



Public Trust Report¹

April 2026

The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility

Suggested citation:

Institute for Liberty and Responsibility. "Public Trust Report April 2026". Institute for Liberty and Responsibility Surveys, Reichman University.


¹The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility is committed to developing robust metrics for assessing Israeli democracy's performance and gauging public confidence in its institutions. Through regular surveys of demographically representative samples across all sectors of Israeli society, the Institute collects data on public trust in various government bodies and overall satisfaction with governmental performance. Since April 2022, these measurements have been conducted monthly, with results presented through several regularly updated indices that track shifting patterns of public trust over time.

Public Trust in Government Institutions

Israeli public trust in government institutions in the first quarter of 2026 displayed a unique pattern of a sharp temporary spike in March during the war with Iran and Lebanon, followed by a return to levels similar to the beginning of the quarter. In April 2026, trust in the government stands at **25%**, trust in the Knesset at **16%**, and trust in the President at **34%**. The Supreme Court continues to receive the highest trust (**42%**). The Knesset continues to be the institution with the lowest trust among government institutions, with only one in six Israelis expressing trust in the legislative body.


Public Trust in the Government:

Public trust in the government in April 2026 stands at **25%**. After stability in the months of January-February (21%), trust jumped to 29% in March during the war with Iran and Lebanon, and declined slightly back in April. The pattern reflects a familiar phenomenon of rallying around the flag during security crises, followed by a return to the long-term trust trend. Given the low trust and high polarization, even the rally-around-the-flag effect was limited. Today, only about a quarter of the public expresses trust in the government.




Public Trust in the Knesset

Public trust in the Knesset in April 2026 stands at **16%**, a level similar to the beginning of the quarter. In March there was a spike to 19% - the highest trust measured since March 2023 - but the spike was temporary and was apparently influenced by the rise in trust due to the war. The Knesset continues to be the institution with the lowest trust among government institutions, with only one in six Israelis expressing trust in the legislative body.




Public Trust in the Supreme Court

Public trust in the Supreme Court in April 2026 stands at **42%**. Trust remained relatively stable throughout the quarter (41%-43%), without significant impact from the security events which had limited effects on other institutions. The Supreme Court continues to be the institution receiving the highest trust among government institutions.



Public Trust in the President

Public trust in the President in April 2026 stands at **34%**. Trust remained stable throughout the quarter (32%-34%), following a downward trend measured in the months of October-January (from 44% to 31%).




Public Trust in the Judicial System

The Israeli judicial system continues to enjoy relatively high trust in the first quarter of 2026. In April, trust in the Supreme Court remained stable at **42%**, trust in the Attorney General stands at **38%**, and trust in the State Attorney's Office at **31%**. The judicial system continues to receive significantly higher trust compared to other government institutions.


Public Trust in the Supreme Court

Public trust in the Supreme Court in April 2026 stands at **42%**. Trust remained stable throughout the quarter (41%-43%), and it continues to be one of the institutions with the highest public support.




Public Trust in the Attorney General

After high volatility in the previous quarter, public trust in the Attorney General in April 2026 stands at **38%**. Trust remained relatively stable throughout the quarter (36%-39%).



Public Trust in the State Attorney's Office


After relatively high volatility in the previous quarter, public trust in the State Attorney's Office in April 2026 stands at **31%**. Trust remained stable throughout the quarter (30%-32%).



Trust in Security Forces


Public Trust in the Police

Public trust in the police in April 2026 stands at **31%**. After stability at lower levels in January-February (26%-27%), trust jumped to 33% in March 2026 and declined slightly in April. The gaps between coalition supporters (48%) and opposition supporters (20%) remain significant and consistent, with a gap of approximately 28 percentage points - a gap indicating politicization of a body that should be professional and independent. The political gaps reflect the ongoing challenges facing the police in restoring public trust.



Public Trust in the IDF

The IDF continues to enjoy the highest public trust in the country, with **76%** trust in April 2026. After slight fluctuations at the beginning of the quarter (71%-76%), trust stabilized at 76% in March-April. The IDF continues to maintain its position as the institution receiving the highest trust among the Israeli public, with approximately three-quarters of the public expressing trust.




Index of Government Assessment

The Government Assessment Index expresses a complex assessment of the government, weighing public trust in the government and satisfaction with its performance.

The index in April 2026 stands at **3.0** (on a scale of 0-10). All four components of the index declined from the peak measured in March, but remained higher than the fourth quarter of 2025: 31% of the public are satisfied with the government's performance (compared to an average of 27% in the fourth quarter of 2025), 29% of Israelis are satisfied with how the government handles the issues they perceive as most important to the country (compared to 25%), and 23% of citizens believe the government is responsive to their wishes (compared to 21%). The improvement in all components contributes to the overall increase in the index in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the previous quarter.


Looking at the long term, from the beginning of 2022 (the previous government) until the beginning of 2023, the index ranged between 3.1-3.6, but from April 2023 until the beginning of 2026 it ranged in a lower band of 2.3-3.0. In the first quarter of 2026, a sharp temporary spike was recorded in March to 3.4 – the highest value since January 2023 – during the war with Iran and Lebanon, followed by a return to lower levels in April. The gaps between coalition and opposition voters remain significant, with coalition voters rating the government higher (5.1) than opposition voters (1.3) - a gap of approximately 3.8 points.



Index Components:


Public Trust in the Government

Public trust in the government in April 2026 stands at **25%**. After stability in the months of January-February (21%), trust jumped to 29% in March following the war with Iran and Lebanon, and returned to low levels in April. Trust in the government is generally low, with about a quarter of the public expressing trust in it.



Public Satisfaction with the Government


Public satisfaction with the government in April 2026 stands at **31%**. After stability in the months of January-February (27%), satisfaction jumped in March to **36%** following the war with Iran and Lebanon, and returned to low levels in April. Satisfaction with the government's overall performance is generally low, with about a third of the public satisfied with its performance.



Public Satisfaction Level with the Government's Handling of the Most Important Problem


This question examines public satisfaction with the government's handling of the important issues facing the country (each respondent chooses the issue they consider most important).

Public satisfaction with how the government handles the most important issue in April 2026 stands at **29%**. Satisfaction remained stable throughout the quarter (25%-29%), following the temporary spike recorded in March. Satisfaction with the government's handling of the most important issue is generally low, with less than a third of the public feeling satisfied.



The Extent to Which the Public Views the Government as Responsive to its Wants


The public's assessment that the government is responsive to their wishes in April 2026 stood at **23%**. After stability in the months of January-February (21%), the assessment jumped slightly in March to 27% during the war with Iran and Lebanon, and returned to low levels in April. The public's assessment of the extent to which the government is responsive to their wishes is generally low: less than a quarter of the Israeli public believes the government is responsive to them.



State of the Nation and National Pride

State of the Nation


April 2026 data shows a return to low levels in the assessment of the state of the nation, with **29%** of the public rating the situation as good. In the first quarter of 2026, significant volatility was recorded: after stability in January-February (29%-31%), there was a sharp jump in March to 38% during the war with Iran and Lebanon. This was the first and only time since December 2022 that a larger portion of the public rated the situation as good than the portion that rated the situation as not good. In April, there was a return to the levels of the beginning of the quarter and the previous quarter.



National Pride


April 2026 data shows that 78% of the public express pride in the country (47% very proud, 31% proud), while 22% are not proud. The share of those very proud in April remained significantly higher than the levels measured at the beginning of the quarter (42%-43% in January-February), following a sharp jump in March to 50% - the highest since June 2025.

Weighing all respondents expressing pride (very proud + proud), the data continues to show consistent gaps in the level of pride between coalition and opposition voters. Coalition voters express high levels of pride (93%) compared to opposition voters (76%), a gap of approximately 17 percentage points. Additionally, there are sharp gaps between Jews (90%) and Arabs (38%) in the sense of pride in the country - a gap of approximately 52 percentage points.



National Pride


(Segmentation by coalition and opposition voters)



The numbers in the graph represent percentages (%). The calculation is done using weights and exclude respondents who answered "don't know"

National Pride

(Segmentation by Jews and Arabs)



The numbers in the graph represent percentages (%). The calculation is done using weights and exclude respondents who answered "don't know"


State of Democracy

The Israeli public in April 2026 rates Israel as a democratic country with a score of **6.0** (on a scale of 0-10), and satisfaction with the functioning of Israeli democracy stands at **4.9**. The data remained stable throughout the quarter, with a slight improvement in March (6.1 and 5.1, respectively) during the war with Iran.

The public attributes high importance to living in a democratic country (**8.5** in December 2025), but the downward trend continues since October 2023. The gap between the high importance the public attributes to living in a democratic country and the low satisfaction with its functioning reflects a sense of disappointment from the realization of democratic values in practice


Public Assessment of Israel as a Democratic State

The Israeli public in April 2026 rates Israel as a democratic country with a score of **6.0** (on a scale of 0-10). The assessment remained stable throughout the quarter (5.7-6.1), with a slight improvement in March during the war.




Public Satisfaction with the Functioning of Israeli Democracy

Public satisfaction with the functioning of Israeli democracy in April 2026 stands at **4.9** (on a scale of 0-10). Satisfaction remained stable throughout the quarter (4.8-5.1), with a slight improvement in March during the war.



The Importance to the Public of Living in a Democratic State

The Israeli public continues to attribute high importance to living in a democratic state, with a score of 8.5 (on a scale of 0-10) measured in December 2025. The level of importance remains relatively stable, but a slow downward trend continues since October 2023.




Political Representation

April 2026 data indicates a low sense of political representation among the Israeli public. 14% of the public feel that the political system represents them and 24% feel that there is a party or politician that represents them.

The sense of representation has remained consistently low throughout the entire period since measurements began. On average, only one in ten citizens feels that the political system represents them, and only one in five feels that there is a specific political entity that represents their positions. While the first figure reflects a loss of trust in the system as a whole (and is not fundamentally different from trust in the Knesset), the second figure indicates that a large majority of the public does not see any currently elected entity as representing them. In the absence of correction of this feeling, the public will choose other ways to express their interests.


In April 2026, there was a slight decrease in the sense of specific representation (from 26% in December to 24%), but an increase in the sense of general representation by the political system (from 12% to 14%). Both senses of representation remain significantly low.



Share Who Feel There Is a Party/Politician That Represents Them (% of Opinion Holders)



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*The calculation is done using weights and exclude respondents who answered "don't know"


Electoral Integrity

April 2026 data shows that **61%** of the public believe the next Knesset elections will be free and fair, a level similar to that measured in January (62%). Simultaneously, **48%** of the public believe that entities associated with the government will try to skew the election results, while **36%** believe that entities associated with the opposition will try to do so. Concern about foreign interference stands at **42%**.

The gaps between coalition and opposition voters remain significant: 75% of coalition voters believe the elections will be free and fair, compared to 57% of opposition voters - a gap of 18 percentage points. Regarding concern about skewing, 65% of opposition voters are concerned about attempts by government entities to skew results (compared to 31% of coalition voters), while 52% of coalition voters are concerned about attempts by opposition entities (compared to 19% of opposition voters). The political gaps continue to reflect polarization in the perception of the fairness of democratic processes.


The Next Knesset Elections Will Be Free and Fair

April 2026 data shows that **61%** of the public believe the next Knesset elections will be free and fair, a level similar to 62% measured in January 2026 and a continuation of the upward trend from 55% in June 2025. Belief in the fairness of elections is relatively stable among coalition voters (75%, compared to 84% in January) and opposition voters (57%, compared to 53% in January). The gap between the two groups stands at 18 percentage points.




Actors Associated with the Government Will Try to Skew the Election Results

48% of the public believe that entities associated with the government will try to skew the election results, a level similar to **49%** measured in January. Concern about governmental skewing varies dramatically according to political affiliation - **65%** of opposition voters are concerned about skewing attempts by government entities, compared to only **31%** of coalition voters. This gap of **34** percentage points remains high, but has narrowed compared to **45** percentage points measured in January.




Actors Associated with the Opposition Will Try to Skew the Election Results

36% of the public believe that entities associated with the opposition will try to skew the election results, a level similar to **35%** measured in January. Here too, political gaps are prominent - **52%** of coalition voters are concerned about skewing attempts by opposition entities, compared to only **19%** of opposition voters. A gap of 33 percentage points.



Foreign Countries Will Try to Skew the Election Results

42% of the public are concerned that foreign countries will try to skew the election results, a level similar to that measured in January. Concern about foreign interference is identical among coalition and opposition voters (**46%**), and constitutes the only issue among the four examined where there are no political gaps.



Methodology

The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility team at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University prepared the survey questions and subsequently analyzed the data.

The surveys conducted in April, September and December 2022, and March and September 2023, were conducted by Geocartography company. The remaining surveys were conducted by ipanel. Both companies conduct online surveys in Israel.

The questionnaires were translated into Arabic, allowing Arab respondents to choose whether to answer in Hebrew or Arabic.

	Survey Date (Days)		Number of Respondents	Jewish Respondents	Arab Respondents	Sampling Error
1	April (10-14)	2022	1,559	1,275	284	2.50%
2	June (11-14)	2022	807	657	150	3.50%
3	July (12-16)	2022	822	665	157	3.40%
4	August (7-13)	2022	810	652	158	3.40%
5	September (22/9-2/10)	2022	1,671	1,417	254	2.40%
6	October (24-27)	2022	1,507	1,206	301	2.50%
7	December (7-11)	2022	807	655	152	3.50%
8	January (16-22)	2023	1,461	1,205	256	2.60%
9	February (9-14)	2023	1,512	1,204	308	2.50%
10	March (19-22)	2023	1,558	1,257	301	2.50%
11	April (18-20)	2023	816	656	160	3.40%
12	May (9-11)	2023	813	657	156	3.40%
13	June (11-14)	2023	811	655	156	3.40%
14	July (12-16)	2023	813	661	152	3.40%
15	August (8-13)	2023	805	652	153	3.50%
16	September (3-6)	2023	1,562	1,227	335	2.50%
17	October (17-19)	2023	807	657	150	3.50%
18	November (13-16)	2023	803	651	152	3.50%
19	December (17-19)	2023	807	657	150	3.50%
20	January (14-17)	2024	805	652	153	3.50%

21	February (11-13)	2024	803	649	154	3.50%
22	March (3-6)	2024	1526	1266	260	2.50%
23	April (1-3)	2024	804	651	153	3.50%
24	May (5-7)	2024	810	657	153	3.40%
25	June (16-20)	2024	815	657	158	3.40%
26	July (14-18)	2024	807	655	152	3.50%
27	August (14-19)	2024	1512	1260	252	2.50%
28	September (8-11)	2024	1501	1251	250	2.50%
29	October (13-15)	2024	803	653	150	3.50%
30	November (11-14)	2024	807	657	150	3.50%
31	December (15-19)	2024	1465	1200	265	2.60%
32	January (5-8)	2025	811	655	156	3.40%
33	February (9-12)	2025	811	659	152	3.40%
34	March (9-12)	2025	1507	1257	250	2.50%
35	April (21-27)	2025	1490	1254	237	2.50%
36	May (12-15)	2025	803	658	145	3.50%
37	June (8-11)	2025	803	650	153	3.50%
38	July (14-15)	2025	800	648	152	3.50%
39	August (10-14)	2025	1505	1259	246	2.50%
40	September 7- (11)	2025	1511	1260	251	2.50%
41	October 16- (19)	2025	1208	1007	201	2.80%
42	November (9-11)	2025	806	654	152	3.5%
43	December (8-11)	2025	1513	1259	154	2.5%
44	January (11-13)	2026	810	658	152	3.4%
45	February (9-11)	2026	812	660	152	3.40%
46	March (9-11)	2026	812	658	154	3.40%
47	April (16-21)	2026	1515	1260	255	2.50%

Note: The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is at a 95% confidence level.

The Jewish respondents constitute a representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel, stratified by gender, age groups, geographical district, and level of religiosity. Additionally, the Arab respondents constitute a sample that closely represents the adult Arab population in Israel by gender, age groups, geographical

district, and level of religiosity, with under-sampling of male respondents, respondents from the southern region, and respondents aged 40 and above within this population.

Public Trust in Government Institutions

Format of the questions asked: "To what extent do you have trust in each of the following institutions?", where respondents were required to answer regarding the Knesset, the Government, the Supreme Court, and the President.

Response options for the questions: 1. I have very high trust, 2. I have high trust, 3. I have little trust, 4. I have no trust at all, 5. Don't know.

Public Trust in the Judicial System

Format of the questions asked: "To what extent do you have trust in each of the following institutions?", where respondents were required to answer regarding the Israel Police, the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the State Attorney's Office.

Response options for the questions: 1. I have very high trust, 2. I have high trust, 3. I have little trust, 4. I have no trust at all, 5. Don't know.

Trust in Security Forces

Format of the questions asked: "To what extent do you have trust in each of the following institutions?", where respondents were required to answer regarding the Police and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF*).

Response options for the questions: 1. I have very high trust, 2. I have high trust, 3. I have little trust, 4. I have no trust at all, 5. Don't know.

**Until November 2025, trust in the IDF was calculated using vote-based weighting. Beginning in December 2025, the methodology was updated, and trust in the IDF has since been calculated without applying vote-based weights*

Index of Government Assessment

The Index of Government Assessment of the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility represents an average of the public's level of trust in the government, satisfaction with the government, assessment of how responsive it is to the public, and the public's level of satisfaction with the government's handling of important problems facing the country. As part of constructing the index, internal reliability tests (Cronbach's alpha) were performed to examine the connection between these questions: $\alpha = 0.74-0.86$.

Format of the questions asked:

1. To what extent do you have trust in the government? Response options: 1. I have very high trust, 2. I have high trust, 3. I have little trust, 4. I have no trust at all, 5. Don't know.
2. What is your level of satisfaction with the government's performance? Response options: 1. Very satisfied, 2. Satisfied, 3. Not satisfied, 4. Very unsatisfied, 5. Don't know.
3. What score would you give the government in addressing the most important problem facing the country today? From 0 (low) to 10 (high).

- Each respondent was asked to indicate the most important problem in their opinion that the country is facing, and then was asked about their assessment of the government's score in addressing this problem.
4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government is responsive to public problems"? Response options: 1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 3. Disagree, 4. Strongly disagree, 5. Don't know.

State of the Nation

Format of the question asked: "What do you think is the general state of Israel?" Response options: Very good; Good; So-so; Not good; Bad; Don't know

Format of the question asked: "Are you proud or not proud to be Israeli?"

Response options: Not proud at all; Not proud; Proud; Very proud; Don't know.

The data are calculated using vote-based weights

Assessment of Democracy

Format of the question asked: "To what extent is it important for you to live in a country with a democratic system of government?"

Response options: Rating on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "very important" ["Don't know" option provided].

Format of the question asked: "To what extent do you think Israel is a democratic country?"

Response options: Rating on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "not democratic at all" and 10 means "very democratic" ["Don't know" option provided].

Format of the question asked: "Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way Israeli democracy functions?"

Response options: Rating on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "very dissatisfied" and 10 means "very satisfied" ["Don't know" option provided].

Political Representation

Format of the question asked: In general, to what extent do you feel that the Israeli political system represents you?

Response options: To a very large extent; To a large extent; To some extent; To a small extent; Not at all; Don't know

Format of the question asked: In general, to what extent do you feel that there is a party and/or politician in the country that represents you?

Response options: To a very large extent; To a large extent; To some extent; To a small extent; Not at all; Don't know

Data calculation is performed using voting weights and does not include respondents who answered "don't know"

Electoral Integrity

Format of the question asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the next Knesset elections in Israel?

- a. The next Knesset elections will be free and fair
- b. Actors associated with the government will attempt to skew the election results
- c. Actors associated with the opposition will attempt to skew the election results
- d. Foreign countries will attempt to skew the election results

Response options for the four questions: Strongly agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly disagree; Don't know

The data are calculated using vote-based weights



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The Institute for Liberty & Responsibility

The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University (IDC Herzliya) is a platform for academic research of Israeli politics and democracy. The Institute seeks to advance the values, policies, and institutions vital to the survival of liberal democracy in Israel. It is a place of research and university instruction, but also an active participant in the public discourse on political institutions and political behavior.