Main Findings of the 2008 Patriotism Survey

Draft

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The 2008 Patriotism Survey is primarily based on questionnaires from previous surveys, but it is updated, revised and adapted to the needs of the hour. It examines Israeli patriotism in light of current issues relevant to Israeli society. Therefore, it is possible, on one hand, to examine whether changes have occurred over the years and, on the other hand, to examine aspects of Israeli patriotism that were not studied in the two previous surveys.

Long-term trends:

In general, it can be said that Israeli patriotism remains very stable in most of its dimensions, and even when differences are found between the years on certain topics, they do not significantly alter the portrait of Israeli patriotism. In comparison with the previous surveys, several key points can be noted:

- No change has occurred in the self-definition of the Israeli public in regard to the question of "To what extent do you see yourself as an Israeli patriot?" Slightly more than two thirds of the Jewish Israeli public define themselves as Israeli patriots – a very similar percentage to that of the previous years.

- The Expressions of Patriotism Index, which includes statements that examine the importance the public attributes to possible expressions for describing Israeli patriotism on the personal level, declined slightly in comparison to last year. While the index score (83) is still very high, there was some decline in a number of statements, such as the readiness to live in Israel and the importance of buying Israeli-made products.

- The readiness to fight for the state remains at the same high level as measured in the past two years. Nine of ten Jewish Israelis are prepared to endanger themselves for the sake of the state and they would agree to fight for the state if another war erupts.

- In comparison with the past, there was no change in the score for the Values Index, which addresses a number of central values of Israeli patriotism. Of a list of eight values, most of the population chose "love of the country" as the value most closely linked to the concept of patriotism. Between the years 2007 and 2008, a number of minor changes occurred in the ranking of the statements. For example, the value of "social justice" dropped from fourth to sixth place.
• Despite a slight decline in the score for the National Symbols Index, the public continues to regard it as a central part of the Israeli ethos. This is particularly reflected in the great importance the Israeli public attributes to the siren on Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel’s Wars, on which there is broad consensus, expressed in a score of 88.

• In all of the components of the Rootedness Index, which examines the strength of the citizens’ connection to a place and to the state, there was a slight retreat in comparison to the past. It can be noted, for example, that there has been a decline in the determination to encourage the young generation to remain in Israel.

• More people prefer to be citizens of other countries in the world. The current survey shows a continuation of the decline recorded last year in the preference for being Israel. That is, fewer people chose to prefer Israeli citizenship – a drop of 6% compared to last year and a decline of 10% compared to two years ago.

• Despite all this, the average Israeli is not inclined to leave the country. A large majority of the Jewish public (78%) believes it will not leave the country, despite the current situation in the state.

• The impact of the Second Lebanon War has weakened: Last year, just months after the Second Lebanon War, we discovered that the war had a considerable effect on half of the population. This year, relatively few people believe that the war influenced their lives.

• Pride in the Israeli identity increased this year after recording some decline the previous year. Most Jewish Israelis are prouder to some extent in their Israeli identity than they were last year. Despite this, Israeli pride does not have a higher score in comparison to other areas studied in the survey.

• Pride in Judaism is particularly high, and it exceeds pride in Israeliness. Similar to previous years, in which Jewish pride recorded particularly high scores, the 2008 Patriotism Survey indicates that the percentage of those who are proud to be Jews is also very high this time.

• The Areas of Pride Index, which measures the public’s pride in various aspects of the society and state, showed some increase in the current survey, after declining in 2007 in comparison to 2006. As in the previous years, the field of science and technology is the focus of greatest pride among Israelis. On the other hand, almost all of the citizens of the state are very disappointed in the Knesset and the education system.
• Despite the disappointment among Israelis on many issues, Israel is still perceived as a better state than others. Though most of the Israeli public ascribes to this view, it should be noted that the score on this question (62) is not particularly high in comparison to other survey questions.

In addition to the above questions, which comprise the core of the Patriotism Survey, the 2008 survey includes three additional topics: regional nuclearization, the security events in the 'Gaza perimeter' area and the status of Jerusalem. The main findings on these issues are as follows:

• As part of the traditional Rootedness Index, we added a question this year that is very relevant to the Israeli reality: Does the existence of a hostile state in the region with nuclear arms constitute a reason to leave Israel? We found that the overwhelming majority (86%) of the Jewish Israeli public is not considering leaving the state under such circumstances.

• Against the background of the almost non-stop launching of Qassams on Sderot and Gaza perimeter communities, the social solidarity of the Jewish citizens of the state is very salient. Most of them believe that the distance of these communities from the center of the country is the reason for their neglect and think that the resilience of the residents of the region vis-à-vis the rocket fire is admirable. At the same time, the survey indicates that a large majority of the citizens of Israel are willing to provide various types of assistance to their brethren living in Sderot and the other communities in the region.

• Sixty years after the founding of the state, the Jewish citizens of Israel tend to appreciate its successes, with many reservations. In their view, the greatest success since the establishment of the state is in the area of security – that is, in securing Israel's existence from a military perspective. On the other hand, the lowest level of success is attributed to economic equality. However, it should be noted that the state's score in the area of security, like the scores in all of the other fields, is lower today in comparison to the assessments the public gave a decade ago at Israel's 50th jubilee.

• The importance of Jerusalem as a united city and the capital of Israel has weakened over the years. The 2008 Patriotism Survey examined which aspects of Jerusalem are important to the Israeli public and how important its status is as a united city and the capital of the state. As we will see below, Jerusalem is indeed a symbol and central value in Israeli patriotism. But, according to several findings in the current survey, it seems that the willingness to divide the city has increased in comparison to previous surveys on this question, though this is still a minority position among the Jewish Israeli public.
Main findings according to population groups:

The 2008 Patriotism Survey devotes special chapters to the views of the Arabs of Israel and the residents of the periphery. A similar study was conducted in the previous surveys in regard to the Arabs of Israel. Here is a summary of the survey’s findings vis-à-vis these groups:

- The periphery is more patriotic than the other parts of the country. The residents of northern Israel and Gaza perimeter communities do not show a lower level of patriotism than the general public. In fact, in some aspects, their level of patriotism is higher than that of other Israelis, and also in comparison to the previous years. That is, during the past year, the patriotic affinity of residents of the periphery strengthened.

- The Arabs of Israel regard themselves as primarily Arab patriots, with Palestinian patriotism taking second place and Israeli patriotism third. According to the survey findings, there are areas in which the gap between the Arab public and the rest of the state's population is extremely wide. This is mainly related to concepts, values and expressions that are Zionist and Jewish in essence. On the other hand, the Arabs of Israel give higher scores than the Jewish population on strictly civic matters such as valuing the Supreme Court or attributing importance to contributing to social organizations. It should also be noted that in other areas, such as the connection to the land, there is almost no disparity between the two populations. However, when it comes to the possibility of a nuclear threat, it turns out that the readiness of the Arabs of Israel to remain in the country in light of such danger is significantly lower than that of the Jewish public.

In addition to the various dimensions and levels of patriotism the survey examines, there is great importance in the effort to characterize the typical Israeli patriot according to socio-demographic variables. This includes an attempt to gauge the impact of each of these variables, while "controlling" the influence of the other variables. Based on statistical analyses conducted for this purpose, it can be said that the average Israeli patriot has the following characteristics:

- The Israeli patriot is first and foremost a Jew. With the exception of isolated cases in which the Arab public receives higher scores than the Jewish public, it is no surprise to find that the Jews constitute the prototype of Israeli patriotism in the overwhelming majority of cases.
• **The typical Jewish Israeli patriot is religious but not ultra-Orthodox.** The variable of level of religiousness is found in many questions and key indexes as a significant factor in influencing the level of Israeli patriotism. Accordingly, the survey indicates that on most issues, the religious public tends to be more patriotic, followed closely by the traditional and secular, respectively. The ultra-Orthodox sector, on the other hand, is in many cases exceptional in its low level of patriotism. This is illustrated in its scant readiness to fight for the state and in the importance it attributes to national symbols. In fact, in certain areas the ultra-Orthodox public displays a level of patriotism similar to that of the Arab population. It is interesting to note that on both ends of the connection between patriotism and the level of religiousness, there are two Orthodox religious groups, but each interpret the national meaning of Judaism in a different way.

• **Older Israelis (above the age of 45) tend to be more patriotic.** On a relatively large number of questions, the level of patriotism among those of ages 25-44 was found to be the lowest. The youngest age bracket (18-24) generally shows a higher level of patriotism, yet lower than that of the oldest group (above 45). Moreover, in many areas it seems that the young group has become more patriotic over the years and is approaching the high level of patriotism displayed by the oldest group.

• **The level of patriotism is higher among people who identify themselves as right-wing.** Nonetheless, it is important to note that on most questions there were no significant distinctions found between those with right-wing, centrist and left-wing political-security orientations. In cases in which there are differences based on political inclination, the right has a higher level of patriotism than that of the left, while those who define themselves as centrist tend to be closer to the right than to the left, with the exception of isolated cases in which the center actually receives higher scores.

• **The wealthy tend to be more patriotic than those with moderate or low income.** An analysis according to income level does not reveal any uniform trend, but the survey data indicates that the level of patriotism among the middle class is the lowest in many cases. In other cases, the weaker segments of the population are actually the less patriotic ones. In any case, it is evident that the higher echelon tends to be more patriotic than the others.

• **The education factor.** No uniform pattern was found in this area. On certain questions, those with higher (post-secondary) education were found to be more patriotic – for example, in the dimension of symbolism. But in other areas, those with a low level of education tend to be more patriotic – for example, in the Expressions Index. However, the disparities in patriotism between the educational levels are also not very large in these cases.
• **Political parties.** According to the 3008 Patriotism Survey, those who voted for the National Union- National Religious Party are the most patriotic public – a finding that corresponds to the high level of patriotism of the religious public. Labor, Kadima and Likud voters come next, without any clear distinctions between them. Shas voters are at the middle of the list, followed by Meretz and Yisrael Beiteinu voters. In most cases, those who voted for the United Torah Judaism party or the Arab parties are at the bottom of the list.

Regression tests conducted on the survey's main indexes showed that the salient factors influencing the scores on Israeli patriotism are (in order): level of religiousness, income level, political orientation in the security-diplomatic sphere, and age.

**The central components of Israeli patriotism**

We will now present the central components of Israeli patriotism according to the importance attributed to them. This ranking, which is based on the highest scores on the various questions we asked in the survey, indicates a broad level of consensus in the Jewish public in regard to these components.

*First:* the value "love of the country" – 92  
*Second:* recognizing the importance of the expression "readiness to fight for the state" – 90.5  
*Third:* the value "the Hebrew language" – 89  
*Fourth:* recognizing the importance of the symbol of "siren on Remembrance Day for Fallen IDF Soldiers – 88  
*Fifth:* the value "Jerusalem" – 88  
*Sixth:* pride in "the Jewish identity" – 88  
*Seventh:* "to live in Israel" – 86  
*Eighth:* "the personal readiness to fight for the state" – 85.5  
*Ninth:* pride in "the state's technological and scientific achievements" – 82.5  
*Tenth:* "voting in elections" as an expression of patriotism - 82
A review of the literature on the concept of 'patriotism'

"National strength," a term that has already taken root in the Israeli public, partly thanks to the annual series of "Herzliya Conferences," seeks to encompass a range of dimensions of strength that are generally regarded as vital for a state's existence and prosperity. This concept expands the purview of the older concept of "national security" because it also includes more abstract dimensions that are essential for a state's strength, such as national morale, a feeling of purpose, steadfastness and belief in the justness of the cause – beyond the well-known dimensions of strength, including the economic, political, international, social and governmental dimensions. A state's material strength cannot be established without spiritual strength. Therefore, these two components together comprise the balance of national strength.

The generic name "patriotism" is given to all these abstract dimensions, which express an individual's commitment and emotional affinity toward his community. Thus, we have also sought to borrow this term in order to describe and analyze the Israeli public's spirit of affinity and loyalty. We preferred using the concept of "patriotism" to the concept of "Zionism," which is not only a loaded term but is also unique to Israel, making it less suitable for comparative purposes.

A review of the literature pertaining to the concept of "patriotism" indicates that many empirical studies have been conducted in recent years, examining the various dimensions of patriotism. However, there have been no significant innovations in the theoretical literature on this concept.
Historical research indicates that the discussion of patriotism began as early as the 4th century BCE, when the Greeks argued about the primary attributes of the desirable citizen and the morality of preferring the nation to the human race in general (Stewart 1917). The word "patriotism" derives from the Greco-Latin concept "patria," which means "father" and "fatherland," and in Latin the concept also refers to fellow citizens. In other words, the term patriotism is directed toward the feeling of affinity, identification and loyalty to a "fatherland" and to the "heritage of the fathers," to the extent of being ready to defend them from an adversary and enemy.

While it is clear that the essence of patriotic feeling is a particularistic affinity for a human group that shares a common past and common cultural characteristics, there is a disagreement on the question: Toward whom and what is patriotic affinity directed? The classic view, reflected in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville and George Orwell, maintains that it is an affinity to a country, to land, to founding fathers and to the heritage of the past. On the other hand, Abraham Lincoln described a different type of affinity, based on a way of life, a constitution and system of government, and less on territory and blood relations. According to Lincoln, patriotic affinity is based on consensual agreement on a political idea. Thus, he argued that a more precise term would be "covenanted patriotism" because of the importance of the social covenant that unites a political community (Schaar 1973).

Despite the differences between these two approaches, they both regard patriotism as a particularistic emotion directed toward a distinct community. Another interpretation of patriotism, which breaks through the walls of particularism, was proposed by the contemporary philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Martha Nussbaum. They both call for replacing the affinity to homeland and nation with a cosmopolitan affinity by making humanistic-universal values the glue that links people (Canovan 2000, Markell 2000, McClay 2003). This proposal has not become popularly accepted and patriotism remains based on an affinity toward a specific political entity that is connected by bonds of language, culture, history and ethnicity.

In delving into the roots of patriotic affinity (including in contemporary Western democracies), it becomes apparent that there is a salient lack of research literature on this topic in Israel. Samuel Johnson's oft-quoted remark that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" is especially prevalent in Israel, and has served as the first refuge for those here who wish to evade any study or discussion of the subject. Perhaps researchers in Israel have refrained from addressing patriotism because in the Israeli context it has largely been associated with a nationalistic and aggressive character, ignoring the fact that patriotism includes an essential and defensive foundation that expresses affinity, pride and commitment to the collective. Indeed, the research literature in the world makes a clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism expresses a positive value, unites and builds the national group, while nationalism expresses aggressiveness and downplays the value of other nations. (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001, Antony 2003, Blank & Schmidt 2003, McClay 2003, Federico, Golec & Dial 2005.) Perhaps
trendy forces of relativism, post-modernism, post-Zionism and privatization have contributed to the erosion of the value of patriotism in academia and among publicists in Israel.

The lack of discussion in Israel about patriotism does not mean it does not exist. As an instinctive emotion, it is alive and well in Israel, and is reflected in many ways. However, the dearth of academic and public discussion is outrageous because the role of leaders and mentors is to continue to instill patriotic spirit. Pericles’ oration describing his pride in the Athenian democracy, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Churchill's writings and speeches, and Kennedy's inaugural address were all sources of inspiration and served as milestones in forging constructive and defensive patriotic feeling. In Israel, it seems that leaders are weary of patriotic inspiration, except when it comes to justifying the sacrifice of the fallen on Memorial Day or in soliciting contributions.

In order to fill the deep vacuum in addressing patriotic feeling, it is essential to break down this emotion into parts and to make it the subject of empirical study. The in-depth academic discussion of this topic in recent decades has shown that patriotism can be directed to various channels and that there are various expressions of patriotism. Schats & Stauc (1997) and later Parker (2003) identified three prevalent types of patriotism. They called the first type "symbolic patriotism" because of the emphasis on the attachment to symbols and to America itself. The second was defined as "constructive patriotism," which is channeled toward constructive and rational criticism of the regime and its actions; and the third was identified as "blind patriotism," which represents blind and irrational loyalty. Sullivan, Fried & Diez (1992) expanded this, pointing to five types of patriotism: "rebellious patriots," who regard the symbolic attachment as something dangerous and channel their love for the state through critical activism; "environmental patriots," who sanctify the environment and the land, and regard polluters of the environment as traitors; "capitalist patriots," who champion the giants of the American economy and see economic growth as the fulfillment of the patriotic vision; "symbolic patriots," who display a strong and uncritical emotional attachment to the state; and "national symbolic patriots," who hold more extreme views, placing America at the center of the universe and rejecting the possibility that it might err.

All of this shows that in our effort to study the patriotic spirit, we should take into account a range of views and behaviors that are likely to express different modes of patriotism. For this reason, the Patriotism surveys are based on a series of diverse questions taken from the studies mentioned above, as well as from additional international (ISSP, WVS) and American (AEI 2005) research. From this pool of research, we identified the four most relevant dimensions for the phenomenon of Israeli patriotism: the dimension of sacrifice; the dimension of rootedness; the dimension of pride; and the dimension of symbolism. Each of these dimensions represents a different aspect of patriotism and is expressed in the survey in a series of questions and statements aimed at indirectly examining each aspect.
In this context, it must be noted that while the patriotic affinity and the channels toward which it is directed have been widely discussed in the academic literature, the discussion about spheres of patriotism and the situation of "multi-patriotism" is still at an early stage. Thus, the Israeli patriotic affinity of an Israeli who emigrated from Israel or of a Jew who has never resided here might pass the tests of operative patriotism and become independent of time and place.
2008 Patriotism Survey

Methodology

The Patriotism Survey was conducted for the third time this year under the banner of "the state's 60th anniversary." This event undoubtedly touches upon Israeli patriotism and, therefore, this event is examined in depth in the current survey.

The 2008 survey is primarily based on the surveys that preceded it, but it has been updated, revised and adapted to the needs of the hour. It examines Israeli patriotism in light of the current and relevant issues for Israeli society. Thus, it is possible, on one hand, to examine whether changes have occurred in comparison to the previous two surveys and, on the other hand, to examine new dimensions of Israeli patriotism.

Despite the fact that the past year was relatively quiet in terms of dramatic events, the current survey has enormous importance. The 2008 survey enables us to examine whether the decline in the level of patriotism recorded in the 2007 survey was a consequence of an all-encompassing event like the Second Lebanon War, or whether it was part of a general trend characterizing Israeli society in recent years.

As noted, the survey attributes considerable importance to the 60th anniversary of the state. It should be recalled that Israeli society has experience significant social and political events during the past decade, including the withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Defensive Shield operation, the evacuation of settlements in Gush Katif and northern Samaria, the rise of Hamas to power in Gaza, the transitions of power between Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, and the Second Lebanon War. These events, together with the widening of economic disparities in Israeli society and the growing alienation between Jews and Arabs in the wake of the events of October 2000, require deeper study and understanding of Israeli patriotism at the threshold of Israeli's seventh decade of independence.

The Patriotism survey was conducted in late December 2007 among a random sample of about 800 people, who comprise a representative sample of the adult population in Israel. Thus, for example, the Arab sample comprises 13.6% of the general sample. The questionnaires were also translated to Russian and Arabic in order to ensure accessibility for these sectors. The Midgam Research and Consulting Institute translated the questionnaires and collected the data. The questionnaire, which appears as an appendix, includes a series of questions and statements pertaining to relevant dimensions of Israeli patriotism: levels, spheres and subjective perceptions of patriotism; willingness to sacrifice; rootedness; national pride; and attachment to national symbols.
In addition, the survey attempts to characterize the typical Israeli patriot. By conducting regression analyses that examine each demographic variable independently, it is possible to recognize the variables that have the greatest impact on Israeli patriotism. For methodological reasons, the regression analyses do not examine the impact of party affiliation. On issues of broad consensus, we will not be able to point toward demographic distinctions, since most of the public shares a similar view on the issue.

In follow-up to the main chapters that examine the various dimensions of Israeli patriotism among Jews, there are additional chapters devoted to specific topics. The first examines the relevance of the Jerusalem issue in regard to Israeli patriotism. Next, there is a chapter focusing on the 60th anniversary of the state, examining its successes since its establishment. The results of the survey are compared to the results of a survey conducted a decade ago for Israel's 50th jubilee.¹

Residents of the periphery, in general, and residents of the North and residents of the area bordering Gaza, in particular, are accorded a separate analysis this year, As a result of the Second Lebanon War and the ongoing barrage on the communities of the northwestern Negev, it was decided to study whether these events affect the extent of their patriotism. The survey also examines how the firing of Qassams on Gaza perimeter communities affects the Israeli society's sense of unity and solidarity. For this purpose, the survey was administered separately to 50 residents of Sderot and neighboring communities. This data is aimed at expanding the external validity of the research, though we still should be cautious in using these findings.

In conclusion, there is a chapter analyzing the views on patriotism among the Arabs of Israel. Due to the complexity of the identity of the Arabs of Israel and their ambivalent attitude toward Israeli identity, it was decided, as in the previous year, to study this public separately from the Jewish public. This chapter presents the key findings in regard to the Arab population and compares them with the Jewish society.

¹ For additional reading, see "The Peace Index," April 1998.
Subjective strengths of patriotism, its spheres and components

To what extent do you see yourself as an Israeli patriot?

![Illustration 2: Israeli patriotism among the Jewish public (in %)](image)

There was no change in the self-definition of Israeli patriotism. First, it should be noted that the question: "To what extent do you see yourself as an Israeli patriot?" received a similar score this year to those of previous years: 65. Slightly more than two-thirds (68%) of the Jewish Israeli public define themselves as Israeli patriots, whether to a very great extent (36%) or to a great extent (32%). The rest see themselves as patriots to some extent (22%) or not at all (10%). These findings are completely identical to the data received in the 2007 Patriotism Survey, which was conducted after the Second Lebanon War. In comparison to the United States, the level of patriotism in Israel is a bit lower: 72% of American citizens declared in a 2005 survey that they are patriots to a great extent (Gallup 2005).

Religious Israelis define themselves as very patriotic; the ultra-Orthodox less so. A comparative analysis indicates that the level of religiousness affects the extent of patriotism: The religious public's score on this question is 76 points. This is an identical score to the one received last year, and is an improvement from the religious public's score of 71 in 2006. They are followed by the traditional (68) and secular (63), the same scores recorded in the previous surveys. The ultra-Orthodox are exceptions to the correlation between religiousness and patriotism: Their score is particularly low (49) because only 66% regard themselves as Israeli patriots.

Older Israelis are more patriotic. The survey data shows that this year, as in previous years, there is a lower level of patriotism among the young than among their elders. As the age increases, the level of patriotism also rises: Young people between the ages of 18-24 had a score of 55, while people in the 25-44 age group had a score of 62. Those over the age of 45 reached a score of 73.
Those with centrist political and security views defined themselves as more patriotic than others. As in previous years, small yet significant differences can be seen. Israelis with a centrist political-security worldview score the highest at 71, a four-point climb from its 2006 level. Next, with a score of 66, are those view right-wing views, with leftists trailing four points behind. This picture is reflected in the percentage of those defining themselves as patriots: left (63%), center (76%) and right (71%).


The combination of right-wing political orientation and religious outlook creates a very high pattern of patriotism. An interesting combination of religiousness and political-security orientation can be seen in an analysis by party affinity: National Union – National Religious Party (76), Likud (71) and Kadima (71) rank highest on the scale of Israeli patriotism. The first two are considered right-wing parties, while the third is considered a centrist party. Next are the two leftist parties, Labor and Meretz, with scores of 66 and 61, respectively. Close behind is Yisrael Beiteinu, a right-wing party. At the bottom of the list are the ultra-Orthodox parties, with virtually identical scores: Shas (45) and United Torah Judaism (44).

As in previous years, men defined themselves as more patriotic. Continuing the trend of previous years, men (66) see themselves as more patriotic than women (64).

Educational level makes no difference in the self-definition of the level of patriotism. Israelis with the highest level of education describe themselves as patriots (69) a bit more than Israelis who have a low level of education (66). It should be noted that two years ago the latter defined themselves as less patriotic, and after dropping 14 points over the past two years, they remain with a relatively low level of patriotism.
Richer, more patriotic. The wealthy define themselves as more patriotic than others. Members of the upper class recorded a score of 68, compared to a 63 for those receiving an average salary and 59 for Israelis who are poorer. The difference is reflected in the percentage of people who regarded themselves as patriots: 73% of the upper class, 64% of the middle class and only 55% of the lower class.

Illustration 4: Patriotism among those earning a lower-than-average salary in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.
Illustration 5: Patriotism among those earning an average salary in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.
Illustration 6: Patriotism among those earning a higher-than-average salary in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

The following variables had a clear effect on the level of the Patriotism Index:

The level of religiousness – the religious are more patriotic in the State of Israel
Political orientation – the right sees itself as more of an Israeli patriotic than others

Regression analyses determine that the demographic variables of income level, education level, gender and age do not have a significant impact on self-definition as a patriot.
Values of Israeli patriotism:

Values that were important last year also remained important this year. In addition to expressions of patriotism, we asked the public about the connection between certain values and the phenomenon we are examining. From a list of eight values, 97% of the Jewish Israeli public said that "love of the country" is the value most closely connected to patriotism. In second place, with only very small differences between the values, are "the Hebrew language" (94%), "the Jewish heritage" (93%) and "Jerusalem" (92%). "The ingathering of the exiles" and “Zionism" receive a middle ranking, while "social justice" and "the Bible" are regarded by the public as less related to the concept of patriotism. The average general score for values related to patriotism is 81 this year, a bit lower than in 2007 (83) and 2006 (82.5). The only significant change that can be noted is in the ranking of the hierarchy of the values. The changes in scores and ranking for each of the values are displayed in Illustration 7:


Jerusalem, Ingathering of exiles, Hebrew language, Bible, Social justice, Love of country, Zionism

The values of patriotism are more important to religious Israelis. According to the data from the current survey, there is a connection between the importance of the values of patriotism and the public's level of religiousness. Among the religious public, the score of values is 90 – the same score as last year and six points higher than the score in 2006. The score is 84 for the "traditional" and 78 for secular Israelis. The ultra-Orthodox public, which attributes less importance to "the Hebrew language" (75, compared to an average of 90 among others) and Zionism (40 versus 85), is in last place with a score of 74.
Trend of growing patriotism among young Israelis. An analysis of the data by age groups indicates that Israelis who are older than 45 regard these values as closely connected to patriotism. For example, every respondent over the age of 45 said that the value "love of the country" is quite connected to patriotism, a view shared by the vast majority of young Israelis of ages 18-24. Consequently, the weighted scores of the young group and the older group were very similar (82 and 84, respectively). On the other hand, Israelis in the 25-44 age group received a score of 78. Last year, we saw an upward trend in this area among the youngest and oldest groups. This year, the oldest group's score is not higher than it was last year, but the youngest group's score is continuing to rise: from 74.5 in 2006, to 77 last year and climbing to 81.5 this year.

Israelis with right-wing and left-wing outlooks disagree on the values related to patriotism. In general, and according to the Values Index we created, it can be said that right-wing voters regard these values as more strongly connected with patriotism (84). The scores for those with centrist or left-wing views on security are 82 and 78, respectively. However, an in-depth study of this question indicates that each one attributes importance to a different value. For example, for 84% of the left-wing public, "social equality" is a patriotic value, while the Bible is a central value for those on the right. Still, centrists comprise the majority of those who believe that "the Hebrew language" is connected to patriotism (97%).

The disagreements are reflected in politics. The difference between the ultra-Orthodox world and the religious world is evident when analyzing by level of religiousness and by party voting. As in other analyses, the religious Israelis have the highest scores, while the ultra-Orthodox have the lowest scores. This explains why the National Union – National Religious Party is the party that received the highest score (93) and United Torah Judaism received the lowest score (61). When combining the level of religiousness and the political orientation, it appears that the first of these factors is more significant because the score for Yisrael Beiteinu voters, who are mostly secular, is particularly low (74). Yisrael Beiteinu voters are ranked at the bottom of the list, far below those who vote for Likud, Kadima, Labor, Shas and Meretz.

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<th>Patriotic values as viewed by ultra-Orthodox Israelis</th>
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<td>Jesus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following variables had a clear effect on the level of the Values Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The level of religiousness – the religious and traditional see a stronger connection between the index values and the concept of patriotism than the secular and ultra-Orthodox.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation – right-wingers and centrists sees greater meaning in the components of the Values Index in terms of the concept of patriotism than do leftists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level – wealthier Israelis tend to have higher regard for the components of the Values Index.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression analyses determine that the demographic variables of gender, education level and age do not have a significant impact on the scores of the Values Index.
Symbols of patriotism:

The last dimension of patriotism examined in this chapter addresses the symbols related to patriotism. In order to learn about how Israel society views the symbolism entailed in the concept of patriotism, we asked how important it is to fly an Israeli flag on Independence Day and how the public reacts to disrespect for the norm of standing at attention during the Remembrance Day siren. The results of the survey this year are not different that those of previous years. This year, 83% of the Jewish Israeli public said that the symbolic act of "flying an Israeli flag on Independence Day" is important for patriotism. The survey also found that nine of ten Israeli Jews agree with the statement: "It makes me angry that there are people who do not stand during the Remembrance Day siren for Israel's fallen soldiers." These findings are very similar to those of the previous years.

Illustration 8: Respect for the siren on Remembrance Day for IDF Fallen Soldiers, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

An analysis of the findings reveals that sensitivity to national symbols primarily divides the ultra-Orthodox from the rest of the Jewish population. The traditional public is very sensitive to symbols (89), followed by the secular (86), the religious (84) and finally the ultra-Orthodox (34). The differences between the traditional, secular and religious can be seen when analyzing the statements that comprise the Symbols Index: The secular (93) and traditional (92) are more angered than the religious (85) when the siren on Remembrance Day is dishonored. The traditional also identify the flying of the flag on Independence Day as a patriotic act more than any other group. Despite these minor differences, there is a clear similarity between the traditional, secular and religious groups in regard to national symbols. This can be explained by the national-Zionist aspect of their view of Judaism, something that is not shared with the majority of the ultra-Orthodox public. Therefore, the ultra-Orthodox score (34) is much lower than that
of the others. This is illustrated by the fact that only 35% of the ultra-Orthodox are angered when the moment of silence is violated on Remembrance Day, compared to 97% of the secular who are angered by this. The scores on this question have not changed significantly over the past years.

**Zionist parties are connected to symbols.** The connection between national symbols and identification with the Zionist outlook is evident when analyzing the data according to political affinity. Voters for United Torah Judaism and Shas, which are non-Zionist parties, receive scores of 20 and 40, respectively. This is a huge difference in comparison to Kadima (91), Labor (88.5) and Likud (88).

**Older Israelis identify more with symbols.** According to the survey data, there is a significant gap in regard to the importance of national symbols between Israelis of ages 25-44 and those above the age of 45 / young people (of army age and after release from the army). The score for the above-45 group is 87, and the youngest group has shown increasing appreciation for national symbols in recent years, climbing from 68 in 2006 to 79 in 2007 and 86 this year. On the other hand, the score for the middle age bracket is lower: 79.

**Symbols are more important for the wealthy.** It seems that the importance that Israelis attribute to national symbols increases as their income levels rise. For example, people with above-average income received a score of 86.5, which was 7.5 points higher than those who earn an average salary and 15.5 points higher than groups with lower income.

**Is flying the flag on Independence Day important for Israeli patriotism?**

The following variables had a clear effect on the level of the Symbols Index:

| The level of religiousness – the religious, traditional and secular attribute great importance to symbols. |
| Income level – wealthier Israelis tend to have higher regard for the components of the Symbols Index. |
| Education level – those with low levels of education attribute more importance to symbols. |
| Age – the young and those above the age of 45 regard the national symbols as a principal part of Israeli patriotism. |

Regression analyses determine that the demographic variables of political orientation and gender do not have a significant impact on the scores of the Symbols Index.
The dimension of sacrifice

When examining Israeli patriotism, it is important to check what the citizens are willing to do for the sake of the state and to what extent they are prepared for this. In the State of Israel, the willingness to fight for the state is the ultimate sign of self-sacrifice. As noted, when we asked whether the willingness to fight is an important expression of Israeli patriotism, 95% of the population responded affirmatively. That is, the overwhelming majority of the state's population views this component as essential for defining the concept. Consequently, it is important to examine whether the citizens are prepared to implement this value themselves.

Most of the public is prepared to fight for the state. We have asked this question in each of the three Patriotism surveys and have received the same result each year: 92% of the Jewish public is definitely willing or quite willing to fight for the state.

Illustration 10: Willingness to fight for the state, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

The ultra-Orthodox are less willing to fight for the State of Israel. The score for the overall Jewish population in regard to the willingness to sacrifice for the state is 85.5. This adjusted average includes the especially high score of religious Israelis (93), weighed together with the scores of the traditional (88), secular (85) and ultra-Orthodox (67). It should be noted that among the traditional, secular and religious, there has been no change during the past years in their willingness to fight for the state. However, among the ultra-Orthodox, this willingness has declined: The score was 80 in 2006 and dropped to 65 in 2007.
Willingness to fight increases with age. We can point to a certain connection between age and the willingness to fight for the state. Israelis above the age of 45 are particularly willing to sacrifice themselves for the state – a score of 91. This compares to a score of 84 for those of army age or just after the army, and a score of 81 for Israelis of ages 25-44.

The gap between women and men in their willingness to fight for the state is narrowing. This year, as in previous years, men (88) tend to be more willing to sacrifice themselves for the state than women (83). However, the disparity between the two groups is narrowing: Two years ago, men (93) scored 11 points higher than women, while in 2007 the gap was 10 points (91 versus 81).

Leftists are less willing to sacrifice themselves for the state. There is a clear and strong connection between one's security outlook and willingness to fight. Leftists (80) and centrists (87) are less determined to fight for the state than rightists (90). It should be noted that the disparities between the three groups were slightly larger a year ago.

The gap between the security views of right, center and left translate, in part, into party affinity. When translating this into the real political map in Israel, one can say that National Union – National Religious Party voters tend to score higher (96) on the question of self-sacrifice, while Meretz voters receive the lowest score (81) among the Zionist parties. Between these two poles of Zionist parties are those who vote for Likud, Kadima, Labor and Yisrael Beiteinu. Far behind the Zionist parties are the two ultra-Orthodox parties: Shas (76) and United Torah Judaism (48).

The following variables had a clear effect on the willingness to fight:

| Gender – men are more willing to fight for the state |
| Age – those above the age of 45 excel in their willingness to fight |
| The level of religiousness – the secular, traditional and religious are more willing to fight for the state than the ultra-Orthodox are |
| Political orientation – The motivation of rightists and centrists is higher in regard to a commitment to defend the state. |

Regression analyses determine that the demographic variables of education level and income level do not have a significant impact on the scores of the Self-sacrifice Index.
The dimension of rootedness

As we know, the term "patriotism" is closely connected to the terms "homeland," "land" and "country." The dimension we examine in this chapter is the concept of "rootedness" – the connection of citizens to a place and state. For this purpose, we created an index composed of three questions: Do you prefer to be an Israeli citizen rather than a citizen of any other state? Would you encourage your children to live in Israel? And are you ready to leave the country? We also were interested in learning the reasons that are likely to cause people to leave the country. In this way, we hope to learn about the relation between the citizenry and the State of Israel and Land of Israel.

The Rootedness Index leveled off after a year. In retrospect, we see that after the significant increase of 2007 (80) versus 2006 (62), the level of rootedness of the state's citizens leveled off. Today the level of rootedness among Jews is 78.

The Rootedness Index – Who is more, and who is less? As noted, the Rootedness Index, which is comprised of three questions, did not change this year in comparison with last year. The Rootedness Index is higher among women, the religious and rightists. However, there is no connection to the public's level of education, income level or political orientation.

General findings:

Women are more connect to the State of Israel. The level of rootedness among women (82) is eight points higher than among. This is reflected, for example, in the readiness to leave the country: According to the data this year, 27% of the men consider this a possibility, compared to 17% of Israeli women. Similarly, the determination of women to encourage their children to remain in the country is 5% than that of men (82%).

The level of religiousness. As we have seen in other questions, the religious public receives the highest score (90), followed by the traditional public (83). In the Rootedness Index, the ultra-Orthodox score higher (77) than the secular (73). This finding is very different than that of previous surveys.

Older Israelis are more connected to the place. When analyzed by age grouping, the Rootedness Index reveals a trend that is familiar to us from other questions: those above the age of 45 tend to receive the highest (84) score. They are again followed (76) by the youngest group (under the age of 24). The middle age group is last with an average score of 74.

Those with right-wing views are more connected to the country. The average score of those with right-wing outlooks is 83, compared to 79 for centrists and 72 for leftists. This
pattern repeats itself in several questions and it was also characteristic of the surveys of previous years.

Those with low levels of education tend to be more connected to the State of Israel. The general score of those with a low level of education (83) is slightly higher than the university educated (78). Among the various income levels, there is no significant difference in regard to rootedness: Israelis with high income (78) are no different in this respect from the poor (80) and the middle classes (77).

Do you prefer to be a citizen of the State of Israel rather than a citizen of any other state in the world?

Illustration 11: Preference to be an Israeli citizen, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

Fewer people prefer to be citizens of the state. Again this year, we asked the respondents whether they prefer to be citizens of the State of Israel rather than citizens of another state in the world and, in comparison to the previous years, we found a significant decline in those preferring to be Israelis. Two years ago, 71% of the public agreed with the view that it is preferable to be an Israeli citizen, while this year only 60.5% selected this option. It should be noted that there was also some decline last year on this question (64%). This is reflected in the average score for these years: 85 in 2006, 83 in 2007 and 81 this year.

Decline among the young and middle age groups. The scores of those 45 and older did not change during the past three years. The youngest group, whose score dropped five points last year in comparison to 2006 (75), improved a bit (77). On the other hand, the middle age group recorded an additional decline to the one of the previous year: Their score (which was 83 in 2006) sank to 76 this year.

The decline in the preference to be an Israeli citizen spans all educational levels. The most significant decline – a cumulative drop of 18 points over the three years – was recorded among those with no post-secondary education. However, those with post-secondary and university education also recorded declines on this question.
There is no uniform pattern when analyzing by economic cross-sections, but all of them show a decline in the preference for Israeli citizenship. Despite the high incomes of the strong classes of Israeli society, their preference for Israeli citizenship is declining. This can be seen in their scores: 86 in 2006, 83 in 2007 and 80 this year. However, perhaps the continuous blows suffered by the weaker classes explain why the score of those who earn less than the average wage declined during the past two years by eight points, from 89 in 2006 to 81 this year. Among the middle classes, the score is lower (80), after recording a drop of seven points this year in comparison to the previous year.

Decline among the ultra-Orthodox, traditional and secular, while the religious remain constant. The preference for Israeli citizenship is declining from year to year among ultra-Orthodox, traditional and secular Israelis. The scores for the ultra-Orthodox were 84 in 2006, 77 in 2007 and 73 this year. The decline was less steep among the secular (81, 79, 76) and the traditional public (92, 88, 86). On the other hand, religious Israelis recorded a very similar score to that of the previous two years (93), making them the public with the highest preference for Israeli citizenship.

Men have a lower preference for being citizens of the state. Following two years of stability in which men scored 84 on the question of whether they prefer to be citizens of Israel or citizens of another state, this year their score dropped to 76.5. In comparison to women, their rootedness is relatively low; the score for women on this question is 85.

Do you agree that you will encourage your children to live in Israel, despite the fact that there are safer and more prosperous places to live?

The majority will encourage their children to remain in Israel. This component of the Rootedness Index indicates that the great majority of the Jewish population would encourage their children to remain in Israel. Only a relatively low percentage of people disagree with assertion. The general score for this item in 2008 is 79, three points lower than in previous years.

The children of Israelis with right-wing views are more likely to remain in Israel. The data from this year, as in previous years, shows a connection between the public's political orientation and the determination to encourage children to remain in Israel: Rightists score 83, compared to 81 for centrists and 74 for leftists. This pattern was also evident last year.

Women encourage more. In 2006, the score for women was nearly eight points higher than that of men. Following an increase in the men's score and a decline in the women's score last year, the men surpassed the women on this question. According to the 2008 Patriotism Survey, women receive a score of 84, while the score for men dropped to 76, the lowest level of the three years.

A decline in determination among the 25-44 age group. In the 2007 survey, this age group received the highest score (83) of the three age groups. Now, a year later, their score is only 75. As a result of this steep decline, the members of this age group are now the least determined to encourage their children to live in Israel. The younger group's score was 78 and the oldest group scored highest, at 83 points.

Decline in the middle class. The middle class of Israeli society scored five points higher than the two other classes in last year's survey. This year, it recorded a decline of nearly ten points, giving it the lowest score (75) of the three classes on the question of encouraging children to remain in Israel. The scores for the lower (80) and upper (81) classes were nearly identical to those recorded in the 2007 survey.

Religious Israelis want their children to remain here. As on most issues, the religious receive the highest score (92) on this question. While this impressive score is lower than last year's figure (95), the gap between them and the other groups has grown: The traditional received a score of 82, the ultra-Orthodox scored 79 and the secular 75. There is a downward trend among the ultra-Orthodox over the years: In 2006, their score was 97, dropping to 90 in 2007 and recording another significant decline this year.
Would you be willing to move and live in another country?

![Bar chart showing willingness to emigrate]

Illustration 13: Willingness to emigrate to another country, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

**Not leaving the country.** 78% of the Jewish population is not inclined to leave Israel, while the rest say they are liable to emigrate to another place. We asked the public to cite the main reason for their willingness to leave the country. A large part (46%) of the population reiterated that they would not leave Israel for any reason. Among those who were willing to cite a reason for leaving, two main motives were found for emigrating from Israel: the economic situation and the security situation. The first reason, the economic situation, was cited by about a third of the public, an identical percentage (32%) as that recorded the previous year. The security situation, which was cited by 26% of the respondents in the 2007 survey, today constitutes a reason for leaving Israel for only 19%. That is, the percentage of people considering emigration from Israel due to security concerns declined from 2007 to 2008. Other reasons cited included government corruption (9%) and aspirations for personal development (10%), including studies and work.

As in most of the previous questions, a familiar pattern is found here when analyzing by political orientation: **The right is ranked first (81) on the question of willingness to leave Israel**, with centrists next (76.5), followed by the left (64). The same pattern was evident in previous years.

**The brain drain is continuing.** Those with higher education, who were the only ones in the 2007 survey to score lower than 70, also show the highest willingness to leave the country in this year's survey. More than 24% of Israelis with higher education are considering moving to live in a different country. Next in the ranking of willingness to emigrate is the group with some post-secondary education. The willing to leave the country is particularly low (14%) among those who did not graduate from high school. We can conclude that there is a positive relationship between the level of education and the willingness to leave Israel.
Men look for other places. 27% of the Jewish men said that the possibility of "leaving the country" was relevant from their perspective, while the percentage was lower among the women (17%). This gap, which is also evident in the responses to other questions in the Rootedness Index, represents a change from last year's survey, when men and women had an identical score (76). This year, however, the average disparity between women and men amounts to nearly 10 points: Women recorded an increase of almost four point, while the men's score declined by six points.

The percentage of young people considering emigration declined, while the percentage rose among the middle age group. The oldest age group has maintained the same score (82) over the years on the question of whether to leave Israel. Despite the significant gap between the oldest group and the other age groups, two conspicuous trends were recorded during the past year: The youngest group recorded an increase of nine points and its score reached 73. Together with this impressive increase, the middle age group recorded a decline of four points, bringing their score down to 69.

The wealthy consider leaving the country. As in last year's survey, the weaker segments of Israeli society show greater rootedness than the strongest segments of society. The low-income group received a score of 80, which was seven points higher than the high-income group. One of every four of those with high incomes is considering leaving the country, while the percentages among middle and low earners are 20.5% and 15%, respectively.

Secular Israelis are more inclined to leave Israel than others. There is a very significant gap between religious (87) and secular (69) Israelis in regard to their willingness to emigrate to a different country. The secular are also more likely to leave the country in comparison to the ultra-Orthodox (82) and traditional (81).
The nuclear threat does not constitute a reason for leaving the country for the Jewish Israeli population. More than 86% of the Jewish public in the State of Israel does not regard the attainment of a nuclear military capacity by a hostile state as a reason to leave the country. Over half of the population is very sure of this, while more than a third of the respondents share this view to some extent. On the other hand, less than 5% does not agree at all with this view and regards the nuclearization of a hostile state as a reason to consider emigrating from Israel.

The youngest group is more fearful and those over the age of 65 are less fearful. The oldest age group is the only one in which over 90% of the respondents do not consider the nuclearization of a hostile state a reason to leave the country. In the other age groups, the percentage of those considering emigration from Israel ranges from 11.5% to 17.5% (among those under the age of 25).

Left-wing Israelis would be more likely than right-wing Israelis to consider leaving the country in light of a nuclear threat. The level of rootedness among the right-wing public also meets the test when this question is raised. Only 12% of the public identified with the right would consider leaving Israel in such a situation, compared to 18% among the left. The lowest percentage on this question is among centrists: Nearly 90% are convinced that they would not leave Israel for this reason.

The secular are more affected by the threat of a nuclear bomb. Among ultra-Orthodox, religious and tradition Israelis, there are no far-reaching differences on this question. But there is gap between these groups and the secular: More than 16% of secular Israelis think that if hostile state acquires nuclear arms, they would be more likely to emigrate, compared to 11% of the ultra-Orthodox and 7% of the religious.
Small differences according to economic cross-section. The percentage of wealthy Israelis who do not regard the nuclear threat as a reason for leaving Israel (89%) is almost identical to the percentage of middle-income earners who hold this view (90%), while about 15% of low-income Israelis view the nuclear threat as a potential reason for emigrating. That is, the gap between wealthy and poor Israelis is about 5% on this question.

If a hostile state acquires nuclear arms, there is a greater likelihood that Kadima and Labor voters would leave the country. While there are no significant disparities between the parties, it is evident that the nuclear threat has a greater influence on Kadima (77) and Labor (76) voters than on Shas (86) or National Union – National Religious Party (88) voters. Those who identify with Likud and United Torah Judaism receive a high score of 83, compared to Meretz and Yisraeli Beiteinu voters, whose scores are similar to those of Labor and Kadima.

Did the Second Lebanon War affect your emotional connection to the state?

Illustration 16: The effect of the Second Lebanon War on the emotional connection to the state, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

The impact of the Second Lebanon War was small. Last year, several months after the Second Lebanon War, we discovered that the war slightly strengthened the public's emotional connection with the state. For example, we saw that this emotional connection to the state strengthened among 32% of the Jewish citizenry. On the other hand, this connection weakened among 26% of this population. The war had no effect on the emotional connection to the state among 42% of this public. The effect of the war is lower in the 2008 Patriotism Survey than in the previous survey: 28% say that the war strengthened their connection to the state and 22% state that the war weakened the
connection. While the overall average on this question is the same as last year, the meaning is different: The survey this year shows a higher percentage of respondents saying that the war "did not affect" them.

The following variables had a clear effect on the Rootedness Index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong> – those above the age of 45</td>
<td>express a particularly high level of rootedness in comparison to those younger than them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The level of religiousness</strong></td>
<td>the religious and traditional are more connected than the secular and ultra-Orthodox to the Land of Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income level</strong></td>
<td>the rich and the poor are more inclined, to the same extent, to be connected to the state, in comparison to middle-income earners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>The level of rootedness is greatly influenced by the gender variable: women tend to be much more rooted than men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political orientation</strong></td>
<td>Those with right-wing and centrist orientations display a higher level of rootedness than leftists.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for the level of education, which does not affect the index, all of the other demographic variables have a significant impact on the Rootedness Index.
The dimension of pride

This chapter is based on one index and three main questions that examine the Israel public's pride. On one hand, we directed the extent of pride in the Israeli identity and the Jewish identity. We also created an index of pride, which examines what Israelis are more proud of, and what they are less proud of. The Pride Index includes statements that were asked in the past, thus enabling a comparison of results over time. The index examines the pride of the state's citizens in social, economic and political areas. Finally, we asked whether the State of Israel is a better state than other states in the world.

A high level of pride in Israeli identity. In regard to the first question ("Are you proud to be an Israeli?"), the 2007 Patriotism Survey indicated a decline in the pride of being an Israeli in comparison to the 2006 survey. In the latest survey, however, the component of pride has returned to the 2006 level: in the 2008 survey, like two years ago, the average score is 78.

![Illustration 17: Pride in being Israeli, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.](image)

Not proud at all, Not very proud, Quite proud, Very proud

Those 45 years old and above are proudest of their Israeli identity (81). The youngest group (army age or just after army age) is next with a score of 78, followed by the middle age group (74). According to the survey data, more than 87% of the young people cited their Israeliness as a source of pride. This compares to only 79% of the middle age group (35-44 years old) who said they are proud to be Israeli.

The pride in being Israeli is particularly high among the religious. The religious group is the one that emphasizes most (89) its pride in being Israeli. The traditional (81) and secular (76) place less emphasis, followed by the ultra-Orthodox, whose level of pride in being Israeli is particularly low (61). During the past two years, there has been a increase of five points among the secular and religious, while the ultra-Orthodox have recorded the same percentage of decline.
When examining the party context for the question of who is proud to be an Israeli, the combination of level of religiousness and political orientation goes a long way toward explaining the picture that arises from the data. The more right-wing and religious the respondents are, the higher their level of pride. Therefore, it is not surprising that the National Union – National Religious Party receives the highest score (89) among the parties. Likud, a right-wing party, is ranked second with a score of 85, followed by Kadima and Labor with an identical score of 82. Though Yisrael Beiteinu is clearly a right-wing party, its ranking is relatively low (78). Shas voters (73) and Meretz (70) are ranked above United Torah Judaism (60).

Low education, high pride. All of the educational levels receive scores of 75 to 78, except for those who did not finish high school, whose score is 83. In last year's survey, those with high school education received the highest score. However, their score declined by six points this year, placing them in second place. In any case, one can point toward a connection between pride in being Israeli and level of education, and this was also true in earlier years.

Illustration 18: Pride in being Jewish, in the Jewish public, 2008, in percentages.

An especially high level of pride in Jewishness. Though the score for pride in Israeliness is high, the score for Jewish pride is even higher (87). The overall percentage of those who are proud of being Jewish is nearly 93% in this year's survey, as in the past.

Secular Israelis are less proud of Judaism. The public whose lives are connected to religion regard Judaism as something central and important. The difference between the religious, traditional and ultra-Orthodox sectors is not substantial. The religious receive the highest score (97), followed by the ultra-Orthodox (95) and traditional (93). As expected, Jewish pride is significantly lower among the secular public, with a score of 80.
The younger the respondents, the prouder they are of Judaism. Those under the age of 25 are prouder of Judaism than their elders. The youngest group received a score of 91, compared to 86 for the middle age group (25-45) and 88 for those over the age of 45.

For the second consecutive year, men showed more pride in being Jewish than women. As in the survey last year, men (86) scored three points higher than women (83). Thus, one can point to continuity in the Pride Index in this respect.

The more right-wing the respondents, the prouder they are in Judaism. The public that has a right-wing worldview is much prouder of Judaism than those inclined to the center (87) and left (74). A similar pattern was evident in last year's survey, though the latest survey shows a four-point decline in the score for the left.

Pride in Judaism among 100% of the voters for Shas, United Torah Judaism and National Union – National Religious Party. This perfect score is higher than that of voters for Likud (94), Kadima (85) and Labor (83). They are followed by voters for Yisrael Beiteinu (81) and Meretz, whose score (64) is the lowest among the Jewish public.

What are Israeli citizens proud of?


Rehabilitation of the Pride Index. As noted, the Pride Index is composed of eight fields. In comparison to last year's index, we see increase of four points this year, to 58. This increase restores the index to nearly its level of two years ago (63). However, as evident in Illustration 19, another field was added that was not examined in the previous year: pride in the education system. Calculating this value into the score, as well as pride in the Knesset (which was also not examined last year), brings the index value to 50.
The ranking of areas of pride has not changed over time. The illustration and data indicate that during the components of the Pride Index have not changed at all during the three years of the survey. Except for minor changes in the percentages of Israelis who are proud in each of the areas, we do not see a change in the ranking of statements. This means that the Israeli population is consistent in its views toward the objects of pride in the State of Israel. With the exception of the education system, which was not analyzed in previous years, one can see an improvement in nearly every area in the 2008 survey compared to the 2007 survey.

Great pride in science and technology. As in previous years, the great majority (91%) of the public is proud of Israel's scientific and technological achievements. According to the data of the Patriotism Survey, this area has received the highest ranking for three consecutive years.

After science and technology, the public is proudest of the security forces (79%). The security forces partially rehabilitated their image in the public's eyes after recording a drastic decline of 23% in public pride in last year's survey (from 87% to 64%). As in previous years, the state's ethical and cultural heritage continues to constitute a source of great pride for Israelis, cited by 61% of the respondents. However, 15% of the respondents are not at all proud of the state's ethical and cultural heritage.

The state's economic achievements ranked fourth on the scale of pride (58%). Compared to last year, the percentage of Israelis who cited pride in this area rose by 12%. (The 2007 figure was 53%, up from 46% in 2006.) Israeli pride in the Supreme Court declined by 5% and is ranked fifth. There was no change in the extent of pride in social solidarity (which rose 5% from the 2006 to the 2007 surveys). The percentage of those who expressed pride in the state's solidarity stands at about 37%, compared to 27% who are not proud at all in this aspect of Israel.

The Israeli education system and the Knesset received the two lowest rankings of pride. Only 5% are "very proud" of the education system and 15% are "quite proud." 43% of the respondents said they were "not proud at all" in the Israeli education system. As noted, the Knesset continued this year to fail to constitute a source of pride for Israelis: Only 10% of the Jewish population is proud in the Knesset, while 90% is not proud of this institution.

The oldest group is proudest. Those 45 and older comprise the group that finds the most reasons to be proud of the State of Israel. They are prouder than the younger groups in five areas: the state's economic achievements, its scientific achievements, the security forces, the Supreme Court and the state's ethical and cultural heritage. However, the youngest group is particularly proud of Israel's social solidarity. The 25-45 age group scores lowest in pride in all of the areas except for the state's economic achievements; the youngest group records the lowest level of pride in this area.

University-educated Israelis are proud, but also disappointed. The illustration above indicates that the university-educated comprise the group that is proudest of Israel's technological achievements, economic achievements and Supreme Court. However, they are the most disappointed in the security forces and the state's social solidarity. At the other end of the education scale – that is, those who did not complete high school – we see an opposite pattern: It is the public that is least proud of the state's economic achievements and its scientific and technological achievements. This group shows more pride in regard to the security forces and the state's ethical and cultural heritage.

Kadima voters are the proudest in the various aspects of the state. Voters for the ruling party receive an average score of 58, while Shas and United Torah Judaism voters are the most disappointed among the voters for the Jewish political parties, with scores of 34 and 21, respectively. Between these two poles, are voters for Labor, Likud, Meretz and Yisrael Beiteinu (in that order). Yisrael Beiteinu, with a score of 44, is closer to Shas than to Kadima.

The following variables had a clear effect on the Pride Index:

| Age – The oldest (above 45) and youngest (18-24) groups show more pride in various aspects of the state than the middle age group. |
| The level of religiousness – the religious are more proud of the state than the secular and traditional. The ultra-Orthodox is significantly less proud of the state. |
| Income level – the wealthy and the poor both see more sources of pride in the State of Israel than do middle class Israelis. |

Regression analyses determine that the demographic variables of education level, political orientation and gender do not have a significant impact on the Pride Index.
Do you agree that Israel, in general, is a better state than most other states?


Despite everything, Israel is still a better state than other states. During the three years in which the survey was conducted, 65% of the respondents agreed with the statement that "In general, Israel is better than other states in the world." The score of the Jewish public on this question is 62.

The State of Israel is not good enough for the secular. While the general score of the Jewish public is 62, a demographic analysis indicates that the secular receive a score of 56 on the question of whether Israel is better than other states. This compares to a score of 74 for the religious, 69 for the traditional and 63 for the ultra-Orthodox on this question. The decline recorded in last year's survey among the traditional and ultra-Orthodox continued in the 2008 survey: The general score for the ultra-Orthodox over the past two years decline by five points, while the traditional declined by four points.

The State of Israel is not good enough for people of ages 25-44. Just as the secular have a lower assessment of the state's situation, those of ages 25-44 also find it difficult to say that the State of Israel is better than other states (56.5). On the other hand, the younger and older groups think that the State of Israel is actually not such a bad place (65 and 67, respectively).

Right-wingers regard Israel as a better state. The public that identifies with the left does not think that the state is particularly good (51), compared to centrists (60) and rightists (71). Over the years, there has been almost no change in this cross section.

Voters for National Union – National Religious Party are ranked at the top, followed by Shas voters. Part of the trend we saw earlier can be translated to party politics: National Union – National Religious Party voters are at the top of the ranking with a score of 79, while Meretz voters are at the other end with a score of 47. However, there are exceptions that do not correspond to the right, center, left continuum. For example, Yisrael Beiteinu voters, despite their right-wing orientation, are not near the top of the
ranking. Rather, they received the second lowest score, 56. Unlike other trends we have seen in the Patriotism survey, it is very surprising to see that voters for a party like Shas received the second highest score (76) when asked whether Israel is a better state than other states.

**The higher the education level, the lower the assessment of the State of Israel.** Those who completed 12 years of schooling or less have a very high assessment of the state (74). On the other hand, those with academic degrees disagree with the claim that Israel is a better state than others (57). Those with a partial academic education or non-academic post-secondary education are in the middle with a score of 62.
Jerusalem

In marking Israel's 60th anniversary, and in light of Jerusalem's dominance as a symbol of Israeli patriotism, the survey examined the main reasons for the city's importance for the Jewish public and the extent of importance it attributes to maintaining its current status as a united city and as the capital of Israel. The findings indicate that for 42% of the Jewish public Jerusalem is primarily important due to its historical significance, while about 25% cited the city's religious significance. A smaller part of the population cited the city's political (6%) and security (4%) importance.

According to the current survey, 85% of the Jews believe that it is important to maintain Jerusalem's current status as a united city and the capital of Israel in the framework of negotiations with the Palestinians. However, the importance of the city's current status declined to some extent in comparison to the Peace Index of 1999, when more than 91% of the respondents wanted Jerusalem to maintain its current status.

The young group (18-24) stood out in its aspiration to maintain the status of a united Jerusalem, with 90% expressing this view. When the data is examined from a political perspective, the gap between the camps is very wide: 99% of the right versus 58% of the left. A gap also exists between the religious and the secular: the religious, traditional and ultra-Orthodox (97%) versus the secular (74%). There is also a disparity between men and women on this question, with women attributing great importance to Jerusalem (88%). The level of education also has an impact: 80% of those with higher education would like to see Jerusalem united and as the capital of Jerusalem at the conclusion of negotiations with the Palestinians, compared with 93.5% of those with lower levels of education.

Despite the importance attributed to maintaining the city's current status for the great majority of the Jewish public, 40% would agree to transfer the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty in a peace accord with the Palestinians, and to establish the capital of the Palestinian state in these areas. While this is still a minority view, it should be noted that when the Peace Index examined this question in 2002, the percentage of those agreeing with this view did not exceed 31%.

According to the Patriotism survey, there are large disparities in the levels of support for dividing Jerusalem when analyzed by political orientation: 14% among rightists, 55% among centrists and 77% among leftists. This finding is not surprising. The disparities by level of religiousness are also not surprising: ultra-Orthodox – 5%, religious – 8%, traditional – 33% and secular – 55%. An interesting finding appears when the data is analyzed by age: the youngest Israelis are the only ones to overwhelmingly oppose an accord (79%), compared to the other age groups, whose opposition does not exceed 60%. 
A strong connection was also found between the levels of education and income and support for such a diplomatic accord: The higher the education and income, the greater the readiness for a peace accord with the Palestinians in exchange for the transfer of the eastern neighborhoods to Palestinian sovereignty.

The state's successes in the eyes if the Jewish public: the 60th anniversary versus the 50th jubilee

In advance of the state's 60th birthday, we decided it would be appropriate to use the Patriotism Survey to examine how the Israeli public sums up its successes and failures, from its establishment through today. In deciding which fields to choose for this purpose, we were aided by a special survey conducted with the objective prior to the state's 50th jubilee, in the framework of the Peace Index. Due to various constraints, we chose to focus on only six of the fields included in that survey. By referring to the 1998 survey, it is possible to compare the assessment of the state's successes then and now. A list of the fields and their scores of success in 1998 and 2008 are displayed in Illustration 22.


The 2008 survey data shows wider disparities between the six areas of the state's successes. The highest score (70) is for the success in ensuring the state's existence from a military perspective, while the lowest score (25) is for the state's success – or lack thereof – in achieving economic equality. It seems, therefore, that the growth in economic disparities that already began in the 1990s, and which accelerated during the past decade, has made a profound mark on the Israeli public. Moreover, such a low score means that the negative assessment in this area is shared by all parts of the Israeli society and is not limited to the lower socio-economic segments that are the principal victims of the
widening disparities. The connection between the objective reality in the economic sphere and the public's subjective assessment is also reflected in the score (58, the second highest in the scale of successes) for the state's achievements in raising the standard of living. In other words, while the public is aware of the growing economic disparities, it also recognizes the growth in the Israeli economy that has occurred over most of the past two decades, leading to an impressive improvement in the standard of living. Another expression of the correspondence between the subjective and objective realities can be found in the low assessment attributed to the state "in generating a sense of solidarity, beyond the internal disagreements," which received the second-to-lowest score (34). As could be anticipated, there is a correlation between the issue of disparities and the issue of solidarity, but it can also be assumed that the public's conceptions of "solidarity" and "overcoming disagreements" include various issues of social, cultural and political divisions as well. The state also receives a relatively high score (56) in the bringing and absorbing immigrants. This score is just slightly lower than the score given to the rise in the standard of living.

Comparing these findings with those of 1998 leads to several unequivocal conclusions:

First, the assessments of the state's successes at the time of the 50th jubilee were higher in all areas, without exception: The average score in 2008 was 48, compared to 58 in 1998. That is, there is much less satisfaction in regard to the state's successes at its 60th anniversary in comparison to its jubilee year.

Second, there is almost a complete overlap in the ranking of the state's successes in the six areas. For example, ensuring the state's existence from a military standpoint and achieving economic equality were ranked first and last, respectively, in the previous survey. There was an insignificant switching of places between raising the standard of living (ranked third in 1998) and bringing immigrants (ranked second in 1998). We believe that this change in ranking is not coincidental because the rates of economic growth in recent years were higher than during the previous decade, while the scope of immigration in recent years has grown smaller in comparison to the large waves of immigration in the 1990s.

Third, despite the uniform pattern of decline in the assessments and the correlation in ranking between the two surveys, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the decline was more pronounced in some areas than in others. For example, in regard to the issue of raising the standard of living, there was a decline of only four points (from 62 in 1998 to 58 in 2008), while in regard to the issue of economic equality, there was a decline of 15 points (from 40 to 25). It is important to emphasize that nearly an identical decline was also recorded in the field of security, from a score of 83 in 1998 to a current score of just 70.
Nonetheless, it seems that the disappointment in the state's performance did not have a significant impact on the emotional connection to it on a personal level. On the question – "Do you care more about the state today than you once did?" – 20% of the respondents said they cared more in the past, 18% said they care more today and 62% said there was no change. That is, most of the public distinguishes between its criticism of the state's performance and its emotional attachment to the state. This attachment does not change, despite the disappointment over its achievements. It is interesting to note that a similar pattern of responses was also recorded in the 1998 survey.

Residents of the North and the rest of the Jewish population

Comparing the residents of the North to the rest of the Jewish population shows that the level of patriotism of the former tends to be higher than that of the latter in most of the fields in which disparities between the two groups are evident. The salient disparities include: defining oneself as an Israeli patriot (a score of 72 for Northern residents, versus 63 for others); pride in being Israeli (83 versus 76); dimension of symbolism (88 versus 81); the dimension of sacrifice (89 versus 84); and the impact of the Lebanon War on the emotional attachment to the state.

Moreover, comparing the findings of the current survey with the 2007 survey shows, in regard to some of the parameters, that the disparity between the level of patriotism of Northern residents versus that of others has even widened. This can be seen in Illustration 23:

Illustration 23: Main indexes, residents of the North and the rest of the population, 2007, 2008, in scores.

It should be noted that a comparison between the residents of the Gaza perimeter and the rest of the Jewish population also showed that the former group is more inclined to be patriotic than the latter. It seems, therefore, that at least according to our findings, the level of patriotism among residents of the Israeli periphery in the North and South is higher than that of the center.
Gaza perimeter communities

In order to examine Israeli patriotism in the context of the Gaza perimeter residents, we devoted, as mentioned, a number of questions specifically pertaining to the region and conducted a comparison between the responses we received from the residents of the region (based on a special sample representing this population) and the responses received from the general sample of the Jewish population. In addition, we compared the two groups in regard to all of the aspects of Israeli patriotism discussed above.

The comparison shows that residents of the Gaza perimeter tend to be more patriotic than others, similar to residents of the North. Thus, they have higher scores in the Rootedness Index (90 versus 78 in the general Jewish public), in their attitude toward symbols expressing patriotism – flying the flag on Independence Day and honoring the siren on Remembrance Day for the IDF Fallen Soldiers (93 versus 82), in assessing the State of Israel as better than other states (69 versus 62) and in pride in being a Jew (93 versus 83). Moreover, in regard to their willingness to personally contribute to assist residents of the Gaza perimeter region, they were nearly unanimous (98%) in saying that they were willing to lend assistance to a great extent (96%) or to some extent (2%). Among the overall Jewish population, 88% said they were personally willing to help (50% to a great extent and 38% to some extent). It seems, therefore, that a sense of shared destiny strengthens the solidarity of residents of the region.

The conclusion arising from these findings is that the level of patriotism among the residents of the Gaza perimeter is no lower than that of the rest of the Jewish public, and in some areas it is even higher. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the constant exposure to rocket and mortar attacks does not leave its mark on the residents of this region. For example, on the question "How does the ongoing firing of Qassams on your place of residence affect your emotional attachment to the state?" – 25% said it strengthened the connection, 31% said it had no effect and 44% said it weakened their attachment. It is interesting to note that the impact of the Qassams correlates to the residents' perception of whether their distance from central Israel influences the attitude of the public and government authorities toward their situation. Among those who believe that this distance has no such effect, the firing of Qassams strengthens their emotional attachment to the state, while among those who believe that the distance affects the concern for their situation on the part of the general public and government authorities, the emotional attachment weakened.
The Arabs of Israel

The question of Israeli patriotism among the Arab citizens of Israel is not something obvious and there are those who would reject the idea of examining this question because the concept of patriotism is inherently connected to the concept of nation, and the Arabs belong to a different nation. Nonetheless, we decided that there is room to examine the Israeli patriotism among the Arab population – if only because Israel, besides being a Jewish state, regards Israeli Arabs as full citizens with equal rights, at least at the declarative level. Still, due to the differences in national identity, we found it necessary to examine the connection of Israeli Arabs to Israeli patriotism separately from the Jewish population, while comparing the two groups in order to discover the areas of similarity and difference in regard to patriotism.

Against this background, we presented the Arab respondents with three possible modes of patriotism – Israeli, Palestinian and Arab – and asked them to what extent they see themselves as patriots in regard to each of the three. Since these questions also appeared in the 2007 Patriotism Survey, we will present the findings for both years in order to see whether any changes have occurred on this question.

As evident from Illustration 24, the ranking of patriotism among the Arabs of Israel is clear and stable over time, with Arab patriotism ranked first, followed by Palestinian patriotism and finally Israeli patriotism, with similar margins between the scores for Arab and Palestinian patriotism, and between Palestinian and Israeli patriotism. In 2008, the scores for Arab, Palestinian and Israeli patriotism were 82, 62 and 44, respectively, compared to 86, 61 and 43 in the previous year's survey. It should be emphasized that despite an ostensible decline in Arab patriotism, the difference is not statistically significant and the conclusion is that there is stability in the ranking and strength of the three types of patriotism. In this context, it is interesting to examine the preference among Arab Israelis for their Arab identity rather than their Palestinian identity.

The sociological explanation for this priority, which was also documented in previous studies, partly derives from the problematic status of Israeli Arabs among their Palestinian brethren living outside of Israel's borders, as well as the problematic status of the Palestinians in general in the Arab world. The aspiration for the primacy of the collective, pan-Arab identity expresses, at least in part, the desire to neutralize the difficulty attached to the Palestinian identity of Arab Israelis.

In comparison to the Jewish public, one can see, as expected, a significantly lower score (44) on Israeli patriotism. (The score for the Jewish public is 65). Nonetheless, it should be noted that this score is an average of a distribution of responses, according to which 33% of Arab Israelis regard themselves as Israeli patriots to a great extent or very great extent, 53% to some extent and only 14% as not at all. In other words, despite the low
ranking of Israeli patriotism in comparison to the two other modes of identity, its weight among the Arab population is not at all insignificant.

A look at the Arab Israelis' connection to the various dimensions of Israeli patriotism reveals a picture that is quite consistent: As expected, with a few exceptions, their scores on patriotism in most areas are lower than those of the Jews. In some of these areas, the gaps are very wide. It is not surprising to find that the most salient of these gaps is the willingness to fight for the state (Jews – 85.5, Arabs – 24). Despite the wide disparity, it is hard to ignore the fact that there is a substantial minority of Arabs who express willingness to fight for the state, despite the fact that this idea is especially loathsome in the eyes of its political and intellectual leadership. In any case, based on this finding, one can assume that if Israeli Arabs were offered the possibility of national service, their level of willingness to choose this service would be much higher.

Another area in which the Arab level of patriotism is much lower than that of the Jews (50 versus 83) is the Symbols Index. This index addresses two issues: honoring the siren on Remembrance Day for IDF Fallen Soldiers and the importance attributed to flying the Israeli flag on Independence Day. Considering the fact that both of these symbols are clear expressions of "Zionism," it is no wonder that the Arabs of Israel find it difficult to identify with them. Moreover, one can even argue that the attitude of Arabs Israelis toward these two symbols is more positive than expected, especially in regard to Remembrance Day, with 60% of the Arabs agreeing to a great extent or very great extent with the statement: "It makes me angry when people disrespect the siren on Remembrance Day for IDF Fallen Soldiers." For comparative purposes, 91% of the Jewish public agrees with this statement.
In regard to the Rootedness Index, the Arabs and Jews received the identical score: 78. As noted, this index is based on three items: the willingness to emigrate to another country, the preference for Israeli citizenship to citizenship in another state, and encouraging children to live in Israel. It seems, therefore, that the strength of attachment to the country, whether on the level of citizenship or in more general terms, is shared by the Arab and Jewish populations, although this attachment does not necessarily derive from the same motives, personal considerations or values.

However, there is a significant disparity between the two groups (Arabs – 60, Jews – 78) on another question related to the rootedness and which was not included in the index because it was not asked in previous surveys – the willingness to live in Israel even if there is a hostile state in the region with nuclear arms. That is, if a hostile state acquires nuclear arms, a higher proportion of Israeli Arabs would be ready to leave the country than Israeli Jews.

Not surprisingly, a significant gap also exists between the two populations in regard to the status of Jerusalem. For 85% of the Jews, it is very important (65%) or quite important (20%) for Israel, in the framework of peace negotiations with the Palestinians, to preserve the current status of Jerusalem as a united city and as the capital of Israel alone. Only 55% of the Arabs share this view, including 23% who said this issue is very important to them and 33% who said it was quite important. We believe that in light of the statements by various spokesmen in the Arab leadership on the subject of Jerusalem, a much larger disparity between the views of the two sectors could also have been expected on this question and that it deserves further in-depth study.

A similar pattern of responses was also received in regard to the question of whether in the framework of advanced negotiations on a peace accord with the Palestinians Israel should agree or oppose the transfer of Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty so that Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian state. Among the Arabs, the levels of agreement and opposition are 67.5% and 32.5%, respectively, while among the Jewish public the corresponding levels are 40% and 60%.

In what ways is Jerusalem important for both groups? The findings show that from a list of four possibilities – historic, security, religious and economic – the city is important for the Arabs primarily for its religious significance, which was cited by 80% of Arab respondents, with none of the other possibilities cited by over 10% of these respondents. As noted above, Jerusalem is important to Jews for two main reasons: First and foremost, the historical significance was cited by 42% or Jewish respondents, while 25% of these respondents cited its religious significance. The other two possibilities were cited by relatively few Jewish respondents. It is important to emphasize that despite the salient differences between them, Jerusalem is important to both groups primarily in its spiritual and symbolic sense and not due to material and instrumental reasons.
The only area in which the Arabs reveal themselves to be greater Israeli patriots than the Jews is in regard to the index of pride in the state's accomplishments, with a score of 56 compared to 49 for the Jews. This is a relatively small disparity but it is statistically clear and, because of its exceptionality, deserves an explanation. In our view, the Arabs of Israel, unlike the Jewish public, tends to compare the achievements of the Israel in various fields – science and technology, education, the economy, the legal system, the legislature, and so on – to those of Arab states. And on the basis of this comparison, most of them recognize the preferability of Israel in these areas. For the Jewish public, on the other hand, Arab states do not apparently constitute a relevant framework for comparison, and it tends to evaluate Israel's achievements in comparison with the Western world or with the achievements of Israel in the past. In any case, the recognition of these achievements by the Arabs of Israel is likely to explain, if only partially, why the great majority of them prefer Israeli citizenship to the possibility of Palestinian citizenship, as documented in a number of studies in recent years.

A similar pattern of findings is evident in regard to the assessment of the state's achievements on the eve of its 60th anniversary. On most of the topics examined in this context (four of six), the Arabs gave higher scores than the Jews. This includes achieving economic equality (Jews – 25, Arabs – 48), generating a feeling of solidarity (33 versus 48), encouraging immigration (56 versus 62) and fostering the Jewish heritage (47 versus 66).

In summary, the comparison between the patriotism of the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel illustrates the tension the latter experience as a result of the contradiction that exists between their Palestinian Arab identity and their civic attachment to a state that is Jewish in essence.
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**Research Institutes and Organizations**

ISR – Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan ([www.isr.umich.edu/](http://www.isr.umich.edu/)).

NES – National Election Survey at the University of Michigan ([www.umich.edu/~nes/](http://www.umich.edu/~nes/)).

NORC – National Organization of Research at the University of Chicago ([www.norc.uchicago.edu](http://www.norc.uchicago.edu)).


WVS – World Values Survey ([http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)).

ISSP – International Social Survey Program ([http://www.issp.org](http://www.issp.org)).

AIE – American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ([http://www.aei.org](http://www.aei.org)).
2008 Patriotism Survey

1. What is your gender?
   1. Male
   2. Female

2. Year of birth? ________

3. Family status?
   1. Single
   2. Married
   3. Widowed
   4. Divorced / separated / single parent

4. How many children do you have? __________

5. How proud are you to be an Israeli?
   1. Very proud
   2. Quite proud
   3. Not very proud
   4. Not proud at all

6. (for Jews only) How proud are you to be a Jew?
   1. Very proud
   2. Quite proud
   3. Not very proud
   4. Not proud at all

7. How proud are you of the State of Israel in regard to each of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Proud</th>
<th>Quite Proud</th>
<th>Not very proud</th>
<th>Not proud at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7a. Israel's economic achievements</td>
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<tr>
<td>7b. Its scientific and technological achievements</td>
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<td>7c. Its Knesset</td>
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<td>7d. Its Supreme Court</td>
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<td>7e. Its defense forces</td>
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<td>7f. Its social solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>7g. Its moral and cultural heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>7h. Its educational system</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
8. (for Jews) To what extent do you see yourself as an Israeli patriot?
   1. A patriot to a very large extent
   2. A patriot to a large extent
   3. A patriot to some extent
   4. Not especially a patriot / Not a patriot at all
   5. Don’t know (because I am not familiar with the concept)
   6. Don’t know (because of other reasons)

(for Arabs) To what extent do you see yourself as a patriot in the following aspects?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To a very large extent</th>
<th>To a large extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>Not especially a patriot / Not a patriot at all</th>
<th>Don’t know (not familiar with the concept)</th>
<th>Don’t know (other reasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8a. Israeli patriot</td>
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<tr>
<td>8b. Palestinian patriot</td>
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<tr>
<td>8c. Arab patriot</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9. Israeli patriotism means many things to different people. How important, in your opinion, are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Quiet important</th>
<th>Not so important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9a. Flying the Israeli flag on Independence Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>9b. Readiness to fight for the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>9c. Buying Israeli-made products</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9d. Voting in elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>9e. Living in Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>9f. Contributing to social organizations that help the needy</td>
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<tr>
<td>9g. Establishing a new village in the Negev or Galilee (for Jews)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
10. Patriotism is also related to values. I will now read a number of terms that some people believe are related to Israeli patriotism. In your view, how much is each of them indeed related to Israeli patriotism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Very related</th>
<th>Quiet related</th>
<th>Not so related</th>
<th>Not related at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10a. Zionism</td>
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<tr>
<td>10b. Love of the country</td>
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<tr>
<td>10c. Social justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>10d. The Bible</td>
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<td>10e. The Hebrew language</td>
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<td>10f. The Jewish heritage</td>
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<td>10g. The ingathering of exiles</td>
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<td>10h. Jerusalem</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

11. Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if another war erupts, would you agree to fight for the state?

1. I would definitely agree
2. I would almost most certainly agree
3. I would almost certainly not agree
4. I would definitely not agree

12. Would you be ready to move and live in a different country?

1. I would definitely agree
2. I think so
3. I don’t think so
4. I would definitely not agree

13. What is the main reason that would make you ready to move to another country to live?

1. The economic situation
2. Security for you and your family
3. Government corruption
4. Lack of social solidarity and equality
5. Not ready for any reason
6. Other ____________
14. I am now going to read you a number of statements. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree very much</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14a. I would rather be a citizen of the State of Israel than of any other state in the world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14b. It is justified to refuse to fight in a war you believe to be immoral.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14c. I will encourage my children to live in Israel, even though there are more secure and prosperous places where they could live.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14d. It angers me when people disrespect the siren on Remembrance Day for IDF Fallen Soldiers</td>
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<tr>
<td>14e. In general, Israel is better than most other countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>14f. I would prefer to live in Israel even if a hostile state in the region acquires nuclear arms</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

15. In retrospect, did the Second Lebanon War affect your emotional connection to the state?

1. Strengthened the emotional connection very much
2. Strengthened it a little
3. Had no affect
4. Weakened it a little
5. Weakened it a lot
6. Don't know
New questions on 'the Gaza perimeter'

16. How do you assess the resilience of the residents of Sderot and the other Gaza perimeter communities in the face of the ongoing firing of Qassams against them?

1. Very good
2. Quite good
3. Quite poor
4. Very poor

17. Do you agree or disagree with the claim that "the distance of the Gaza perimeter communities from central Israel weakens the level of interest of the state's residents in the security problems of these communities?"

1. Agree very much
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Don't agree at all
5. Don't know

18. Do you agree or disagree with the claim that the distance of the Gaza perimeter communities from central Israel weakens the urgency assigned to dealing with the security problems of these communities by the government in Israel?

1. Agree very much
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Don't agree at all
5. Don't know

19. Would you personally be willing to contribute in some way to assist those living in the Gaza perimeter region?

1. To a great extent
2. To some extent
3. To a small extent
4. Not at all
5. Don't know
Only for residents of the Gaza perimeter:

20. **How has the continuous firing of Qassams at your place of residence affected your emotional connection to the state?**

1. Strengthened the emotional connection very much
2. Strengthened it a little
3. Had no affect
4. Weakened it a little
5. Weakened it a lot
6. Don't know
New questions in advance of Israel's 60th anniversary

21. Which sentence is most correct in your opinion?

1. People used to care more about the state
2. People today care more about the state
3. There is no difference between today and the past
4. Don't know

22. Which sentence is most correct in your opinion?

1. I used to care more about the state
2. I care more about the state today
3. There is no difference between today and the past
4. Don't know

23. How do you assess the state's success versus its lack of success in each of the following areas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very successful</th>
<th>Quite successful</th>
<th>Not very successful</th>
<th>Not successful at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Ensuring the state's existence from a military perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Raising the residents' standard of living</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Achieving economic equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Generating a sense of solidarity, beyond the internal disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Encouraging immigration and bringing immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Preserving water reservoirs and natural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Fostering the Jewish heritage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
New questions about Jerusalem

24. How is Jerusalem important to you?

1. From a historical perspective
2. From a security perspective
3. From an economic perspective
4. From a religious perspective
5. From a political perspective
6. Other _______
7. Jerusalem is not important to me
8. Don’t know

25. In the framework of peace negotiations with the Palestinians, how important is it for you that Israel maintains the current status of a united city and as the capital of Israel only?

1. Very important
2. Quite important
3. Not very important
4. Not important at all
5. Don’t know

26. If Israel and the Palestinians ultimately reach the stage of advanced negotiations on a peace accord, would you personally agree or disagree to transfer the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty and that East Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian state?

1. Agree very much
2. Agree
3. Don’t agree
4. Don’t agree at all
5. Don’t know
**Demographic questions**

27. What is your level of education?

1. Elementary and below
2. High school without matriculation
3. High school with matriculation
4. Yeshiva high school
5. Post-secondary
6. Partial university
7. Full university

28. What is your religion?

1. Jewish
2. Muslim
3. Christian (Arab)
4. Christian (non-Arab)
5. Druze
6. Other

29. (Jews only): To what extent are you religious?

1. Fervently religious (ultra-Orthodox)
2. Religious
3. Traditional
4. Secular

(Arabs only): To what extent are you strict in carrying out religious commandments?

1. To a very great extent
2. To a great extent
3. To a small extent
4. To a very small extent
5. Not at all

30: Where were you born?

1. Israel
2. Asia or the Middle East
3. North Africa
4. Confederation of Independent States
5. Europe / America
31. (if not born in Israel): In what year did you immigrate to Israel? ________

32. (if born in Israel): Where was your father born?
   1. Israel
   2. Asia or the Middle East
   3. North Africa
   4. Confederation of Independent States
   5. Europe / America

33. How many people live in your household, including yourself? ______________

34. How many of them are under 18, including yourself? ______________

35. What was your gross monthly income last month?
   1. Less than 2,000 shekels
   2. 2,000 – 4,000 shekels
   3. 4,000 – 8,000 shekels
   4. 8,000 – 16,000 shekels
   5. Over 16,000 shekels

36. What is the total gross monthly income of all family members living in your home?
   1. Less than 2,000 shekels
   2. 2,000 – 4,000 shekels
   3. 4,000 – 8,000 shekels
   4. 8,000 – 16,000 shekels
   5. Over 16,000 shekels

37. How would you define your political-security views?
   1. Right
   2. Moderate right
   3. Center
   4. Moderate left
   5. Left

38. To which of the existing political parties do you feel closest in your views?
   1. Kadima
   2. Labor
   3. Likud
4. Shas
5. Petitioners
6. National Religious Party and National Union
7. United Torah Judaism
8. Meretz
9. Yisrael Beiteinu
10. Hadash
11. Ra'am – Ta'al
12. Balad
13. Green Leaf
14. Greens
15. Don't know
16. Blank / empty ballot

39. If elections were held today, which party would you vote for?

1. Kadima
2. Labor
3. Likud
4. Shas
5. Petitioners
6. National Religious Party and National Union
7. United Torah Judaism
8. Meretz
9. Yisrael Beiteinu
10. Hadash
11. Ra'am – Ta'al
12. Balad
13. Green Leaf
14. Greens
15. Don't know
16. Blank / empty ballot

40. Which party did you vote for in the last elections?

1. Kadima
2. Labor
3. Likud
4. Shas
5. Petitioners
6. National Religious Party and National Union
7. United Torah Judaism
8. Meretz
9. Yisrael Beiteinu
10. Hadash
11. Ra'am – Ta'al
12. Balad
13. Hetz (Poraz)
14. Shinui
15. Green Leaf
16. Greens
17. Tafnit (Uzi Dayan)
18. I didn't vote
19. Blank / empty ballot

41. What is the name of the community in which you live? ______________