some assets have not yet been used in this battle: The blogsphere and the free web environment. Another asset is the awakening audience around the world, who feel that their humanitarian approach does not necessarily fit the Islamic overview. This gives us a window of opportunity to re-shape their attitude towards Israel. The article supplies policy recommendations for the media battle, such as: to react more efficiently. Presenting Israel as a supplier of knowledge who has many times over offered help and information to the West, which was repeatly rejected . Other tools to combat this media bias include speaking in all languages, including Arabic; taking advantage of technology, using cyberspace and Blogsphere, real time review of intifada coverage, foreign media data collection; Etc.

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers 2007

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers | This document is a
compendium of the extant peace plans for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document includes an analysis of the various peace plans: interim plans, permanent status plans, “two states” and “one state” solutions, “Jordanian options” and plans for territorial swaps. The document contains comparative tables of the various plans, illustrative maps and tables forecasting the Jewish and non-Jewish populations in Israel and Palestine in the event that the plans are implemented.

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

Taskforce Members: Maj. Gen. (Res). Herzl Shafir; Head of Taskforce ; Maj. Gen. (Res.) Shmuel Arad; Brig. Gen. (Res.) Abraham Bachar; Dr. Yoram Luninsky; Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aviezer Yaari

Taskforce Members: Col. (Res.) Dr. Shmuel Gordon, Head of Taskforce ; Brig. Gen. (Res.) Dr. Alon Dumanis; Maj. Gen. (Res.) Shlomo Gazit; Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilboa; Brig. Gen. (Res.) Giora Goren Avi Ifergan; Col. (Res.) Dr. Ephraim Laor; Prof. Zeev Maoz; Brig. Gen. (Res.) Dr. Shlomo Markel; Dr. Martin Sherman; Dr. Zalman Shiffer; Imri Tov; Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aviezer Yaari; Brig. Gen. Yaakov Zigdon;

כנס הרצליה השלישי 2002 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).
Taskforce Members: Maj. Gen. (Res.) David Tzur– Taskforce Coordinator; Dr. Uzi Arad; Dr. Shmuel Bar; Daniel Taub; Brig. Gen. Ruth Yaron; Col. (Res.) Dr. Eran Lerman; Prof. Nathan Lerner; Daniel Seaman; Niva Von Weisel; Jeffrey Kahn; Prof. Arieh Kochavi; Ron Prosor; Irit Kohn; Col. Daniel Reizner; Prof. Gabriel Sheffer; Dr. Martin Sherman;

The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002

This paper containing all the key insights that emerged from the IPS conference held on November 23, 2021, at Reichman University. This document consists of statements made by the speakers at the conference, alongside policy recommendations formulated by the IPS staff, and pertaining to the strategic challenges that Israel is facing. The conference centered on the strategy Israel needed, and, in this context, the following core issues were discussed: addressing the threat posed by Iran (both nuclear and with regard to its subversive regional policy); grappling with the complex dilemmas that accompany Israel's policy vis-àvis the Palestinians (both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip); responding to Washington's and Moscow's conduct in the Middle East; preparing for the next campaign in which Israel will engage; and coping with the strategic implications of the COVID-19 crisis.

Online International Security & Policy Conference: Israel in an Era of Crises Where Do We Go From Here?

In light of the dramatic events Israel has been experiencing, the Institute for Policy & Strategy (IPS) at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya held an online international security & policy conference that focused on two aspects: the strategic security threats and challenges Israel is facing in this region, and the domestic risks to national resilience. As a result of the COVID-19 crisis, Israel is grappling with a potential multisystem disaster as well as a severe risk to its resilience and endurance. Beyond the said challenge, which reflects negatively on Israel's image and deterrence, the c onference has focused on and analyzed four core issues that will impact national security most significantly in the near future: the Iranian threat; the Palestinian challenge; the U.S., its regional status and relations with Israel; and the era of upheaval in the Middle East

Navigating Stormy Waters - Time for a New Course
The 19th Herzliya Conference 2019

70 Years of Independence Israel at Critical Junctures

The 17th Annual Herzliya Conference took stock of Israel’s unprecedented strategic, military, and economic power. Notwithstanding, a multitude of domestic and external challenges pose a threat to Israel’s national security and resilience, and could rapidly and dramatically undermine its power preponderance.

Pre-Conference Principal Observations The 13th Herzliya Conference

The 12th Herzliya Conference 2012

Critical Junctures for Israel – World and Middle East in Turmoil

Herzliya Conference 2011

The Ninth Herzliya Conference 2009

The 8th Herzliya Conference

The 7th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The Sixth Annual Herzliya Conference 2006

The Fifth Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel’s National Security took place during Hanukah 2004. The discussions of the conference were a reflection of the central dilemmas faced by Israel today in the political, security, economic, social and cultural spheres, and produced strategies and options for issues on the national agenda.

The Fourth Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel's National Security was held during the week before Hanukkah, 2003. The conference deliberations were a reflection of Israel's national agenda, and dealt with a variety of defense, security, political, economic, and social issues. This document contains the main conclusions and recommendations that arose during the conference proceedings. The ideas within are presented according to the main themes of the conference, with no distinction made between the origins of the materials: findings of task force reports, lectures by Israeli or foreign experts, or speeches by political leaders.

Conclusions and Principal Policy Directions

The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002

The 17th Herzliya Conference

The 16th Herzliya Conference

​At the 15th annual Herzliya Conference, the President of the State of Israel, Mr. Reuven Rivlin, presented his "Four Tribes" vision and called for a new domestic national order for Israel.

The delegitimization campaign promoted by a decentralized network of Palestinian civil society organizations and their allies around the world, which is further fueled by an oppositional political campaign against Israel, led by the Palestinian Authority, has been gaining tremendous momentum and success recently, inter alia in the form of resolutions made against Israel in international establishments and organizations, as well as in western popular opinion. At the same time, the number of antisemitic incidents – verbal as well as physical – against Diaspora Jews and the State of Israel has also been soaring.

The 11th Herzliya Conference 2011

Seminar Report of the The "Jewish People as a Strategic Asset" Task Force of the Second Herzliya Conference 

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers

The 4th Herzliya Conference 2003

The paper stretches the importance of today's Jewish students as the future leadership of the Jewish community. It discusses the importance of applying cultural and educational programs at the university age and before, in preparing the youth to this crucial formative stage in their lives, and in involving them in the Jewish communal life. These actions are most important at the present age of growing anti-Israeli atmosphere on campuses, which sometimes infiltrates into classrooms, in the guise of academic objectivity. One must realize that today's youth is tomorrow's leadership, and discuss some crucial question surrounding its nature, the challenges it faces and the character of its relation with the Jewish people.

Collection of Position Papers Presented by the Jewish Agency.

The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002

The 3rd Herzliya Conference 2002

כנס הרצליה השלישי 2002 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).

Seminar Report of the The "Jewish People as a Strategic Asset" Task Force of the Second Herzliya Conference