Protests in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran: Similarities and Implications for Israel

By Col. (res.) Udi Evental | December 18, 2019

Photos: NicolasGaron CC BY-SA 4.0

The extensive demonstrations that broke out in Iraq (October 1), spread to Lebanon (October 17), and eventually spilled-over to Iran (November 15) share several common features.

The backdrop of all three waves of protest is suppressed resentment that eventually burst out due to deepening economic crises^[1] with price hikes, governance failures, collapsing public infrastructure (power outages, insufficient supply of water, fuel, food, communication and financial services) and disgust over broad and institutionalized corruption.

In all three arenas, the economic protest – triggered in the cases of Lebanon and Iran by harsh economic measures (Whatsapp call tax and cancelling fuel subsidies – respectively) – quickly turned into an unprecedented demand for a fundamental overhaul of the existing political and governance order. The protesters essentially repudiate the bankrupted political systems as the source of all the fundamental deficiencies, and claim that as long as these corrupted systems are in place, addressing these deficiencies is impossible.

In Lebanon and Iraq, demonstrators demand an end to the ethnic-based government system – that divides the power among the main ethnic groups. In Iran, demonstrators rallied against the Islamist system that places the ruling in the hands of clergy (Velâyat-e Faqih).

In all three countries, the protests are led by the young generation and they bear a character of an inter-generational struggle. The young generation has no first-hand experience regarding the shaping events that produced the current systems of government, is less clinging to the past and does not hesitate to challenge head-on prevailing customs and taboos. In Lebanon, the young generation did not experience the protracted civil war that ended with the Taif agreement that revalidated the ethnic-based system. In Iraq, the young generation does not remember the brutal rule of Saddam Hussein, and in Iran, the young generation was born after the Islamic Revolution and its attachment to religion is diminishing.

The inter-generational gap is notable in several other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia. The young Saudi Crown Prince appears to be attempting to get ahead of the challenge by a series of reforms. While maintaining the limits and oppressive regime rule measures, several reforms address, even if limitedly, the demands of the young generation (including recently cancelling gender separation in restaurants). At the same time, the Crown Price is deviating from the path of his grandfather and founder of the Kingdom by decreasing dependency on oil and weakening the Wahhabi religious establishment.

Another notable feature of all three protest movements is of a societal class clash. Citizens, including those from the low rungs of society, demonstrate against corrupted elites, which became wealthy at their expense, exploiting a system based on patronage and closed religious or ethnic cliques.

Despite their demands to change the system, demonstrators in all three arenas are not organized, lack leadership that would connect their socio-economic agenda with a political agenda, and do not hold comprehensive platform or viable alternative to the current systems. For instance, in Iraq and Lebanon, following the resignation of the governments, there is no agreement even on a new candidate to head the governments and lead the required reforms.

An additional and important common feature is the notable anti-Iranian dimension of the demonstrations. The Iranian regime is under popular assault at home, while in Iraq, demonstrators oppose a "puppet regime" that Iran is trying to install and in Lebanon there is controversy concerning the power of Hezbollah and its arms that are not subject to the state authority.

Another common feature, recently pointed out by Tom Friedman as well, is the role of the Iranian regime in attempts to stifle the protest. On top of brutally suppressing demonstrations at home, the Iranian regime – directly and via proxy – the Shiite militias – was involved in the violent actions against demonstrators in Iraq, including violent assaults on demonstrators by the militias claiming the lives of more than 450 people. In Lebanon as well, Hezbollah ordered its operatives to intimidate demonstrators by force, although at a lower scale and scope so far.

Looking to the future, it seems that all three countries have entered a long period of domestic instability. The regimes and the ruling elites appear determined not to relax their grip on power and positions although they are unable to administer their countries effectively and there seems to be no viable political alternative that could change the people's quality of life.

Strategic Implications for Israel

Instability in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran is not unique to them, but is the share of other regimes in the region – all dealing with similar challenges in light of their inability to address socio-economic, infrastructure, and demographic shortcomings.

In a regional setting of turbulence and uncertainty, with domestic instability "infecting" neighboring countries, Israel must hedge its risks and focus on the stability challenge especially in two crucial arenas – Jordan and the West Bank.

There is no alternative for Jordan as strategic component in Israel's national security. Over the past decade, monarchies have proven to be more stable during periods of instability for various reasons. However, the Hashemite Kingdom is facing mounting challenges over the past few years – the burden of Syrian refugees, declining financial aid from the Gulf countries, domestic socio-economic challenges, and increasing criticism against the Royal Court, even among the Bedouin population – the backbone of the regime.

Israel must act to bolster the Royal Court and the Kingdom. It has to persuade the Saudis to increase their support and aid; to ascertain that the level of American aid is maintained, and most importantly to avoid measures (e.g. regarding the holy sites and the Jordan Valley) that could amplify domestic criticism against the King and undermine the Kingdom's stability and the peace between the two countries.

Jordan and the West Bank are two neighboring arenas with high potential of rapid spilling-over instability. The current situation in the West Bank combines all the combustible components that could produce upheaval – a young generation that did not experience the costs of the Intifada, under the control of a corrupt leadership with questionable legitimacy, helpless in face of Israeli measures, and feeling deserted by the Arab world. As the rule of President Abbas is about to end, his departure might signify the failure of his approach – seeking peace and opposing violence and terror.

Under these circumstances, Israel must avoid measures that could undermine the status-quo, such as annexation, and focus on immediate solutions to the economic hardship facing the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority (amending U.S. legislation preventing security aid to the Palestinians and enhancing the partial arrangement allowing the transfer of custom revenues by Israel to the Palestinian Authority).

From an Israeli perspective, the protest wave in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran also offers an opportunity – mounting dissent against the Iranian regime. If until recently, the regime in Teheran was accused of seeking to subvert other regimes in the region, it is now actually suppressing the aspirations of the young generation across the region to live in dignity and enjoy freedom.

Reinforcing the negative image of the Iranian regime by framing it as the enemy of the people and of freedom might deepen the damage to Iran's standing across the region. Therefore, it is essential to expose the regime's brutality towards its own people, its direct support to the violent oppression of protests in Iraq and Lebanon, and its key role in sustaining the Assad regime. Additionally, it would be important to expose and to resonate how Iran is exploiting its neighbors – Iraq for instance – as part of its campaign against Israel, U.S., and Saudi Arabia – and trampling their sovereignty and independence.

** Thanks to Lt Col. (res.) Dov Dell for his assistance in developing the ideas for this piece.

^[1] In Iran – the inflation rate is approaching 50%, the estimated GDP growth for 2020 is negative standing at -9.5%. Accounting for 50-to-60% of public revenues, oil exports were slashed by 70-to-90%. Youth unemployment is near 30%, while among the educated youth unemployment is around 40-to-50%. In Iraq – increasing oil production (5M bpd) is expected to boost GDP growth by 5.2% in 2020, but is estimated to decline in 2021 to 2.7%; 20% of the population is below the poverty line and youth unemployment stands at 25%. In Lebanon – the public debt is among the highest in the world (150% of GDP); GDP growth is negative at -1% and youth unemployment stands at 37%.

Authored by Col. (res.) Udi Evental

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