

# **The Balance of Israel's National Security**

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## **The Herzliya Indices of National Strength: The Military Power Index**

### **Executive Summary**

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# **Herzliya Indices of National Strength: The Military Power Index**

## **Executive Summary**

This project aims at two separate but complementary goals. First, it was designed to provide those who deal with military net assessment with a model that allows for qualitative aspects of power to be quantified and compared. To that end, the model presented in this study enables, for the first time, an analytical distinction to be made between 'bigger' forces and 'better' ones. While intuitively it may seem clear that a smaller, smarter force could be superior to a larger, less advanced one, this study, and the model it proposes, allows these assumptions to be tested, examined, and placed in more traditional quantitative terms, facilitating a more comprehensive picture of the strengths and capabilities of a military force.

The second goal of this study is to apply this new model to the conditions prevailing in the Middle East, in an attempt to provide insights for military and political leaders, as well as for policy-makers. Towards this end, the present study uses the aforementioned assessment model to compare the Israel Defense Forces with the combined military forces of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraqi expeditionary force and Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM). In so doing, the study could give new perspectives regarding the military realities in the region, and related questions of deterrence posture, inter-state policy, and a host of related issues. It is hoped that these comparative assessments will provide the reader with better grasp of the overall military balance in the Middle East.

The measurement of power is not merely an intellectual exercise; rather, it is an attempt to provide tools to military commanders and policy-makers, regarding both the building of military force and its use. Military power is a technologically intensive medium, in which capabilities are determined in large part by the sophistication of platforms and weapons, and by the level of training afforded to the commanders, soldiers and technicians operating them. Accordingly, no

serious attempt to assess forces can be made without relating not only to overall *numbers* of assets (tanks, missiles, etc.), but also to their specific capabilities. In this context, the question of quality becomes paramount: more accurate missiles hit their targets more often; better pilots are more likely to fulfill their objectives and return home alive; better intelligence-gathering systems mean that forces can locate and destroy more targets in less time.

However, the measurement of quality is not limited only to the recognition that specific planes, missiles or pilots may be better armed or trained than others. The American successes over Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and the doctrinal “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) that has taken place within the armed forces of technologically advanced states, have driven home the need for whole new set of criteria when it comes to measurement of relative powers. Among these new criteria is the ability of a given force or coalition of forces to create a unified, synergetic complex of systems -- that is, to create an overarching, and unifying system which ties together different levels of command and control with field intelligence, and information gathering and dissemination. The model presented here attempts to provide the would-be analyst with tools for the comparative assessment of such capabilities. Historically, such assessments were made by individual experts, who would compare forces and rate them according to their personal experience and knowledge. This study builds on this approach, combining the assessments of a large, heterogeneous group of experts which can then be placed alongside “hard” quantitative data. In so doing, the present model offers the analyst the ability to create overall comparative assessments of different forces, which can be broken down into specific elements of power.

This project measures the relative power in two approaches: the first one, the general index, includes all parameters of power. The second one comprises only parameters of high quality systems, manpower and force multipliers. The main results of the project are shown in the following table

	<b>General Index</b>	<b>Qualitative Index</b>
Increase of Israel Military Power 1992-2002	27%	41%
Israel's Military Power in Relation to Arab Coalition in 2002	1.31	1.55
<b>General Index:</b>		
The Best Power Ratio: The Air Force	1.47	
The Poorest Power Ratio: The Ground Forces	1.20	
<b>The Qualitative Index:</b>		
The Best Power Ratio: Manpower		1.70
The Poorest Power Ratio: Systems		1.41
The Rate of Change of The Relative Power 1992-2002	6%	15%
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ <b>Classical indicators show increase of relative strength.</b></li> <li>▶ <b>Qualitative indicators rapid increase of relative strength.</b></li> </ul>		

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