2020: The Iranian Nuclear Program is Back on the Centerstage

 

 

By Col. (res.) Udi Evental | January 21, 2020

Centrifuges
 

Over the past week, the Iranian nuclear file has once again captured Israeli and international attention. Four main developments led to this outcome:

 

  1. The Iranian missile attack on the American base in Ein al-Assad, Iraq (January 8), ended the tense anticipation for the Iranian military retaliation following the killing of General Soleimani. Seemingly, at this point, Iran is not planning direct additional reprisals against American targets. Rather, Iran and its proxies have declared the launch of a long-term campaign against American presence in the Middle East. The Iranian regime is expected to combine diplomatic maneuvers with attempts to harm American interests, returning to its traditional modus-operandi of low-signature proxy operations, "grey-zone warfare", and armed attacks without leaving "fingerprints" behind. Likely, the regime, seeking to remain under the threshold of full-fledged war, will consider carefully additional attacks on oil facilities in the Arab Gulf.

  2. Iran announced its fifth and final step to "reduce" its commitments stipulated in the nuclear agreement (JCPOA).[1] On January 5, Iran declared that it has suspended its final commitment regarding uranium enrichment – limit of the number of centrifuges. Iran announced that "from here on, its nuclear program will be developed solely based on its technical needs." Notwithstanding, Iran stated that it will continue full cooperation with the IAEA and it has not withdrawn from the JCPOA.

  3. On January 14th UK, France and Germany triggered the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM) of the JCPOA, according to article 36 of the deal. The European statement starts a period for resolving Iran's declared violations of its commitments to the JCPOA. If disagreements are not resolved, it could lead to the reinstatement of UN sanctions and extend the arms embargo that was scheduled to expire in October 2020.

  4. In Israel, the military intelligence (IDI) published the main points of its annual intelligence assessment. The Israeli media headlines misrepresented the assessment suggesting that Iran was heading to "nuclear breakout".

 

 

Iran's Nuclear Policy – Concerning but Prudent

 

According to IDI assessment, in the worst-case scenario, Iran could produce fissile material sufficient for one nuclear device within one year and it would take it another year to install it on a nuclear warhead. However, according to the more likely scenario, in the foreseeable future, Iran will refrain from deciding to enrich uranium to military-grade level (90%) or resume its weaponization project, which was suspended in 2003. These steps would expose Iran to a growing threat of war.

 

The nuclear deal is based on the same strict timeframes regarding Iran's estimated Breakout Time (BOT) to produce sufficient fissile material for one nuclear device. The JCPOA was designed to set the BOT at one year for the duration of the first 12 years of the deal. This timeframe would allow the international community to stop Iran if it would decide to renege its commitments and "rush to the bomb". At this stage, and despite the violations that effectively shorten slightly the BOT, Iran's nuclear program generally remains within the parameters of the deal's risk management.

 

Since the onset of Iran's violation of the deal in May 2019 and till November 2019 (IAEA's latest report on Iran's nuclear program), Iran has accumulated 551kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and has not enriched uranium above 5%. In addition, Iran's nuclear R&D of advanced centrifuges has progressed (IR-2, IR-4, IR-6 models). Contrarily, prior to the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran's uranium stockpile consisted of 8,318kg of LEU and more than 200kg of highly enriched uranium level of 20%.

 

In sum, Iran has taken relatively measured and cautious steps that leave the door open for negotiations. Its recent statement on the fifth step kept its future intentions and plans ambiguous. Following the last statement Foreign Minister Zarif tweeted: "This step is within JCPOA & all 5 steps are reversible upon EFFECTIVE implementation of reciprocal obligations". Although the statement was published several days of the killing of Soleimani, so far, Iran has not taken concrete measures.

 

 

The Nuclear File Converging to a Critical Test

 

Several interlocking developments could converge forming a critical test in 2020:

 

  1. Iran announced that the fifth step of reducing its commitments to the nuclear deal was the last step and no further steps are expected. It seems that this process, from Iran's perspective, has failed – not only did it not reduce the pressure on Iran, it actually increased the pressure.

  2. Beyond concrete measures to expand the nuclear program, the most meaningful bargaining chip that Iran still retains is downgrading cooperation with the IAEA, as Majlis Speaker, Ali Larijani, threatened last week. That would mean the end of the JCPOA. The next level available to Tehran is even more drastic, consisted of extreme measures such as withdrawing from the NPT, as Foreign Minister Zarif warned this week.

  3. The EU-3's decision to trigger the DRM could lead – if not reversed – to the full reinstatement of international sanctions and Iran's isolation, which would also mean the end of the nuclear deal. Notably, Russia and China would not be able to prevent the "snapback" of sanction, as it would require only a UNSC resolution to extend the exemption from sanctions. Presumably, European decision-makers opted for this harsh measure at this sensitive juncture of Iranian weakness, following the killing of Soleimani, to place pressure on Teheran not to retaliate by grossly violating the deal.

  4. The killing of Soleimani and the restored American deterrence have curtailed – if not thwarted – at least temporarily, Iran's ability to launch "tiebreaking" reprisals in the region in an attempt to break the pressure. Iran's mounting economic crisis and increasing domestic protests and signs of public defiance, which are receiving growing international support, particularly from the U.S. administration, further hinder Iran's maneuverability.

 

 

What Next?

 

Conventional wisdom has it that Iran will stick to its declared position and will not agree to negotiate a new nuclear deal, at least until the U.S. elections. First, not to grant a political coup to President Trump and second, considering that a president coming from the Democratic party might agree to readopt the original deal and lift the sanctions. The killing of Soleimani only reinforced the assessment that Iran – weakened and humiliated – cannot "crawl" back to the negotiating table.

 

Notwithstanding, waiting out the U.S. elections entails considerable risks for the Iranian regime. Trump will remain in the White House at least till January 2021 – an entire year of domestic and international pressure that will most likely tighten.

 

During this period, the collapse of the nuclear deal – as a result of Iranian steps or of a European surprising decision to snapback sanctions – will remove the option of a U.S. Democrat president reinstating the original deal even before he or she would be elected.

 

The "maximum pressure" strategy – of both Iran and the U.S. – seems to have failed for the time being. The economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran has only increased and rather than deterring the U.S., Iran suffered a significant blow. Contrarily, Iran has not decreased its malign activities in the region, but rather increased them, and has gradually expanded its nuclear program.

 

 

Under these circumstances, there appear to be three core scenarios for 2020 that might overlap:

 

  1. Hold (until U.S. elections) – the American administration gradually intensifies the sanctions regime to build-up the domestic and international pressure on Iran. Iran carefully advances its nuclear program to add bargaining chips for eventual negotiations. In addition, it launches attacks below the threshold of war to increase the pressure on the U.S. to withdraw its forces from the region.

  2. Escalation – the prudent policy of both sides spirals out of control; the risk of confrontation and war increases and the nuclear deal finally collapses. In this scenario, Iran might limit its cooperation with the IAEA to hinder monitoring of its nuclear program, leading to increased tension with the international community.

  3. Negotiations – a "face-saving" solution enables the resumption of talks between the U.S. and Iran; this might follow Macron's initiative – a European "credit package" that eases the economic pressure without formally rescinding American sanctions as a pre-condition for negotiations.

 

 

Israel, as always, has to be prepared to address all possible scenarios.

 

Despite its prudent nuclear policy, Iran might leverage its decision to withdraw from the agreement to speed up its progress and, within a few months, to substantially shorten the BOT for producing fissile material.

 

Considering this possibility, and even worse scenarios (e.g. limiting IAEA's inspections and monitoring), Israel must develop an independent military capability to thwart Iran's nuclear program. This capability must be retained only as a last-resort option, in case the international community fails to stop Iran.

 

Simultaneously, Israel should be ready for the other core scenarios. Military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. could lead to armed escalation along Israel's borders. Israel ought also to ready for the possibility of resumed negotiations to make sure that the main shortcomings of the JCPOA (particularly, the "sunset" clauses) will be amended. In addition, Israel ought to reach out and develop close dialogue with the Democratic Party and the teams of its presidential candidates to explain the shortcomings of the JCPOA and the considerable risks the original deal entails.

 


[1] In May 2019, exactly one year after the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran declared that it would gradually (every two months) reduce its commitments to the nuclear deal. In the first "step", Iran ceased to abide by the restriction on stockpiling low-enriched uranium (LEU). The second "step" was to suspend the restriction limiting uranium enrichment to the level of 3.76%. The third "step" suspended the restriction on R&D of advanced centrifuges. The fourth "step" was Iran's announcement that it will begin injecting gas into centrifuges at the heavily-fortified Fordow plant.

 

 

 

Authored by Col. (res.) Udi Evental

 

 

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