

Palestinians After Reconciliation

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June 2014

Data

Poll conducted between 5 and 7 June 2014

Representative sample of 1270 respondents

In the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East
Jerusalem

Face to face interviews

Margin of error is 3%

Implications for the peace process


Majority in sees reconciliation not closing door to negotiations

Majority wants conciliation government to accept international conditions


Majority believes Hamas indirectly accepts international conditions when joining the PLO

Disarming factions in the Gaza Strip


Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for the peace process



Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for the peace process— Disarm factions in Gaza



Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for the peace process— Disarm factions in Gaza




Implications for the two-state solution

West Bankers support two-state solution, not Gazans

All view it as impractical

All reject one-state solution

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for two-state solution



Implications for Palestinian options


Majority supports joining international organizations

Majority supports non violence

Majority opposes return to armed intifada

Majority opposes dissolution of the PA

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for Palestinian options



Implications for Plan B– Going international

An overwhelming majority favors going to the ICC even if leads to PA collapse

Majority opposes UNSC imposing borders on two sides

Majority opposes UN trusteeship on WBGS

Majority does not believe the international community will impose sanctions on Israel even if occupation lasts much longer

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for Plan B– going international

