




Survey Findings

The War with Iran

March 2026

Week 4



Summary

Initiation of the War with Iran and Progress toward Its Objectives

In the fourth week of the war, public support for initiating the conflict has declined, albeit moderately. A majority of 65% of the public still supports the decision to go to war. Broad support is also observed among opposition voters. At the same time, public confidence in achieving the War's objectives has declined noticeably. This trend is similar across political camps.

Public Confidence in the Israeli Leadership

Confidence in the current Israeli leadership's ability to manage the war against Iran has eroded. In the fourth week of the war, only 37% of the public expresses a high level of confidence in the Israeli leadership.

Public Assessment of the Likelihood of Another War with Iran

A total of 42% of the public believes that another war with Iran will break out within three years following the end of the current war. Of these, 19% believe such a war will occur within one year.

Public Evaluation of the Media Coverage of the War

The public is dissatisfied with the way the media is covering the war. The media receives an average rating of 4.4 out of 10.

Public Evaluation of the IDF, the Prime Minister, and the Government in Managing the War

Public satisfaction with the performance of the military, the Prime Minister, and the Government of Israel in the current war is lower compared to Operation "Rising Lion" in June.

Performance of Local Authorities


Approximately half of the public report satisfaction with the performance of local authorities during the current war with Iran.

The data are based on a survey conducted between March 22–24 by iPanel, among a sample of 810 respondents (655 Jews and 155 Arabs). The data were weighted based on voting patterns.



In the fourth week of the war, public support for initiating the war has declined, albeit moderately. Nevertheless, a majority of 65% of the public continues to support the decision to go to war. Broad support is also observed among opposition voters.

The Level of Support for Israel's Decision to Initiate a War Against Iran




Based on two surveys conducted for the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility between March 9–11 and March 22–24, 2026, by iPanel, among samples of 812 respondents (658 Jews, 154 Arabs) and 810 respondents (655 Jews, 155 Arabs), respectively; the total sample also includes respondents who voted for parties that did not pass the electoral threshold or did not vote at all.



In the fourth week of the war, we find a decline in public confidence in the achievement of the war's objectives. This trend is similar across political camps. Public confidence that the war will lead to a reduction in Iran's nuclear capabilities and its ability to launch ballistic missiles toward Israel has decreased from 49% in the second week of the war to 41% in the fourth week.

A more pronounced decline is observed in public confidence that the war will lead to regime change in Iran. In the fourth week of the war, only 39% believe this will occur, compared to 50% in the second week.

Respondents Who Strongly Believe that the War Will Lead to a Reduction in Iran's Ability to Produce Nuclear Weapons, Launch Ballistic Missiles at Israel, and Cause to a Regime Change




Based on two surveys conducted for the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility between March 9–11 and March 22–24, 2026, by iPanel, among samples of 812 respondents (658 Jews, 154 Arabs) and 810 respondents (655 Jews, 155 Arabs), respectively.



Public confidence in the current Israeli leadership's ability to manage the war against Iran has eroded. In the fourth week of the war, only 37% of the public expresses a high level of confidence in the Israeli leadership's management of the war, compared to 45% who expressed high confidence in the second week of the war. The decline in confidence is shared across political camps.

Respondents Expressing a High Level of Support for the Current Leadership's Management of the War Against Iran




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When Does the Public Expect Another War with Iran to Break Out?



A total of 42% of the public believes that another war with Iran will break out within three years following the end of the current war. Of these, 19% believe such a war will occur within one year. Opposition voters are more pessimistic, with more than half of them believing that a war with Iran will break out within three years of the end of the current war, compared to approximately one-third of coalition voters who hold this view.


After the current war with Iran ends, when do you think another war between Israel and Iran will break out?




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The public is dissatisfied with the way the media are covering the war. The media receive an average rating of only 4.4 out of 10, compared to a rating of 5.4 at the conclusion of Operation "Rising Lion" in June 2025. Dissatisfaction with media coverage is shared across political camps.




The public expresses lower levels of satisfaction with the performance of the military, the Prime Minister, and the Government of Israel during the current war than it expressed during Operation "Rising Lion" in June 2025. On a scale of 1 to 10, the IDF receives a relatively high rating (7.6), while the Prime Minister and the government receive lower ratings: 5.4 and 4.8, respectively.





Approximately half of the public reports satisfaction with the performance of local authorities during the current war with Iran. For comparison, at the conclusion of Operation "Rising Lion" in June 2025, nearly two-thirds of the public expressed satisfaction with the performance of local authorities. The decline in satisfaction relative to Operation "Rising Lion" is shared across political camps, but is more pronounced among opposition voters.

Satisfaction with the Performance of Local Authorities



Based on two surveys conducted for the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility between March 9–11 and March 22–24, 2026, by iPanel, among samples of 812 respondents (658 Jews, 154 Arabs) and 810 respondents (655 Jews, 155 Arabs), respectively; the total sample also includes respondents who voted for parties that did not pass the electoral threshold or did not vote at all.



The Institute for Liberty & Responsibility

The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University (IDC Herzliya) is a platform for academic research of Israeli politics and democracy. The Institute seeks to advance the values, policies, and institutions vital to the survival of liberal democracy in Israel. It is a place of research and university instruction, but also an active participant in the public discourse on political institutions and political behavior.

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