Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in Modern Islamist Thought

Working paper

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Executive Summary

The research is divided into the analysis of fear and construction of fear in Islam, followed by the taxonomy of classical Islamic concepts of deterrence and the analysis of modern Islamic deterrence strategies (i.e. measures to prevent hostile actions). Classical Islamic deterrence paradigms strongly influence contemporary jihadi perceptions in theory and in practice. We will illustrate this at the example of real attacks and ideas of different key-thinkers of global jihad. Moreover, the research examines loopholes in Islamic deterrence paradigms and suggest religious-psychological counter-strategies, after examining conventional state-deterrence against non-state jihadi actors and their non-viability. The methodological basis is a qualitative organizational network analysis together with socio-anthropological and religious-cultural approaches to examine non-state actors’ behavioral patterns.

The conclusion argues that successful deterrence must be based on psycho-religious approaches that exploit concepts of fear in Islamic culture; specifically in Sunni-jihadi subculture. Furthermore, the study shows that Sunni jihadi sub-state actor perceptions of deterrence vary considerably from those of Western secular state. The task is to find a "common language." Tactical deterrence by punishment and the actual application of force and realization of threats play a much bigger role for Muslim sub-state actors and are inherent elements of Sunni-jihadi deterrence; the realization of threats, however, plays a much less lesser role in "classical" nuclear-deterrence thinking (where equilibrium of nuclear threat is supposed to guarantee stability). For example, jihadis analogize medieval "single attacks," to suicide-attacks, which are meant to frighten the enemy. Initiative deterrence concepts ("pre-terrence;" Shmuel Bar 2012) are thus often connected to terrorist tactics and the asymmetric weaker position of sub-state actors.
Furthermore, Sunni-jihadi deterrence is characterized by perceptions of tribal endemic warfare and terrorist tactics. The reason is the strong focus of jihadis on example cases from early Islam, when Muslims developed from endemic to imperial warfare. These are taken as conceptual cornerstones by today's Sunni fighters to develop patterns of deterrence. However, deterrence strategies and patterns are not only based on frightening the enemy. There exists also a perception of fright in the mind of the actor himself. In religious sub-culture, transcendental and concrete fears can be clearly discerned. It is the role of reformed deterrence strategists to exploit this Achilles Heel, i.e. the fear in the mind of the opponent. Dealing with militant religious sub-state actors in the information age means to transit from conventional to alternative deterrence approaches. Linguistic and psycho-religious approaches are required to address their fears, while viable non-conflict and conciliation policies must address Muslim populations and respective meta-cultures.

Military deterrence against Muslim non-state actors has worked so far only in geographically limited environments (Occupied Palestinian Territories), with terrible prices for the local civilian population involved. Military deterrence against jihadi sub-state actors in larger Muslim regions lacks viable results. Firstly, jihadi culture nurtures on martyrdom mythology; getting passively killed by the enemy (by targeted assassinations) is rather a reward than a punishment. Secondly, Western security cooperation against jihadis is often combined with military campaigns against local Islamist and nationalist forces, for example, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Such actions further fuel Muslim anger against local governments and Western involvement: both jihadi and insurgent agendas feed on this anger, finally both groupings become ever more ideologically united.

Reformed deterrence paradigms should address religious-psychological fears of jihadis (*ittiqa'; khauf*), which prohibit actively seeking martyrdom. At the same time, complementary conciliation policies in parallel should address non-jihadi Muslims and local host populations. The key for a successful deterrence strategy against jihadi sub-state actors is to understand

1. Jihadi in-group-culture (rootedness in neo-tribalism and information-age fundamentalism);
2. Jihadi deterrence (rootedness in "pre-terrence" based on neo-endemic warfare perceptions);
3. Jihadi sectarian cultism and martyrdom (rootedness in perceptions of fear and reward);
4. Deterrence as a defense strategy that developed out of primordial patterns of human behavior (rootedness in threat-display; rituals that glue groups together; re-emergence of these rituals in virtual space).

Religious-psychological deterrence is based on communicative conditioning and information-targeting of root-myths and beliefs.

Israel, for example, has "perfected" a concept that combines security control with deterring measures such as collective punishment (house demolitions) and tactical deterrence by punishment (targeted assassinations versus Palestinian terrorist attacks). However, democratic state alliances can and may not apply the same model to the deterrence of salafi-jihadis on an international level, i.e. collective punishment as legitimate means of deterrence. It is logistically impossible and by all standards of International Law illegitimate to control or punish larger regions and populations in response to attacks or threats by non-state actors. This is a key problem. The arrest and deportation of Muslim non-state actors into states which torture, such as Abu Musab al-Suri to Syria in 2005, may have an effect on individuals. But they do not witness a deterring effect on the jihadi movement as a whole. Western Cold War deterrence paradigms (state vs. state, bloc vs. bloc) do not function against non-state actors. In case of jihadi terrorist threats, Western states pose themselves the question, whom to counter-attack. The problem was clearly
demonstrated by the U.S. reaction to the attacks of 9/11, which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, bitter experience shows that trying to dry out one hotbed of extremism creates many others at the same time (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, and Libya). Moreover, such a policy has the effect that the popularity of and the support for jihadi concepts among Muslim populations is dangerously rising.

The West has to refrain from collectively punishing Muslims (which is indirectly done by catastrophically failed military policies and the resulting massive “collateral damages” in the Muslim world). Jihadi sub-state actors, in contrast, do not suffer from any moral predicament. The "strength" of jihadi deterrence paradigms relies on an unscrupulous construction of enemy categories that include civilians.

Classical Islamic deterrence concepts "exemplary punishment" (tankil) and "equal retaliation" (qisas) are supported by modern theological justifications that allow third-party, individual and collective (mass-) attacks. According to jihadi non-state actors, civilians of hostile western states (soft targets) can be targeted directly to communicate a message. Such attacks are—in salafi-jihadi thinking—defensive retaliatory attacks (9/11, Madrid 2004, London 2005), not offensive terrorist attacks.

One could argue that Western concepts of deterrence should work diametrically opposed. This would mean an approximate, but modified continuation of the presently U.S.-dominated international security strategy against hardcore terrorists: Muslims will not be punished collectively by interfering in their right of freedom and self-determination, but jihadis who plan attacks in the West will be taken out very pointedly, which cuts the leadership away from the base. Other deterrence strategists point to the removal of those leaders of global jihad who are influential enough to convince followers of the validity of their ideology, for example Ibrahim al-Banna, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, the ideological-figure heads of AQAP, who were assassinated by the U.S. in late 2011. However, deterrence against jihadi actors is a double-edged sword as long as the West will not end military policies in Muslim regions. Allowing regime changes to take place means that Islamists will to come to power. This will create political bargaining chips, possibilities for state-to-state deterrence and non-aggression pacts. Islamist regimes can actually be hold accountable for actions by jihadis who operate from their territory.

It is therefore very difficult to develop a functional approach of deterrence against jihadis non-state actors. A main point of this study is that religious ideology and a similar sub-culture are the lowest common denominators among jihadi non-state actors. A psychological deterrence strategy must attack this Achilles Heel. Every deterrence strategy is per definition psychological. However, the emphasis lies here on the prevalence of psychological means of information warfare and methods of conviction as opposed to military measures or threat scenarios.

Therefore, the transcendental element of fear is more important than the worldly element if one wants to deter a religious enemy. It is in the beginning not advisable to confront him with a Realangst (realistic fear). Rather, it requires a stratagem, namely to take a psychological detour to condition transcendental fears on concrete worldly matters.

Without a doubt, such an approach should be based on multifaceted combinations of soft and hard security measures as well as revised foreign policy strategies in the Middle East, without impeding on the freedom and rights of citizens of democratic states, and by drastically curbing Western military engagement in the Middle East.

In the introduction of this study, we will shed light on how the multiplicity of terrorist sub-state actors, the global rise of fundamentalism and drastically changed ways of perception in the information age alter
deterrence strategies, especially when a multiplicity of state and non-state actors are occupying the same field. New-old forms of deterrence are re-emerging which draw on the most tribal instincts and mythological fears of human societies. Classical Islamic deterrence rituals and tribal martial behavior are transformed into analogue virtual actions. For example, big-lettered Islamic formulas of laudation on jihadi discussion forums serve as virtual counterpart for physical threat behavior, thus being an expression of psychological and neo-tribal deterrence in virtual space.

The first part of the research analyses different psychological states of fear as well as the construction of fear and deterrence in Islam. It concludes that Islamic deterrence strategy is based on a synthesis of the different fear concepts. Muslims are supposed to feel a general fear to observe God's commands (khauf) and to feel awe from divine punishment if they do not give support to deterrence (ittiqa'), which takes the the form of terrorist attacks. A threat scenario must be created to deter the enemy (ra'b; irhab). Islamic deterrence itself is called rad'. This term does not appear in the Qur'an, but in later texts. (The Sunna and its literary form hadith; as well as in the different strands of Islamic jurisprudence fiqh). Modern jihadi ideologues have condensed this concept into a deterrence by punishment strategy, calling it "terrorist deterrence strategy" (istiratijiyat al-rad' bi-l-irhab).

The second part of the research deals with classical concepts of Islamic deterrence in the Qur’an, Islamic tradition and theology. Early Islamic scripts, as well as different branches of medieval Islamic theology show – similar to the monotheistic religions Judaism and Christendom – clear ideas of punishment, or the threat of punishment for the sake of preventing hostile actions from adversaries and for securing their own group. Intra-religious similarities become clear when looking at the Old Testament, where God revealed to Moses after Joshua’s fight against the Amaleks that "I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven" (Exodus 17, 14), and the destruction of the Anakims at the hands of Joshua (Joshua 11:21-23) with the goal that "the land rested from war." These passages can be read as divine injunctions to secure the own group by showing a sacred form of strength and power, which follows "divine injunctions." The threat to be annihilated in case of an attack is a powerful mythological theme that can be used against an adversary. The cost-benefit calculation in the mind of a possible enemy from the out-group can prevent him from an attack. This kind of mythology may also find a practical release valve in the systemic creation of fear within the in-group. The Catholic Church used the Inquisition to suppress any deviant views and bolster its monopoly on the interpretation of Christian faith through a policy of deterrence and intimidation.

Examples that clearly show the roots of classical Islamic deterrence paradigms and their importance for modern salafi-jihadis are, for example, Muslim raids against Meccan merchant caravans in the 7th century that took place from the Muslim stronghold in Medina. These raids seem not to have been motivated by economic reasons only. Moreover, the assassination of the Jewish tribal leader Ka'ab bin al-Ashraf from the Banu Nadir in 624 AD, who was accused of anti-Muslim incitement in his poetry, as well as the alleged mass execution of male members of the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayza in 627 AD, who were accused of treason, were deterrence measures and warnings not to turn again against the Muslim community. The classical Islamic concept of "exemplary deterrent punishment" (tankil) resurfaces again and again in theory and practice in contemporary jihadi justifications and calls for terrorist attacks. The "tankil"-concept originally goes back to the Qur'an verse Surat al-Nisa’ 4:84; it has been extensively treated by the medieval jurisprudent Ibn Taymiyya ('uquba munakkala) in his text "The drawn sword against those who insult the Prophet."
The third part of the research focuses on deterrence concepts in contemporary Salafi-jihadi ideology. About seven hundred years after Ibn Taymiyya’s death, his treatise is again very prominent in the Internet. The Saudi-Arabian al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Jandal al-Azdi (arrested 2004) even takes up Ibn Taymiyya’s argument in his own treatise “Incitement of the heroic fighters to revive the custom of assassinations ...kill the infidel leaders,” which refers to prominent cultural activists, politicians and military personnel. Al-Azdi puts special focus on the intimidating nature (ra’b) of assassination-techniques such as stabbing with a knife and slicing the throat (dhabah). Muhammad Bouyeri, the Muslim terrorist who assassinated the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, took these two texts as guidelines. They served him as theological justification, strategic-operative manual and divine order. Also Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s "Terror as Strategy of Deterrence" and "Legal Terrorism" paradigms shed important light on contemporary Salafi-jihadi deterrence paradigms. These paradigms mix classical Islamic doctrines such as the law of "equal retaliation" (qisas) offer a religious-ideological framework for attackers with WMD aspirations. In that sense, jihadi texts like "The jihadi-Nuclear Bomb – Ways to Enrich Uranium" cause a split-minded feeling. On the one hand, the text does not tell or teach anything a moderately talented high-school pupil could not achieve with by himself with his chemistry set. Yet, the manual points out that the possession of WMD would serve the jihadi cause. The authors call themselves "The Black Flags," which symbolize an apocalyptic doomsday vision of Islam.

The last part of the research will return to the initial argument and suggest ideas how to address the semiotics and religious-psychology of jihadi sub-state actors. Perceptions of salvation and non-deterrability should be attacked at their very ideological roots (See parts 7.b,c and d of the paper). Some jihadi groups may be held in check if they start doubting their own culture. In the mind of radicalized perceivers, "divine reward" can be replaced with "divine punishment." This disturbs, unsettles and raises questions among jihadis. Most importantly, it has the potential to deter them psychologically. This requires the build-up of "intellectual firewalls" (Shmuel Bar, 2012) that address religious-psychological key signs (symbols, belief expressions, rituals).

Introduction

Muslims and Doctrinaire Global Jihadis

Many and diverse Muslim cultures foster peaceful and universal human values. Muslims often welcome travelers with a hospitality and acceptance that surpasses the welcoming of strangers in Western cultures. However, the Muslim world is shaken and agitated by terrible conflicts. Some of the fringe groups within it are extremely violent. Such groups draw on popular concepts; they drain the conceptually rich soil of Islamic meta-culture in order to prosper. As a matter of fact, certain streams in Sunni culture adore violence, punishment and fear in an almost cultic manner. The sectarian ideology under examination is "salafi-jihadism" (al-salafiya al-jihadiyya), a sub-trend of Sunni Muslim fundamentalism (salafism), which is rooted in cultic and violent Interpretations of Islamic belief; the Internet is the most important platform for its dissemination. However, neither does the modern idea of jihad originate out of a vacuum, nor is it by any means a new or young phenomenon. Firstly, terrorist trends in any culture emerge in contexts of repression (perceived and real), social and political change as well as occupation. Secondly, precursors of jihadi activism can be found in doctrinaire, militant and Islamic resistance movements, respectively on the

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2 Parts of the dangerous ideological reservoir, which jihadis tap, are popular Muslim resentments against the West.
Arabian Peninsula since the 18th century (Wahhabism), in Sudan (The Mahdi-Movement between 1885-99), as well as in Libya (Senunite resistance-forces against colonial occupation in the 1930s).

At present the term "doctrinaire jihadis" describes adherents of the idea of global jihad, who either fight out of purely ideological reasons, or have been socialized through the experience of occupation and repression. The majority of them would not drop their goal to establish a worldwide caliphate after the withdrawal of western troops from Muslim countries, or the establishment of Islamist governments. As a fringe group with considerable interpretational authority, doctrinaire jihadis stick to their goal of global Islamic dominion and formulate their own Islamic military jurisprudence in order to justify their cause. In every respect, doctrinaire jihadis display characteristics of highly modern fundamentalists, neo-tribal warriors and cult adherents of the 21st century information age.

Sunni "jihadism" as a distinct ideology is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its development started in the mid-1960s, when radical groups broke away from the broader Islamist opposition in Arab countries. Repressed and frustrated in their political aspirations, these groups started fighting their local governments, paraphrasing Marxist-Leninist revolutionary slogans and ideas in Islamist parlance and utilizing analogies to the Islamic law of War to justify terrorist tactics. They were inspired by the Medieval Damascene Hanbali school, led by Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), who wrote extensively on jihad when the Abbaside caliphate was under different attacks by the Mongols. Moreover, the ultra-literal Sunni fundamentalist school of Wahhabism, which originated in Saudi Arabia in the 18th century, strongly influences jihadi thinking. Since the Afghanistan jihad 1979-1989, Wahhabi fighters and ideologues from Saudi Arabia have been exerting a strong doctrinaire influence on the international jihad scene. Moreover, since 2006, internal doctrinaire feuds have led to a split between classical al-Qaeda followers and so-called Neo-Zarqawists, who follow a more extremist line oriented at the late leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Protest by internal critics against ever more brutal terrorist tactics and the massive killing of civilians have been refuted by the latter strand with pseudo-legal arguments.

The paradigm-expansion in the perception of jihadis from the local "near enemy" represented by Muslim governments (al-'adu al-qarib) to the international "far enemy" (al-'adu al-ba'id), and finally into an all-comprising dichotomy that divides into jihadis and non-jihadis passed through two stages. The first one was decisively influenced by the main ideologue of the Afghanistan jihad and his school of thought. Abdullah Azzam (k. 1989) and his followers Tamim al-Adnani and Abu al-Walid al-Masri described the Soviet troops as "the biggest satan" (al-shaytan al-akbar), which represented the paradigm change from the near to the far enemy and internationally oriented jihad concepts. The ideology of global jihad thus started to develop

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3 Political conflicts and state repression have led to the break-away of revolutionary splinter groups from broader Islamist movements since the 1940s. For example, militant splinter groups have broken away both from the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami and the Egyptian/Syrian Muslim Brothers. During the 1990s, key ideologues of global jihad sat in London while discussing the plight of Muslims and developing terrorist strategies against the West. Yet, the 1990s also witnessed brutal civil wars in which Muslims were involved (Bosnia, Chechny, Algeria, Somalia), and which influenced the praetorian ideological formation of global jihad. With the rise of direct Western interventionism, global jihadis have been co-adapting insurgent struggles such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and oppositional struggles such as in Central Asia, China (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Uighur Islamic movement).

4 The Islamic Law of War on the ethics of war, declaration of warfare, conduct of warfare, legitimacy of warfare etc. may be comparable in many points to the Western jus in bello. See Rudolph Peters, "The Doctrine of Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam," in Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, edited by Rudolph Peters (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 103-148. On a sidenote: The local jihad concepts originated in the 1970s in the jihadist scenes of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine. By then, they were interpreted in the contexts of local oppositional and liberation struggles. The jihadist theological doctrines are heavily inspired by the medieval jurisprudential Hanbali school, led by Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), which formulated war doctrines when the Abbaside caliphate was under attack by the Mongols.

5 However, the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya is extremely selective and does neither represent their life-works, nor the historical reality. See Michot 2006.

6 Neo-Zarqawists call themselves after the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed in 2006. They mainly use the Medad al-Suyuf Forum, which was closed in late 2010 and not relaunched by the time of writing. See the excellent analysis by Musawi 2010.
in Afghanistan and became mixed with the most radical outgrowths of Wahhabi-cultism (see the 1990s teachings and writings of Abu Qutada al-Filastini, Omar Bakri Muhammad, Abu Basir al-Tartusi). Already in 1988 Osama bin Laden, who would later become the leader of al-Qaeda central organization, spoke about the "fight against the crusaders (al-salibiyun)." This concept became more visible in a fundamentally changed geopolitical situation a few years later. The retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 was followed by the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the geopolitical transition period of the 1990s, global jihadis started to understand the "far enemy" (al-adu al-ba'id) as neo-crusaders (al-salibiyun al-juddad) led by the USA and commanded by the Jews, which also allowed jihadis to engage in bloody struggles against "Muslim collaborators" at their home fronts. This interpretation led at the same time to more attacks in the West and in Muslim countries. The near and the far enemy have since then melted into one enemy and are until today inextricably connected.

Jihadi ideologies, discourses and groups are for convenience often identified as "affiliated to al-Qaeda," or as "Islamism inspired by al-Qaeda." More precisely, they are based on the concept of the salafiya-jihadiyya [sic]. The noun "salafiya" describes here the belief-doctrine (‘aqida). The belief doctrine is based on the emulation of al-salaf al-salih (righteous forefathers), who were the first three generations of Muslims. As the etymology of word salafiya already implies, adherents of this sectarian streaming within Sunni Islam orient themselves at a time period, during which Islam is perceived as original and uncorrupted, and represented by a nascent Muslim community which develops within a short time from a persecuted tribal minority (ghuraba') into a centralized imperial force (khilafa). When Salafis speak about the "pious forefathers," they try to emulate the first three generations of Muslims. These are either the companions of the Prophet (al-sahaba), or those, who did not accompany the Prophet directly, but knew his first followers (al-tabi'un). The successors of the tabiun (atba' al-tabi'un) are the third generation of al-salaf al-salih. The attribute "jihadiyya" stands for the method (manhaj) by which this doctrine is put into practice. Regarding the method, the majority of salafi-jihadis nowadays accept the leadership and operative paradigm of individualized and self-responsible jihad that is said to have been revealed to Muhammad in Qur'an 4:84: "Then fight in God's cause — Thou art held responsible only for thyself — And rouse the Believers." This injunction is the contemporary basis of jihadi discourse and encapsulates the major strategic and operative doctrine of individual terrorism. From an evolutionary perspective, deterrence developed out of primordial social patterns of collective threat display. Brave individuals who sacrificed themselves for the sake of the collective have always played an essential role in (religious) deterrence mythology. One must not underestimate the influence of doctrine together with tribal conflict mechanisms on jihadi perceptions of deterrence, "because an actor's identity depends upon discourse, discourse is also part of the mechanism through which actors can become attached to their strategies." A simplification and radicalization of Islamic concepts and discourses is connected to changes in religious authority and the dissemination of religious information. Sunni Islam, unlike Shiite Islam or the Catholic Church, has no centralization and formal hierarchy of religious authority (clergy). It is much more protestant than orthodox in regards to power and authority. According to Olivier Roy (2002) the addressees are often Muslims who do not live anymore in Muslim societies and lack their absorbing qualities. Marc Sageman (2004) argues that the mass-

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7 Interview with Shmuel Bar, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, October 2008.
8 Philipp Holtmannn, Abu Musab al-Suri’s Jihad Concept, Tel Aviv, Dayan Center, 2009.
nature of Internet-communication furthers an extreme simplification of content, which does not account for the complexities of real life.

The most central doctrine to enhance group identity is the self-reflection of modern jihadis as a pious elite among corrupted Muslim masses, which is, among others, based on the Prophetic saying: "One sect (ta’īfa) of my umma remains that stands up for truth until the Hour of Resurrection."\(^{12}\) Salafi-jihadis introspect themselves as re-incarnation of al-ghuraba', al-firqa al-najiya, al-ta'īfa al-mansura or generally as ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama'a. They carry simple interpretations to the extreme. An essential part of this interpretation is the equalization of "Islam" with "jihad." This comes to the fore, for example, through a steady selective recitation of a tradition attributed to Muhammad that jihad is dhīrwat sanam al-Islam, i.e. the peak of the hump of Islam (Islam is being analogized to a camel, which was a most precious animal in 7th century tribal Arab society). This reasoning, in turn, is picked up by modern ideologues and continued in the sense that amaliyat istishhadiyya (martyrdom operations, i.e. suicide attacks) are the dhīrwat sanam al-Islam as well as the best form of jihad. This way, a key thought of jihadi discourse is the admonition of terrorism, by portraying suicide-attacks as ultimate form of religious devotion.

**Point 1: Global doctrinaire jihad and its adherents have over the last 10 years developed in jihadiyah istishhadiyya (martyrdom-jihadism), due to the over-emphasis of martyrdom culture, the veneration of saint-like examples, and the centrality of suicide-attacks. This must also be seen in the context of globalized networked information society. In this society, information is essentially ideological.**\(^{13}\)

Until their shattering in 2001, the training camps of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan were the organizational and ideological "base" of global jihadism. Afterwards, the organization morphed out into an action-guiding ideology and a decentralized world-wide movement and network. The Internet turned into a parallel base for the spread of ideology, strategy and communicative command. Against this background an organizational network approach will be used to understand the concept of deterrence by modern Islamist actors (salafi-jihadis). Organizational networks are led by communicative mechanisms (symbols, rituals, theology), which can be called virtual leadership.\(^{14}\) John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt focus in their path-breaking study of 2001 on network forms of organization. "[T]he information revolution favors the rise of network forms of organization. The network appears to be the next major form of organization – long after tribes, hierarchies and markets – to come into its own to redefine societies, and in so doing, the nature of conflict and cooperation [...] even worse is the possibility that information-age dictatorships will arise in parts of the world, based on the skillful exploitation of the new technologies for purposes of political command and control."\(^{15}\) Organizations such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Maghreb, on the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq and the Shabaab al-Mujahidin Movement in Somalia keep up "traditional" command and control structures. With their propaganda, they foster organizational networks (information and communication lines of control). Yet, they also act as centralized organizations (hierarchical top-down lines of command and control). The latter model represents the classical organizational build-up suggested by the Egyptian jihad strategist Dr. Fadl, who argued in his 1980s seminal work on jihadi leadership that

\[\text{La tazal ta'īfa min ummati zahirin 'ala al-haqq hatta taqum al-sa'a} \text{"(...)there remains a righteous sect of my nation until the hour [of Judgement Day]},\] quoted in: Abu Usama Salim bin 'Aid al-Hilali, "Al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya fi Dau' al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna bi-Fahm Salaf al-Umma ("Islamic Movements in the Light of the Qur'an and the Sunna According to the Forefathers of the Umma") (Amman: Al-Dar al-Athariyya, 2003), 45.


\(^{15}\) Arquilla and Ronfeldt
younger groups always must subordinate under the more established one (such as the subordination of regional al-Qaeda affiliates under al-Qaeda central).\textsuperscript{16} Communicative, individual and hierarchical command patterns are all reconcilable in the eyes of global jihadi strategists. Organizational networks and hierarchical groups have different deterrence paradigms, which they apply according to their evaluation of possible deterrence force and propaganda benefits (see Chapter Five).

Point 2: We should use an organizational network analysis mixed with an anthropologist approach instead of a classical organizational analysis when studying Islamic deterrence paradigms and their interpretation among Muslim sub-state actors. \textit{Virtual leadership} mechanisms should be integrated into this approach. This analysis includes key symbols, signs, rituals and belief expressions of jihadi sub-culture, as well as their discourses on terrorism and interpretations of deterrence.

\textbf{Deterrence}

"The basic mechanism of deterrence – in both its nuclear and its conventional form – is to avert an aggressive act by an opponent by threatening that opponent with unacceptable losses should it carry out the act."\textsuperscript{17} According to Snyder’s classical distinction, one can deny an enemy all potential benefits of an aggressive act (\textit{deterrence by denial}) and/or threaten to heavily punish unacceptable behavior (\textit{deterrence by punishment}).\textsuperscript{18} A different scholarly interpretation states that "the unacceptable cost to the target can be in the form of a punitive action or an act of defensive resistance, corresponding to cases of 'deterrence by punishment' and 'deterrence by denial' [...]".\textsuperscript{19} Our discussion of deterrence by and against Muslim sub-state actors will include tentative formulations of religious-psychological deterrence approaches by denial and punishment versus terrorist deterrence/preterrence concepts. Firstly, the paper will explain what deterrence/preterrence for jihadis actually means. Secondly, possible concepts of deterrence against them will be presented. This includes building up discursive "fortifications" and "walls," also called "intellectual firewalls."\textsuperscript{20} Such walls are needed to block terrorist theological arguments. The idea is to build a discursive-semiotic wall in Muslim sub- and meta-culture, for example, against the definition of (suicide) martyrdom as ultimate act of belief. Muslim deterrence hinges at the concept of martyrdom. Is the reward of martyrdom in paradise measurable? Actually, no counter-proof can be constructed. However, the human interpretation of martyrdom can be addressed, i.e. if there is a divine reward or if "illegal forms" of self-sacrifice will be heavily punished in the afterlife.

For the sake of a wider conceptual understanding of deterrence and its possible applications, reassurance as a third major approach should be mentioned. The original goal of \textit{reassurance} in deterrence strategy is to convince other states – in our case sub-state actors - that one’s intentions are benign, which supposedly reduces the danger that one’s own deterrence strategy accidently provokes defensive violence from the opponent. Superpowers practiced the tactic of \textit{reassurance} during the Cold War by mutual agreements on limits of nuclear bomb tests; arms control initiatives, Strategic Arms Limitations and Reduction Talks (SALT;

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{17} Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, "Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger," Security Dialogue 38, 2007, p. 421
\item\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., see for the original Text Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence by Denial and Punishment", Princeton, Center for International Studies, 1959.
\item\textsuperscript{19} Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, "Origins and Age of Deterrence: Comparative Research on Old World and New World Systems", Cross Cultural Research 33, 1999, p. 242.
\item\textsuperscript{20} Interview by the author with Shmuel Bar, Herzliya, June 2012.
\end{itemize}
START) and the Hot Line. Similar reassurance mechanisms should be taken into consideration when defining the limits of discursive denial approaches within Muslim culture.

A fourth element of deterrence strategy is conciliation. Some strategists strongly reject the idea that conciliation is a valid element of deterrence strategy, since it puts the actor who applies it into a weaker position. However, when developing religious-psychological deterrence against sub-state actors, one should keep in mind reconciliation as a parallel information strategy towards them and their meta-culture. The key point is to reward an enemy "for abstaining from undesirable actions." In the meta-conflict between Western and Muslim cultures, pragmatic modes of conciliation should be formulated to build popular support for religious-psychological deterrence strategies against sectarian sub-state actors (jihiadiya istishhadiyya). A successful reformation of deterrence also means to develop forms of deterrence that do not look like deterrence. The "reformation calls for the paradoxical developments of both seeking to deter more reliably, while simultaneously placing less reliance on deterrence."

Furthermore, a distinction between conventional and non-conventional deterrence is crucial when speaking about deterrence-force. The reason is that "[c]hemical or biological weapons are other potential ways for weaker states to deter stronger enemies by threatening to inflict 'unacceptable' damage [...] These weapon's are sometimes called the ‘poor man’s’ atomic bomb." One such example is the Norwegian Christian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who allegedly tried to recruit a jihadi terrorist cell [sic] for a chemical weapons attack in Europe. When dealing with fundamentalist extremists, the stakes of losing one’s grip on them once they have acquired non-conventional weapons are very high. One must have a sufficient amount of religious psychological deterrence force and credibility to address the opponent. However, it "is extremely difficult to identify or deny a potential gain if there is neither an actor nor a common currency (Münkler, 2002) against which threats and claims can be evaluated." In this respect, a conventional deterrence strategy cannot work against doctrinaire salafi-jihadi actors who lack a clear line of command and control; and against organizations, such as al-Qaeda, that foster both traditional organizational behavior and self-reliable individual terrorism (irhab fardi), which is guided by communicative guidance through incitement (tahrid). The further this strategy develops, the less a common actor or currency, specific territory or enemy can be addressed. What remains to be deterred is an overarching religious-doctrinal ideology and neo-tribal behavioral pattern of socialization.

Bernard Brodie, one of the key-thinkers of early U.S. deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union, has argued in his seminal essay The Anatomy of Deterrence: "Deterrence as an element of national strategy or diplomacy is certainly nothing new under the sun [...] The threat of war, open or implied, has always been an instrument of diplomacy by which one state deterred another from doing something or a military or

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22 Ibid., 8. "Kuwait practiced conciliation with some success during previous disputes with Iraq. For example, when Iraq’s Ba’ath Party assumed power in 1963, Kuwait extended an interest-free $85 million 25-year loan to Iraq, and in the so-called ‘Agreed minutes’ (October 1963), Iraq renounced its claims to Warba and Bubiyan islands.”
24 Ibid.
26 Rüdiger Lohlker observes that an "interesting new aspect of this question may be seen in news that the Norwegian anti-Muslim terrorist Anders Breivik considered the use of CBRN, esp. anthrax, recruiting Muslim suicide attackers and helping them to pass controls; So the discussions on jihadi WMD gave birth to an unexpected offshoot." See Rüdiger Lohlker (ed. Rüdiger Lohlker,) "Religion, Weapons, and Jihadism: Emblematic Discourses,” New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism: Online and Offline, Vol. 2, Göttingen, Vienna University Press, 2012.
27 Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, "Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger,” p. 421.
political nature which the former did not wish the latter to do." During the era of the Cold War deterrence as a strategic policy was only meaningful if "the strategic instrument [nuclear arms] upon which it relies will not be called upon to function at all."27 Historically seen, however, deterrence is a very dynamic phenomenon. Deterrence by denial through intimidation is one of the oldest human defense mechanisms. In fact, deterrence can be seen as one of the most basic social patterns and phenomena of mankind, besides government, warfare, trade and alliances. "The exact antiquity of deterrence may never be known with high precision, but a terminus ante quem of 7500-5000 B.C. seems solid. This means that deterrence could have emerged much earlier; we just have no way to detect it. Similar to warfare, deterrence probably developed from primordial skills of strategic interaction, and it was selectively acquired by hunter-gatherer groups prior to the rise of organized polities with centralized authority (chiefdoms and states). However, evidence of deterrence became only later visible through fortifications (deterrence by denial) and eventually through epigraphy (deterrence by punishment)."28 The first epigraphic evidence for deterrence by punishment dates from the border-conflict between the Sumerian city-states Umma and Lagash around 2450 BC: "Do not attempt to threaten our city’s surrounding lands or we shall launch an army to destroy you." (Lagash to Umma, ca. 2450 B.C.).29 Let us call to mind Bin Laden’s speeches, for example, in October 2011: "As to America, I say to it and its people a few words: I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Mohammad, peace be upon him."30 Other threats have characterized Bin Laden’s speeches, such as: "God willing, our attacks against you will continue as long as you maintain your support to Israel."31 Root patterns of deterrence, however, developed already in pre-historic times. Hominids probably gathered in groups in the open grass-lands of Africa several million years ago and developed collective stomping, shouting and intimidation rituals in order to deter enemies (large predators and other groups). The need to deter was one of the most effective group-building mechanisms, which allowed hominids to switch from individual to collective awareness and organize themselves.32 Yet, Cold War deterrence paradigms (WMD, second strike; Mutually Assured Destruction) overshadow until today evolutionary-biological and tribal deterrence patterns. After a long standstill in the formulation of deterrence policies, "the concept of deterrence has lately been making something of a comeback in Western strategic circles." However, John Stone concludes that "it would be a grave mistake to assume that conventional deterrence can reclaim anything like the strategic centre-stage that nuclear deterrence occupied during the Cold War."33 Stone may be right, but that does not justify any negligence towards other possible means of deterrence. Accordingly "concepts used in modern theories of deterrence tend to focus on the relationship between states, and on the high end of potential conflict. For example, confrontation between regular armies or nuclear conflict between states. These theories naturally overshadowed traditional descriptions of coercion – deterrence and compellence – which have existed since time immemorial for deterrence relations between states as well as between states and non-state (insurgents, guerillas, terrorists). The relationship between a state (Israel) and non-state terrorist organizations is, by nature, asymmetric. This asymmetry makes doctrines of deterrence, which were

formulated for relationships between states unsuitable solutions for many cases." Accordingly, one should keep in mind that evidence on deterrence exists since 7500 BC and that deterrence has meant very different concepts to different cultures. Firstly, deterrence probably originated out of primordial group behavior and was afterwards strongly influenced by tribal behavioral patterns, before it developed into a defense strategy of early city states, empires, monarchies and was finally applied by nation states. Moreover, contemporary Muslim sub-state actors strongly center their group culture and mythology on Islamic narratives that emerged out of tribal Arab society. Thus, religious and the tribal elements influence their perceptions of deterrence.

At the same time the information age changes organizational and social structures, command and control patterns and thus forms of conflict. "It is easier to identify an enemy, if one stands in the middle of a totality. However, today we see ourselves confronted with a situation, in which everything is slightly vague. Like a mist, as if screens were placed all around us, and we were avatars of ourselves." Ritualized interactions are utterly important for Muslim warriors to conquer fears, create intimidation and renew their ideology. Their behavior, with due respect to changes in time and space, i.e. multiple layers of civilization-development and ages of Islamic socialization, thus can be explained with theoretical approaches on primordial deterrence patterns like the induction of battle trance among early hominids through ritualized group interaction. Modern fundamentalists are at the same time past-oriented and highly modern, the observers tackles with a very advanced phenomenon. As a general rule, Muslim warriors derive inspiration from both the past and present incidents and uses highly sophisticated means of communication. Classical Islamic deterrence rituals and tribal martial behavior are transformed into analogue virtual actions. For example, big-lettered Islamic formulas of laudation on jihadi discussion forums serve as virtual counterpart for physical threat behavior. In addition, group rituals such as pledges of allegiance and martial songs often serve as show of force to deter outsiders and at the same time strengthen their ingroup-cohesion. Jihadis display neo-tribal threat display, which is based upon endemic warfare concepts that are integrated into religious-terrorist frameworks. Jihadi paradigms of deterrence can therefore be called "neo-endemic terrorist-deterrence."

Sub-state actors can apply only little strategic deterrence leverage in terms of WMD. Their main weapon is the "message," i.e. communication of threat, mobilization of support. In parallel, the use repeated small scale terrorist attacks to provoke and build up tactical deterrence. One should not selectively argue that "the actual application of force is not deterrence. On the contrary, understanding sub-state actor perceptions of deterrence is a key matter. As we have argued, it is rooted in primordial threat display, neo-tribal behavior and endemic warfare within a religious framework.

Increasingly, state actors also try to deter sub-state adversaries by force and on a tactical level, for example, through inroads of Special Forces, targeted assassinations, torture or collective punishment. This

34 Shmuel Bar, "Israeli Experience in Deterring Terrorist Organizations," Working Paper Submitted for the Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2007. A comprehensive Israeli strategy of deterrence against Palestinians has been quite successful. The deterrence of Palestinians by denial and punishment including daily harassment, collective punishment by house demolitions, counter-terrorism, blockades and targeted assassinations has worked, since it has been effectively put into effect through all lines of command. Yet, Palestinian-internal divisions and relatively clear political goals, as well as internal decisions to end the suicide-bombing strategy were also relevant factors. Palestinian terrorist actors, including Hamas, think very differently from doctrinaire salafi-jihadi terrorists. Their cultural, political and geographical scope is limited. Ideological rigidity does not forbid them to exert political maneuverability. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
37 Endemic warfare includes ritualistic show of force such as hostage taking, duels, and tackles. In a distorted way, similar elements can be found in jihadi culture, for example, deterrence by punishment through beheading of hostages, ritualistic killings of prisoners, show of force and determination through suicide attacks and engagement in guerilla warfare.
policy fails, since states cannot mobilize legitimacy for acting like terrorists. Lastly, the definition of "deterrence" is a matter of cultural perspective.

It is now clearly understood that the multiplicity of terrorist sub-state actors, the global rise of fundamentalism and drastically changed ways of perception in the information age alter deterrence strategies, especially when a multiplicity of state and non-state actors are occupying the same field. New-old forms of deterrence are re-emerging which draw on the most tribal instincts and mythological fears of human societies. "The millenarian age of deterrence implies that it is a deeply rooted behavioral pattern manifested since the earliest pre-state polity systems (chiefdoms), similar to government, warfare, and other fundamental behavioral patterns, and not one that is ephemeral or easily modified."\textsuperscript{38} The focus of Muslim sub-state actors on tribal rituals and religious mythology allows drawing the conclusion that successful deterrence strategies must go back to the very roots of their self-perception. With the background knowledge on the development of deterrence and its application to the information age in mind, exclusion from and non-possibility to re-enter discourses can also be seen as deterrence by denial, in fact, should be a key-approach.

Bernard Brodie was one of the first scholars who argued that effective deterrence should be based on anthropological and sociological analysis.\textsuperscript{39} Amir Lupovici picked this idea up and developed it further. According to Lupovici deterrence is a social construction that can be learned; socialization affects its practices. Regarding the importance of discourse (or speech acts) within a specific subculture we should ask how deterrence is affected by social constructions. But we might add to that equation symbols, rituals, ceremonies and belief expressions. Following the interpretative approach discourses not only shape actors' knowledge, and how actors communicate and act, but also construct their reality. Lupovici also integrates the concept of "role identity" into sub-state actors' perceptions of deterrence, i.e. group identity as a driving force to develop deterrence. Actors may thus act not only for strategic reasons, but also to (re)validate their identity (that is, as a detererrer actor). In some cases, this need to deter may enhance the practices of deterrence; however, in other cases, it aggravates the sense of insecurity and intensifies the need to use force (rather than to avoid violence).\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, when looking at central community and foundation myths of jihadis, such as the wish to self-identify as strangers (\textit{ghuraba'}) or to be like the single attacker (\textit{munghamis}) at the siege of Constantinople in 774, we should ask ourselves how much these interpretations are connected to deterrence and how much to the role-identity of jihadis. In this respect, Lupovici's observation is important that "social context is created through learning, socialization, and social constructions, producing a discourse and even constituting the actors themselves. Acknowledging the importance of this context allows us to better establish the connections between the strategy of deterrence and the avoidance of violence, and helps to clarify and explain contradictions in deterrence research. It also provides scholars with a richer framework through which to understand how deterrent threats may influence the behavior of actors."\textsuperscript{41}

The lowest common denominator in jihadi group culture is a very similar religious psychology. An Iraqi and an Egyptian citizen might strongly disagree over the role of Saddam Hussein versus that of Gamal Abdel Nasir in international Arab politics. However, if they are both devout, they will agree on Saudi Sheikh al-

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. p. 718.
Shu'aybi's (d.2001) religious opinion that it is an individual obligation to fight foreign troops in Muslim lands.

Chapter One:
The Concept of Fear

For the sake of analytic clarity, we will use the term "fear" to describe a general and overarching feeling, both concrete and abstract. If a specification is needed, we will return to the distinction between "fright" and "fear."

Most generally speaking, the feeling of "fear" can be divided into two similar, yet very different states of consciousness. "Fright" (Latin timor; German Furcht) is focused on a concrete object and signifies something different from an abstract fear (Latin angor; German Angst). The Roman poet Ovid describes timor as a fright that obstructs people and prevents deeds.42 The threat that emanates from an object of fright can be real or can be perceived as real, yet this difference does not really matter for the perceiver. However, fright and fear can sometimes blur into one conscious perception. Then it becomes difficult to differentiate between the rationality and irrationality of an intimidation. Is it an imagination, bluff or misinterpretation? The problem arises for the perceiver to determine if a threat really exists and how serious it is. Awe and piety (German Ehrfurcht; Gottesfurcht), for example, are states of mind, which signify deep solicitous and fearful respect from God. They are difficult to measure objectively, though religious texts differentiate quite explicitly between concrete and abstract fears. Religious awe and piety are maybe best translated as "fear from a transcendental authority." In Islamic leadership culture, God is the supreme leader to whom all believers have given an oath of loyalty: "Those who pledged allegiance to you actually pledged allegiance to God."43 Therefore, the psychological description of piety in Islam as "fear from a transcendental superiority" is not merely metaphorical. The relationship to God – a transcendental chain of command – is to different degrees and interpretations also based on fear and reappears in Islamic doctrines connected to "belief" (iman) such as "fear from hell-fire" (al-khafuf min al-nar), "loyalty until death" (bayat al-maut), the rejection of "love of the worldly and hate for the Hereafter" (hub al-dunya wa karahiyat al-maut) or the doctrinal tradition "the love of life is the most severe of all mistakes (hubb al-dunya ra's kull khati'a).

In classical literature, deterrence is already a mix of abstract and concrete fears. Laokon warns the Trojans with the words "quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentis." (Whatever it is, I fear the Greeks even when they bring presents [i.e. the Trojan Horse]).44 The fright theme was picked up almost 2000 years later by Friedrich Schiller in Die Räuber.45 The myth of the Trojan Horse is a deterrent fable and stretches over

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43 "Verily those who plight their fealty to thee do no less than plight their fealty to Allah. The Hand of Allah is over their hands: then any one who violates his oath, does so to the harm of his own soul, and any one who fulfils what he has covenanted with Allah,- Allah will soon grant him a great Reward" Qur'an, Surat al-Fath 48:10, Yusuf Ali Translation, (Accessed Mai 9, 2012) - http://www.islam101.com/Qur'an/yusufAli/QR'AN/48.htm
44 Vergil, Aeneis, First person narrative on the fall of Troja (Iliupersis), second book, verse 49, accessed September 22, 2012, http://www.gottwein.de/Lat/verg/aen02a.php Verg.Aen.2.48. Vergil is one of the most influential Roman poets (70-19 BC). His work Aeneis describes the escape of Aeneas from Troy, which finally leads him to Italy where he becomes the founding father of the Romans. The Aeneis is thus the national epic of the Romans. Friedrich Schiller translated the Aeneis.
45 It is fair to assume that the Aeneis, which Schiller partly translated, strongly influenced his intellectual interest in the fear and fright theme. See Friedrich Schiller, Die Räuber (Mannheim: C.F. Schwan und G.C. Götz, 1802). For Schiller's translation of the maxime on the
cultural epochs, from Roman Antiquity to German Classicism. If one enters into a conflict with an adversary such as the Greeks, one might be defeated by stratagem. Vergil uses the concrete term for fear, "timeo" and implies the Trojan Horse as object of fright, yet he expresses actually a general feeling of fear from the Greeks. Such a dona-phobia (fear of presents) could again be explained with different perceptions of fear in antiquity. Despite their cultural and geographic closeness, antique Mediterranean cultures had very different relationships to their emotions. Stoics and Epicureans, for example, despised fear as an artificially created feeling. The remedy was composure (atoraxia), which is comparable to the 19th century Prussian value system that was influenced by neo-classicist ideas. Toughness against oneself and one's fears was compensated by sense of duty (Pflichtbewusstsein). However, other trends of antique culture treated irrational states of fear with great awareness. In Greek mythology, Phobos means similar to the Latin timor "fright" and is fixed to a concrete threat, yet it emanates from an inner state of fear. The mythology, which Muslims foster in times of conflict, has its own classical and modern idols of terror. For example, the self-sacrificial attacker (mughamis) at the siege of Constantinople in 674 is an important figure in jihadi fright and deterrence perceptions; as well as Bin Laden, or Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (killed 2003); but also CIA-attacker Abu Dujana al-Khorasani (2009). They are perceived as almost saint-like figures who threw dreadful wrath upon their enemy, the enemies of all Muslims, were guided by God, now reside in paradise and are full of love for their own kin.

The veneration of some Sunni idols of fear by followers strongly borrows from Sufi, even reminds of Shiite martyrdom spirituality. But it is reversed into a martial and terrorist cult, which culminates in expressions of total devotion to inspirational figures (fan-pictures, posters, wall-banners, movies, discourses, etc.). Some trends of Islamic fundamentalism (similar to Christian and Jewish counterparts) very consciously cultivate states of fear. Divine command and human piety are strongly based on different threat scenarios that cause fear and explicate prohibitions against infringements.

But cultural perceptions change over time. While a statue was a worshipped cult-object for antique Greeks, medieval Christian clerics saw it as a frightening idol (Abgott). Yet, both perceived its singularity, in other words, its aura. Since the 1980s scholars have started integrating new concepts into deterrence including the "interpretative version of the concept of strategic culture." The mystic "aura" of suicide attackers and slain jihadi leaders is highly flexible on the level of interpretative culture and depends on socio-political context. The acceptance of suicide-deterrence has been "learned" through a bitter history of asymmetric conflicts, and has become ever stronger over the last 15 years. 30 years ago, Muslim publics would probably have reacted extremely "deterred" by the idea that sectarian co-religionists commit dozens of suicide bombings each year.

States of consciousness dread and scare, according to the French intellectual Georges Bataille (1897-1962), are the impetus for prohibitions. A prohibition or negative rule only works, if a scare or dread scenario has been established, which is effectively causing the abandonment of actions out of fear from the results. The

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46 Phobos and Deimos were the gods of dread and terror in Greek mythology and their counterpart in Roman mythology was Metus. In Greek mythology, Phobos means similar to the Latin timor "fright." Phobos is fixed to a concrete threat, yet it emanates from an inner state of fear. Phobos and Deimos are the twin sons of the God of War, Ares, and the Goddess of Love, Aphrodite.

47 Walter Benjamin, "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter Seiner Technischen Reproduzierbarkeit", Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2010, p. 21. The influence of Greek culture in the Roman Empire greatly contributed to the acceptance of Christianity, which resulted in the establishment of the "Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation" (Sacrum Romanum Imperium). All of these epochs are nowadays understood as central elements of "Abendländischer Kultur." Yet, each cultural epoch in one way or other exploited and at the same time annihilated the previous.

theory of legal deterrence advocates methods such as incapacitation, which aims at ending the life of a perpetrator and setting an example for others. As Michel Foucault and Émile Durkheim argued, the setting up of draconic punishment and institutions is a necessary prerequisite to project scare and crime on others – the "inmates," "criminals" and so on, in short, to define ourselves. In Islamic culture, the hisba-doctrine "to enjoin what is right (known) and forbid what is wrong (unknown)" (al-'amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahi 'an al-munkar) is used by fundamentalists such as the Wahhabi-cult to set up a draconic system of prohibitions and punishments that is self-defining and threatening at the same time. The Saudi-Arabian mutawwa (Islamic religious police), for example, derives its legitimacy from the doctrine and the corresponding institution of hisba. "Strangers in this World" (ghuraba), a Sunni-Salafi sub-sect, interprets the behavior of Umar, the second rightly-guided caliph, as hisba. Tradition tells that he "sought to humiliate himself when he was preaching and his soul felt above everyone else’s. It is said that his ring was inscribed with the words, ‘Death suffices as an admonition oh ‘Umar.’"

Understanding different applications of hisba could be crucial for developing reward and punishment laws for and against psychological-religious deterrence.

Chapter Two:
The Construction of Fear in Islam for the Sake of Deterrence

Deterrence is a social construction that can be learned, and socialization affects its practices. The construction of a successful deterrence strategy relies on two sorts of fear. Firstly, a successful mobilization of the fears of the own group secures financing and political support for a deterrence strategy (creating fears among "friends"). Secondly, a successful intimidation by denial or punishment prevents an enemy from attacking or achieving his goals (creating fears among "foes").

![Figure 1. Four states of fear](image)

Internally, the abstract fear of the own population (in-group) needs to be projected on concrete and feasible examples of the enemies malevolence. The process can be described as projection of abstract fear (angor) on an out-group, which as a result becomes a concrete and rational fright feeling (timor). Propaganda helps to exaggerate the natural phenomenon of in-group-out-group bias, turning it into controlled aggression, which is fed by fright/fear. In-group-out-group bias describes a natural preference

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49 See, for example, Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: McMillan and Co., 1933).
52 Intensity of in-group cohesion correlates with heightened out-group aggression.
for members of the own group or nation, and an instinctive sense of anger and suspicion against outsiders. The mixture between abstract threat and concrete fear is often manipulated by creating a collective altered state of consciousness within the population that may be described as "security-phobia." A phobia is characterized by abstract fear (lack of security) projected on concrete matters (terrorist attacks), which in turn allows avoidance-behavior (security policies, for example deterrence) and increases the feeling of security among the population. However, this technique still does not offer any solution for a working defense mechanism against inner fears, and is therefore rejected by many psychiatrists in individual treatment therapy. Populations in general suffer from cultural biases that can be turned into collective states of fear that are phobia-like. Their senses of fear are characterized, among Westerners, for example, by the perception of Muslims as backward, fanatic, irrational terrorists. Among Muslims a perception of degradation, cultural and military imperialism and Jewish-Christian conspiracy against Islam prevails. Westerners are often seen as technocratic people without spiritual ideals. With its foreign policy, the U.S. further aggravates other deep seated inner fears of Muslims. Muslims fear their own cultural demise, incapability to self-organize and are searching for reasons. The U.S. presents itself as a welcome projection surface for the quasi-phobic fear of Muslim fundamentalists from Western cultural and military dominance. On the other hand, the enemy image of Islamism can be seen as a compensatory reaction to the lack of ideological adversaries by the West. Enemy pictures are always a welcome escape from self-reflection. Furthermore, self-victimization plays an important role in the dynamics of politico-religious conflicts and deterrence policies. Only heroes can protect the own victimized group; yet the archetypical "hero" needs to die for the sake of the community. The hero carries the collective victimization on his shoulders. His self-sacrificial act, propagated through mythical narratives of bravery, is also supposed to have a deterring effect on the enemy (evidence: epigraphic and medial deterrence by punishment). Martyrdom then becomes legitimate, if it preserves the own group. Thus, myths of victimization, heroism and self-sacrifice are inextricably connected to deterrence strategies and the build-up of fears and aggressions, finally the cohesion of groups.

Common rituals, such as prayer, and talk on shared cultural values can further aggression and in-group out-group bias, as much as they diminish in-group frictions. Ritual group behavior strengthens collective identity. Among jihadis, ceremonial rituals such as oaths of allegiance, eulogizing God in dialogues and singing and war-dance rituals play essential roles for deterrence perceptions and collective identity. Empirical proves exist in jihadi reality, for example testimonies of drop-outs and captives, as well as in jihadi propaganda and discourse, which serve as social glue. An essential goal of propaganda is to address both internal and external fears of friend and foe. The enemy needs to be intimidated and the member strengthened in his conviction to fight out of fear from harm, but also out of excessive hubris. The closer group members get, the more aggressive they become against the outside world. This behavior is born out of prehistoric instinctive patterns of socialization. Fear, fright and distancing from an enemy were learned as survival mechanisms by early hominids. The best way to keep a distance from enemies is by intimidation. Show of intimidation is best created by real preparedness to fight. The altered state of consciousness, which is called "battle trance," may have been first induced through ritualistic group

dancing and the use of body colors by early hominids in Africa. When hominids first went to the open grasslands in Africa, they needed to find ways to deter large predators, later other groups. Ritualistic stomping, dancing, making noises and mutual body-painting served as social mechanisms to glue groups together, replace individual awareness with collective awareness, and enter a state of "battle trance" to deter or fight enemies.\(^{57}\) Thus, group building, collective identity and deterrence are closely connected to common rituals and one element strengthens the other. This partly answers questions of ratio behind the collective behavior of religious sub-state actors’. The need to constantly renew group identity serves as a driving force to develop deterrence paradigms and vice versa.

German jihadis who stayed at training camps of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Waziristan between 2009 until 2011 have explicitly described their conditioning, when they were interrogated by the German police. "The stay at the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was governed by a rigid daily schedule, which comprised common prayer, reading the Qur'an as well as communal sports activities and shared dinners."\(^{58}\) In addition, common singing of traditional Islamic battle songs (huda’ and anasheed), as well as ritual passages of motivation and loyalty (bay’a) were used to induce "battle-trance" states, group cohesion and intimidate enemies. In combination with actual battle operations, this resulted into a strong socio-ideological gluing together of some of the German jihadis with the Uzbeks.\(^{59}\) The group cohesion was disturbed by hierarchy conflicts within the German sub-group, which took place between "elders" and "novices," i.e. those who arrived later from Germany. This and the rough atmosphere was the reason that some German jihadis quickly left the Uzbek training camps. The Germans, who stayed, however, became indoctrinated. They were convinced that their appearance alone would frighten and deter U.S. soldiers (stationed in Afghanistan).\(^{60}\) "The defendant described himself as a man not from this world, but from the hereafter. He strived to live with his whole family in paradise. Enemies he saw would be beheaded by him; American soldiers were afraid of him and the likes of him. He summoned his father to move to him at the end of his live in order to participate in jihad and die as a martyr."\(^{61}\)

This example of the psychology of a young European jihadi is very telling. The recruit fully incorporated simple jihadi myths of community, enmity and salvation, which led him to believe that the sole aura of his group spreads dreadful fear among the enemies. This was paired with an excessively exaggerated self-perception as living martyr, based on an undifferentiated and awestruck veneration of martyrdom culture, which one might call ittiqa’ al-istishhadiyya.

Specific group behavior and rituals strengthen the collective identity, but also anger on the perceived enemy. The result is ever more dissociation from mainstream society, which evokes display of power. Group rituals around martyrdom ideology diminish fears from death, intimidate the enemy and have strongly dis-inhibiting effects. This cultivation of martyrdom and deterrence among Muslim sub-state actors does not resemble "classical" paradigms of Cold War thinking. It is rather based on primordial small-group socialization, religious fear and concepts of endemic warfare.

Just as there are different ways to diminish fear, there are common ways to learn and condition fears. These are the own experience, such as playing with fire; the observance of members of the own species and group, i.e. learning at a model; and instruction by warnings, rules and threat scenarios. A psychological


\(^{58}\) "Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof; Anklageschrift gegen W.S." 2 BJs 40/11-8-2 StE 10/11-8, Karlsruhe, den 26. October 2011.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid and interrogation protocol by German Federal Police of R.M.

\(^{61}\) Ibid.
deterrence strategy must address weaknesses and fallacies in martyrdom culture. Externally, the credibility of the threat of retaliation must be intimidating enough to stop the enemy from major hostile actions. Thus, the first question is: does the message reach him? Sub-state actors such as terrorists vary in their characteristics and are difficult to reach. It is much more difficult to develop a deterrence policy against Muslim sub-state actors than against Muslim state actors. Regional affiliates of al-Qaeda stretch from the Caucasus via Central Asia, over the Indian subcontinent, North and central Africa, the Arab Middle East and Europe. There are numerous networks with clear organizational affiliation as well as small cells and even individuals who adhere to al-Qaeda’s terrorist doctrine of global jihad. The common denominator of the sub-state actors is their broader ideology, which repeats basic arguments and appeal to internal fears and sense of devotion. This includes central fundamentalist myths which serve as glue for Muslim collective identity and sense of community.

In a legal conceptual sense neither specific deterrence, nor general deterrence or incapacitation is really successful against jihadi foes. The deterring factor lies on a collective psychological level. This means, that one has to meditate the roots and causes that make religious terrorists tick. In that sense, one can fight a fire with fire. Yet, one has to be very careful not to ignite a wildfire. Jihadi terrorists know very well how to activate fears of Muslims by "divine orders and punishment," conspiracy discourses around western imperialism, anti-semitism, exploitation of western military policies; and jihadists know how to frighten Westerners by threats of and perpetration of terrorist attacks, which are justified by theological arguments that look totally irrational to Western eyes. Acts of terrorism are mostly directed at third party actors. Thus, Western and Muslim civilians are the victims. As a sad matter of fact, they only serve as intermediaries to communicate a message to the hard targets, i.e. politicians and militaries.

Words meaning "fear and fright" appear 296 times in more than 250 verses of the Qur'an. Conceptually, these can be split up into abstract, concrete, internal, external and deterring forms of fear. In jihadi belief, correct faith equals militant jihad. Basic injunctions on faith, which tell about fear and punishment, are interpreted in a jihadi sense. The second chapter of the Qur'an can serve here as an example. "This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear Allah [muttaqin, noun: ittiqa’]; [...] As to those who reject Faith [...] great is the penalty ['adhab] they (incur)." The concept of fear from God’s punishment for misbehavior is concretized in another verse of the same chapter, as it is projected on the hell-fire, that says "then fear [fa-ttaqu] the Fire whose fuel is men and stones,- which is prepared for those who reject Faith." The psychological construction of deterrence in (Sunni-) Islam and among its radical sub-sects relies on two factors. Firstly, internal abstract fear makes followers obey and is generally based on "fear from hell-fire" (khauf (min al-nar)) as well as the more specific fear to break obligations to God (bay’at Allah; ittiqa’ Allah) – The Islamic credo itself is an oath of loyalty to Islam, God and his messenger Muhammad, which is taken most seriously by devout Muslims. As third and fourth conceptual elements, there are fears that are levered against the enemy. These concepts carry the names "intimidating fright" (ra’b) in an abstract and terror (irhab) in a more concrete sense. Both concepts of fear, the own fear of obedience and the fear of harm levered against an enemy, form a strategic meta-category which is called "deterrence" (rad').

To understand the internal abstract and concrete fears of Muslims is essential for policy makers who want to develop deterrence strategies as well as peace plans. One must not undervalue the insights which result

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out of truly meditating the meaning of these and similar injunctions for Muslim culture, which read even clearer in their entirety (similar to Jewish and Christian fundamentalist injunctions on faith). Khauf is thus a more general and abstract concept of fear to observe God’s commands, while ittiqa’ signifies a more concrete concept of fear from God, i.e. his injunctions must be fearfully observed, otherwise concrete penalties will eventuate. This concept is called “the fearful observance of His services (of faith).” Both concepts of fear concern Muslim internal psychology, not the fear levered against non-Muslim adversaries. As I argued before, this knowledge should not be abused by Western policy makers against the majority of peaceful Muslims. However, political realism at times requires the deterrence of Muslim extremists. This can be a precondition for non-military political strategies towards other Muslims as well.

Secondly, there are Islamic terms for states of mind which signify the internal abstract fears and external concrete frights of enemies. “Terrorizing fright” as a deterrence by punishment strategy is thrown against the opponent in a concrete sense by suicide attacks (‘amaliyat istishhadiyya) or classical assassinations (ightiyalat), as well as in an abstract sense. The abstract concept ra‘b appears five times in the Qur’an. It describes a feeling of paralyzed powerlessness; a psychological destruction that conquers the enemy’s mind. For example, adversaries are struck with a terrorizing feeling of fear when they turn against Islam. In contrast, the concept ra‘hab has a concrete meaning. The simple transitive verb ra‘hab means to fear God and especially the fulfillment of agreements which believers have reached with Him. The fourth form derivate of this verb, arhaba, means “to cause terrorizing fright” in the enemy’s mind. The English translation of its related noun irhab is “terror.” The most prominent Qur’an injunction is: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into [turhibuna] the enemies of Allah.” This injunction is often used very selectively by jihadi ideologues, for example, to prove that "terrorism” is a legitimate concept (Abd al-Qadir bin Abd al-Aziz, Abu Musab al-Suri).

Finally, Islamic deterrence strategy is based on a synthesis of the different fear concepts. Muslims are supposed to feel a general fear to observe God’s commands (khauf) and to feel awe from divine punishment if they do not give support to deterrence (ittiqa’), which takes the the form of terrorist attacks. A threat scenario must be created to deter the enemy (ra‘b; irhab). Islamic deterrence itself is called rad’. This term does not appear in the Qur’an, but in later texts, which were narrated and subsequently written down as Islamic traditions (The Sunna and its literary form hadith), as well as medieval and modern legal interpretations. Modern jihadi ideologues have condensed this concept into a deterrence by punishment strategy, calling it "terrorist deterrence" (istiratijiyat al-rad’ bi-l-irhab) to be discussed in detail below (part 7.a of this paper).

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64 Qur’an, Surat al-Baqara 2:2-7: This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear Allah; Who believe in the Unseen, are steadfast in prayer, and spend out of what We have provided for them; And who believe in the Revelation sent to thee, and sent before thy time, and (in their hearts) have the assurance of the Hereafter. They are on (true) guidance, from their Lord, and it is these who will prosper. As to those who reject Faith, it is the same to them whether thou warn them or do not warn them; they will not believe. Allah hath set a seal on their hearts and on their hearing, and on their eyes is a veil; great is the penalty they (incur).

65 “Khashiya” has a similar concrete meaning of fear and is used like "ittiqa”.


66 Exact stipulations are connected to this concept of terrorizing fright. Either it is understood reflexively, i.e. terrorizing fear from something, or causing, i.e. to instill terrorizing fear. See Verses al-Baqara 2:40 and al-Nahl 16:51.

67 Surat al-Anfal 8:60.

68 "Turhibuna" see also Surat al-Isra 17:100, الْرِّحَابُ
Chapter Three: The Deterrence of Religious-Doctrinaire Terrorists

"[...] it has been suggested that one must employ different deterrent threats against the different actors involved in the terror act: the individuals who commit terrorist attacks, the leaders of terrorist organizations ordering the attacks (Almog 2004:513–414), and the states that support and sponsor these attacks.\footnote{Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda," International Studies Quarterly 54, 2010.}

Any opponent who develops a strategy of deterrence against Muslims must ask himself: What is the deepest irrational fear of the most radical Muslim jihadi-takfiri fringe groups (\textit{anguor}, i.e. \textit{khauf})? What causes them religiously induced phobia (a mixture of khauf and \textit{ittiqi'}, i.e. the rationalization of abstract fears project onto concrete matters)? What do devout Muslims fear in a concrete sense (\textit{timor}, i.e. \textit{ittiqi'} \textit{Allah})? What arouses their anguish (\textit{clamor}) and what their anger (\textit{furor})? These are fix-points to start with and will not be treated in detail, as they would breach the scope of this study.

Religious ideology and a similar sub-culture are the lowest common denominators among jihadi non-state actors. A psychological deterrence strategy must attack this Achilles Heel. Every deterrence strategy is per definition psychological. However, the emphasis lies here on the prevalence of psychological means of information warfare and methods of conviction as opposed to military measures or threat scenarios. The transcendental element of fear is more important than the worldly element if one wants to deter religious fundamentalists.

The construction of a successful deterrence strategy against jihadi actors as proposed in this paper relies on addressing two sorts of fear. If someone believes in a myth, one should counter him on the same level. It is in the beginning not advisable to confront him with a \textit{Realangst} (realistic fear). Rather, it requires a stratagem, namely to take a psychological detour to condition transcendental fears on concrete worldly matters. A phobia is in the beginning a diffuse fear and treatment often begins by attaching it to a worldly subject. The therapeutic stratagem allows a patient to avoid fear by avoiding the subject (spiders, closed rooms, examinations). Conversely, one can condition a phobia, even a collective phobia, by attaching certain fears to certain actions and objects (See the "Little Albert" experiment by Watson, 1920). A psychological strategy of deterrence against fundamentalists targets collective audiences, which define themselves not via physical proximity, but through a shared ideology. There is a heated security and public debate, if the killing of ideological figureheads is successful. Another argument is that ideological figureheads should be won over for such a strategy, or be ridiculed. Furthermore, the question poses itself if deep-seated religiously-motivated fears of religious fundamentalists to infringe God’s can be evoked in order to deter them from terrorist attacks? In the conclusion we will look at the difficulties of such a strategy, as long as Western military are occupying Muslim countries. However, to continue this thought, neurological and psychological experiments have shown that fear reactions among members of an in-group are based on emphatic feelings for each other. Fear reactions of humans are emphatic. Fear susceptibility rises in a group game if participants observe fear and pain other participants of their own group (Lanzetta & Enulis: 1989).\footnote{Lanzetta & Enulis, "Expectations of Cooperation and Competition and their Effects on Observers’ Vicarious Emotional Responses", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 56, S. pp. 534-554.} Some terrorist groups are characterized by high ingroup-cohesion and shared feelings of brotherly love and dedication create strong \textit{communitas} (Turner, 1969). Targeted assassinations of jihadi leaders and arrests of members have not proven to be successful in breaking apart group ideology. Their
main social glue, i.e., religious ideology and fundamental tenets are still intact, such as salvation, martyrdom and a messianic will to destroy. On the other hand, the pretention of sound and cohesive group ideology can also be a halo: The Internet allows constructing propagandistic images larger than life size. The German jihadi Shahab Dashti (aka Abu Safiyya, killed 2010) was sick of the situation on the ground, yet probably forced to participate in propaganda movies glorifying himself and other Germans who had joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Waziristan.

When ex-al-Qaeda ideologue Abd al-Qadir bin Abd al-Aziz (aka Dr. Fadl) renounced doctrinaire terrorist strategy in 2007, hundreds of jihadis followed suit. Al-Qadir used theological arguments which contained stipulations of punishment and fear for terrorist attacks. The fact that al-Qadir did so from inside an Egyptian jail damaged his credibility in the jihadi scene.

A reformed deterrence strategy against doctrinaire jihadis should use a psychological stratagem that creates general fear from divine punishment, which is based on religious myths that are projected on concrete actions and situations. Devotion, religious laws and fear from God are central factors. This quasi-phobic fear of fundamentalists can only be controlled by avoidance, namely the lack of terrorist actions. If a threshold state of mind between fright and fear, which contains concrete and abstract elements, is successfully created, it can check the ideology of "offensive doctrinaire" terrorism. Insurgent struggles against Western occupation, however, cannot be addressed with this strategy. A major problem is that insurgency-jihadis and doctrinaire jihadis are closely connected. Furthermore, a psychological deterrence strategy against doctrinaire proponents of global jihad should, ideally speaking, originate from inside Muslim culture, not from its outside. Fundamentalists who adhere to apocalyptic myths can then be checked by spiritual-transcendental mechanisms of deterrence. Divine signs and injunctions must prohibit (see prohibitions) to adore martyrdom, jihad and destruction of the West.

The SheshBesh game (Backgammon) is deeply rooted in Arabic and Middle Eastern culture. The game combines luck with strategy and offers itself for an analogy to a strategy, which essentially turns around the power of discourses. One may illustrate the importance of the clustering of arguments in discursive deterrence with the buildup of a successful gaming strategy: Never let playing pieces stand alone, lest they be hit by the enemy. Rather, it is advised to build central settlements from time to time, to protect the rear and to block the opponent’s checkers from re-entering the game once they have been throw out. If one applies this strategy to discourse (ideology): The own single piece is comparable to Western info-ops and public relations failures in the Muslim world. A functioning discursive deterrence strategy needs coherence, for example coherent rules of *quid pro quo* instead of unilateral adventures and experimenting with military measures. The single piece of the opponent is comparable to doctrines in his legalistic ideological discourse. Dices in the game are comparable to the unpredictable dynamics of politics in general and special policies such as deterrence in particular, since "there is nonknowledge about what we do not know and cannot know (‘unknown unknowns’). This is the wild card, the unpredictable that can throw over the most careful planning.”

Dynamics in communicative and cultural strategies can be compared to eventualities in military battles. In 1942, the Japanese were absolutely convinced of their naval superiority in the Pacific region. Yet, the Battle of Midway turned this order upside down and put them into the defensive. The U.S. had gathered excellent intelligence, but suffered heavy losses in the initial hours of the battle. But then the attack of SBD-

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Dauntless bombers on four Japanese aircraft carriers turned the tables around. A communicative strategy is about cultural intelligence. Jihadis are irrefutably convinced of their ideological superiority in the Muslim world. In addition, the stakes do not look good for the West. Yet, one should never underestimate the dynamics of an ideological battle in which the tables may turn around. At the same time, it is important not to suffer from own cultural hubris. The Roman Empire was rapidly expanding in geographical terms in the fourth century AD, yet collapsing politically from within. This also means that cultural and discursive advances into the Muslim world should be done with utmost precaution.

Chapter Four:
Taxonomy of deterrence in Islam

*Deterrence and preventive punitive measures in early Islam (Muhammadan and Sahaba periods)*

Firstly, in the Medinan period, i.e. after the *hijrah* of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, the Muslim Prophet was in need of security to consolidate and build his nascent community. Punitive measures against enemies were meant to deter them from disturbing this process. A number of key examples from this period may be seen in the light of deterrence with the goal to gain time and room for community building and ideological and military consolidation, keeping in mind the specific political circumstances of this period, in which the Muslim community was often besieged and in battle. Muhammad countered offensive counter-propaganda or military measures with punitive actions that were meant to deter his enemies from hostile actions. For example, the assassination mission against the Jewish tribal leader Ka‘ab bin al-Ashraf from the Banu Nadir in 624 AD, who was accused of anti-Muslim incitement in his poetry, as well as the alleged mass execution of male members of the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayza in 627 AD, who were accused of treason, can be seen as deterrence measures and warnings not to turn against the Muslim community. However, both incidences are interpreted differently in Muslim historiography, depending on peaceful or martial interpretations of Islam, since religious mythology is used differently for mobilization and identification (constructing a community myth) as well as activating followers (constructing martial, conspiracy and salvation myths).

The mythology offers broad interpretational possibilities, and often one interpreter confirms the veracity of an account, while another one denies it. Salafi-jihadis, who are the focal point of this study, tend to overstress the martial, conspiracy and salvation aspects of Islamic tradition and historiography to foster their communities (which is typical for the agitation of fundamentalist extremists in general). This is also a key-factor for understanding salafi-jihadi concepts of deterrence. Another, very base line incidence of deterring punishment is illustrated by the account of Abu Jahil in Mecca before the emigration in 622. Abu Jahil was one of the Meccan pagan Quraish leaders and very hostile towards the Muslims. He insulted Muhammad. Hamza ibn abd al-Mutallib, Muhammad’s paternal uncle punished Abu Jahil by hitting him with full strength, which led to an excuse by Abu Jahil and stopped him from speaking out further insults. Abu Jahil was killed in the Battle of Badr 624, and after the conquest of Mecca by the Muslims in 630 his son Ikramah ibn abi Jahil converted to Islam and became one of Muhammad’s most successful field commanders.


73 According to Greek mythology, *hubris* (wantonness) is inevitably avenged by *nemesis*, which is just and divine anger.
Secondly, as we have argued before, deterrence is one of the most ancient patterns of social organization; it is a policy to influence group behavior (in-groups and out-groups); and part of an instinctive reaction that results out of the correlation between in-group cohesion and out-group aggression.伊斯兰 traditions on martial incidents during the Sahaba period (the first three generations of Muhammad's followers) stress numerous cases in which the battle spirit and resolve of Muslim fighters was so overwhelming that it deterred the enemy during battle. One such instance is the battle of Constantinople under the caliphate of Mu'awiyya in 674 AD. Even though the Theodosian Walls of Constantinople proved impregnable during the siege, the single attack of a Muslim fighter who threw himself into the rows of the enemy (inghimas; iqtiham) is said to have had a destructive effect on the Byzantines' fighting moral:

On the strength of Abu 'Umran, who told: We were at Constantinople. 'Aqba Bin 'Amir was in charge of the people from Egypt, and a man was in charge of the people of Syria. A powerful division of the Byzantines left the city. We lined up towards them. Then, a man from the Muslims launched an attack against the Byzantines, until he entered into them. Then he returned towards us. The people shouted at him: Praise the Lord! He threw himself with his own hands into his destruction (tahluka). Then Abu Ayub al-Ansari, the companion of the prophet of Allah, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, raised and said: Oh, all of you people! You interpret this verse with this interpretation (Inna-kum tata'awwalun hadhihi-al-aya 'ala hadha al-tahluka). However, this verse was revealed to the community of the al-Ansar (ma'shar al-Ansar). When the religion of Allah prospered, and its followers grew, some of us spoke in a small circle in secrecy from the prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him: Our wealth perished, let's rebuild it. And we rebuilt what had perished. Then Allah, the exalted, revealed in his book the answer to what we planned. He said: Spend your money in the way of The Lord, and don't contribute with your (own) hands to (your) destruction. [Surat al-Baqara, 2:195] Wa unfuqu fi sabil Allahi wa la t alqu bi-ayadikum ila al-tahluka]. And the destruction (al-tahluka) meant the upheaval (al-qiyama), when we wanted to raise our wealth, and rebuild it. He ordered us to raid (fa-'amarana bi-l-rhazu). And Abu Ayub kept on raiding in the way of Allah until Allah, the exalted, seized him.

According to the hadith, K 2:195 does not refer to self-destruction, but to a divine revelation for the al-Ansar, which commanded them to continue jihad. Thus, "tahluka" implies that "(self) destruction is the omission of jihad". Some Muslim interpreters argue that K 2:195 must not be interpreted in a narrow tactical sense, but has a wider strategic and ideological implication. And it does not contradict suicide-martyrdom operations.

In the quoted example two deterrence paradigms are again stalemating each other. The Theodosian Walls of Constantinople posed an impenetrable obstacle (deterrence by denial). According to Muslim tradition the single attack was successful tactic of deterrence by punishment, which demoralized the enemy. Thus, the single attack example becomes a corner-stone of medieval theological deterrence concepts, and then continues to be important in contemporary Islamic legal justifications of suicide attacks, which are frequently used by sub-state actors as a form of extended deterrence by punishment. Excursus: One might

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74 The goal is to build-up a coherent in-group, at the same time to deter and reduce the harmony of out-group(s). The correlation between in-group harmony and out-group aggression is probably one of the most basic social behavioral patterns. (trans-species: among chimpanzees as well as humans) (Demonic Males; Revilla; Jordania).

75 Translation by the author. There are different versions of this hadith with reference numbers to their transmitters, among them: Abu Daw’d (1512), Abu ‘Umran with a supposedly sound hadith by the fourth century a.H. Hanafi scholar al-Jasas, al-Tirmidhi (2972), al-Nis’i’s interpretation (48), and Ibn ‘Atiya in “Al-Muharrir al-wajiz”, “interpretation of the Koran 2/146.”

76 One of two groups of Muslims around the Prophet Muhammad after his Hijra (emigration) to Mecca in the year 622. The First Group were members of the Quraysh who emigrated with Muhammad to Mecca, the so-called al-Muhajirun. The second group were people from Medina who granted Muhammad refuge after the Hijra and converted to Islam. Therefore, they gained the name "al-Ansar", “the Helpers or Supporters.”

77 The principle underlying this deterrence/preference battle tactic is that constant dropping wears the stone; but Constantinople only fell in 1453.
argue that using the term "deterrence" is wrong, but rather "preterrence" should be used for this modus operandi. However, this would be a double-standard. The actual use and not only threat of force is also an integral element of Western deterrence (targeted assassinations, house demolitions). Moreover, the actual use of force in deterrence accords with endemic perceptions of tribal warfare. These perceptions are deeply rooted underneath the cultural and civilization layer of every society. The predominant focus on WMD-deterrence during the Cold War has led to the neglecting of other forms of deterrence for the better part of half a century. If state actors and sub-state actors like salafi-jihadis battle each other, the latter often refer to asymmetric warfare tactics such as suicide attacks, which they integrate into extended deterrence concepts ("Do not attack us or other Muslims, otherwise we will perpetrate [irrationally looking] martyrdom operations" – [which when used as a war tactic underlie clear rationales]) – while the former respond in kind with targeted assassinations. This is neo-endemic warfare at the high ends of technological and doctrinaire conflict. In psychological terms, the modus operandi "suicide attack" can be compared to an unconventional weapon in the hands of a weaker actor facing a stronger actor: Suddenly the weaker actor gains deterrence force. Analogies between medieval "catapults" and weapons of mass destruction are another possible use of Muslim sub-state actors to legitimize extended deterrence paradigms (see below, 1.c). Also in this case extended analogical reasoning (qiyas) is applied. One should focus again on different perceptions of deterrence and applicability in Muslim culture and jihadi subculture; as well as in state culture versus sub-state culture. Do religiously motivated sub-state actors tend to realize threats; would they always follow a strategy of preterrence (pre-emptive deterrence), also with WMD? The big question is how they would behave if they possessed non-conventional weapons.

The "pledge of the tree" (bay'at al-shajara) is another example of a deterrence-standoff between Muslims and non-Muslims. As for the background, in March 628 CE, Muhammad went with more than 1000 Muslims to Mecca in order to perform the annual pilgrimage. However, the Quraysh of Mecca denied the Muslims entry to the city. Therefore, Muhammad sent an envoy, 'Uthman bin 'Affan, to negotiate unhindered entry into the city. When the envoy Uthman did not return, the Muslims assumed that he had been killed or taken prisoner. Muhammad assembled his followers under a tree and took a pledge of allegiance to fight for Uthman ("kanat bay'atun fi 'Uthman"), who was later released by the Quraysh. Muhammad's followers pledged "not to run away" (baya'nahu ann la nafirra). Some traditions stress that "we did not pledge loyalty until death." Other traditions, which are more in line with jihadi doctrine, narrate that Muhammad demanded a pledge of loyalty "until death" (ala al-maut). Both sides used threat display. The Quraysh levered deterrence by denial (blocking entrance to their city) against the Muslims, who responded with threatening deterrence by punishment to influence their adversaries’ behavior (pledging, singing, show of force and determination). Such standoffs were frequent and integral elements of endemic warfare of 7th century tribal society on the Arabian Peninsula. At least once a year, a truce was concluded to end the constant state of low scale conflict and allow pilgrims to enter Mecca. It is utterly important to understanding the deeper social dynamics connected to the pledge

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78 This concept stems from Shmuel Bar.
79 Also called “pledge of the pleasure [of Allah] (bay'at al-ridwan). The Qur'an quote reads like a description of a rite of personal devotion that was performed for the sake of the community. Certainly Allah was well pleased with the believers when they swore allegiance to you [idh yubayi'unaka] under the tree, and He knew what was in their hearts, so He sent down tranquillity on them and rewarded them with a near victory.” See Qur'an Surat al-Fath 48:18, translation by Muhammad Habib Shakir, (Accessed May 4, 2012) - http://www.muslimaccess.com/quraan/translations/shakir/048.htm.
80 Some traditions speak about 1400, others about 1300 followers who accompanied Muhammad to Mecca in 628 CE.
of the tree. Similar procedures strengthen the build-up of deterrence force and in-group-cohesion among modern jihadis.\footnote{Oaths of allegiance and connected rituals strengthened the collective identity of the early Muslim community. They stand for the ceremonial establishment of leadership as well as important group-internal transitions. Such procedure strengthens the fearlessness, devotion and obligation of Muslim warriors, which is additionally based on strong customary feelings.}

Modern jihadis often use rhythmic encouraging battle songs (\textit{huda'}) and melodic singing (\textit{anasheed}) to induce a state of "battle trance" before they carry out an attack or enter into battle. Oftentimes this happens together with oaths of allegiance, which are given either to elect a leader, or to confirm steadfastness immediately before battle. Since these forms of ritualized battle-preparation are rooted in traditional Arabic-Islamic culture, it is likely that also Muhammad’s followers used additional means of ritualistic expression, such as singing and praying during the pledge of the tree. The pledge of the tree allegedly had a strong effect on the Meccans, who were deterred. Let us keep this in mind and cross 1400 years of socialization in order to "switch" from then to now: U.S. soldiers who were attacked by a suicide bomber under a bridge in Khalidiyya (Anbar Province, Iraq) reported that they frequently heard chanting and singing on the other side of the bridge prior to the attack.\footnote{Sean Langan, "Mission Accomplished," BBC-documentary, 2004.} The pre-battle singing-ceremonies are not particular to Sunni-jihadis. Yet, there is a particular element connected to modern salafi-jihad that is called "\textit{zaaffat 'ushaq al-hur}" (procession of the lovers of the paradise-maid).\footnote{Also a jihadi propaganda video released afterwards by "the Group of Monotheism and Jihad," since 2006 "al-Qaeda in Iraq" put focus on ritualized singing: The bomber is accompanied to his van, which is loaded with three and a half tons of explosives. The group chants an encouraging battle song (\textit{huda'}) and then each member says goodbye to the driver. See: \textit{Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad}, "Riyah al-Nasr", Winds of Victory, 2004.} The ceremony serves three purposes. Firstly, it ritually carries the soul of the bomb-truck driver from here to the afterlife (\textit{rite of passage}). Secondly, the singing is a tactical instrument to induce a state of battle trance. Thirdly, the singing is a firm part of Islamic deterrence and directed at non-Muslim audiences. Let us intellectually return 1400 years in time and space, in order to look at the classical example.

During the pledge of the tree in 628 CE, no actual force was applied in the standoff between both sides. Yet, the political gain for the Muslim community was considerable. Muslim historiography narrates that the "Pledge of the Tree" led to the "Treaty of Hudaybiyya," i.e. the 10 years truce (\textit{hudha}) between the Muslims and the Quraysh of Mecca, which would allow the former an annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The defenders of Mecca were allegedly deeply impressed by the show of force and determination of the Muslim community during the oath, which "was sworn on patience and non-retreat even if they were killed." The ceremony itself is said to have had a deterring on the Quraysh, but a calming effect on the Muslims.\footnote{A tradition on the revelation of Surat al-Fath says "when the people trusted", i.e. indicates that the ceremony under the tree had a calming effect not only on the Muslims (sending them heart-peace (\textit{sakina})), but also a calming effect on the unbelievers (\textit{amn}). \textit{Dala’il al-nabwa li-l-Bayhaqi} (Proofs of the prophet-hood by al-Bayhaqi), No. 1537, (Accessed May 9, 2012) - \url{http://www.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=681&hid=1537&pid=143912}.}

As for the psychological state of the conflicting sides during the standoff: both sides showed threat display. "Nevertheless, Mohammed made the journey with a thousand followers. Armed only with swords, they were in a state of \textit{ihram}. Consequently they were subjected to the restrictions of freedom of action which this holy state imposed upon them."\footnote{Tor Andræ, Mohammed, "The Man and His Faith", Mineola, Dover Publications, 2000, (originally published by Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), translated from German into English by Theophil Menzel, p. 152.} \textit{Ihram} signifies a spiritual state that forbids violent acts or thoughts and is achieved by cleansing and boundary-crossing rituals, as well as a ritual dress code in order to perform pilgrimages (\textit{hajj} and \textit{'umra}). There are now two interpretational possibilities. The pledge of the tree turned the Muslim state of mind into a \textit{battle trance}. Furthermore, it is possible, that the ceremony ritually strengthened the peaceful \textit{ihram}-state of mind, and the conviction to perform the pilgrimage even if the Quraysh blocked the way. Either way, one of these actions – peaceful or hostile determination - must
have impressed the Quraysh tribe. The Quraysh became convinced that the Muslims’ deterrence force was stronger than theirs. Determining factors were in-group cohesion, religious devotion and belief. The Muslims defeated the Quraysh, who applied deterrence by denial, i.e. not granting the Muslims access to the city, with deterrence by punishment, which is associated with the pledge of allegiance under the tree.

**Deterrence in the Qur’an**

During the famous Battle of Uhud in 625 AD a Qur’anic verse is said to have been revealed to Muhammad that states: “And if ye do catch them out, catch them out no worse than they catch you out: But if ye show patience, that is indeed the best (course) for those who are patient.” Surat al-Nahl 16:126 belongs to the Qur’an chapters, which deal extensively with the battle topics that were dominant in the Medinan period, as in contrast to the Meccan chapters revealed before the emigration of the Muslim community in 622, which have a more conciliatory character. If we understand deterrence as “the art of producing in the mind of the enemy ... the fear to attack” (Dr. Strangelove 55:09), or "measures by one actor or alliance to prevent hostile action by another actor," then this verse tells us something about reciprocity in combination with Muslim strategic patience. Possessing the means to deter, allows being patient because deterrence is not about the actual use of the weapon and realization of the threat, but about the psychological momentum that keeps both sides from attacking each other. In theological terms this guideline can be read in conjunction with other verses, which add clearer ideas for deterrence. For example, the Medinan Surat al-Baqara 2:194 "The prohibited month for the prohibited month,- and so for all things prohibited,- there is the law of equality. If then any one transgresses the prohibition against you, Transgress ye likewise against him. But fear Allah, and know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves." The law of equality (qisas) and the doctrine of likewise hostility (i’tida’ bi-l-mithl) can both be used by hardcore extremists as guidelines for punishment and countervalue deterrence, as well as extended deterrence to justify "legal" terrorist attacks to restrain the enemy from hostile action out of his fear of counter-measures against soft targets. A further building block that fits into the formulation of an Islamic-theological deterrence concept can be derived form Surat al-’Imran 3:151, which speaks about "terror" (ra’b) in the sense of fear that the enemy is supposed to experience. "Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers, for that they joined companions with Allah, for which He had sent no authority: their abode will be the Fire: And evil is the home of the wrong-doers!" The verse was probably revealed shortly before the Battle of Uhud in 625 CE, at least some traditions stress this. The future tense of the verb "to cast" indicates that the fear will be sown, it does not yet exist.
Also deterrence, which is a psychological game of attrition, requires both sides to sow fear steadily and anew every time the other side stops believing in the threat. The often misread Qur’an verse Surat al-Anfal 8:60 is another instance, which fits like a basic brick into Islamic deterrence paradigms: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly." If read correctly, the verse tells about "preparing" (wa a’iddu) war equipment in order to frighten, and not the actual application of the equipment for war measures. The next verse, al-Anfal 8:61, allows giving up martial measures if the enemy is inclined to do so himself. It could, however, also be read as a strategic injunction to keep up a level of deterrence which is based on the psychology of fear, not its actual application (preterrence). However, the restrictive application of "ra’b" (terrorizing fright) injunctions loses some of its momentum, when looking at other verses that use the same concept. Surat al-Anfal 8:12 is said to have been revealed to Muhammad at the Battle of Badr in 624 CE: "Remember thy Lord inspired The angels (with the message): ‘I am with you: give Firmness to the Believers: I will instill terror (ra’b) into the hearts of the Unbelievers: Smite ye above their necks And smite all their Finger-tips off them [sic]." In the Iraq-conflict, the beheading of hostages has been legitimimized with this verse, i.e. "smite their necks" (fadribu faqal-a’naq). The ritualized beheading of hostages in front of cameras is, of course, a form of terrorist deterrence. The message is more or less clear. The interesting question, however, is if jihadi perceive this as a sort of tits-for-tats game, where western tactical deterrence by targeted assassinations must be answered in kind. Or, if they think that they must "strike terror into the hearts of the enemies" and are only God’s tool to fulfill this injunction. In any way, regarding the popularity of jihadi martyrdom-culture, hardcore adherents will probably not be deterred by the tits-for-tats game that characterizes the nature of conflict presently. According to Muslim exegesis, Surat al-Kahf was revealed to Muhammad after the Quraysh of Mecca sent emissaries to test his claim that he was the last of the Prophets. Al-Kahf is probably based on the Christian legend of the seven sleepers of Ephesus. One verses describes how approaching hostiles will be deterred. "[...] if thou hadst come up on to them, Thou wouldst have certainly Turned back from them in flight, And wouldst certainly have been Filled with terror of them." While the former verse is a general stipulation not to turn against monotheists, the next verse can be read as a specific threat against monotheists not to turn against Muslims "And those of the people Of the Book who aided Them—God did take them Down from their strongholds And cast terror into their hearts, (so that) Some ye slew, and some Ye made prisoners."

Also Surat al-Hashr describes a punitive deterrence scenario. According to Muslim exegesis it was revealed after the Jewish tribe Banu Nadir broke the pact with Muhammad following the Muslim loss at the Battle of Uhud against the Quraysh form Mecca in 626 CE. Muhammad then besieged the tribe, burned some of its houses down and expelled it from Medina. "It is He Who got out The unbelievers among The people of the Book from their homes At the first gathering (of the forces). Little did ye think that they would get out: And..."
they thought That their fortresses Would defend them from God! But the (Wrath of) God came to them from quarters From which they little Expected (it), and cast Terror into their hearts, So that they destroyed Their dwellings by their own Hands and the hands Of the Believers. Take warning, then, O ye with eyes (to see)!”

Moreover, Qur’an Surat al-Nisa' plays a preeminent role for individual tactical deterrence by punishment, which we will further discuss below (2.a). One might even argue that the verse is the doctrinaire fundament of contemporary martyrdom jihadism (jihadiya istishhadiyya), i.e. that doctrinaire strand in the jihadi movement that puts absolute focus on punishment (tankill) martyrdom (istishhadiya): "Then fight in Allah’s cause - Thou art held responsible only for thyself - and rouse the believers. It may be that Allah will restrain the fury of the unbelievers; for Allah is the strongest in might and in punishment.” The verse contains a stipulation that - in jihadi thinking- allows individuals to apply "exemplary punishment" by self-responsible terrorist attacks against alleged enemies of Islam. The rationale behind it is to deter others from hostile acts against Muslims, such as insult, vituperation, ridicule (for example, caricatures of Muhammad), or occupation. Also the Kosovo-Albanian Arif Uka, who killed U.S.-soldiers at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011, was praised by jihadi ideologues as someone, who realized this doctrine of deterrence.

Medieval Islamic theology and deterrence

One of the Islamic legal conditions that needed to be met in al-Qaeda’s reasoning to justify the September 11, 2011 attacks was that of heavy weaponry being used against the enemy with no possibility to distinguish between enemy civilians and combatants. Al-Qaeda argued that this went back to the use of catapults by Muslim armies against fortified enemy cities in early Islamic warfare, when similar conditions were met. As Cioffi-Revilla argues, fortifications are one of the earliest empirically proven forms of deterrence by denial. When we translate a similar reasoning to a possible situation of nuclear armament by salafi-jihadis, then an atomic bomb could be analogized to catapults (manjaniqat). The modern interpretation nurtures itself on the medieval precedence case in which Muslims found themselves confronted by fortifications, neglected the message, besieged the fortified city and were in need to develop tactics to open it. The concept of manjaniq can be found in numerous Islamic traditions, for example, in Malik bin Anas, when at the siege of Ta’if in 630 AD Muhammad used catapults against the city and ‘it was said to him, ‘Messenger of God, there are women and youth inside,’ and the messenger of God said, peace be upon him, ‘they belong to their fathers.” Since then, the catapult case has been applied to numerous battle situations in Muslim history. In Islamic legal terms, an analogy (qiyas) is drawn from an original case (asr) to a new case (far) on the basis of a reasoning (‘illah) that such a ruling (hukm) is permissible, if it benefits the Muslims under war circumstances. Similar rulings based on extended analogical reasoning can be found in extremists’ writings on the issue of civilian casualties, always drawing on historical precedents in Islamic tradition and law, which are being read selectively by salafi-jihadis. For example, if the enemy threatens to overrun Muslim

100 Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, "Origins and Age of Deterrence: Comparative Research on Old World and New World Systems.”
The classical legal interpretation goes back to the advances of Mongol invaders into the Abbasside caliphate in the 13th century AD and has been picked up by numerous contemporary jihadi ideologues to justify terrorist attacks, in which the likelihood of civilian casualties is very high. Non-Muslim civilians may be killed because they indirectly support the enemy with their work and are part of his war-machinery, which also goes back to classic salafi-jihadi interpretations of Islamic legal stipulations such as "The Rulings of the Qur'an" by the medieval scholar Ibn al-'Arabi, who states "Do not kill women unless they fight, because the Prophet, peace be upon him, forbade their killing. And this is valid for as long as they do not fight, for if they fight, then they will be killed."\(^{103}\)

Interpretations of two classical Muslim scholars\(^ {104}\) on the single attack during the siege of Constantinople in 674 deserve special attention. The reasoning is chain-like, starts with a tradition (hadith), is continued by classical scholars, and finally integrated into contemporary Islamic deterrence concepts based on terrorist tactics. The above quoted hadith explains the event itself. It is the root source for the interpretations. Classical Muslim scholars interpret the event in a deterrence context. Furthermore, the classical interpretation of single attacks has become a cornerstone in the justification of contemporary suicide attacks. Suicide-attacks are analogized to single attacks such as the one at the siege of Constantinople in 674. Furthermore, suicide-attacks are supposed to "frighten" the enemy, which also follows the medieval interpretation of single attacks. The classical discussion of single attacks (inghimas; iqtiham)\(^ {105}\) in relation to "self-destruction" (tahluka; talaf al-nafs) sheds more light on this topic. Classical Islamic law states that self-sacrifice is legitimate if it serves the motivation of Muslims and deterrence of enemies: \(^ {106}\)

- Al-Shaybani said: If one man alone launched an attack against thousand men from the idolaters and he was alone, there wouldn’t be a virtue in this, if he strives for save rescue, or the destruction (nikaya) of the enemy. Therefore, he has no option and he is reprehensible, if he turns himself to the destruction without a benefit (manfa’a) for the Muslims. If his intention is to encourage the Muslims to do it like him, the permissibility will be likely, because it is a benefit for the Muslims from some points of view (fihi naf'an...'ala ba'ad al-wujuh). And if his intention is the frightening (irhab) of the enemy in order to teach him about the firmness (salaba) of the Muslims in the religion, then the permissibility is likely.

- If there is a benefit for the Muslims, the life is destroyed for the strengthening of the religion of Allah (fa-tulifat al-nafs li-l'zaz din Allah), and the discouragement of atheism (tawhin al-kufr). Allah praises that the

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\(^ {103}\) Sadat was sitting among a large entourage, watching a military parade that celebrated the Egyptian "victory" against Israel in the 1973 war, when the attack took place.

\(^ {104}\) Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, "Da'wat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya" ("Global Islamic Resistance Call"), p. 1228.

\(^ {105}\) Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Shaybani (749/50 - 805) and Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abu Bakr al-Ansari al-Qurtubi (1214 - 1274) were famous Sunni scholars. The former belongs to the Hanafi school and the latter to the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence.

\(^ {106}\) The penetration of the single man into the enemy is termed iqtiham. The term is an eighth form verbal noun derived from the root word qaham and means intruding, but also defying a danger, or hardship. Another term is inghimas, a seventh form verbal noun of its corresponding word root rhayn-mim-sin, which literally means to plunge into the enemy. Thus, the matter of dispute (ikhtilaf) among Muslim jurists is the permissiveness of the intrusion or plunging of the man into the enemy in the war, and his single attack against many of the enemy (jawaz iqtiham; inghimas al-rajul fi-l-harb, wa hamlulu 'ala- l-'adu –I- kathir wahdahu).

believers have an exalted position with his saying: "Allah bought from the believers their lives and goods" [refers to al-Taubah, 9:111]. This is the verse, among other verses of laudation, with which Allah praises the one who sacrifices his life. Therefore, it is desirable to enjoin what is just and forbid what is wrong (hakama al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa alnahiy 'an al-munkar [the hisba, a central Islamic doctrine, which can be found in Surat The Wise (al-Luqman), 31:17]).

- In contrast, Abu Abdallah al-Qurtubi said in his interpretation: The 'ulama' disputes about the circumstance when a the fighter breaks into the enemy (iqtiham) and attacks him alone (hamluhu wadhahu). Al-Qasim ibn Muhaymara, and al-Qasim ibn Muhammad and Abd al-Malik from our 'ulama' said: It is good that he single man launches an attack against the powerful army, if he has power, and is in a good physical constitution. But if he is weak, this is the destruction (al-tahluka). It was said that if he requests the martyrdom, and the purpose is pure, then he shall do it (idha talab al-shahada wa khalasat al-niya fa-li-ya'mal), because his purpose is one of them, and that follows his [Allah’s] saying "And there is a type of man who gives his life to earn the pleasure of God" [refers to Surat The Cow (al-Baqara), 2:207].

However, the doctrine of tactical deterrence based on single attacks is not unproblematic. It emerged when Muslims war strategy evolved from endemic warfare to imperial warfare. Averroes, an important representative of Muslim military jurisprudence, which developed from the eight century BC onward, states that "the maximum number of enemies against which one is obliged to stand one’s ground is twice the number [of one’s own troops]. About this, everyone agrees on account of [K 8:66]: Now Allah hath made it lighter for you and knoweth that there is weakness among you."\(^4\) Thus, Averroes’ 12th century treatise and the legal opinions of the two cited 8th respectively 13th century scholars can be read differently, according to context and purpose. This is an innate trait of religious law and also heavily influences interpretations of deterrence and warfare in modern Muslim thinking.

**Chapter Five: Deterrence Concepts in Modern Salafi-Jihad**

*Deterrence in contemporary Salafi-jihadi thinking*

A detailed Salafi-jihadi deterrence concept has been formulated by the al-Qaeda thinker Abu Musab al-Suri in his jihad encyclopedia "Global Islamic Resistance Call" (Da’wat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya al-Alamiyya). Al-Suri speaks about "Terror as Strategy of Deterrence" (istiratijiyat al-rad’ bi-i-irhab). The Arabic word "rad’" comes closest to the western concept of "deterrence." One of al-Suri’s key examples are the Madrid attacks in 2004, which according to jihadi reading led to a surprising win in the parliamentary elections of the Socialist Spanish Workers’ Party and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Of course, the jihadi interpretation of the chain of events exaggerates the validity of the Spanish case and projects similar developments after jihadi deterrence attacks on other states. Yet, al-Suri’s formulation of a clear deterrence concept based on a *quid pro quo* of casualties (terror in the Muslim world leads to terror in the West) bears elements of the rationalization of Islamic terrorism on a strategic level. In theological terms, al-Suri uses the above mentioned verse of reciprocity, Surat al-Baqara 2:194, as basis for his argument. In addition, he sums up detailed conditions for “deterrence operations” and the killing of civilians, which are orientated at the behavior of Western states. Among the conditions for the large scale killing of civilians is “a situation that requires the use of weapons of mass destruction.” This condition is fulfilled if “the law of

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equality" necessitates their use, i.e. if a strike by the enemy has led to such a high number of causalities that it must be answered likewise, argues al-Suri, orientating himself at Qur’an 2:194 "There is the law of equality (al-hurma qisas). If then anyone transgresses against you, transgress likewise against him (bi-l-mithl), but fear God and know that God is with those who restrain themselves (Allah ma’ al-muttaqin)."

We have discussed the concept of ittiqa’ earlier in this paper. In a religious-psychological sense, putting focus on fear of God, which in this case is expressed by restraint, would be a first door-opener to address jihadi mindsets.

According to al-Suri, terrorist operations against civilians in hostile countries are legitimate. Especially in the U.S., claims al-Suri, more large scale "strategic operations" like 9/11 should be realized, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, possibly nuclear bombs and biological weapons. The reason, according to al-Suri, is that aggression against Muslims necessitates retaliation in the same manner (’amaliyat bi-l-mithl) or operations that deter aggression (rad’ al-’adwan).108

Conditions for an immediate deterrence operation according to al-Suri (deterrence by punishment) are:109

1. Any state that arrests and extradites mujahideen to the U.S. or their home countries must be hit immediately, even if it is not a U.S. ally.
2. Any action by a hostile state that causes the death of a Muslim civilian must be answered with an exemplary deterrence attack.
3. Any state that joins the U.S.-coalition must be hit immediately with a terrorist operation so that the coalition will disintegrate.

Islamic legal conditions that permit the deterring murder of civilians according to al-Suri (extended deterrence by punishment) are:110

1. Cases in which the law of equality necessitates deterrent terrorism against civilians;
2. An operation requiring the use of weapons of mass destruction;
3. Civilians mingling with enemies and preventing the former from being singled out;
4. Civilians being used as human shields (tatarrus) by enemies;
5. The necessity to burn the stronghold of the enemy.

The possible range of interpretations of these conditions and the decentralized structure of actors is overwhelming, and a counter-strategy should address the smallest common denominator. As argued above, this is the fear of God (ittiqa’ Allah) and corresponding interpretations on restraint, or lack of reward of paradise.

The scenario which al-Suri develops is deterrence by punishment strategy based on extended and counter-value attacks, which are based on terrorist interpretations of divine injunctions. If jihadis obtained WMDs, it would either lead to Massive Retaliation and Mutual Assured Destruction paradigms. The second possibility is that the informal doctrine would spin out of control. The perception of victimization might lead jihadi actors to use WMD in preterrence, such as they do with conventional tactics and suicide-attacks. The question is if they can and want to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional uses of

109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
weapons (preterrence versus deterrence); and if the so-called "war on terrorism" socializes them, for example through targeted assassinations, to actually apply threats.

The capabilities do not yet exist, but the communication of al-Suri and fellow ideologues testifies to the credibility to realize such scenarios. Therefore, weapons of mass destruction would probably be directed against Western population centers, the condition being that Western influences and non-Islamic regimes in the Middle East have to disappear. However, even after the fulfillment of such a condition, the fight will go on, argue jihadists. Moreover, since they are sub-state actors, it would be difficult and unlawful according to International standards of Just War to deter them with counter-threats directed against Muslim population centers. This again strengthens our key argument of a reformed deterrence strategy which addresses the martyrdom and salvation myths of jihadi actors. The prominent London based jihadi cleric Abu Basir al-Tartusi, for example, condemned the killing of civilians after the suicide bombings in London in 2005. In contrast, Yusuf al-Uyeiri, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, argued for extended deterrence by punishment and the killing of civilians. "The inviolability of the blood of infidel women, siblings and elders is not absolute [...] the Muslims are allowed to kill infidel civilians as an act of equal retaliation (al-mu’amala bi-l-mithl, Surat al-Baqara 2:194); if the infidels aim at Muslim women, siblings and elders, then the Muslims can do likewise." The discussion among jihadi ideologues turns around the question what "fighting" actually means, i.e. if indirect support of the economy of a hostile state is already fighting, etc. Therefore, in a nuclear scenario, jihadi sub-state actors who obtain nuclear weapons will probably argue along such lines to build up deterrence, or even apply WMD (preterrence might be legitimized by jihadists on grounds as acts of "just retaliation"). Mustapha Abu-l-Yazid, for example, a high ranking commander of al-Qaeda central in Pakistan (k.2010), said in an Interview with al-Jazeera News in 2009 that nuclear bombs obtained in case of a Pakistani regime breakdown should be used against the United States. It remains to be asked if al-Yazid meant the actual "use" of such weapons against the U.S., or the setting up of deterrence equilibrium. This question is important. However, al-Yazid, cannot answer personally anymore.

A similar concept of extended deterrence as a punishment strategy was formulated by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and communicated through its online-magazine Inspire (Special Issue of November 2010, published by al-Malahim Media). Referring to the parcel bombs sent from Yemen to Jewish targets in the U.S. in summer 2010, the magazine stated that this operation had "struck fear in the hearts of the American and their allies," which probably refers to the notion of fear mentioned in Qur’an Surat al-Imran 3:151 (see above, 1.b). The concept of parcel bombs then stands for an extended deterrence strategy in the sense of al-Suri, because the operation is justified as "a response to the Crusaders’ aggression against the Muslims of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Maghreb, Chechnya and the Arabian Peninsula." Any harm done to Muslims worldwide leads to counter-strikes by al-Qaeda. Punishment is threatened for any invasion in Muslim affairs by the West. In a classical deterrence sense, it is a communicational-psychological strategy: The bomb-parcels on U.S. airfreight jets cost 4,200 U.S. Dollars, yet have cause economic damage that goes into the millions and psychological damage that is incalculable, states AQAP (security measures, delays, fear, etc.). The goal is to bleed out the West with "a strategy of thousand cuts." The text also contains two

111 Al-Tartusi has kept to this argument and reiterated it in several forum discussions since then, for example, "Fatwa from Shaikh Abu Basir Al-Tartusi prohibiting suicide operations," (Accessed June 25, 2012) – http://forums.islamicawakening.com/t20/fatwa-shaikh-abu-basir-al-tartusi-prohibiting-20144/  

112 Yusuf al-'Uyeiri, "Haqiat al-Harb al-Salibiyya" ("The Truth of the Crusader War"), 1422 AH.  

pieces of theological evidence from the Qur'an and Islamic tradition. A well known hadith states that a jihadi elite "will continue fighting for the cause of Allah ... until Judgment Day." The second piece of evidence is the above mentioned Surat al-Anfal 8:60, which commands to "prepare" means of war to frighten the enemy. It becomes once again clear that al-Qaeda and affiliates go back to classical sources in order to develop new paradigms and regard themselves as chosen elite, which acts on behalf of, defends and represents the whole Muslim ummah. To bolster this claim, salafi-jihadis present themselves as authoritative actors with formal institutions, ministries and administrations such as the virtual "Islamic State of Iraq," the "Council-Committee of Fighters," and the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan."

Another major deterrence paradigm of modern jihadis is exemplary punishment (tankil). It can also be described as "individual deterrence" because Muslim individuals are supposed to strike against non-Muslim individuals, who have allegedly done harm to Islam. The Islamic legal justification for individual deterrence and individual terrorism derives from Surat al- al-Nisa' 4:84 "Then fight in Allah's cause - Thou art held responsible only for thyself - and rouse the believers. It may be that Allah will restrain the fury of the Unbelievers; for Allah is the strongest in might and in punishment [tankil]." Individual deterrence is thus based on "exemplary punishment" (tankil), the modus operandi being assassinations (ighityalat).

Muslim outrage in the wake of the publication of the Muhammad caricatures in 2006, for example, was answered by bin Laden with a call upon individuals to revenge the hostile ridicule of Muhammad. Bin Laden cited the classical example of the Prophet’s companion Muhammad bin al-Maslamah, who killed the Jewish tribal leader Ka’ab bin al-Ashraf. Al-Ashraf had ridiculed Muhammad in his poetry (see above, 1.a). The Dutch extremist Muhammad al-Bouyeri, who assassinated filmmaker and Islam critique Theo van Gogh in 2004, oriented himself at the same Islamic legal precedence. In both cases, punitive assassinations were meant to deter critiques or ridiculers of Islam.

The same strategy can from a Muslim viewpoint be applied to politicians, military personnel and economic figure-heads that cause harm to Islam. For example, the ridicule of Muhammad by Neo-Nazis (Pro-NRW movement) in Solingen in Germany was followed by violent clashes between local salafis and the police, including a knife-attack against a police officer. Short time later, the German jihadi Yassin Chouka aka Abu Ibrahim, one of the figure-heads of German jihad propaganda from Waziristan under the patronage of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, published a video titled "Death to Pro-NRW." Yassin Chouka calls for self-responsible single deterrence attacks and quotes the classical scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal „whoever insults the Prophet must be killed." Chouka explicitely summons German salafis to revenge the ridicule of Muhammad. Volunteers shall to go underground, keep a low profile and assassinate key figures of Pro-NRW, which will be painful punishment (‘adhab muhin; Qur’an 33:57 and adhab ‘alim; Qur’an 9:61). The command comes out of Waziristan. Fellow jihadis from Khorasan "told me to tell you [the German Muslims] that you shall kill them all [the right-wing Pro-NRW followers]." German police found the video on the cell phones of several salafis, who had downloaded it and were distributing it in their social milieu.

Global jihad relies on two strategic pillars with a communicational link in between. The first pillar comprises everything that is connected to the realm of established terrorist organizations and networks. The second pillar of global jihadi strategy is based on "individualized terrorism" (irhab fardî), i.e. individuals or small
cells that perpetrate attacks. These are linked to and guided by authoritative organizations and individual media activists through the salafi-jihadi propaganda machinery.

Shmuel Bar observes in his analysis of Israeli deterrence that leaders of organizations such as Fatah (Arafat) and Hezbollah (Nasrallah) sometimes rely on their intuition and own sources of intelligence, which makes it difficult to spread "deterrent messages through sophisticated disinformation campaigns [...] when leaders are using such paradigms."117

Bar's analysis is right in regards to charismatic leadership. Yet, jihadis confront us with multiple modes of leadership which are coupled with different deterrence strategies. Organizational networks and hierarchical groups apply "collective responsibility" deterrence paradigms according to their reading of deterrence force, propaganda benefits and local interests. For example, hierarchical jihadi groups that are affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, apply extended deterrence by punishment on behalf of the central organization or its affiliates. In the Shabaab's case, strategic and ideological subordination to al-Qaeda central and its affiliates was already clear in 2010. A suicide-attack video by the group featured a bombing in Somalia against Ethiopian peace-keeping forces.118 The video justified the bombing as retaliation (tha'r) for the death of two al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq (al-i'tidad bi-l-mithl).119

A complex doctrine of subordination, retaliation and deterrence emerges from this piece of evidence. From an organizational network theory point of view, major jihadi groups seem to share a collective sense of deterrence as well as an obligation and solidarity to revenge killings of leaders of their own networks. Although they are sub-state actors, they behave on retaliation and deterrence level as a collective, or also as quasi-institutionalized players (whose institutions are based on informal organizational (often tribal) and clandestine networks).

Our description of early, classical and Qur'an-based Islamic deterrence concepts allows us to detect further deterrence patterns, namely individualized deterrence. Information based organizational networks (i.e. "online jihad") foster communicative command structures and order individuals to perpetrate deterrence attacks. Organizational networks apply a mix of theological command-doctrines such as "inghimas" (single attack), "unnat al-ightiyal" (tradition of assassinations), tankil (exemplary punishment) and tahrid (incitement). A major problem from a counter-deterrence point of view is the lack of control over the members of such networks which are led by indoctrination and targeted information sharing (communicative leadership). How do different actors read the situations and what are their perceptions of collective retaliation? For example, a whole series of videos by the German jihadi propaganda figure-heads Yassin and Mounir Chouka calls for individual deterrence operations on the basis of "divine command."

For example, in one video Mounir Chouka confirms the "value" of being a terrorist and issues commands via the Internet. "Do anything, no matter what. Every operation is beneficial"- arson, derailing trains, destroying buildings, stabbing or shooting people. Chouka applies here the Qur'an based command

116 "Individualized terrorism" is another one of al-Suri's key concepts, but promoted by numerous other jihadi thinkers as well.

117 Bar, Israeli Deterrence, p. 17.


119 Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Shabab Movement, justifies the attack with a short speech. The driver of the bomb-truck prays. The chirping of green paradise-birds in which the souls of martyrs are said to live on is added as background acoustic. Afterwards the driver swears to revenge the slain al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. This is followed by an audio speech of Abu Yahya al-Libi, the chief theologian of al-Qaeda central. The video itself was produced by al-Kataeb, the media wing of the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia.
doctrine (4:84). He cites the examples of Arid Uka (Frankfurt in March 2011) and Nidal Malik Hassan (Fort Hood in November 2009).\(^{120}\) Chouka states "Allah demands that we follow his commands." According to Chouka, divine command is further encapsulated in the doctrine: "It is enough to hold on to "the Qur’an that guides us and to the sword that honors us" (Kitab yahdi wa saif yansur).\(^{121}\) Originally attributed to the 13\(^{th}\) century theologian Ibn Taymiyya, the doctrine flourishes among jihadis who passionately believe in the power of doctrine and guidance via the Internet (facilitating the "book that guides" (guidance) and the "sword that conquers" (attacks)). Sunni Authorities (shuyukh) who do not call for deterrent terrorism should be neglected, Yassin Chouka (the brother of Mounir) argues.\(^{122}\) Even if western troops retreat from Muslim countries, such as Germany from Afghanistan, "the bill is still open," jihadis have to revenge foreign deeds and strive for world-dominion of Islam.\(^{123}\) The perception of "an open bill;" the struggle for world dominion; and likewise retaliation (al-'amal bi-l-mithl) stick out of Chouka’s speech. This makes it difficult for adversaries to develop ratio-based counter-threat scenarios.

**Deterrence in Salafi-Jihadi Propaganda**

The marketing of suicide attacks, assassinations and executions in videos and pictures on jihadi websites is often used for deterrence purposes. In the logic of jihadi web-semiotics, signs of deterrence testify to the effectiveness of terrorist tactics and are supposed to frighten enemies and recruit supporters. At the same time, these signs aim at mobilizing followers. Followers are supposed to re-enact terrorist acts and violence against enemies. This process starts in the head of the percipient. Propaganda-deterrence uses gruesome footage from terrorist reality. This reality, however, transcends itself, when it is being re-branded and further marketed in online jihad. Emotions of victoriousness against an overwhelming enemy are created, very similar to the root myth of the "victorious sect" (al-tai’fa al-mansura), which refers to the companions of Muhammad during the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, the paradigm of asymmetric warfare where a small group of Muslims defeated an overwhelming enemy.

Examples of these signs are manifold. One explicit example suffices to demonstrate the concept. Below, a screenshot from a video of al-Qaeda in Iraq that was posted on jihadi websites shows the execution-style murder of government employees who worked in the interior ministry. The men were kidnapped, rowed up and shot in the back of their heads. The media company of "al-Qaeda in Iraq," al-Furqan (Divine Inspiration) stands with its logo (visible in the upper left side of the screenshot) for ruthless and brutal killings and has strongly influenced jihadi aesthetics of terror over the last years. Such pictures and videos exemplify the "we" versus "them" divide of jihadi group mobilization, using the theme of punitive "resistance." On a local level, the footage is supposed to deter anyone working with the government. But also on a global level, punitive deterrence is feasibly demonstrated with the help of such videos. The (jihadi) religious legal underpinning derives from tractates and doctrines stipulating to not work with the idolaters (taghut), to not govern by man-made laws (bi ghayr ma anzala Allah), to not befriend enemies and adapt their mores (al-wala’ wa-l-bara’), and if they do so, to excommunicate them (takfir), which is punishable by death.


\(^{122}\) Ibid.


36
The Role of Martyrdom and Salvation in Salafi-Jihadi Deterrence

The aesthetics and cult of salvation in jihadi martyrdom culture support deterrence concepts in a crucial way. This point is also essential for counter-deterrence approaches. Jihadi propaganda and martyrology overflow with death-glorification. The aesthetics serve to portray own fighters as determined, pious, and almost saint-like, being ready to do anything for the cause.

Deterrence strategies rely on elements of uncertainty. The enemy is left in the dark about the real arms, or political capacity as well as the final conviction to realize a threat. Metaphorically speaking, deterrence can be compared to a game of cards that is never supposed to end. One can have a good, or a bad hand – Deterrence aims at never ending the game. The psychological capacity of jihadis lies in their absolute willingness, even doctrine of self-sacrifice. This is a certainty, which frightens the enemy, even more so, if he is not certain about the exact arms capacity.

The question is how to break the certainty of salvation among fundamentalist Muslims who believe in terrorist jihad. A solution may be to address key signs of their mythology.

Fundamentalists rely on interrelated myths to build up community; define enemies and justify goals. This formula applies to the group-culture of almost any strict sect or cult and its collective identity. Similarly, jihadis construct a COMMUNITY MYTH for the sake of IDENTIFICATION and MOBILIZATION. Secondly, they construct a CONSPIRACY MYTH in order to ACTIVATE followers. Thirdly, they construct a MYTH OF SALVATION to justify their end-goals.

Until now jihadi ideology has been lacking any clear realizable concepts of statehood and government. Focus has been put on local and global struggles as well as on the rewards of martyrdom, i.e. paradise. The

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failures of local attempts of coup d’état since the 1970s, the Algerian, Afghani and Palestinian examples in
the 1990s, the fall of the Afghan Emirate in 2001 had a frustrating effect on political strategists of the jihadi
movement. The result has been a low output in strategic-political goals connected to Islamic state-building.
This situation has begun to change with the Arab Spring which started in late 2010, and the emergence of
new jihadi fronts in Libya, Syria and Lebanon. The election of governments which are dominated by
Islamists and salafi-fundamentalists opens up new venues for political activism in salafi-jihadi fringe groups.
As a consequence, Muslim deterrence concepts may change from sub-state terrorism to state military
strategy. Moreover, the institutionalization of Islamist actors (the establishment of Islamist and salafi
parties, and the creation of Islamist governments) may influence Muslim perceptions of goals and salvation.

However, until now, salvation myths play a major role in activating sub-state terrorism. For extremist
Muslim fundamentalists, salvation is not only a reward, but also a command. If read selectively, then the
Holy Book of Islam dictates believers to gain salvation by way of fighting: "Allah hath purchased of the
believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in His
cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the
Qur’an: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah. then rejoice in the bargain which ye have
concluded: that is the achievement supreme." Salvation, martyrdom and deterrence are closely
connected in jihadi culture. The observer can detect manifold signs of salvation in jihadi (web-) culture,
which are mostly connected to self-sacrifice and deterrence. The most prominent ones are E-wallpapers
and E-banners which present martyrs. More subtly, the salvation myth is expressed by colors in jihadi
propaganda as well as arabesque and floral patterns which are supposed to represent paradise
imagination.

Illustration 2: E-wallpaper displaying myth of salvation and rewards of martyrdom

126 "Surat al-shahid Abi Hafs al-Ansari min shuhada’ masjij Ibn Taymiyya taqabbalahu Allah" (Picture of the martyr Abu Hafs al-Ansari who
Salafis seem to think that they cannot be deterred. This raises the question if counter-deterrence should be a concrete, or an abstract concept. Does counter-deterrence work on the basis of threat of actual force, or on the basis of threat of transcendental and divine punishment? Is their own perception of non-deterrability so suggestive that it really works? Are there loopholes in this concept?

Perceptions of non-deterrability can be illustrated with an example from the German salafi scene. Over the last years, Germany has witnessed the formation of a broad salafi movement, which is anything by homogenous. There are mergers between da’wa proponents and jihadis; splits within da’wa trends and within jihadi-trends, and the emergence of sub-groups within the da’wa trend with a hardened ideology. The latter trend discriminates non-salafis and non-Muslims and support elements of jihadi ideology.

For example, 33 years old Pierre Vogel is a popular German itinerant Salafi preacher from the da’wa stream. High street credibility, the talent to maneuver within different salafi trends and the effective marketing of his cause in social media characterize Vogel. Vogel is close to the da’wa-group "Die Wahre Religion," and the latter also features hard-core jihadis on its website such as the Austrian Abu Usama al-Gharib, who is the media-emir of salafimedia.de. The website of "Die Wahre Religion links extremist, purist and missionary salafis together. If Vogel is aware of this, and committed to the cause of this network, is not the matter of discussion of this study. Much more interesting is the question, if a central actor such as Vogel could have a conciliatory effect on other, more extremist actors and their deterrence perceptions. In 2010, Vogel made an interesting statement at a press conference that gives some indication about martyrdom conceptions within the da’wa streaming. Yet, the context must be taken into consideration. The press conference was held after Vogel’s association "Einladung zum Paradies" was searched by police. Vogel then stated: „Enough is enough. I am a Kamikaze pilot, you know...it is always difficult to intimidate someone who is ready to die for the cause...Allahu akbar!" When developing counter-deterrence concepts, it has, therefore, to be taken into account that salafis in general and jihadis in particular cultivate bravery in the face of death. Especially jihadis foster "a love for death," which is reflected in their constant critique of mainstream Muslim’s "love of worldly matters and hate of death" (hubb al-dunya wa karahiyat al-maut). The German-Uzbek case further highlights this point. In April 2009, at least five German jihadis formally joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (by an oath of allegiance). This took probably place near the town Sera Rogha in the Waziristan region of

127 Following the example of Salafi itinerant preachers and television priests in Great Britain the and the USA, it started out with half a dozen of preachers from Leipzig, North Rhine Westphalia and Berlin, who went to mosques in different cities, holding lectures in German (Hassan Dabbagh from Leipzig, Abdul Adhim from Berlin, Abu Jabriel from Wuppertal). Soon, Salafi Islam became a sort pop-culture drawing a wide range of individuals into its rows, who tried to jump the train of its growing popularity. The German Salafi scene consists of purists (retreat and isolation), missionaries (da’wa and outreach), political-jihadis (radical propaganda, but no action), and jihadis (radical propaganda and action). In between and among these trends, coalitions form, splits emerge and sub-trends appear.

128 Vogel is a former, very successful, amateur and professional boxer, who converted to Islam at age 21 in 2001. In 2005, Vogel joined the group "Die Wahre Religion" (The True Religion) led by the Palestinian Abou Nagie and the Moroccans Abu Dujana and Sheikh Araby. In 2008 he left this group and founded his own association "Einladung zum Paradies" (Invitation to Paradise). Until 2011, he made a successful solo-career as itinerant preacher within the da’wa trend. However, since 2011 major figures of the non-violent German da’wa trend have distanced themselves from Vogel. In 2011, Vogel appeared together with Abu Dujana of "Die Wahre Religion." In a video uploaded on Youtube, they buried their doctrinaire hatchet, which had divided both camps since 2008. See: Abu Dujana und Pierre Vogel, "WIR SIND EINE GEMEINSCHAFT IN DEUTSCHLAND", (Accessed January 11, 2012) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgQZt8Ai_zE

129 "Irgendwann ist das Maß voll. Ich bin Kamikaze Flieger, wisst ihr...Es ist immer sehr schwer jemanden einzuschüchtern, der bereit ist, für die Sache zu sterben...Allahu akbar!" Pierre Vogel, "Press conference about the current events on January 20, 2010 concerning the police action against the association Einladung zum Paradies e.V. and its honorary workers," www.youtube.com, "Pierre Vogel rastet aus", (Accessed January 11, 2012) - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8kWTHaW_nA

130 These were from Hamburg Ahmad Wall Ss, his brother Suleiman S., Shahab D., and from Bonn Khojah Javad S. Probably, Rami M., originally from Frankfurt-Bockenheim, also participated in the oath. However, M. left the campus of the IBU around one month later (in late

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North-Western Pakistan. The life of the Germans in IBU training camps was characterized by a rigid daily schedule. This schedule included common praying, Qur’an-reading, sports and meals as well as steady indoctrination on the values of martyrdom. Some participants became ever more radical, their awareness rose from an individual to a collective group level. It seems that the culmination of the German jihadists’ socialization was their self-awareness as deterring Muslim warriors. According to the self-perception of one jihadi, American soldiers were afraid on sight of them. The reason, in jihadi self-perception, was the Muslim warriors’ love for martyrdom.

Chapter Six:
Ideas for Counter-Deterrence

Contemporary Cases of State Deterrence against Salafi-Jadis

As recent history shows, state suppression and deterrence against Salafi jihadis does not really work. The latest U.S. killings of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’s most prominent media operators (Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan and Ibrahim al-Banna who represented al-Malahim Media Company of AQAP), in addition to the U.S. assassination of one of al-Awlaki’s sons, Abdulrahman Anwar Al Awlaki, can without the blink of an eye be seen as useless in terms of deterrence, maybe useful in terms of disrupting chains of command and propaganda. A further effect is the ever growing alienation among Muslim populations from U.S. foreign policies. The same conclusion may be drawn on the targeted killings of Bin Laden, Mustapha Abu al-Yazid and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, if regarded from a deterrence viewpoint. Instead of separating the killed leaders from their followers, their deaths cemented their personae into a mythology of trustfulness and sacrifice, which leads to even greater admiration of them in the salafi-jihadi scene. When Syrian President Hafez al-Assad wiped out Sunni Islamic opposition together with thousands of civilians in the city of Hama in 1982, the result was the emigration of the remaining groups, among them the "Fighting Vanguard" (al-Tali’ah al-Muqatilah) to neighboring Iraq and to Egypt, where they received specialized weapons and explosives training. When Egyptian authorities, following the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981, crushed the "Islamic Jihad" (Tanzim al-Ghada) and the "Islamic Group" (al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah) plus their followers, the result was the emigration of militants via Saudi Arabia to the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, where the roots of al-Qaeda were laid. In short, the leverage of brute power and killing of symbolic targets will not deter and stop salafi-jihadism.

One counter-argument brought forward by supporters of the assassinations is that the targeted killing of Palestinian leaders by Israel has led to a decrease of attacks inside Israel. Yet, Palestinian goals are clearly defined in a national framework and underlie rationales that are easier to manipulate by the occupying power Israel than those of a globally oriented network of extremists as it is represented by al-Qaeda and affiliates. Furthermore, the Israeli policy of deterrence, which struggles hard for justifications, takes place in a geographically limited environment. The targeted killing of tribal and al-Qaeda leaders by the U.S. in the Afghani-Pakistani border region of Waziristan, for example, has witnessed results that are unwanted: Queues of volunteers for "martyrdom-operations" gather after each attack. Instead of breaking the ideological resolve to fight, young men from the local populace line up in front of militant leaders’ houses

April or early June 2009. Based on the indictment of the Federal Prosecutor General against Ahmad Wali S., which contains testimonies by S. and fellow jihadists who participated in their training at IBU and al-Qaeda.
to be recruited into tribal and jihadi networks who battle against the Pakistani state and are influenced by a
global jihadi agenda.

**Transition from Conventional to Alternative Deterrence**

If targeted repression does not work properly, other means of controlling terrorist threats must be
considered. If the U.S. considers comprehensive deterrence strategies against salafi-jihadis, then the latter
force has reached a level of power in U.S. perception that makes it an equal opponent. One answer to this
is to create an effective threat balance. Salafi-jihadi power cannot be seen in absolute military terms, but as
a conglomerate of military, ideological, network, support and communicational capabilities. If these
capabilities are examined, then several difficulties come to mind. Salafi-jihadis are non state actors who
apply terrorist tactics. Their ideology is rooted in broader Muslim dissent against Western influence and
socio-political inequalities in Muslim countries. This does not mean, however, that Muslim populaces can
be held responsible for salafi-jihadi actions, and therefore, they cannot be addressed with threat scenarios
in order to deter salafi-jihadis. Another factor that comes to mind is the communicative control and the
ideological strength of salafi-jihad. It creates followers and networks worldwide. Even if most followers and
sympathizers do not perpetrate terrorist attacks, the idea and worldview of global jihad is sown
successfully into their minds via the Internet and its information possibilities. If the communicational link
between authorities and followers could be targeted in a way that forces followers to perceive a higher cost
than benefit, then they might give up supporting salafi-Jihad.

Another problem is the idea that salafi-jihadi actors will not answer tit for tat to threat scenarios according
to Western cultural perceptions. The approach of “If you have a bomb and I have a bomb, then both of us
will not use it” might be erroneous. Islamic rationality must be understood in conjunction with religious
honor and mythology that needs to be calculated when building threat or deterrence scenarios, especially
so when speaking about the most radical fringes of salafi-jihadism. Under severe pressure, the pendulum of
religious ratio tends to swing towards millenarian and apocalyptic visions. This problem might be solved by
threatening essential earthly goals, not transcendental objectives of salafi-jihadis to keep them in check.
However, the author expresses his sincere doubts that salafi-jihad can be checked with a conventional
threat strategy. Threatening the transcendental objectives of salafi-jihadis could keep them in check. It
should be complemented with a communicational and political strategy that diminishes the sympathy
among larger Muslim populaces for radical Islam and drains the pool of support and communication for
salafi-jihadis. Finding out further venues will be the next analytic step.

**Linguistic and Religious-Psychological Approaches**

Perceptions of salvation and non-deterrability should be attacked at their very ideological roots (See parts
7.b,c and d of this paper). Some jihadi groups may be held in check if they start doubting their own culture.
Culture can be described as “a web of signification spun by meaningful actions, objects and expressions.”

Ideology within culture serves the construction of collective identities through linguistic and psychic
processes. Propaganda is the carrier of ideology. The most visible proponents of salafi-jihad, i.e.
ideologues who run their own websites or belong to terrorist organizations with own media companies,
should be directly criticized and attacked with valid counter-arguments. The aesthetics of terror which
these ideologues sow via the Internet should be targeted with counter-narratives.

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133 Stevenson, Understanding Media Cultures, p. 37.
Ideology occupies an emotional-psychic trigger in the mind of a recipient (very similar to marketing). The ideological process requires individuals constantly to move between their inner and their actual outer worlds. The meanings of things constantly change according to the psychological state of a perceiver. Propaganda, the carrier of ideology, is supposed to occupy the inner world of a perceiver. He shall identify with fellow members of his group, think and behave in a suggested way.

The jihadi propagandist tries to manipulate the mind of the perceiver with a mix of emotional, spiritual/religious and rational arguments. The propagandist aims at attaining interpretational sovereignty over concepts such as "martyrdom," "legitimate terrorism," "enemy," "legitimacy of violence", good-bad dichotomies, "Islam" per se, etc. The emir of salafimedia.de, Muhammad Mahmoud, illustrates this with a simple formula. Mahmoud is a popular Austrian jihad propagandist and describes Salafi thinking as: "belief is speaking, acting and [pure] intention." 

This triadic description of "belief" allows conceptualizing psychological deterrence operations on the basis of a triadic semiotic model (the semiotic model of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)).

Illustration 4: Peirce’s triadic model of semiotics

Accordingly, followers of terrorist "belief" will only keep the concept of "jihad" rolling, when their "intention" tells them that it is legitimate. This legitimacy is created by "words" (i.e. indoctrination) and leads to "actions" (i.e. re-enactment of indoctrination in reality).

Counter-deterrence should focus on delegitimizing the concept of divine "reward." "Divine reward" is the impetus for martyrdom; martyrdom is a major element of jihadi threat scenarios.

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134 Jihadi ideological culture can be deconstructed by using the triadic model of semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). An "object" bears a certain conceptual meaning. A "sign" can be a verbal, visual, audio, gestural or multi-modal representation of the object. The "interpretant" in the mind of a perceiver, creates an (concrete or abstract) idea or a sense of an object, which is represented by a sign. This process is called signification. Not only daily communication, but also ideology relies on agreed upon and dynamic processes of signification.


136 Jihadis use theologically loaded communication, i.e. the "qaul" (signs: sermons, videos, pictures) to create an intention, i.e. the "niya" (interpretant) that glorifies jihad and stimulates actions, i.e. the "amal."

137 To describe Peirce’s model, a sign creates another sign in the mind of a perceiver, which is the interpretant of the first sign. The interpretant is not a person, but the mental concept elicited in somebody’s mind. The object represents the external reality of the sign. "Semiotics", The Chicago School of Media Theory, The University of Chicago, (Accessed December 30, 2011) - http://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/semiotics/
In the mind of radicalized perceivers, "divine reward" can be replaced with "divine punishment." This disturbs, unsettles and raises questions among jihadis. Most importantly, it has the potential to deter them psychologically.

Understanding jihadi group culture, its psychic triggers and propaganda processes opens possible venues to apply such a concept. If the process of terrorist "belief" (i.e. here jihadi ideology) can be disrupted, the whole construct of jihad loses validity. The vastness of the concept "jihad" in Islam must not be underestimated. One only has to think about Sufi mystic and Sunni approaches. The Persian Sufi mystic Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111), until today one of the most influential religious thinkers of Islam, wrote on jihad al-nafs (fighting one’s ego): "The strong one is not the one who overcomes people, the strong one is he who overcomes his ego (ghalaba nafsahu)."138 salafi-jihadis are essentially open to mystic concepts. They use them constantly in the marketing of martyrs and in the construction of ideology (for example, "karamat" (wonders), "alamat al-shuhada' (signs of the martyrs such as smiles on their faces, the smell of musk, the "invulnerability of jihadis").

Islamic movements which foster non-violent interpretations of jihad should be supported. This might have frightening effects on terrorists: They have been ordered to blow themselves up, but already doubt that they will gain a divine reward from it, because of theological interpretations that deny this reward. One goal is to create a "jihad"-discourse [sic] that rejects violence. A devaluation of terrorist jihad should first of all focus on controversial justifications to kill civilians, and then on constructions of jihad in war scenarios (Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Chechnya, Libya).

In parallel and according to point 3.b, a massive media-based re-branding of Islam is required. Key message: "Islam and Muslims are welcome, good and excellent partners." The ideal case would be to convince an immensely popular Muslim preacher, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to deconstruct jihadi salvation myths. But one can also start on a more basic level. Western media-depictions of "moderate political Islam" and "moderate Muslims" should be loaded up with positive representations and connotations. This might help to influence Muslims to support policies against terrorist Islam. Muslims would eventually overtake this work and devaluate terrorist interpretations by themselves. However, catastrophic military policies and public relations failures should be avoided at all costs such as further occupations of Muslim countries, or prison and torture scandals (Abu Ghuraib 2004), or U.S.-Marines urinating on dead Afghan Muslims (January 2012). Similarly, the publication of anti-Muslim ads such as upcoming advertisements in New York’s subway stations should be avoided. One of the ads in the campaign that has been initiated by U.S. anti-Islam activist Pamela Geller reads: "In any war between the civilized man and the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat jihad."139 The statement contains an implicit syllogism, which - in the mind of a Muslim perceiver - compares Islam to savagery. It is counter-productive for "deterrenceconciliation" approaches that should address jihadis and mainstream Muslims in parallel.

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Summary

Successful deterrence must be based on psycho-religious approaches that exploit concepts of fear; specifically in Sunni-jihadi subculture. Sunni jihadi sub-state actor perceptions of deterrence vary considerably from those of Western secular states. The task is to find a "common language." Tactical deterrence by punishment and the actual application of force and realization of threats play a much bigger role for Muslim sub-state actors and are inherent elements of Sunni-jihadi deterrence; the realization of threats, however, plays a much less lesser role for state actors who still think in patterns of "classical" nuclear-deterrence, where an equilibrium of nuclear threat is supposed to guarantee stability. For example, jihadis analogize medieval "single attacks" to suicide-attacks, which are meant to frighten the enemy. Initiative deterrence concepts (preterrence; Shmuel Bar) are thus often analogue to terrorist tactics and the asymmetric weaker position of sub-state actors. State actors re-act confused and unsuccessfully experiment with tactical deterrence, trying to beat sub-state actors on their own turfs (for example, in Waziristan). This policy fails, terrifies and terrorizes local populations and indirectly supports jihadi causes.

Sunni-jihadi deterrence is characterized by neo-tribal endemic warfare elements and terrorist tactics. The reason is the strong focus of jihadis on example cases from early Islam, when Muslims developed from endemic to imperial warfare. These are taken as conceptual cornerstones by today’s Sunni fighters to develop patterns of deterrence. However, deterrence strategies and patterns are not only based on frightening the enemy. Deterrence is also based on the construction of fear and fright among friends to justify aggression against foes. In religious sub-culture, transcendental and concrete fears can be clearly discerned. It is the role of reformed deterrence strategists to exploit the fear in the mind of religious actors to fail fulfilling God’s commands. Dealing with religious actors in the information age means to transit from conventional to alternative deterrence approaches. Linguistic and psycho-religious approaches are required to address their fears, while viable non-conflict and conciliation policies must address Muslim populations and respective meta-cultures.

It is very difficult to counter jihadi deterrence by propaganda and preterrence by terrorist attacks. Yet, possible concepts of deterrence include the building up of "discursive fortifications" and "psychological walls," also called "intellectual firewalls." Such walls are needed to block terrorist theological arguments. Similar to physical walls fortifying a medieval city, intellectual walls deny the opponent to securely cross into a place which he aspires to occupy (physical: a city; or psychological: paradise). Denying possible transcendental benefits of actions, for example rewards in paradise, can cause great fears. Intellectual thresholds can then be described as religious-psychological deterrence by denial. Most generally speaking, the feeling of "fear" can be divided into two similar, yet very different states of consciousness. "Fright" (Latin timor; German Furcht) is focused on a concrete object and signifies something different from an abstract fear (Latin angor; German Angst).

In religious culture, divine command and human piety are strongly based on different threat scenarios that cause fear and explicate prohibitions against infringements. An essential goal of deterrence and propaganda is to address both internal and external fears of friend and foe. Just as there are different ways to diminish fear, there are common ways to learn and condition fears. The psychological construction of deterrence in (Sunni-) Islam and among its radical sub-sects relies on two factors. Firstly, internal abstract fear makes followers obey and is generally based on "fear from hell-fire" (khauf (min al-nar)) as well as the more specific fear to break obligations to God (bay'at Allah; ittiqā' Allah) – The Islamic credo itself is an oath of loyalty to Islam, God and his messenger Muhammad, which is taken most seriously by devout Muslims.
As third and fourth conceptual elements, there are fears that are levered against the enemy. These concepts carry the names "intimidating fright" (ra'b) in an abstract and terror (irhab) in a more concrete sense. Both concepts of fear, the own fear of obedience and the fear of harm levered against an enemy, form a strategic meta-category which is called "deterrence" (rad').

Religious sub-state actors can apply only little strategic deterrence leverage in terms of WMD. Their main weapon is the "message," i.e. communication of threat, mobilization of support. In parallel, the use repeated small scale terrorist attacks to provoke and build up tactical deterrence. With the background knowledge on the development of deterrence and its application to the information age in mind, exclusion from and non-possibility to re-enter discourses can also be seen as deterrence by denial.

The SheshBesh game (Backgammon), deeply rooted in Arabic and Middle Eastern culture, combines luck with strategy and offers itself for an analogy to a discursive deterrence strategy. One may illustrate the importance of the clustering of arguments in discursive deterrence with the buildup of a successful gaming strategy: Never let playing pieces stand alone, lest they be hit by the enemy. Rather, it is advised to build central settlements from time to time, to protect the rear and to block the opponent’s checkers from re-entering the game once they have been thrown out. If one applies this strategy to discourse (ideology): The own single piece is comparable to Western info-ops and public relations failures in the Muslim world. A functioning discursive deterrence strategy needs coherence, for example coherent rules of *quid pro quo* instead of unilateral adventures and experimenting with military measures. The single piece of the opponent is comparable to doctrines in his legalistic ideological discourse.

Followers of terrorist "belief" will only keep the concept of "jihad" rolling, when their "intention" tells them that it is legitimate. This legitimacy is created by "words" (i.e. indoctrination) and leads to "actions" (i.e. re-enactment of indoctrination in reality). Counter-deterrence should focus on delegitimizing the concept of divine "reward." "Divine reward" is the impetus for martyrdom; martyrdom is a major element of jihadi belief and permeates every facet of jihadi subculture. In the mind of radicalized perceivers, "divine reward" can be replaced with "divine punishment." This disturbs, unsettles and raises questions among jihadists. Most importantly, it has the potential to deter them psychologically.

Understanding jihadi group culture is a key to develop such paradigms.
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