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WORKING PAPER

Hizballah's Ideology: Main Points and Practical Implementation

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A. Background Factors and Influences behind the Development of Hizballah's Ideology

The Hizballah organization attributes supreme importance to the religious and political ideology it has formulated since its establishment in 1983. In fact, the organization regards ideology as the basis for its existence and as the driving force for the resistance militia it has built in Lebanon. In the organization's view, ideology is equivalent to its weaponry. Thus, the motto of Hizballah is that faith is the guarantee of victory, and without faith the organization will fail to attain its objectives.

The local and regional background for the formulation of Hizballah's ideology was based on a number of fundamental factors:

1. The Iranian role versus the Lebanese-local interest – The Hizballah organization was established as a long strategic arm of Iran in the heart of the Arab world, in general, and in Lebanon, in particular.¹ Over time, Hizballah, in addition to its role as a militia, also turned into an authentic Lebanese-Shiite force, both political and social. These two factors had a decisive impact on the essence and content of the ideology. Hizballah needed to formulate an ideology that would present a broad common denominator for these two factors, which often were in a state of conflict with each other. The role of ideology was to find the right formula to connect these two factors and bridge the gaps between them in order to form a political and military force of great influence and power in Lebanon, capable of realizing the movement's objectives. In addition, the role of ideology became critical, considering the fact that Hizballah's leadership demands that its members be prepared to martyr themselves (*shahada*) for the sake of realizing the movement's aspirations. The mobilization of the motif of enmity toward Israel and the confrontation with it, ostensibly aimed at defending Lebanese sovereignty, has served as Hizballah's main formula for bridging between these two conflicting motifs.
2. Rivalry vis-à-vis veteran players in the Lebanese political arena – The Hizballah organization is a relatively new political movement in the diverse Lebanese political landscape. The existence of the veteran Shiite Amal movement did help Hizballah to emerge, but Hizballah's leadership – after breaking away from Amal – had to compete with political rivals from the Sunni, Shiite and Christian factions. The formulation of the ideology in a relatively quick way and its aggressive dissemination helped Hizballah to establish itself as a local political force.
3. Political pluralism in Lebanon – In general, the diversity of the political system in Lebanon made it difficult for any new political player to stand out as a force offering an innovative message. Therefore, the founders of Hizballah – in Iran and in Lebanon – needed to emphasize in a sharp and prominent way the uniqueness and revolutionary nature of Hizballah's ideology in this pluralistic political landscape. Even so, attractive content and effective tools were both required to market and instill the ideology among the various strata of the Shiite community, while simultaneously convincing the general public of its essentiality.² In practice, Hizballah succeeded in disseminating its ideology not only among the Shiite public but also among other communities. It also succeeded in mobilizing support for

1 The Deputy Secretary General of Hizballah, Sheikh Na'im Qasim, explicitly states that: "Hizballah was established in its current format in accordance with the instructions of Imam Khomeini" and that Khomeini, "because of his understanding of Islam and his loyalty to the Prophet's family, directed Hizballah toward a confrontation with Israel." See: *Baqiyat Allah* (Beirut), February 2001.

2 Dr. 'Abbas Maznar points out the difficulty of establishing "a resisting Lebanese society" (*mujtama' lubnani muqawim*) in light of the cultural and ethnic pluralism, on the one hand, and the political and sectarian rift, on the other hand. Against the background of these basic realities, the Lebanese have not demonstrated a uniform stance vis-à-vis the "resistance" (*al-muqawama* – that is, Hizballah's militia). Instead, they have been divided in regard to its definition, influence and acceptance for about two decades: See, for example, *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2001.

its political worldview among Sunnis, Druze and Christians. The multi-sectarian coalition led by Hizballah, which has competed since late 2007 against the March 14 Alliance led by Sa'ad Hariri, testifies to this.

4. The conflict between the influence of the Islamic Revolution and particularistic Lebanese interests – When first established, the Hizballah organization initially adopted a pan-Islamic ideology under Iranian inspiration. This ideology called for establishing a state in Lebanon based on Islamic law (*Shari'a*), which would be an integral part of a world-embracing Islamic state. According to this ideology, the center of this state is in Iran and its ruler is the *wali faqih* – the ruling jurist – the leader Khomeini. In effect, Hizballah rejected the Lebanese identity and right of existence of the (Christian-controlled) Lebanese regime, and recognized Imam Khomeini as both its religious and political leader.³
5. The ideological paradox between representing Lebanese interests and promoting foreign interests – Over the years, and in light of the development of new political and strategic conditions, Hizballah in mid-1992 formed a political entity, alongside its militia, with the aim of participating in the parliamentary elections and integrating into the political life of the state. Hizballah sought and received an Islamic legal ruling for this move from the leader Khamene'i – Khomeini's successor. In practice, Hizballah's ideology is caught in a political paradox that is one of the primary reasons for the Lebanese tragedy: On the one hand, Hizballah purports to represent the particularistic aspirations of the Lebanese people vis-à-vis Israel, the U.S., the West and the Arab world. It justifies the continued existence of its militia – the Islamic resistance – by the need to defend Lebanon from its enemies. On the other hand, Hizballah operates in the service of two key states in the region – Iran and Syria – in order to promote the regional agenda and even the international agenda of these two states. Its founders left the mother movement – Amal – and started Hizballah in order to fulfill this mission. In addition, the organization demands complete freedom of action and autonomy for itself in waging the resistance against Israel – whenever it wants and employing any means and method it deems appropriate. This demand is inconsistent with Lebanon's sovereignty and contrary to the foundations of its constitutional-parliamentary regime, which is supposed to have the sovereign right to decide whether to pursue war or peace with any external entity.
6. Hizballah's demand for full autonomy in conducting the resistance is a supreme value in its ideology. In May 2008, this demand faced a national test against the background of the ultimatum the government of Lebanon gave to Hizballah to dismantle the independent communications network it built for itself in the state. In response, Hizballah took over the main strongholds in Beirut and threatened to carry out a military coup d'état. The retraction of the ultimatum by the government of Lebanon lifted Hizballah's threat and

ultimately led to the Doha Agreement⁴ and subsequently to the election of a president and government. All these moves were made under the dictates of Hizballah and its local political allies, who strengthened their status in the political and governmental system.⁵

In summary, the Hizballah organization formulated its ideology in the face of different variables, some of which conflict with one another. This ideology aspired to bridge these variables and was imposed upon the Lebanese reality. In this way, Hizballah built in Lebanon – with the assistance and guidance of Iran and Syria – a powerful military force alongside a local political force that wields considerable influence.

B. Formulating the View of a “Resisting Society” (*al-mujtama' al-muqawim*)

The leadership of Hizballah shaped the ideological and organizational view of a “resisting society,”⁶ characterized by a “culture of resistance and of sacrifice.” The “resisting society” is based on the Shiite community in Lebanon and includes all those identifying with Hizballah's notion of “resistance” – men and women, armed and unarmed – who take upon themselves the responsibility to assist the “resistance” (the militia) in all aspects. According to this definition, “anyone who shirks the responsibility to assist the ‘resistance’ also shirks his human, religious, moral and national responsibility.” In other words, Hizballah states that devotion to the “resistance” – by identifying with it, assisting it or joining its ranks of fighters – is the entry test for the “resisting society.” Hizballah regards the Shiites in Lebanon as a community that must be committed to comprise an inseparable part of the “resisting society” and to fulfill its purpose. Any Shiite who fails to act in this way remains outside of the “resisting society.” In practice, Hizballah tries to mobilize non-Shiite citizens to join the “resisting society,” but its center of gravity, as stated, is the Shiite community.⁷ The main instrument for building and consolidating the “resisting society” and shaping it in the spirit of the “culture of resistance” is the “resisting information campaign” (see below for more on this). The primary purpose of the “resisting society” is to recruit and mobilize all of its resources, systems and institutions for a single, central objective – providing service for the “program of resistance.”⁸ The aims of the “resisting society” in Lebanon can be summarized as follows:

1. Vis-à-vis the political movement and militia (the “Islamic resistance”): Building a base of strategic support within the

⁴ The “Doha Agreement” was signed in May 2008 and ended the long political crisis in the state. As part of this agreement, the sides decided to form a national unity government, whose 30 members would include 11 from Hizballah. In addition, the agreement gave Hizballah the right to veto any government decision. The agreement paved the way for General Michel Suleiman to assume the role of president of the Lebanon, thus ending the political crisis.

⁵ The deputy chairman of Hizballah's Political Council, Mahmud Qamati, decisively states – at the time these lines are being written – Hizballah's policy in regard to the autonomous standing of the resistance in Lebanon and its independence from the state's sovereign institutions: “The Islamic resistance will continue to defend, more than ever, the independence of its weapons, its power, its capability and its readiness. It does not belong to any official institution because if it belonged to an official institution it would be forced to be subject to every official decision that is derived, in practice, from the dictates of the international forces. The resistance's decision-making process will remain free and its weapons will remain in its hands. We are engaging in national dialogue so that the official decision-making process will be conducted in parallel to the army, the resistance and the people.” See *al-Mustaqbal* (Beirut), February 21, 2009.

⁶ The concept of the “resisting society” / the society of resistance (*mujtama' muqawim*) derives from the word “resistance” (*muqawama*). The intention is a society that stands behind the “resistance” that was established to wage resistance against the West in general and against Israel in particular.

⁷ The deputy chairman of Hizballah's Political Council, Mahmud Qamati, clearly divides the Lebanese between “resistors” (*muqawimim*) and “those who place their trust in the American region and the victory of Israel.” *al-Mustaqbal* (Beirut), February 21, 2009.

⁸ Regarding the “institutions of the resisting society” (*mu'assasat al-mujtama' al-muqawim*), see at length in *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2001.

³ Shimon Shapira, *Hizballa between Iran and Lebanon*, Tel Aviv, 2000, p. 125; a central dilemma for Hizballah is the debt to Iran for helping to establish and sustain it. Hizballah follows Iran's path, perceptions and even its dictates. It wants to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, like the Iranian counterpart. But Hizballah must also consider the Lebanese context in which it functions. Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads,” *MERIA*, Vol. 3, September 1997; in Hizballah's platform from February 1985, the organization adopted the view of its spiritual leader at the time, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, stating that despite its commitment to Islam, Hizballah would not forcibly impose it on Lebanon. Iran, on the other hand, demanded that the platform stipulate the establishment of an Islamic Republic as the immediate solution for the problems of Lebanon. See: Shapira, pp. 127-128.

Shiite community, which fills two principal roles:

- To give the party electoral power in municipal elections and in parliamentary elections, and thus strengthen its political and public standing.
 - To serve as a catalyst for providing economic and social aid to the militia, and to constitute a persistent source for recruiting fighters to its ranks.⁹
2. Vis-à-vis the Lebanese state: Recruiting ethnic and religious communities outside of the Shiite community to provide ideological, political and material support for the “resistance” and its objectives. In practice, Hizballah achieved success, even if only partial, by mobilizing non-Shiites in Lebanon – Sunnis, Druze and Christians – who identify with the idea of “resistance” and some of them even became political allies of Hizballah.¹⁰
 3. Vis-à-vis the Arab and Islamic world: Creating a form of “resisting society” and “resistance” that can serve as a model for emulation and help in exporting the Iranian Islamic Revolution. An important Hizballah spokesman stated in this context that the “culture of resistance” had become the leading culture not only in Lebanon but also in Palestine.¹¹

Dr. ‘Abbas Maznar writes in an article that Hizballah’s Islamic resistance succeeded in winning enthusiastic support in the Arab world because of its religious and Arab identity, on the one hand, and its messages, on the other hand. According to Maznar, the “resisting information campaign” (that is, the dissemination of information that shapes the “resisting society” in Lebanon) in its broad sense filled an important role in this success because it gave expression to the aspirations and hopes of the Arab and Islamic peoples. In his article, he writes that thanks to the “resisting information campaign,” a “resisting society” was also formed in Palestine – where its popular expression was the *intifada*.¹² The person in charge of Hizballah’s central cultural unit, Sheikh ‘Ali Da’mush, emphasized that “the culture of resistance” became the leading one in Lebanon and in Palestine. He added in another article that the Palestinian people emphasize via the al-Aqsa Intifada that the only way to restore Palestinian is the way of Hizballah and the logic of resistance and martyrs (*shahada*).¹³ On another occasion, Da’mush claimed that the victory of the “resistance” in May 2000 expressed the victory of the culture of resistance and helped to disseminate it.¹⁴ These statements also reflect the view of Hizballah’s Secretary General, Hasan Nasrallah, who stated that the culture of the Islamic nation is advancing in large steps toward a program of “resistance,” and he says that this is a “product of belonging to the Qur’an.”¹⁵

There are two exemplary models of a “resisting society” and its culture in Islamic history. The first is the society that existed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca and in Medina; the second is the Iranian society following the Islamic Revolution. A general, universal model of a “resisting society”¹⁶ is also derived from these two examples. This type of society can arise in various countries

9 Ibid.

10 For example, two extreme Salafist Sunni movements support Hizballah and are even allies by virtue of their identification with Hizballah’s anti-American and anti-Israeli view. The movements are the Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islami) led by Fathi Yakan, and the Islamic Unification movement (Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islamiyya), Muhammad ‘Alush, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1209357566616&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout, May 14, 2008; The Islamic Action Front recently called for disseminating the “strategy of resistance” so that it will be adopted as policy in the region. The movement argues for this policy particularly in light of its claim that the Lebanese resistance and the Palestinian resistance have attained achievements that all of the Arab armies together have never achieved. Lebanese Press Agency. See January 26, 2009: <http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb>

11 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 *Baqiyyat Allah*, February 2002

15 *Baqiyyat Allah*, July 2003.

16 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

and arenas, without affiliation to the Shiite group (for example, the “Palestinian resistance”) or even Islam as a religion. According to Hizballah’s view, this universal model of a “resisting society” includes common denominators, such as: resistance to Israel and to the West, led by the U.S.;¹⁷ identification with certain principles of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (for example, the resistance to the oppression of the downtrodden); reference to the “internal strength” (that is, the corporal/military) as a necessary means for attaining political objectives and becoming established on “foundations of contemplation, leadership and emotion.”¹⁸

The vanguard: The resisters (*muqawimun*) or fighters (*mujahidun*) who bear arms are the vanguard of the “resisting society.” They are under the command of a leader who assigns directives to them and they must be in a state of readiness to carry out any action. They serve as an example of self-sacrifice / martyrdom (*shahada*) for the entire society. Thus, the martyr (*shahid*) who is killed from among the vanguard is not only a martyr of his family, but a martyr of the entire society.¹⁹

Foundations of the strength of the “resisting society”: The first basis of strength are institutions and companies that provide economic, social and spiritual backing for the “resistance” (that is, Hizballah’s militia). Prominent examples of these companies and institutions include: the Authority for the Support of the Islamic Resistance (Hay’at Da’m al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), which conducts fundraising activity in Lebanon and abroad; the Martyr’s Association (Jam’iyyat Mu’assasat al-Shahid), which works to provide socio-economic and medical assistance for the families of fallen fighters (in addition to disseminating the culture of jihad and martyrdom); and the Jihad Building for Development Institution (Mu’assasat Jihad al-Bina’ al-Inma’iyya), which provides economic and social assistance to the “resisting society” in general, with a view of “strengthening its resilience vis-à-vis the enemy.” A central part of this institution’s activity is the rehabilitation of infrastructure and homes damaged during the war.

The second basis of strength is the voluntarism by the individual for the resistance, which makes the individual a partner in it. In light of this approach, the Islamic resistance has succeeded in mobilizing many Lebanese Shiites in jihad and resistance activity.²⁰

Comparing the Islamic resistance in Lebanon to the Iranian Islamic Revolution: Spokespersons for Hizballah recognize the fact that the Islamic resistance is the project of, and fostered by, the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, led by Imam Khamene’i. Nonetheless, they try to aggrandize the “resisting society” and its core – the militia in Lebanon – by comparing it to the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Sheikh Muhammad Khatun portrays the “victory of the resistance in May 2000 over Israel” (the reference is to the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon) as an event of the magnitude of the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution over its enemies, domestic and foreign, and as a formative event in the Middle East that was unprecedented in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, Khatun makes every effort to remove any illusion that in the wake of the victory of the “resistance” in May 2000 it is possible to rest on its laurels. He states, for example, that even after this victory, the “resisting society” in Lebanon must continue to preserve its characteristics as a fighting society in order to continue to achieve additional goals, because its work is yet to be completed.²¹

These remarks are echoed by Hizballah’s Deputy Secretary General, Nai’m Qasim, who notes that the Islamic resistance drew inspiration from and was influenced by the Islamic Revolution, and received assistance from the Revolutionary Guards, who helped to establish

17 These are referred to by the general name “arrogance” (*istikbar*)

18 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

19 Ibid. In the literature of the global jihad, the “vanguard” are the fighters (*mujahidun*), who are called The Group that Merits Allah’s Compassion (*al-ta’ifa al-mansura*).

20 For the interview with Sheikh Muhammad Khatun on the “resisting society,” see: *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

21 Ibid.

it. Qasim also describes the ideological principles guiding the two revolutions as principles that actually derive from the revolutionary worldview of Khomeini.²²

The researcher 'Abbas Maznar states that "it is impossible to ignore the important and tremendous role the blessed Islamic Revolution played in reinforcing the path of self-sacrifice / martyrdom (*shahada / istishhad*) and the choice of jihad and resistance. He notes that this choice was made since the establishment of Hizballah and the historic declaration of its ideological platform (*al-risala al-maftuha*),²³ which formed a strong and strategic connection between the party and the Islamic Revolution."²⁴

Sheikh Mahmud Karnib shares this approach and even expands it by drawing a mystical / religious line connecting the Prophet Muhammad's act of "migration" (*hijra*) and the Islamic Revolution and Islamic resistance. He claims that the common denominator of these three phenomena is the motif of "migration" in its mystical / religious sense of abandoning a state of ignorance, exploitation and deviation, and transition to the light of faith and the straight path, which occurs by connecting (migration) to Allah. Karnib even sees this connection as "the proof of the superiority of Shi'ism and that it is the authorized and legitimate Islamic stream, deriving its authority from the founder of Islam himself – the Prophet Muhammad." In the specific example of "the Islamic resistance" (that is, Hizballah), Karnib speaks about "migration from a place of defeat, surrender and desperation to a space of hope and the realization of victory over the enemy after a period in which no one hoped this would occur." At the same time, the author notes that the Islamic resistance was formed under the watchful eye of Khomeini and his instructions, which were implemented by a group of religious sages and fighters (*mujahidun*) led by the "master of the martyrs" (*sayyid al-shuhada'*) of the Islamic resistance, 'Abbas al-Musawi.²⁵

In summary, these and other documents indicate that "the resisting society" and its product – "the Islamic resistance" – draw their inspiration and basic principles from the philosophy of the fathers of the Islamic Revolution via the clerics of Hizballah. Moreover, the formation of these two bodies in Lebanon is, in fact, a result of the establishment of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and was executed according to the teachings and instructions of the instigators of the Islamic Revolution and based on the implementation of lessons from the conduct of this revolution.²⁶

Central Principles in Hizballah's Ideology and Their Formation in the Spirit of Shi'ism and the Iranian Islamic Revolution

General

The source of the name Hizballah, whose literal translation is "party of Allah," is from the Qur'an. In general, Hizballah embraces a pan-Islamic ideology influenced by the religious-Shiite revolutionary view of the fathers of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, led by Imam Khomeini. This is expressed, first and foremost, in accepting the undisputed standing of Caliph 'Ali – the founder of the *al-Shi'a al-Imamiyya*²⁷ stream in Shi'ism – and his 11 descendant Imams as the exclusive heirs of the Prophet Muhammad and, consequently, as the

22 [Baqiyyat Allah](#), February 2001; see also in the Appendix 1: Hizballah-Iran – Shared Ideological Principles and Reciprocal Relations.

23 The reference is to Hizballah's ideological platform from 1985. See more on this below.

24 [Baqiyyat Allah](#), August 2001.

25 [Baqiyyat Allah](#), February 2002.

26 On the Iranian role, including the roles of Iran's embassies in Damascus and Beirut in regard to the cultural and Islamic direction of Hizballah, youth education and the establishment of economic and social aid institutions for the "resisting society," see: Shapira, pp. 143-145.

27 This stream has two additional names: "*al-Shi'a al-lthna' 'Ashariyya*" (Twelver Shi'ism, named for the 12 imams) and "*al-Shi'a al-Ja'fariyya*" (named for the Sixth Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq). The source of the word *Shi'a* is *Shi'at 'Ali* – the faction of 'Ali. Shi'ism describes 'Ali with the title Commander of the Faithful – *amir al-mu'minin*.

leaders of the Islamic nation.

In its ideological platform, published on February 16, 1985 as an "open letter" to the "downtrodden" in Lebanon and in the world (*risala maftuha li-al-mustad'afin*), Hizballah accepts the innovative idea of the Islamic Revolution pertaining to the *wali faqih* – the rule of the jurist – that derives, inter alia, from the status of 'Ali as the heir of Muhammad in the Shiite heritage. In its platform, Hizballah also emphasizes its loyalty to Iran and its leader Khomeini – the *wali faqih* – while stating that the secretary general of Hizballah manages the organization's everyday affairs as empowered by the leader of the revolution. In addition, the document emphasizes that the organization is an Islamic movement and rejects the Lebanese identity and the Lebanese regime's right to exist, and expresses opposition to anyone who operates in the framework of the Lebanese constitution.²⁸

This platform remains Hizballah's only official political and philosophical document, despite the fact that the organization itself has revised and adjusted its policies. These revisions were evident in the parliamentary elections held in Lebanon during 1992-1996, but they did not reach the level of reexamining the party's ideological and religious worldview.²⁹

The revision of the traditional Shiite worldview by the fathers of the Islamic Revolution was conducted in a way that serves the political aims of the revolution: domestically – mobilizing the support of the masses for the Islamic Revolution and enlisting them in realizing its objectives (among other ways, by reinterpreting the idea of jihad); and abroad – promoting the interests of the Shiites vis-à-vis the Sunnis, particularly by emphasizing the principle of inheritance from Muhammad to 'Ali, as well as the lofty status of the latter and the need to be loyal to him. Hizballah, which regards itself as a copy of the model of the Islamic Revolution and an inseparable part of it, follows the path of the revolution in all things related to this matter. This is expressed in the fact that Hizballah also employs its ideology to promote the interests of the organization, at home and abroad.

The View of the Leader, the Leadership and the Patterns of Rule The Status of 'Ali as the Heir of the Prophet and the Founder of the "Imama," as well as His Spiritual Values

A basic principle in the religious-political faith of the Shiites in Iran – which, in fact, constitutes a basis for the very existence of Shi'ism – is the transfer of inheritance to lead the Islamic nation from the Prophet Muhammad to the members of his family (*ahl al-bayt*) and, more specifically, to Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib. The Shiite tradition bases the veracity of its version of the handing down of power from Muhammad to Caliph 'Ali and his descendants – the imams – on an event that Muhammad conducted at a place called Ghadir Khumm. At this event, the Shiites claim, Muhammad declared to the community of believers that 'Ali would inherit his rule. (This announcement of the succession of rule is referred to in Shi'ism as the Day of al-Ghadir (*yawm al-ghadir*) for the name of this place.) The event of Ghadir Khumm is considered in Shi'ism as the formative event constituting the basis for its establishment, its justification for being the faithful continuer of Muhammad's path, its mission on behalf of Islam and all of humanity, and its lofty values, as embodied in the personality of 'Ali.³⁰ Shi'ism also deduces from certain passages in the Qur'an the divine command to Muhammad regarding the transfer of rule from him to 'Ali, as well as the principle of the "*imama*" in the sense of granting leadership to humanity.³¹ The idea that 'Ali inherited the rule from Muhammad is ingrained in the Shiite consciousness in the sacred concept of *wilayat 'Ali* (or *al-wilaya*), which means the rule of 'Ali and his spiritual patronage.

28 Shapira, pp 125-126.

29 "The Hizballah Party and the Amal Movement," [Al-Rasheed Encyclopedia](#), May 6, 2008, see: <http://www.alrasheed.net/index.php?partd=18&derid=785>.

30 [Baqiyyat Allah](#), January 2005.

31 See, for example, *Qur'an*, Sura 5:67.

A senior religious figure in Hizbollah even states that the principle of *wilayat 'Ali* is the equivalent of the entire religion of Islam. In his view, without the existence of the *wilaya*, the religion of Islam loses all value, as if it had never been brought down to Allah and conveyed by Muhammad his messenger. Based on these beliefs, the Muslims are required to demonstrate their loyalty to 'Ali and his offspring.³²

Shi'ism attributes to 'Ali exalted qualities of great spirituality, absolute religious devotion and fear of Heaven, which in fact constitute the peak of human spirituality. According to Shi'ism, 'Ali received the highest spiritual authority and patronage, in addition to the reigns of power. Khamene'i states in his commentary on the event that transpired at Ghadir Khumm that the Prophet Muhammad appointed 'Ali as his heir at this event because of his lofty spiritual qualities and his outstanding Islamic and human values. From this, he derives a model of the character of the leader a community and society should appoint. In his view, authoritative leaders should be appointed according to criteria of noble and lofty Islamic, social and spiritual qualities and characteristics. According to Khamene'i, the Iranian state implements this model and is now returning to "its Islamic identity" thanks to the criteria of the leader defined at al-Ghadir. However, Khamene'i states that the Islamic nation does not devote sufficient attention to Islamic values and places the weight of responsibility of leadership on its elected officials, while the West is trying to compel the Muslims to change their way of life and conducts attacks against the Iranian people due to its adherence to its Islamic culture.³³

Khamene'i points to the special personality of 'Ali as reflected in the book attributed to him in the Shiite tradition – "Peak of Eloquence" (*nahj al-balagha*). Khamene'i calls 'Ali: "a heavenly man," and "a perfect model of Islam." Based on the "Peak of Eloquence," which enables us to get to know 'Ali as a person of knowledge and morality, Khamene'i states that the Islamic society should develop the Islamic person (through education) according to the character of 'Ali. He says in summary that much time has passed since Muslims have followed the path illuminated by the "Peak of Eloquence" and now is the time to return to this path and disseminate it throughout the entire Islamic world.³⁴

In summary, the concept of *wilayat 'Ali* expresses, therefore, 'Ali's authority to rule as well as his qualities and spiritual patronage.

The Doctrine of the Twelve Imams – Sole Repositories of Truth, Intercessors with Allah, Redeemers of Mankind, Infallible and Omnipotent

Around the Caliph 'Ali (who is called the Commander of the Faithful – *amir al-mu'minin*) and his descendants (the 11 imams), who are portrayed as Muhammad's true heirs, the Twelver stream of Shi'ism (*al-shi'a al-ithna 'ashariyya*) developed, named for the 12 imams. This stream is dominant in Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Middle East. There are other streams in Shi'ism: the al-Zayyidiyya (in Yemen) and the al-Isma'iliyya. The Isma'iliyya stream believes that the successor of the sixth imam should have been Isma'il and not Musa Kazim, as the Twelvers believe, and that after the death of Isma'il, while his father was still alive, the rule should have passed on to his son Muhammad al-Maktub. This community is primarily found in Southeast Asia, with a minority in Iran.

The View of the Rule of the Jurisprudent (*wilayat al-faqih*) and Its Integration in the System of Rule in the State

The concept of *wali faqih* (ruling jurisprudent), which Khomeini developed and is implemented in practice in Iran, made an impact

32 For an interview with the Islamic sage Ja'far Murtada on the Day of al-Ghadir and *wilayat 'Ali*, see: *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

33 *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

34 *'Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha* (Returning to *Nahj al-Balagha*), Beirut, 2000, pp. 43-45, 55-56. The book contains three lectures of Khamene'i about *Nahj al-Balagha* ("Peak of Eloquence" – a collection of 'Ali's speeches that deal with all aspects of life).

on Hizbollah's ideology. Hizbollah views this idea as an ideal pattern of leadership for running the state. The organization also regards the acceptance of this view as identification with the very heart of the Islamic Revolution and as a declaration of absolute loyalty to the leader of Iran, who embodies in his personality and education, as a religious sage, the patterns of the *wali faqih*. Against this background, the organization inculcates the idea of the *wilayat al-faqih* in the system of information and indoctrination it operates – in the framework of studies and courses – among its adherents.

In his essay *al-Jihad*, the leader of Iran, Khamene'i, explains the essence of the position of the *wali faqih* as "great divine benevolence, on the one hand, and as a central envoy of the Islamic movement, on the other hand, during the period of disappearance (of the hidden imam). This is because the *wilayat al-faqih* will dispel dangers, identify the interests of the nation, which will march together in one direction, since the *wali faqih* is the guarantee of the continuation of this march and non-deviation from it." In other words, Khamene'i – in line with his predecessor Khomeini – attributes to the *wali faqih* a mystical status of substitute / representative of the hidden imam during the period of his disappearance and until his appearance as mahdi, which will bring redemption to the world. This status empowers the *wali faqih* with mystical capabilities for protecting the revolution from its enemies and advancing it safely and correctly toward the realization of its goals.³⁵ For emphasis, Khamene'i cites excerpts from Khomeini who demands from the fighters and the Republican Guard – which constitute the main stronghold of the regime of the Islamic Revolution – that "the issue of *wilayat al-faqih* flow in their veins and that they take upon themselves its constant supervision."³⁶

The decision of the Hizbollah organization regarding the *wali faqih*, which is a controversial issue in the Shiite world, is clear. In Hizbollah publications, Khamene'i is given the title of "substitute / general representative" (*al-na'ib al-'amm / al-na'ib bi-al-haqq*) of the hidden imam.

Further evidence of acceptance of the Khomeinist revolutionary concept of *wali faqih* by Hizbollah and its dissemination among the ranks of the organization can be seen in the organization's training booklets. One such example is the booklet used in the Hizbollah training course that teaches about the essence of the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* and its connection to the Islamic government. According to this booklet, "*wilayat al-faqih* is not merely a conceptual theory discussed by scholars. Rather, it is reality, a way of life and a regime on which Islamic society is based, with the goal of attaining victories, one after another."³⁷

Another series of lessons expounded by Khamene'i, and which was translated from Farsi to Arabic for Hizbollah personnel, explains the importance of the revolutionary idea that Khomeini formulated. Here he emphasizes that according to Khomeini the disappearance of the hidden imam – the leader of the Muslims who will appear in the future – must not create a vacuum of leadership and sound rule that guides and directs the Muslims. In accordance with Khomeini's teaching, these lessons challenge traditional Shiite views that prohibit an active leadership and fateful decisions (such as a declaration of a jihad campaign) as long as the hidden imam has yet to appear. The lessons teach that a collection of laws for reforming the society is not enough, and there is a need for a government that takes action. Khamene'i argues that "no society can organize its affairs except under the existence of law and a ruler who ensures that this law is executed." He states: "The establishment of a government is a duty; if not, many laws would stop operating – for example, in the areas of jihad and defense of the Muslim states and their property, and in the area of implementing the laws."

35 The Shiite tradition ruled that Islamic sages are *al-na'ib al-'amm* (the general representative), and that they are entitled to assume only some of the authorities of the hidden imam. Contrary to this view, Khomeini's concept of *wali faqih* determined that Islamic sages, and the religious jurists in particular, are entitled to also fill the political roles of the hidden imam.

36 'Ali Khamene'i, *al-Jihad*. Beirut, 2004.

37 *Durus fi Wilayat al-Faqih*. Beirut, 2005.

Based on this outlook, it becomes a duty to establish a leadership, headed by the *wali faqih*, which will manage the affairs of the Muslims. Khamene'i notes the need for a government / rule to exist based on the ultimate authority of Caliph 'Ali. In this context, Khamene'i states that there is opposition to the concept advocated by the stream that opposed 'Ali in his day – the Khawarij. This ancient stream claimed that there was no need for a government and proclaimed the following slogan: "There is no rule except Allah" (*la hukm illa li-Allah*). 'Ali stated in response to the challenge this group posed to his rule: "The people need a ruler." He agreed that the only rule belongs to Allah, but argued that this does not mean that the society must remain without someone to direct it. According to 'Ali, it is a natural social and human need to have someone lead a society, regardless of whether he is good or bad."³⁸

This series of lessons presents two models for implementing the idea of *wali faqih*: The first model is an existing state such as Iran, where the only source of rule in the Islamic regime is the *wali faqih*. The three branches – legislative, executive and judicial – enjoy independence, but their authority to rule derives from the *wali faqih*. The second model is the rule of the *wali faqih* in a non-state setting. As Khamene'i explains, "He [the *wali faqih*] rules over the Muslims whether a state exists in the country or not." Obedience to those appointed by the *wali faqih* is obligatory for all people as long as the directives of these appointees remain within the domain of their authorities in the framework of the foundations of Islamic law. It seems that the second model suggests the situation in which Hizballah operates in Lebanon – a state where the rule is divided between Muslims and Christians and is not subject to the rule of the *wali faqih*. This model apparently grants legitimacy to Hizballah to accept the authority of the *wali faqih* – the leader of Iran, Khamene'i – and to enforce obedience to the leader of Hizballah as the representative of Khamene'i in Lebanon.³⁹

The mystical / apocalyptic idea derived from the idea of *wali faqih* is that his leadership and policy constitute a guarantee for expediting the appearance of the hidden imam, and thus for bringing redemption nearer. This means that the decisions of the *wali faqih* should be obeyed and executed in order to advance the appearance of the hidden imam and, consequently, to realize this Shiite ideal.

In summary, the leadership of Hizballah uses the idea of the *wilayat al-faqih* – from which it derives its authority – in its propaganda in order to promote its vital interests:

- establishing the legitimacy of Hizballah's leadership and the party's institution of rule
- strengthening the patterns of discipline and obedience to Hizballah's leadership on the part of the "resisting society"
- boosting motivation among the members of the "resisting society" and fighters of the "Islamic resistance" to carry out the directives of Hizballah's leadership.

Exemplars of Leadership

The religious and ideological literature that Hizballah distributes via its publications and institutions are full of paradigms of leaders from the ancient and modern history of Islam and Shi'ism, exalting their qualities, attributes and leadership skills. The reliance on these examples is designed, inter alia, to reinforce the cohesion of the "resisting society" around the organization's leadership and to intensify religious adherence to Shi'ism. These examples of leaders can be divided into the following categories:

38 *'Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha* (Returning to *Nahj al-Balagha*).

39 The leadership of the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts Organization traditionally sends blessings on Shiite Islamic religious holidays to the community of scouts, including a special blessing for three people: the hidden imam (who bears the title of Master of the Era and the Times – *sahib al-'asr wa-al-zaman*), his substitute / representative (Imam Khamene'i), and the secretary general of Hizballah (Hasan Nasrallah – who bears the title *sayyid al-mujahidin samahat hujjat al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin*). See: *al-Bayan*, November 2002.

A. The Prophet Muhammad:

The status of the Prophet Muhammad as the founder of Islam is emphasized through reliance on the Qur'an as the central source of authority. The appearance of these motifs is designed to create a broad common denominator with the Sunnis in Lebanon in order to bring them closer to Shi'ism and to emphasize its Islamic authenticity. Hizballah attributes supreme importance to attaining this objective in order to serve two important interests: A) to promote its aspiration to achieve wide national consensus around its strategy; B) to counter propaganda by extreme Sunni groups that depict Shi'ism as a religion that deviates from Islam and is considered heretical. For this purpose, Khamene'i promulgated a message about the need to forge "unity of the Islamic nation by exposing the true character of the Prophet Muhammad to Muslims and non-Muslims."⁴⁰

Sheikh Karnib summarizes the Prophet Muhammad's attributes and patterns of leadership and, by analogy, those of Imam Khomeini too by noting the following main points: absolute reliance on Allah, and courage and strength to lead a complete nation, transforming it from a state of ignorance and weakness to a state of enlightenment, spirituality, faith in the oneness of God and in attaining victory. The leader's role is to communicate tidings and warnings, while also serving as a beacon that sheds light around it.⁴¹

B. The Imam 'Ali:

There is a conspicuous effort to depict 'Ali as a central and formative figure in Islam, in line with the character of the Prophet Muhammad. Especially salient is the portrayal of 'Ali as the founder of the dynasty of imams, which constitutes the backbone of Shi'ism. Shiite interpretation finds Qur'anic authority for 'Ali, for his rule and for the *Mahdi*, his descendant. This also accords divine legitimacy to the status of 'Ali and his heirs as the leaders of Islam, and strengthens the Shiite claim to the handing down of rule from Muhammad to 'Ali. The collection of speeches attributed to 'Ali (*Nahj al-Balagha*) is sometimes presented as the second most important book in Islam after the Qur'an.⁴² The character of 'Ali is also described as a universal Islamic figure in a way that enables Muslims outside of the Shiite community to identify with him.

C. The fathers of Shi'ism after the Imam 'Ali, with an emphasis on his son – Hussein

(The reference is to Imam Hussein Ibn 'Ali and the other ten imams.) Imam Hussein is accorded special status due to his death as a *shahid* in the battle of Karbala. The *'Ashura* ceremonies, which revolve around this event (observed as a memorial day and fast on the tenth day of the month of Muharram), have become a formative experience in Shi'ism and gained momentum in the wake of the Islamic Revolution. Shiite doctrine portrays Hussein as the exemplar of self-sacrifice and this is expressed in an even stronger way in the doctrine of the Islamic Revolution. Hussein is called the "Master of the Martyrs" (*sayyid al-shuhada*) in Shiite revolutionary terminology and Shiites are obliged to emulate him. Khamene'i attributes to Hussein "the revitalization of Islam thanks to his jihad."⁴³

D. The mothers of Shi'ism

(The reference is primarily to Fatima, Muhammad's daughter and the wife of 'Ali, as well as their daughter Zaynab.) The two women appear in Hizballah informational material as an exemplar of female scouts and commanders in Hizballah's Scouts organization. In an article on Fatima (who is referred to in Islam as *al-zahra* – that is, the "radiant" or "shining") published in the newspaper of the organization's Scouts organization, it is noted that Khomeini chose Fatima's birthday to be the "Muslim Woman's Day" and that this day was also chosen to be the "Day of the [Female] Commander" in Hizballah's Scouts organization. The newspaper explained this by the fact that Fatima

40 *Sada al-Wilaya*, (Beirut), January-February 2006.

41 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

42 *'Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha* (Returning to *Nahj al-Balagha*).

43 See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram in a document released by Hizballah's Central Information Unit on April 17, 1999.

is an example of an outstanding fighter and commander, and that Muslims can learn from her about courage, worshipping God and obeying Allah.⁴⁴

E. The leaders of the Islamic Revolution

(The reference is to Imam Khomeini and his successor, Imam Khamene'i.)⁴⁵ The status that Khamene'i attributes to Khomeini is particularly salient, placing him on the same level of the prophets. This is done by comparing Khomeini's attributes to those of the prophets by describing 17 qualities shared by the imam and the prophets.⁴⁶

It should be noted that Hizballah recognizes the status of Khamene'i as *wali faqih* – as the “general representative of the hidden imam” – and also as the source of emulation (*marja' taqlid*).⁴⁷ Hizballah's publications also sing the praises of Khamene'i, his qualities and actions, as follows:

- symbolizes the way of Islamic culture, in the path of Khomeini
- guarantees the wellbeing of Islamic culture, keeping it from straying from its lofty mission
- maintains the continued support on issues of justice and the rights of Muslims in the global arena – first and foremost, the Palestinian issue
- guides the nation's activity toward moderation and the middle way, and distances it from extremism and exaggeration – characteristics that Islamic societies suffered from in the past and present
- shapes the holiness of the Islamic ruler among the nation. The ruler is considered the primary force in the Islamic leadership's ability to motivate Muslims to achieve their victories in the fields of policy, economics, the army and culture.
- defends Islamic unity against division
- blocks the cultural invasion, warns against it and exposes its plans⁴⁸

F. Two of the founders of Hizballah

(The reference is to Raghieb Harb and 'Abbas al-Musawi.) There are biographical chapters devoted to these two men, extolling their personality, qualities, leadership and death on the holy altar of martyrdom.

There are two prominent motifs in the “exemplary” life of Raghieb Harb. The first motif is his behavior in accordance with “what he learned from the Messenger and the imams.” This means that each leader in Shi'ism serves as an example for the leaders of the generations to follow him. The second motif is his joining and leading the fighters in jihad battles.⁴⁹

One of many examples of memorializing the character of former Hizballah secretary general 'Abbas al-Musawi can be found in an article written in a Hizballah journal to illustrate his character. The article portrays al-Musawi as the epitome of true leadership from both the political and spiritual aspects, and as a model of moral human leadership – a model derived from the attributes defined by

44 *Al-Mahdi* magazine, July 2005.

45 Khamene'i appears in Hizballah's publications with the title: “the leader” (*al-qa'id*), “leader of the Muslims (*wali amir al-Muslimin*), “source of supreme authority (*al-marja' al-a'la*). He also appears with the title of “substitute for the missing imam” (*al-na'ib bi-al-haqq*).

46 *Al-Imam al-Khomeini kama Yarahu al-Imam al-Khamene'i* (The Imam Khomeini as Seen by the Imam Khamene'i.) Beirut, 2000.

47 In a detailed article, Sheikh Akram Barakat – one of Hizballah's religious sages, writes that “a number of the leading Shiite religious sages have published testimony regarding their recognition of Khamene'i as the source of emulation (*marja' taqlid*). This is based, inter alia, on their recognition of Khamene'i's erudition – which is a key condition among the qualities required of a source of emulation. See his article in *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2002; the Secretary General of Hizballah, Hasan Nasrallah also released a video declaring his recognition of Khamene'i as a source of emulation. See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeBbsZl5kUw>.

48 *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2003.

49 See for example: *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002. Sheikh Raghieb Harb, one of the most prominent religious figures in southern Lebanon, was killed in February 1984. He became a Shiite martyr, a symbol of self-sacrifice and a symbol of Hizballah's struggle against Israel: Shapira, pp 120-121.

the Qur'an, the Messenger Muhammad and members of his family. These attributes are not acquired in a regular school, but rather in “the school of life,” and based on a true desire to follow the attributes that Allah commanded. Khomeini is also mentioned as one of the exemplars from whom al-Musawi learned.⁵⁰

The Perception of the Enemy

As the product of the Khomeinist Islamic Revolution and under its patronage, the Hizballah organization adopts and completely identifies with the revolution's perception of the enemy and regards it as an inseparable part of the perception of the strategic and operative confrontation with the enemies of the revolution and its rivals. The revolution's perception of the enemy – anchored in the Shiite religious and political tradition – was substantially updated and defined by Khomeini, based on the Islamic, regional and global strategy he charted.

The Religious Basis for the Perception of the Enemy – “Disavowal and Faithfulness” (*al-bara'a wa-al-tawalli*)

In an extensive article, Sheikh Malik Wahbi describes the principle of “disavowal and faithfulness) that underlies the Shiite tradition's perception of the enemy – a principle that was also adopted by Sunnism.⁵¹ The concept of disavowal represents “disavowal of polytheism and unbelievers and anything that is opposed to the principles of the religion” (*al-bara'a min al-mushrikin wa-al-kafirin wa-min kull ma huwa didd al-din*). The parallel principle to disavowal is “loyalty” (*al-tawalli*) to Allah, to the faithful and to anyone whose rule Allah tells us to accept.

The concept of “disavowal” not only represents a passive approach of identifying the enemy – polytheism and unbelievers – but also an operative approach to take action against it. According to Wahbi, the Qur'an is full of verses that prohibit loyalty to unbelievers and that call for disavowing them. In one of the verses (Sura 3:28), it is written:

Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from Allah, except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them.

According to the Shiite tradition, the traditional / historic root of the concept of “disavowal and faithfulness” is the declaration made by 'Ali – upon the directive of Muhammad himself – during the period of the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca. The declaration was made before a large crowd in Mecca that included both believers and polytheists. In the framework of this declaration, 'Ali read a verse from the Qur'an (Sura 9:2-3) that contains – according to the Shiite tradition – the concepts of disavowal and faithfulness” in all their meanings:

So go about in the land for four months and know that you cannot weaken Allah and that Allah will bring disgrace to the unbelievers. And an announcement from Allah and His Messenger to the people on the day of the greater pilgrimage that Allah and His Messenger are free from liability to the idolaters; therefore if you repent, it will be better for you, and if you turn back, then know that you will not weaken Allah; and announce painful punishment to those who disbelieve.

Khomeini was able to endow the concept of “disavowal and faithfulness” with modern meaning and to identify the ancient enemy of Shi'ism – that is, polytheism and unbelievers – with the enemies of the Islamic Revolution in the modern era. These enemies were identified in Khomeini's thought with the West, the U.S. and Israel, which are referred to in the terminology of the Islamic Revolution

50 See for example: *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

51 See Malik Wahbi's article and an additional article by Khamene'i on this subject in *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

and Hizballah by the name “arrogance” (*istikbar*). In other words, Khomeini drew from the Prophet Muhammad and the Imam ‘Ali the legitimacy to declare “the arrogance” as the enemy of the revolution. In order to substantiate his perception that equated the polytheists and unbelievers of the period of Muhammad and ‘Ali with the “arrogant ones” of our day, Khomeini decided that it was necessary to renew during the hajj season the declaration ‘Ali had made in his day about “disavowing the polytheists and the unbelievers” – which, according to Sheikh Malik Wahbi, was tantamount to a declaration on “disavowal from the arrogant ones.”⁵² Thus, according to Khomeini’s view, the concept of “disavowal” not only represents a passive approach of identifying the enemy – polytheists and unbelievers – but also an operative approach of embarking on a confrontation against it, even if only on the level of propaganda.

It should be noted that the concept of “disavowal” in the Shiite tradition is not only identified with disavowing unbelievers (who are outside of the framework of Islam), but also the internal opponents of the imams (that is, the first three caliphs and some of the members of Muhammad’s family who firmly opposed ‘Ali). According to Sheikh Wahbi, “the disavowal in our days must also be carried out vis-à-vis ‘rulers’ [that is, from the Sunni community] who have handed over the rule to unbelievers, who seek to obliterate our religion.”⁵³

After gaining power, the Iranian regime endeavored to implement Khomeini’s ruling that the ceremony of declaring “disavowal from polytheists and unbelievers” should be carried out and renewed during the period of the hajj in Mecca. However, the Saudi regime regarded Iran’s attempt to perform this ceremony in the midst of the hajj ceremonies as a serious deviation from the laws of the hajj – a deviation that amounted to heresy (*bid’a*). The Saudi regime also regarded this as an Iranian attempt to exploit the hajj for political objectives. The Saudis ruled that any foreign delegation of pilgrims could perform its own ceremonies only within its defined area; under no circumstances could such ceremonies be performed in the open spaces where the public hajj ceremonies were conducted and controlled by the authorized Saudi religious officials.

During the hajj ceremonies in Mecca in 1987, a violent clash erupted between a procession of Iranian pilgrims, who conducted the “disavowal” ceremony in an open space, chanting “death to America and Israel,” and the Saudi security forces, who tried to prevent this ceremony from being conducted. Hundreds of people were killed or injured in this confrontation, most of them Iranians. As a result, Iran boycotted the hajj ceremonies during the years 1990-1998. Subsequently, Iran was careful to conduct the ceremony of declaring “disavowal” at the hajj only within its delegation’s tent encampment and without the involvement of the Saudi authorities.

However, during the hajj season in December 2008, a senior official in Iran’s delegation to the hajj announced that the Iranian pilgrims would carry out the ceremony of the “disavowal” declaration at Mount ‘Arafat, where the central and most sacred hajj ceremony is conducted, on December 8, 2008. This Iranian ceremony planned for the open space apparently was not conducted due to opposition from the Saudi authorities. Nonetheless, the head of the delegation of Iranian pilgrims read a speech to a group of pilgrims at the delegation’s dwelling at Mount Arafat while thousands of pilgrims – most of them from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain – chanted “death to America and Israel.”

This Iranian ceremony was broadcast on Iranian television and, during the ceremony, Hizballah’s delegation expressed its anger over the embargo Israel had imposed on Gaza. A letter from Khamene’i was read at the ceremony, stating that “after two centuries of collapse and defeat, the dawn is coming for the Islamic nation. The confrontation with the West – and particularly with the U.S. and Israel – has led to

52 “The declaration about disavowal from the arrogant ones (*mus-takbirin*) during the hajj season is the best method for awakening the [Muslim] peoples. The hajj is the best platform for warning the people.” *Ibid*.

53 Sheikh Wahbi’s article indicates that “the disavowal” directly pertains to the Sunni world too. In general, Shi’ism divides the world into three camps – the believers (Shiites), Muslims (the Sunnis who do not accept the principle of ‘Ali’s rule) and the unbelievers.

the defeat of the [Western] political and economic system. A number of Arab regimes have also suffered damage from this ordeal.”

In summary, it can be stated that the declaration of “disavowal from polytheists” during the hajj, as advocated by Khomeini, was designed for clear sectarian and political needs. From a sectarian and religious perspective, Khomeini sought to fill the hajj – whose ceremonies were defined and conducted by the Sunnis – with Shiite content for the Shiite pilgrims in order to glorify and empower the Shiites. From a political standpoint, Khomeini aspired to exploit the hajj as a catalyst for promoting two main political objectives: The first objective was to intensify propaganda against the U.S., the West and Israel, and to imbue it with global Islamic resonance, exploiting the holy occasion of the hajj and the massive concentration of Muslims there. The second objective was to exploit the call of “disavowal from polytheism” to denigrate Sunni Muslim rulers “who collaborate with the West” – a course of action that should be disavowed according to modern Shi’ism, as the West itself should be disavowed. For these reasons, the Saudi government opposes the exploitation of the hajj by Khomeinist Iran and seeks to prevent Iran from endowing this holy event with content that is foreign to Sunnism and utilizing it for its political purposes. The exploitation of the hajj for these objectives illustrates the activist religious and political facet that Shi’ism and the Iranian Islamic Revolution have adopted.

The Threats and Dangers Posed by the “Arrogance” to the Islamic Nation and Shiite Response to These Threats

During the contemporary period, the perception of the enemy contends with the threats and dangers the leaders of the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah identify as a central enemy for them. As noted, this enemy is embodied in the term “arrogance.” The term “forces of heresy” (*quwwat al-kufr*) also sometimes appears in the literature of Hizballah and the Islamic Revolution as a name for this enemy. Khamene’i notes that the bitterest enemies of Khomeini were the Israelis and the Americans. According to his analysis, the Israelis are the leaders of the Jewish people, while the Americans are the leaders of the polytheists (*mushrikin*), and both confronted Khomeini – which proves that he was the leader of the believers. Among Khomeini’s important objectives was the war against “global arrogance.”⁵⁴

From the perspective of the revolution and Hizballah, the “arrogance” is not only the enemy of the Islamic nation, but is also a global enemy of the “downtrodden peoples” – including the Muslim peoples. Khomeini raised the banner of the struggle of downtrodden peoples against the “arrogance” as part of an offensive of “exporting the revolution” to the broad world. (See the discussion below of Jerusalem (*al-Quds*) Day, which is celebrated as the day of the struggle of the downtrodden against the “arrogance.”)

In the view of the leaders of the revolution and Hizballah, the threats from the “arrogance” against the Islamic nation can be divided into several categories:

A. Cultural offensive by America against the Islamic nation:

This offensive operates as a pincer movement: on the one hand, by exerting pressure for changing the cultures and ideologies that exist in the region, and on the other hand, by infiltrating Western ideas and worldviews that are foreign to Islam, together with intervention in the cultural and religious program of the Muslims.⁵⁵ According to Musa Hussein Sifwan, a Lebanese journalist close to Hizballah, the American invasion of Iraq was primarily aimed at gaining a stronghold in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world that would make it easier for America to more effectively disseminate its ideology in the Middle East, while simultaneously facilitating its management of this region from a cultural, military and economic perspective. At the same time, the writer argues that the war the U.S. declared on terror in the wake of the September 11 events is used by the “arrogance” as a pretext to threaten the cultural, religious and even the political existence of the

54 *Al-Imam al-Khomeini kama Yarahu al-Imam al-Khamene’i. Baqiyyat Allah*, December 2003.

55

Islamic nation.⁵⁶

According to senior Hizballah leaders, the Shiite response to this threat is expressed in various ways:

First, in the recommendations adopted by the Conference Against the American Cultural Attack, convened in Beirut in June 2003 and organized by Hizballah's cultural unit. The conference's recommendations included, inter alia: returning to the sources of the religion; developing cultural institutions; strengthening Shiite religious institutions; deriving benefit from the experience of Islamic movements, including Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the experience of Iran in confronting these challenges; and in the execution of a meticulous examination of cultural programs coming from the outside.⁵⁷ It seems that underlying these recommendations is Hizballah's aspiration to make the Shiites in general and Iran and Hizballah in particular the ones who set the tone in shaping the Islamic nation according to the Shiite path in the political and cultural realm in the world of Islam. Second, in adopting the Islamic culture and applying it in its most original form, with the belief – imbued with the Shiite apocalyptic-eschatological outlook – that “this culture is a divine culture that descended to God's Messenger in order to bring salvation in this world and in the next world.”⁵⁸

B. The West's demand that Muslims interpret Islam in a more modern and moderate way in the spirit of the values of the West

The Shiite response states that the Islamic nation is capable of providing a more correct interpretation of Islam that competes with the Western outlook in regard to democracy, liberties and human rights.⁵⁹

C. An active cultural offensive accompanied by the dissemination of corruption and abomination

This offensive includes the use of sex, drugs and alcohol, and aims to infect the Muslim youth with these afflictions and distance them from their original society. According to Khamene'i, this policy operates from the economic centers of “Zionism and the global forces,” which have set their sights on the resources of the poor and weak countries. The way these centers have found to destroy these countries is to corrupt the youth through drugs, alcohol and sex.

The Shiite response to these threats, according to Khamene'i, is to motivate the peoples who hold natural resources to place obstacles before this policy of corruption. In addition, Khamene'i argues for acting in accordance with the Qur'anic directives in Sura 3: 103-104: “enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong.” Khamene'i defines the fulfillment of this directive as the religious, revolutionary and political responsibility of the state mechanisms. In his view, this duty is even greater than the obligation of jihad.⁶⁰

Attitude to the Struggle against Israel in Light of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The ideological basis for Hizballah's armed struggle against Israel, the United States and the West relies to a great extent on the thought of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. In its ideological platform of February 1985, Hizballah adopted the goal of Israel's liquidation and

56 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

57 The conference was convened under the patronage of the organization's deputy secretary general, Sheikh Na'im Qasim under the title: “Cultural Programs in the Islamic World – The American Plan and Ways of Confronting It.” For an extensive article about the conference, see: *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2003.

58 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

59 *Baqiyat Allah*, December 2003.

60 See the speech by the leader Khamene'i marking the month of Muharram, in the publication of Hizballah's central information unit, June 17, 2008; see also a letter from Khamene'i to the youth in *Sada al-Wilaya*, July 2004.

the liberation of Jerusalem as a stage to follow the expulsion of Israel from Lebanon's territory.⁶¹

It can be assumed that Hizballah was also influenced by Khomeini in its outlook vis-à-vis the struggle against Israel. The director of Hizballah's central unit for culture, 'Ali Da'mush, explains Khomeini's outlook vis-à-vis the struggle against Israel and its very existence in light of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as follows:

According to Khomeini, the existence of the State of Israel and its continuation do not derive from its own strength but instead from a number of reasons:

1. The unlimited support of the West for Israel.
2. Disputes among the Muslims and Arabs have divided the nation and made it weak facing the Zionists.
3. The adoption of the diplomatic channel in confronting Israel by a number of Arab and Islamic regimes.
4. The absence of “honest” governments in the Muslim states, together with the distancing of Islam from the struggle against Israel.

In regard to the nature of the struggle against Israel, Khomeini believed that:

1. The struggle against the Zionist entity is an existential and religious struggle.
2. The struggle takes place on multiple fronts, which is also conducted versus America, the shah and the despotic rulers. (The reference is to the Arab and Muslim rulers who are hostile to the Iranian revolution.) This assumption was based on Khomeini's basic premise that the State of Israel was founded by the global forces of the “arrogance.”
3. In all matters related to the return of Palestine to its owners and confronting the “Zionist plan in the region,” Khomeini believed that the Arabs and Muslims have no alternative but to use the option of “resistance and disavowal” vis-à-vis the enemy. (See above regarding the concept of “disavowal” in Shiite doctrine.)⁶²

The Attitude toward the Western Effort to “Deny Iran Its Nuclear Capability”

In his articles published in Hizballah publications, the leader Khamene'i fiercely attacks the efforts of the West to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability. In his view, “the enemy seeks to deny us this capability so that we will consume oil until this resource runs out.” Khamene'i rejects the Western contention that Iran is in fact aspiring to achieve the capability of producing nuclear weapons. His remarks clearly indicate that Iran will continue to develop nuclear energy, because this development “is designed for the generation of electricity and the defense of independence.”⁶³

The Domestic Sunni Rival

The Shiite literature – disseminated by the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah – sometimes wrangles with its Sunni rival. This is especially true vis-à-vis the extremist elements in Sunnism who consider the Shiites a heretical community and refer to it with derogatory names such as “the insubordinate” (*al-rafida*) and “the group that abandoned the Islamic community (*ta'ifat al-ridda*). In response, Khamene'i calls Sunnism “the deviant Islam” (*al-Islam al-munharif*) compared to Shi'ism, which represents the original Islam (*al-Islam al-asil*). According to his view and words, the deviant Islam has engaged in battle against the original Islam.⁶⁴

61 Shapira, pp. 127, 151.

62 *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2002.

63 *Sada al-Wilaya*, July 2004.

64 *Ibid.* See also the speech by the leader Khamene'i marking the month of Muharram, in the publication of Hizballah's central information unit, June 17, 2008.

The deputy secretary general of Hizballah, Na'im Qasim, strongly attacks the policy of *takfir* (charging fellow Muslims with unbelief) that "small groups" have adopted against the Shiites. He regards this policy, practiced mainly by fundamentalist Sunni groups, as "a deviation from Islam and the divine content." Qasim promises that Allah will ultimately settle accounts with these groups.⁶⁵ The spiritual leader of Hizballah, Fadlallah, recently lashed out against the Sunnis and their "corrupt" leaders. (See the section on the 'Ashura' below.)

The Concept of "The Downtrodden of the World"

Hizballah adopted the call of Khomeini to declare an international Jerusalem (*al-Quds*) Day as a day of revenge for the oppressed people in the world. Khomeini declared this day on August 7, 1979 and issued a directive that it be marked each year on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan. Hizballah organizes a military parade each year on this day with the participation of various groups, including the organization's Scouts movement. The significance of global Jerusalem Day for the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah can be seen in the following text, which appears on an Iranian Web site devoted to Jerusalem: "The Imam Khomeini defined Jerusalem Day as a global day, not only as a special day for Jerusalem, but also as a day of confrontation of the downtrodden (*mustad'afin*) versus the 'arrogant ones' (*mustakbirun*)." The Iranian Web site attributes the following purpose to this day: "This is a day of confrontation of peoples suffering from America and others. It is a day of reckoning of those who adhere to religion versus the hypocrites (*munafiqun*). The former regard this day as Jerusalem Day, while the hypocrites – those who maintain relations with the great powers and friends of Israel behind the scenes – prevent their peoples from conducting demonstrations on this day."⁶⁶

The Concept of Jihad

In the past, there was great doubt among the Shiites regarding their obligation to embark on jihad before the return of the hidden imam. The determining factor deferring the obligation to embark on jihad was the ruling that only a legitimate political authority could declare a jihad. Such a declaration was impossible to issue because from the perspective of the prevailing Shiite legal theory, no such legitimate authority has existed since the twelfth imam disappeared. Khomeini's doctrine deviates sharply from this line of thinking and emphasizes the need for jihad.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, the Islamic Revolution has not formulated a firm and well-defined view of jihad – particularly in regard to the military confrontation with the enemy on the various fronts and in defining those who are obligated by this jihad – as the jihadist Sunni Salafists have done.⁶⁸

In general, Hizballah's literature focuses on jihad of a defensive nature – that is, jihad aimed at defending the sovereignty and integrity of Islamic territory against an offensive move by an external foreign enemy or to mobilize for an offensive military action to expel a foreign

65 *Baqiyat Allah*, December 2003.

66 On the global Jerusalem Day, see: <http://www.tebyan.net/index.aspx?pid=29073>, October 17, 2006.

67 Shaul Shay, *The Axis of Evil – Iran, Hizballah and Palestinian Terror*, Herzliya, 2003, p. 27.

68 The ideologues of the Sunni / jihadist stream de-legitimize the Shiites by claiming, among other reasons, that Shi'ism block the jihad in its belligerent sense and does not fulfill this obligation as long as the hidden imam does not return as *Mahdi*. From the standpoint of these ideologues, the jihad is very central in the commandments of Islam and only belief takes precedence in importance. They describe two different types of jihad: The first is a defensive jihad that occurs when Muslims embark on a war to defend Islamic land from an approaching enemy that seeks to conquer it, or in a situation in which it is necessary to liberate Islamic land that has already been conquered. The second is an offensive jihad that occurs in a situation in which the Muslims initiate an attack against non-Islamic territory with the goal of conquering it and transforming it from *dar al-harb* to *dar al-Islam*. Moreover, they explicitly state that in the event it is necessary to liberate Islamic from the burden of foreign conquest, there is no need for a Muslim ruler to declare a jihad that is defensive in nature, and that the obligation to conduct jihad to liberate this land falls upon the shoulders of each individual in the Muslim community who is capable of pursuing it (*fard 'ayn*).

enemy that is occupying Islamic land. However, it should be noted that Hizballah's literature also contains articles exalting the "jihadist personality of the Prophet Muhammad, his jihadist activity and that he was the first fighter (*mujahid*) and the "founder of the school for jihad and *mujahidin* in Islam on the constitutional / legal and practical level."⁶⁹ The fact that these articles appeared indicates that there are some circles in modern Shi'ism and in Hizballah who see the need to support jihad of an offensive nature, aimed at emulating Muhammad, and not only defensive jihad intended, as noted, to defend Islamic land.

According to this literature, the jihad on the battlefield that entails self-sacrifice constitutes the highest level of fulfilling God's commandment (the jihad for Allah). However, it is also possible to carry out a jihad for the benefit of the war through non-military actions – for example, by a financial contribution or by conducting propaganda. There is also a view that regards jihad as a means to refine and perfect the soul, particularly when the jihad is taking place on the warfront.

This literature also emphasizes that it is possible to fulfill the obligation of jihad not necessarily on the military front, but rather on the fronts of science and society, as well as other non-military activity – such as financial contributions.

Jihad of a Defensive Nature

The following are examples of jihad of a defense nature that appear in Hizballah's literature:

The right to self-defense

The heavenly religions recognize the right to self-defense, including the right to defend the freedom of thought and the rights of nations and groups to independence and dignity. Waging war against aggression for the purpose of restoring rights and self-protection is a holy war from a religious and human perspective. This right of self-defense and counter-attack is anchored in the Qur'an.⁷⁰

Expelling the enemy:

Sheikh Na'im Qasim argued that jihad is essential in order to expel the occupier of Islamic land and to purify it from exploitation and aggression. In his view, jihad cannot take place without maximal preparation and requires the mobilization of force in order to promote various situations. According to Qasim, there are two types of preparation:

Preparation for the purpose of deterrence:

"The acquisition of power and weapons, and the preparation for a confrontation against exploitation are likely to confer strength and to deter an exploiter from carrying out aggression."

Preparation for the purpose of defense against possible attack or liberation of conquered territory:

Qasim argues that: "Just as the person is required to prepare himself to contend with the internal enemy (that is, the evil inclination), so is he required to prepare vis-à-vis the external enemies – the enemies of humanity and the enemies of the truth. This type of preparation derives from the need for self-defense. Allah commanded us to prepare in order to use force when necessary." As it is written in the Qur'an, in *Surat al-Anfal* (Sura 8:60): "And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy."

Qasim adds that: "If we are attacked, we use our force when necessary. If we will not be prepared, the enemy will defeat us with simple weapons and even with the threat to use them. [But] if we will be strong, we will be able to defend our rights, protect our arena, liberate our land and

69 *Baqiyat Allah*, April 2006.

70 Sheikh Mustafa Qusayr writes at length about the battle for Islam in *Baqiyat Allah* (December 2003) and cites the Qur'an (Sura 2:191): "And kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you out, and persecution is severer than slaughter, and do not fight with them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it, but if they do fight you, then slay them; such is the recompense of the unbelievers."

attain at least an opportunity to restore our land and rights.”⁷¹

Jihad in the sense of self-sacrifice:

In Hizballah religious and heroic literature on jihad and those who have fulfilled it, there is usually a motif claiming that: “the love of self-sacrifice is the most appropriate title for jihad and its driving force.” This literature argues that the Prophet embodies the full readiness for self-sacrifice, because he is the one who said: “The most honorable death is a death of self-sacrifice,” and he was present in all arenas of battle and self-sacrifice. Consequently, the believers should learn from the example of the Prophet and exhibit readiness to fulfill the jihad, even if it entails self-sacrifice.”⁷²

A Perfect Combination of Two Types of Jihad

The literature of the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah fosters the idea that fulfillment of the jihad in its most complete way can be done by combining the two types of jihad: the first is the lesser jihad (*al-jihad al-asghar*) – a jihad of material / corporeal action (such as preparing a military force or conducting a military action) and the second is the greater jihad (*al-jihad al-akbar*) – a jihad of spiritual preparation. This literature states that this complete fulfillment of jihad – by combining two types of jihad – can be performed in three parallel dimensions:

The combination conducted within the personal dimension of the fighter:

An article published in Hizballah’s journal develops the view that the battlefield is the ideal school for purifying the soul from indecent aspects, acquiring lofty attributes and ultimately attaining spiritual and ethical perfection of the soul. There are two conditions for attaining the supreme level of a fighter with spiritual perfection: The first condition is participation by the fighter in a violent confrontation (*muwajaha*), which is defined as the “lesser jihad.” The second condition is the spiritual change the fighter undergoes during the course of the confrontation itself – a change that entails purifying the soul and adopting noble attributes. This change is called “the greater jihad.” A person who engaged in a confrontation and did not undergo this “spiritual-educational change” – even if he is killed in the war and is considered a “*shahid*” – does not receive the same reward and high level as someone who experienced both the war and the “spiritual-educational change.” The message that Hizballah tries to disseminate among its fighters is that they each must make a personal effort to merge and combine these two types of jihad – the lesser jihad and the greater jihad.⁷³

The combination conducted within the dimension of the fighting force:

Sheikh Na’im Qasim compares the practical experience of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon, which “achieved a victory over the enemies,” to the lesser jihad. At the same time, he compares the “spiritual purity, the faith in the victory of Allah and the adherence to his directives” – without which “the weapons would be useless against the enemy” – to the greater jihad. According to Qasim, the latter is the more important of the two.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, he preaches for both “spiritual preparation and military preparation” – that is, for a combination of the two. Qasim quotes Khamene’i, who also emphasizes these two types of jihad. According to Khamene’i: “We should not limit ourselves only to fostering material or military strength (that is, the lesser jihad), but we should focus on its driving force, which is the fear of Allah, adherence to Him and ‘the jihad of the soul’ (that is, the greater jihad).”⁷⁵

71 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

72 *Baqiyat Allah*, April 2006.

73 *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2001.

74 To illustrate this, Na’im Qasim cites a well-known *hadith* attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. In welcoming a group of Muslims after they completed their mission in one of the raids, the Prophet would start by saying: “Blessed are those who have carried out the lesser jihad and it remains for them to fulfill the greater jihad. They asked him: ‘And what is the greater jihad?’ And he responded – the jihad of the soul (*jihad al-nafs*). See: *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

75 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

The combination conducted within the political dimension:

According to Khamene’i’s outlook, to establish an Islamic society and regime entails their material development, but also involves creating change and revolution in the hearts of people, which is the more difficult jihad (the greater jihad).⁷⁶

Jihad on the Fronts of Science and Civic Activity

Khamene’i often addresses the question of jihad in his articles. From his point of view, it is possible to fulfill the obligation of jihad in various actions, all of which are directed to a single purpose that appears in the Qur’an – the jihad for Allah. However, in his view, from a practical perspective, the final objective of the jihad is to serve the Islamic Revolution. In one of his articles, he exhorts the youth to fulfill the jihad not necessarily on the battlefield but rather on the fronts of science, morality, political cooperation (that is, the youth should also be a partner in setting policy), research, culture and correct thinking in the society. According to Khamene’i, jihad on these fronts, which strengthen the Islamic Revolution, is actually a jihad directed against “the enemies fighting against Islam.”⁷⁷

The Holiest Jihad

In an article by Khamene’i, the Iranian leader depicts the jihad in two aspects:

The first is the personal aspect – The individual must fulfill the will of Allah and be prepared for martyrdom (*shahada*). The imams of Shi’ism determined that martyrdom is an honor bestowed by Allah. Martyrdom is the action upon which all military activity is based. The jihad is one of the gates to the Garden of Eden. This is the routine type of jihad and martyrdom (*istishhad*) expressed by falling in regular battle against the enemy. According to Khamene’i, the most sacred and important jihad occurs when the *mujahid* is in a completely alien setting (*jihad fi al-ghurba*). The most prominent case of this type of jihad in Shiite history is the jihad Imam Hussein waged against his enemies at Karbala when operating in an alien setting. This jihad is the essence of the ‘Ashura’. This type of jihad exists when the person heads out to the battleground and the society around him is alien, an enemy or ignores him. The emphasis of this particular aspect of jihad is designed to motivate Hizballah fighters operating outside of their country and in an external setting, especially when operating on their own.

The second aspect of jihad pertains to organizations, especially military and security organizations. Khamene’i states that they must operate according to an organizational and disciplinary outlook and motivation that serves the jihad. In summary, he says that devotion to the *shari’a* gives a real identity to the jihad and serves as a guarantee of victory.⁷⁸

The Eschatological / Apocalyptic View

The eschatological / apocalyptic view of the Hidden Imam – the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-Askari – whose return is awaited by the world: The *Mahdi* disappeared twice – the minor occultation (*al-ghayba al-sughra*) lasted 69 years and the major occultation (*al-ghayba al-kubra*) began after the death of the fourth emissary (*safir*) al-Samari in the year 329 of the *Hijra* (the four emissaries witnessed the imam’s appearance) and continues to this day. The Shiites believe that it will continue until the end of days, and then the imam will return as the *Mahdi* to establish justice in the world.

The deeply rooted Shiite belief in the Hidden Imam and the *Mahdi* – whose return (*faraj; raj’a*) is slated to impose justice in a world ruled by injustice and exploitation – was developed and shaped by the Islamic Revolution. In its updated form, it has become the central motif in the ideology of both the Iranian Revolutionary and Hizballah.

76 *Ibid.*

77 *Sada al-Wilaya*, (Beirut), March 2003.

78 ‘Ali Khamene’i, *al-Jihad*, Beirut, 2004.

This view was shaped by the fathers of the Revolution in a way that was designed to serve a political interest that accords nearly unlimited authority to the leader of the Revolution. According to this view, the leader's authority derives from the delegation of authorities by the Hidden Imam. (Thus, the leader is given the title of *na'ib* – that is, the substitute / representative of the Hidden Imam.)

This view of the Hidden Imam also serves the activist approach that the Revolution seeks to instill in its supporters: The believers are called upon to demonstrate activeness⁷⁹ and to do all they can to accelerate the return of the Hidden Imam⁸⁰ and not to wait passively until his appearance. Khamene'i determined that "the ground is ripe for the appearance of the *wali al-haqq*" (a moniker for the mahdi). He called upon the entire community of believers to act according to the principles of the '*Ashura*' in order to bring rapid reform to the world and, by implication, to expedite the coming of the *Mahdi*.⁸¹ In discussing the *Mahdi*, Nai'im Qasim employs the Qur'anic concept of *baqiyyat Allah* in the sense of "the remnant that Allah left"⁸² – which is attributed to the *Mahdi* in Shi'ism. In the following text, he clearly expresses the idea of action aimed at hastening the coming of the *Mahdi*: "Many of those who do not understand the Islamic culture and its philosophical and theological content wonder how we believe that the future is for the benefit of the believers (that is, the Shiites). If it were not for our belief in the *Imam al-Mahdi*, we would not maintain faith and hope. This is an inseparable part of his promise to grant us victory. The important thing for us is to keep sight of this promise and [to feel] hope in *baqiyyat Allah* (Allah will hasten his appearance) in every step and action we undertake in our daily lives. This is so we can live the principle in a practical way and overcome the difficulties that delay our action and our victory for the sake of the future victory of Allah's law over heresy and deviance."⁸³

D. The Means and Motifs for Instilling the Ideology

The Hizballah organization follows the path of the Islamic Revolution to a great extent, making extensive use of means and methods of preaching, education, propaganda and indoctrination. The use of these means is designed to inculcate its worldviews in the organization's target community in Lebanon, in particular, and in other communities in general. It seems that Hizballah learned in this respect from essays written by the fathers of the Islamic Revolution (see below) about the importance of information about the essence of Shi'ism and the Islamic Revolution and its ideas, both at home and abroad.

These means can be divided into three broad categories: means of propaganda and information, formative events in Shi'ism in particular and in Islam in general, and motifs with messages of self-sacrifice, obedience and discipline.

Means of Propaganda

The Role of Information in Forming and Consolidating the "Resisting Society"

Hizballah's spokesmen and leaders are proud of what they portray as their success in forming around "the Islamic resistance" a

⁷⁹ A central principle in Khomeini's doctrine deals with legitimizing Shiite activism. Most Shiite theologians advocated a passive approach, arguing that Shiites should wait for the return of the hidden imam and, until then, use the principle of *taqiyya* (dissimulation) – the obligation to conceal the faith in time of danger. This obligation has special importance for the Shiites because they have often been a persecuted minority. See: Shaul Shay, p. 25.

⁸⁰ The Hidden Imam has a number of titles, such as "the exemplar" (*al-hujja*) and "the ruler of justice" (*wali al-haqq*).

⁸¹ See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram, published by Hizballah's Central Information Unit on April 17, 1999.

⁸² "That which Allah leaveth with you is better for you if ye are believers" (Qur'an: Sura 2:248).

⁸³ *Baqiyyat Allah*, December 2005. Heresy here refers to Christianity / Judaism. Deviance refers to Muslims – with an emphasis on Sunnis – who do not follow the ways of Shi'ism.

supportive "resisting society." This society is based primarily on the Shiite community, but its founders are proud of the fact that it enjoys support and identification from elements outside of the Shiite community that belong to the Sunni, Druze and Christian communities, and even from overseas. This success was achieved to a considerable extent by what is called the campaign of "resisting information" (*i'lam muqawim*) – that is, information with a character and attributes of dynamic and intensive resistance that succeeds in reaching a growing target audience within and outside of the Shiite community through the intelligent use of increasingly sophisticated means of mass media.⁸⁴

This information campaign utilizes means of "mobilization and motivation" (*ta'bi'a wa-tahrid*) designed to mobilize the "resisting society" and motivate it to identify with the beliefs and views of Hizballah and to act according to its policy. From this perspective, the information fills a complementary role to the system of indoctrination conducted in limited frameworks of specific sectors in Hizballah (the youth movement, associations and courses). On the internal level, the information campaign includes the following main messages and content:

1. Religious content, including the principles of the tradition and heritage of Shi'ism.
2. The culture of jihad and self-sacrifice: This is based on reviving the Arab jihadist history in general and Shiite history in particular. Instilling this in the masses is designed to transform the society from one that supports Hizballah to a society of resistance and self-sacrifice. The ways of action and methods of disseminating this culture include:
 - Expanding the dissemination of the culture of jihad and self-sacrifice of Shi'ism – which was previously conducted only in limited circles and frameworks (*Husseiniyyat*),⁸⁵ mosques and '*Ashura*' councils convened during the first ten days of the month of Muharram to commemorate the death of Hussein Ibn 'Ali – to the general public as well. An effort was made to instill among the general public a feeling of shared destiny and identification with the jihad and self-sacrifice by presenting exemplary models of self-sacrifice among the fathers of Shi'ism and the use of uniform patterns of language, messages and attire that express the idea of self-sacrifice.
 - Screening videos of "true jihadist events" that illustrate attacks of resistance fighters against "the Zionist enemy."
 - Using various means of propaganda such as slogans, anthems, proclamations, signs and television dramas preaching for a jihad of self-sacrifice. Starting in the 1990s, the emphasis was shifted toward disseminating this culture from the radio media to the visual media, which is considered to have a greater impact on the senses.
3. The culture of the Islamic Revolution, focusing on the principle of the religious sage (*wali faqih*). Through this principle, the information campaign works to unify the "resisting society" around the leadership of the leader of Iran and the substitute for the *Mahdi* – Khamene'i. In this framework, the organization emphasizes the contribution of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in building the Islamic resistance in Lebanon.
4. Political content that clearly distinguishes between the path of the Arab peoples, which is "paved with defeats and agreements with the enemy," and the path of resistance, "which achieved an historic victory in 2000." (The reference is to the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon). This political content also includes illustrating "the danger inherent in the enemy."

⁸⁴ *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

⁸⁵ Shiite community centers named for Hussein Ibn 'Ali, The centers organize cultural and religious activities and provide social assistance.

The Role of the Preachers

Khamene'i points toward a hostile information campaign conducted against "the original Islam" (Shi'ism) and acceptance of Shi'ism as a religion (*tashyyi*), and against the "Islamic government" (the Iranian Islamic Revolution). This campaign is attributed to two main forces: "the forces of heresy" (the West) and "the deviant Islam" (Sunnism). Khamene'i calls upon Shiite preachers at home and abroad to explain the essence of Shi'ism and the policy of "the Islamic government," on the one hand, and to repel the hostile propaganda, on the other hand. According to Khamene'i, the information campaign should be based on the 'Ashura' event.⁸⁶

Formative Events in Shi'ism

The day of 'Ashura' – commemorated on the tenth day of the month of Muharram – was and remains the central date in the Shiite calendar. Originally, it was an optional fast day, which is still practiced today in Islam. The Shiites transformed it into a day of assembly and memorial, marking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the son of 'Ali and Fatima, in the battle of Karbala on this day in the year 61 of the *Hijra*. (Hussein was born in the year 626.)⁸⁷ The myth of the martyrdom of Hussein – who is called *sayyid al-shuhada'* (the master of the martyrs) – and his fall in the battle of succession for Islamic rule was imbued with religious and political meaning in Shi'ism. The event is rooted in the Shiite historical consciousness – not only as the loss of rule but also as a need to restore it to Shiite hands.

The Islamic Revolution transformed the 'Ashura' into an event with contemporary meaning that extends far beyond citing the martyrdom of Hussein Ibn 'Ali. It uses the 'Ashura' as a powerful political catalyst for disseminating its ideas, and recruiting and integrating adherents into its ranks. The Islamic Revolution also uses the 'Ashura' to help promote the export of the revolution and to manage an attack against its enemies within and outside of the Muslim world.

Khamene'i presents the 'Ashura', which centers around the martyrdom of Hussein, as a formative event in Islam that influenced central processes of Shiite history and created values and norms that serve as guidelines for Shiites today. In a speech translated into Arabic for Hizballah members, Khamene'i references the 'Ashura' in an effort to aggrandize the Iranian Islamic Revolution and to grant it legitimacy from the Shiite perspective by:

- Drawing a parallel between the Islamic Revolution and the 'Ashura', and portraying the events as heralding the war against exploitation and injustice.
- Raising the status of Khomeini to the rank of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, depicting both men as "the sun shining light upon the world."
- Presenting central values of the Islamic Revolution – self-sacrifice and jihad, in particular – as values that derive from the martyrdom of Hussein. This presentation obligates the believers to adhere to the revolution in a complete way.

Khamene'i attributes a central role to the system of propaganda / preaching (*da'wa*) about the revolution, designed to instill its beliefs and values. In his view, the main role of the 'Ashura' and its advantage in *da'wa* (and of other texts) is expressed in its direct appeal to people's emotions and in preparing people to rationally accept – at a later stage – the beliefs, ideas and values that are initially foreign to them. Khamene'i presents as an example the Prophet Muhammad, who at the beginning of his preaching campaign, during the *Jahiliyya* period, appealed to the emotions of the idol worshippers in order to convince them to stop their pagan rites. Only later did he present rational evidence to them in order to convince them about the existence of God, His oneness, and the falsehood of idols. Accordingly,

⁸⁶ See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram, published by Hizballah's central information unit on April 17, 1999.

⁸⁷ The day of 'Ashura' is a central event conducted during the first ten days of the month of Muharram and on the tenth of this month in particular. It is a play portraying the suffering of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, called *ta'ziya* (literally: "the condolences").

Hizballah indeed worked to make maximal use of the 'Ashura' and other Shiite holidays (such as *'id al-ghadir*) to act upon the emotions of the various segments of the Shiite community, whether this was aimed at instilling values or goading its enemies and rivals.⁸⁸

The Hizballah organization followed the lead of the Islamic Revolution in this matter. It adopted the revolution's view that developed around the day of 'Ashura' and used this day – and the events and public ceremonies marking it and the other dates associated with it⁸⁹ – to convey its messages. In particular, the organization seeks to instill the principle of self-sacrifice and jihad in order to fulfill its ideals, and first and foremost, the ideal of resistance.⁹⁰ In addition, Hizballah has mobilized to serve the objectives of exporting the Islamic Revolution and goading its enemies.

Sheikh Na'im Qasim recently noted Hizballah's success in exploiting the outlook intrinsic to the 'Ashura' and "the Husseinist path" for "cultural, educational, jihadist and political mobilization that restored the youth to the original, just path." In his view, "the divine victory in July 2006 [the second Lebanon War] was one of the fruits of this effort. The *shahada* became a culture of life that is unwilling to accept surrender."⁹¹

Hizballah's spiritual leader, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, described the 'Ashura' as a "Husseinist revolution" that goes beyond mourning the fall of Hussein and entails spiritual, theological and cultural content and purposes. In his view, the 'Ashura' must not only be a movement reenacting the tragedy of its heroes and content. Instead, it must also be a movement of spiritual values that strives to generate changes and demonstrates openness toward the Islamic nation and the entire world. Fadlallah notes the contemporary aspects of the 'Ashura' and their parallel to historical aspects. According to Fadlallah's historical analysis, Hussein Ibn 'Ali wanted to liberate the nation from those who seized control of its resources and turned its people into slaves (that is, the Umayyad Caliphate), while today the Islamic nation is undergoing a similar situation, suffering from those who expropriated its wealth for their benefit and for the benefit of their families. The nation no longer has wealth of its own and has become the property of a particular dictator or family in states living under appalling exploitation. (The reference is apparently to the rulers and ruling families in the Gulf States.)

Fadlallah also used the 'Ashura' to instill the activist view of modern Shi'ism. In this context, he emphasized the connection between the 'Ashura' and the current challenges facing the Islamic world and demanded practical action in order to escape the circle of poverty, weakness and silence, and to move toward the circle of action and strength. He blamed the weakness of the Islamic world and its marginal status on the loss of conscience, the distancing from pure Islam and from the path of Hussein, and the distortion of Islam by adopting foreign practices. In other words, Fadlallah issued a challenge to the Sunni world and its "despotic and corrupt" regimes and its practices, which are foreign to pure Islam, while presenting Shiite Islam as "the original and true Islam" and calling for openness toward Hussein – that is, Shi'ism – as "a symbol of Islamic unity."

⁸⁸ See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram, published by Hizballah's central information unit on April 17, 1999.

⁸⁹ The reference is to the first ten days of the month of Muharram, including the day of 'Ashura', as well as the fortieth day after Hussein's death.

⁹⁰ 'Ashura' ceremonies include the *latmiyyat* (poems that tell about tragedies that befell the martyred fathers of Shi'ism) and the *nadabiyyat* (the eulogies / lamentations read at ceremonies for the fathers of Shi'ism. It is derived from the word *nadab* – lamentation.)

⁹¹ These statements were made at a conference entitled "Ashura' – Content, Role and Possibilities of Change" that Hizballah convened at the end of January 2009 to mark the fortieth day after the 'Ashura'. The conference was conducted by the Institute for Study and Research of Modern Islamic Thought (Mu'assasat al-Fikr al-Islami al-Mu'asir li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Abhath). Participants included representatives of Lebanese political parties and representatives from overseas, including Iran. The conference adopted recommendations about fostering the tradition of the 'Ashura' and disseminating it beyond the boundaries of the Shiite community. The Lebanese Information Agency, January 29, 2009. <http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/>

Central Motifs

The Hizballah organization works intensively to instill two basic norms of behavior among its supporters in general and its militia in particular. In fact, the organization's existence depends upon the maintenance of these norms. The first is readiness for self-sacrifice and the second is obedience and discipline.

Self-sacrifice

Sheikh Khadr al-Dirani devotes an article to presenting the value of self-sacrifice – a value the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah place at the top of their hierarchy of values, and which is accorded a dimension of sacredness and a divine mandate.

According to Dirani, self-sacrifice entails various aspects ranging from giving and investing money or effort, to jihad, to martyrdom (*shahada*) and risking one's life (*fida'*). Nonetheless, it should be noted that of all these, the most exalted and highest level of self-sacrifice is sacrificing one's life for Allah.

The value of self-sacrifice, in its various dimensions, is anchored on the one hand in sources of authority – the Qur'an and the *Hadith* – and, on the other hand, on the human and political experience of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, as expressed in Karbala. The self-sacrifice is executed in the framework of the individual and in the framework of the state. The supreme goal in these two frameworks is to realize dignity, freedom and independence. Without these, the individual and state will be relegated to humiliation and devastation.

The Iranian Islamic Revolution and the victory of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon (that is, the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000) are presented as the two salient phenomena in the Islamic world during the previous century and, by implication, bear the same historical weight. It is also argued that the self-sacrifice involved in them was the decisive factor in their victories.

Elevating the value of self-sacrifice and its holiness to the rank of a divine decree, and establishing this value on the empirical experience of peoples who have demonstrated self-sacrifice (and the Shiites in particular), is aimed at instilling this value in the "resisting society" in general and in the militia in particular. This was done with the aim of mobilizing them for the effort of realizing the goals of the resistance, even if this entails self-sacrifice.⁹²

Obedience and Discipline

Sheikh Nabil Qawuq devotes an article to a very central issue for the ideology, and patterns of behavior, hierarchy and management of the Islamic Revolution and of the Hizballah organization. This is the issue of inculcating the principle of obedience and loyalty among Hizballah personnel and officials, and concretely, obedience and loyalty to the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the leader of Hizballah. Obedience is defined as a central pillar of the Islamic regime.⁹³

The importance of attaining this goal is emphasized and discernable in its presentation in the article as the central factor for "the success of the path of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, on the one hand, and the Islamic resistance, on the other hand, and their reaching the shores of victory and security." This means that obedience and loyalty to those in authority must continue and serve as guidelines for the Islamic Revolution and the "Islamic resistance" in order for them to realize their objectives.

The obedience and loyalty to those in authority – which is elevated to the level of a sacred duty – are based on a number of pillars that are interdependent. The first is the pillar of obedience to God – the source of delegation of authority:

- Obedience to Allah and submission to Him
- The principle of *al-wilaya*, which means recognizing the rule of 'Ali and loyalty to him
- Obedience to *ahl al-bayt* (the Prophet's family), which

actually overlaps the principle of the *al-wilaya*

- The role filled by the hajj in illustrating obedience and as an example of obedience to those in authority (the obedience of Ibrahim and Ishmael to the divine decree to sacrifice Ishmael)
- *Wilayat al-faqih*: the principle Khomeini formulated and instituted regarding the status of the *wali faqih* and obedience to him. This principle is presented as directly derived from the aforementioned principles and foundations.

The Shiite tradition and the innovations of Khomeini in the area of *wali faqih* serve as a means of unequivocally imbuing Hizballah personnel, in general, and the organization's fighters, in particular, with the duty of completely fulfilling the principle of obedience to their leaders and commanders at all ranks of the organization's hierarchy. This principle is taught in the array of training and indoctrination of the organization's personnel, starting in the youth movements, continuing in training courses, and culminating in the training of fighters.

E. Summary

The ideology of Hizballah, in its various components, constitutes not only a set of fundamental religious views and a political path. It also comprises a central tool for Hizballah in establishing a broad base of support among the Shiite population – which serves as the natural pool for its militia and party. In some of its aspects, the ideology is also intended to create a bridge to the mosaic of sectarian groups in Lebanon in order to mobilize their support for its resolute political views – or at least to prevent them from mounting an opposition against Hizballah. The practical and operative use of ideology is conducted among the hard cores in the Shiite population. This paper illustrated this use of Hizballah's ideology by describing different methods applied to them.

92 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

93 *Ibid.*

Appendix 1:

Hizballah-Iran: Shared Ideological Principles and Reciprocal Relations

In an interview with *Baqiyyat Allah* (February 2001), a monthly published by Hizballah, the deputy secretary general of the organization noted the shared characteristics of the Iranian Revolution and Hizballah in terms of ideology, policy and practical experience.

The Parallel between the Two “Victories” of Iran and Hizballah

There are shared characteristics between the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the victory of Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance in 2000 – each engendered a turning point in the local, Arab and international arena. (It should be noted that this parallel is often reiterated in Hizballah’s political literature.)

The Shared Ideological Principles behind Both of the Victories

- The philosophy of Islam and its guidance are based on faith in Allah and his imams (that is, the Shiite view of Islam)
- The leadership embodied in the *wali faqih* (rule by the religious sage) – Khomeini and his successor Khamene’i. This leadership succeeded in leading the people from one victory to another, and awakening and mobilizing the nation. Hizballah has fulfilled its duty vis-à-vis this leadership.
- Readiness and expressions of self-sacrifice that both – the Revolution and the Resistance – have demonstrated, aimed at reviving Islam and implementing its path.

Hizballah’s Sources of Influence

- The guidelines of Imam Khomeini, which shaped the format of Hizballah, led it toward confrontation with Israel and helped it to achieve victory.
- Members of the Revolutionary Guards, who influenced Hizballah in all areas by their moral and spiritual character and their Islamic conduct.

Shared Principles of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon

These principles, derived from Khomeini’s guidelines, are:

- Islam is the solution.
- Jihad and confrontation against the oppressors and “arrogant ones” (*mustakbirun*), even if this requires many sacrifices.
- Refusal to be a pawn of the “arrogant” (*istikbar*), whether the East or the West.
- Preference for action that derives from morality and connects one to Allah.
- A call for Muslims to unify.
- Creating a reciprocal connection between peoples in order to utilize joint resources to stand up against “the bloc of oppression.”
- Achieving a solution for conflict in the region in a way that Israel ceases to exist.

The Particular Attributes of the Islamic Resistance

- From the perspective of principle and ideology, there is no difference between the Islamic Resistance and the Islamic Revolution.
- The difference that exists is in the method of action, since Iran is a state and Hizballah is a movement.

The Lessons the Resistance Drew from the Islamic Revolution

- The victory of the will of the public over its lack of resources and over the great military power of the shah.
- The loyalty (*ikhlas*) of the people in Iran to the revolution and their great contribution to it.
- The readiness of the people to sacrifice themselves, carrying out the directives of the imam without question despite the casualties incurred
- Allegiance to the leadership embodied in the *wali faqih* and the imams, which imparted a high level of spirituality and morality to the revolution.

Khomeini’s Method of Guidance versus that of Khamene’i

Khomeini guided Hizballah in a very general way. On the other hand, Khamene’i guides Hizballah in a more detailed way because he was responsible for the connection with Hizballah during the Khomeini era.

The Role of the Iranian Assistance

- The assistance by the Revolutionary Guards began in 1982, helping Hizballah to achieve real strength by training and arming its militia. In parallel, Iran provided extensive economic/social assistance and constant political support, while the regime in Lebanon remained idle.
- The Iranian assistance to Hizballah derived from Hizballah’s identification with Iran’s policy, as expressed in its stance alongside the oppressed of the region, as well as resistance to Israel and the superpowers.

Appendix 2:

Hizballah: The System of Indoctrination

1. Sources of Religious Inspiration

- Shi’ism as the correct interpretation of Islam, an interpretation that will ultimately be accepted by all Muslims
- The Qur’an – the fundamental constitution in its Shiite interpretation
- The imamate – the belief in the dynasty of Shiite imams. This is the essence of Shiite religion, differentiating it from Sunnism, and includes:
 - Faithfulness to Imam ‘Ali as the legal successor to the Prophet Muhammad
 - The example of the imams as a guide to every Shiite Muslim
 - Active “anticipation” of the Hidden Mahdi; this requires preparing the ground for his appearance and belief in the imminence of the apocalypse.
- Self-sacrifice and martyrdom, exemplified in the death of Imam Hussein and the ‘Ashura’ event, which became the seminal event of Shi’ism
- Jihad as a value in itself – jihad as pro-active defense, the virtue of an individual’s jihad

2. Sources of Political Inspiration

- The Iranian Islamic Revolution – a seminal event
- *Wilayat al-faqih* – rule of the jurispudent – applies not only to Shiites, but to all Muslims and to the entire world
- Rebellion of the oppressed peoples, embodied in Iran’s leadership in the Islamic world and in the Third World
- Hostility toward the West, and particularly the “arrogant axis of evil” – the U.S., Britain and Israel; belief in activism and in an armed struggle to achieve objectives
- Jihad
- The Lebanese reality – the sectarian / political divide in Lebanon; the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

3. Means of Indoctrination and Dissemination

- Religious literature, nearly all of it from Iran
- Courses and workshops – organized by Iran and some conducted in Iran
- Lectures by senior religious and military figures, and meetings with them
- Experiential activity by visiting holy places
- Advanced training in Iran
- Use of examples and exemplars – the forefathers of Shi’ism and the Islamic Revolution, jihadists who died in the Islamic resistance
- Electronic and print media
- The Khomeini Emdad (Support) Committee
- Al-Shahid (The Martyr) Foundation
- Institutions that provide assistance to families of Hizballah’s dead and wounded
- Jihad al-Bina’ – Developmental Association, the jihad of construction – establishing civilian and military infrastructures to reinforce the organization
- Iranian institutions operating in Lebanon for the benefit of Hizballah

4. Target Population

- The Shiite community in Lebanon
- The young generation, which constitutes the hard core
- Organized associations

- The Sunni population in Lebanon
- Shiite communities overseas
- Sunni communities overseas and in periphery countries

5. Goals of the Indoctrination

- Local political objectives:
 - Making Hizballah and Iran the central power in Lebanon by:
 - Maintaining a base of public support and preparedness for political activity
 - Maintaining a militia
 - Maintaining a political party
- Instilling a combative spirit in its fighters and readiness for self-sacrifice
- Strategic objectives:
 - Maintaining a magnet for mobilization and training of fighters for Iran, also outside of Lebanon
 - Instilling obedience toward the Iranian leader and his representatives in Lebanon
 - Deterrence against an attack on Hizballah and Iran from within and from abroad
 - Establishing an Islamic state, along the lines of the Iranian model, under Hizballah's leadership in Lebanon
 - Exporting the Islamic revolution
 - Implementing the objectives of the Islamic Revolution throughout the Islamic world

Appendix 3:

Index of Concepts for the Hizballah Project

1. Shiite concepts

- **Baqiyat Allah** – The remnant that Allah leaves in your hand; a nickname and synonym for the Imam *Mahdi*, taken from the Qur'an – "That which Allah leaveth with you is better for you if ye are believers" (Sura 2:248). Hizballah published a political / cultural monthly entitled *Baqiyat Allah*.
- **The Hidden Mahdi** – the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-'Askari – whose return is awaited by the world.
- **'Id al-Ghadir** celebrates Ghadir Khumm, the occasion when Muhammad announced 'Ali's imamate before a multitude of Muslims. 'Id al-Ghadir is held on the 18th of Dhu al-Hijja. This occasion reflects the status of the Caliph 'Ali (referred to as *amir al-mu'minin*) and his descendants – the imams – as the true heirs of Muhammad.
- **Taqiyya** (dissimulation) – the obligation to conceal the faith in time of danger
- **Bara'a** (disavowal) – the obligation to avoid all contact with the enemies of the imams
- **Shahada, istishhad** – the culture of martyrdom. This ideological concept grants religious Islamic legitimacy to suicide bombing attacks and is the cornerstone of the worldview of Iran and Hizballah.
- **Jihad** - holy war
- **Jihad fi al-ghurba** – The most sacred and important jihad occurs when the *mujahid* is in a completely alien setting.
- **Wilayat 'Ali** – the rule of 'Ali and his spiritual patronage
- **Al-wala' li-ahl bayt rasul Allah** – loyalty to the family of the messenger of Allah
- **Sayyid al-shuhada'** – the "master of martyrs" of Shi'ism, Imam Hussein

2. Concepts of the Iranian Islamic Revolution

Political

- **Al-thawra al-Islamiyya al-Iraniyya** – The Iranian Islamic Revolution
- **Wilayat al-faqih** – the rule of jurisprudence; the belief that this principle is a continuation of the rule of the imams
- **Al-na'ib bi-al-haqq, amir al-muslimin, al-Imam 'Ali al-Khamene'i** – substitute (for the mahdi), the leader of the Muslims, Imam 'Ali al-Khamene'i
- **Al-istikbar** – the arrogance, boastfulness: a nickname for the West, America and Israel

- **Yawm al-Quds al-'alami** – international Jerusalem Day; a day of revenge by the oppressed of the earth, declared by Khomeini. According to the leader Khamene'i, it is a call for jihad and holy defense against invaders, for fulfilling the obligation to Allah and all of the oppressed and casualties, and for exposing the treachery of negotiation. Celebrated very widely by Hizballah; it serves as a main propaganda tool for Hizballah in disseminating its ideology.
- **Al-amr bi-al-ma'ruf wa-al-nahi 'an al-munkar** – "Enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong" (Sura 3:104; Sura 3:110). This commandment is part of the legal, revolutionary and political responsibility of the revolution and will help in forming a sound society, cleansed of corruption.

Religious

- **Murtadd** – heretic / abandoning the Islamic community
- **The remembrance of Muharram and 'Ashura'** – Hussein Ibn 'Ali's martyrdom. Imam Hussein was a grandson of Muhammad, who was killed by Yazid Ibn Mu'awiya, the Sunnis' sixth caliph. 'Ashura', which occurs on the tenth of Muharram, is a day of deep mourning.
- **Ta'ziyya** – Condolences; reenactment of the suffering of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, held by Shiites during the first ten days of the month of Muharram and especially on the tenth day of the month (the date when Hussein and the ten companions were killed)

Military

- **Al-Haras al-Thawri** – the Revolutionary Guards
- **Quwwat at-ta'bi'a** – a paramilitary organizational framework for mobilizing teenagers and young people

3. Concepts of Hizballah

Political

- **Al-thawra al-Islamiyya al-Iraniyya** – the Iranian Islamic Revolution
- **Hujjat al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin** – Hizballah's Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, "the exemplar of Islam and Muslims" (a title for a recognized status of religious sages in Iran)
- The leadership of Hizballah is the legitimate body authorized by the *wali faqih* (that is, by the leader Khamene'i)

Military – terrorism

- **Al-muqawama al-Islamiyya** – the Islamic resistance (appears as a parallel to the Iranian Islamic revolution)
- **Al-muqawama al-musallaha al-istishhadiyya** – the armed resistance that sacrifices its life for Allah (a name given to the resistance by Nasrallah; in his view, the resistance is a product of belonging to the Qur'an)
- **Shaykh shuhada' al-muqawama** – the sheikh of the martyrs of resistance; the name given to Sheikh Raghieb Harb, who "fell" in 1984
- **Sayyid al-shuhada'** – "master of martyrs" of the Islamic resistance, 'Abbas Musawi
- **Al-mujahid wa-al-muqawim** – the fighter in the holy war and the member of the resistance
- **'Amaliyyat istishhadiyya** – acts of martyrdom
- **Shahada** – death in sanctifying Allah (martyrdom)
- **Siyasat rad'** – policy of deterrence
- **Al-intifada, thawrat sha'b wa-khiyar umma** – the intifada, revolution of a people and choice of a nation (a name given by Hizballah to the Palestinian intifada)

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