

The Herzliya Insights 2018

Conference Conclusions

70 Years of Independence Israel at Critical Junctures

- Israel's Efforts to Thwart Iran's Entrenchment in Syria – at All Costs?
- "One State for Two People" – Have We Reached the Point of No-Return?
- Is Israel's Home Front Ready for the Next War?
- Hamas in Gaza – Contain or Defeat?
- American Policy in the Middle East – a Fly in the Ointment?
- Facing Russia – from Coordination to Collision?
- The Danger to Israel's Democracy – on the Rise?
- Inequality and Societal Gaps – a Threat to Israel's National Resilience?
- The Rift between Israel and the American Jewish Communities – Is it Healable?

The 18th Herzliya Conference
Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)
IDC Herzliya

Herzliya Insights 2018

Conference Conclusions

70 Years of Independence
Israel at Critical Junctures

Herzliya, October 2018

The Main Message

Israel at Critical Junctures

Israel faces critical junctures as it addresses unprecedented threats and complex dilemmas in two main arenas: first, the threat posed by Iran and its proxies; second, the risks associated with a confrontation with the Palestinians.

The immediate threat that Iran presents is its determination to militarily entrench itself in Syria and create another formidable front, alongside Hezbollah in Lebanon, against Israel. Preventing the construction of an Iranian front against Israel in Syria ought to be the highest priority, as long as Iran's nuclear weapons program is not advancing.

In the second arena, the emerging driver is the strategic plan of Hamas to take over the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas' takeover of the Palestinian Authority will pose a core threat to Israel's national security. The decline of the veteran Palestinian leadership and the uncertainty regarding the "day after" President Abbas departs put continuation of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation at risk. These risks remain 'below the radar' due to the unprecedented scale of counter-terror operations led by Israeli military and security services. The main objective in this arena ought to be weakening and containing Hamas, while attempting to improve humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip.

A meaningful peace process that offers the Palestinians a clear political horizon could support the weakening of radical impulses, particularly as the American peace initiative appears to be fading away. Peace negotiations could contain Hamas and weaken Iran's influence in the

Palestinian arena. In dealing with the Iranian threat which tops Israel's priorities, the peace process has a major role in deepening Israel's strategic relations with the Arab countries. The emerging alignment between Israel and the Arab countries, along with the United States, is essential in obstructing Iran's ambition to dominate the Middle East. The degeneration of the peace process and the distancing of any chance of reaching a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians could make the risk of a "one state for two people" outcome a de facto reality. Time has come – before reaching the point of no-return – for a strategic debate on the identity and character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

Addressing the external threats and challenges requires strengthening national resilience. However, underlying trends afoot in Israeli society and economy are increasing domestic risks and harming the nation's resilience at a time when bolstering national resilience is so critical.

Corruption and detriment to the values enshrined in Israel's Independence Declaration pose a serious threat to national resilience. The deepening rift among the "tribes" that make up Israel's societal fabric is undermining the bond between Israel and the Jewish world.

Israel's economic resilience and its remarkable accomplishments allowed it to deal with a series of security challenges. However, the country's economic successes have not resulted in narrowing societal gaps. Failing to address key structural weaknesses of Israel's economy and society could curtail Israel's economic growth and pose a serious risk to its resilience.

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Preface

Marking its 70th anniversary, Israel is experiencing a positive defense, diplomatic and economic climate. Notwithstanding, looming storm clouds are clearly observable. The 18th Annual Herzliya Conference, convened in May 2018 by the Institute for Policy and Strategy, found indications of intensifying threats to national security from abroad and increasing risks to national resilience at home.

During the Conference, Iranian-Israeli rivalry escalated. Iran constitutes Israel's primary strategic threat. Along with its ambition for regional hegemony, the Iranian regime seeks to destroy Israel. In the round of escalation in May, Israel struck and severely harmed Iranian military assets and infrastructure in Syria. Iran attempted, but failed, to strike back at Israel. This round has not affected Iran's determination to entrench itself militarily in Syria. Thus, this was not the last round of escalation. However, the likelihood of a full-fledged Iranian-Israeli military confrontation in the foreseeable future is low. The swift conclusion of the escalatory round in May shows that, for now, neither side is interested in an all-out military confrontation.

In addition to the threat posed by Iran, Israeli-Palestinian relations pose a significant challenge. With the relevance of the "two-state" solution diminishing, Israel is on a strategic collision course with the Palestinians that could last for decades. The degeneration of the peace process and the distancing of any chance of reaching a peace agreement between Israel and

the Palestinians could result in materialization of the risk of a “one state for two people” outcome by default. Reversing trends for this course of events is in itself essential. However, it is equally important in expanding the base of relations with the Arab countries and for confronting Iran.

At these junctures, Israel ought to apply strategic thinking that prioritizes threats and leverages its assets to shape a strategic environment that blocks Iran’s expansion and prevents confrontation in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.

However, underlying trends in Israeli society and economy are increasing domestic risks and harming national resilience at a time when bolstering resilience is so critical. National resilience is not only about military capabilities; national resilience is value-dependent. National resilience, considering Israel’s challenges, hinges greatly on a national sense of “togetherness” despite political and ideological differences.

The manuscript at hand draws together the major insights and recommendations of the Institute’s team, distilled from the overall proceedings of the 2018 Herzliya Conference. As such, the insights and recommendations presented here reflect the spirit of the exchanges at the Conference, but they neither presume to include all that was said, nor do they obligate the Conference’s speakers or participants. Nonetheless, one hopes this manuscript will facilitate and contribute to a most timely and urgent public debate.



Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Chairman of the Annual Herzliya Conference Series
IDC Herzliya

Key Insights

Iran – The Primary Core Threat

Iran is focused on constructing a multi-dimensional threat:

- A continuous territorial sphere from Iran to the Mediterranean and an operational base in Yemen
- A second front against Israel in Syria with Hezbollah and Shiite militia
- Developing ballistic capabilities
- Acquiring nuclear weapons

Attempting to deter Israel from attacking assets related to Iran's force construction, Iran is seeking to change the balance of power by undercutting Israel's military superiority and deterrence.

The Palestinian Arena – Strategic Challenge

The diminishing relevance of the "two-state" solution could actualize the risk of a "one state for two people" outcome. Israel is on the brink of a strategic collision course with the Palestinians that could last for decades. Violent escalation and the decline of the veteran Palestinian leadership of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority pose substantial security and strategic risks. The strategic plan of Hamas to take over the PLO and the Palestinian Authority is a serious threat to Israel's national security.

Reversing the course of these trends in the Israeli-Palestinian track is in itself essential. However, it is no lesser important for expanding the foundations of relations with the Arab countries and for confronting Iran. Nonetheless, the Arab countries will not impose upon the Palestinians an arrangement that does not meet their most minimal expectations.

Israel's Strategic Assets

- Israel's military and defense establishment (IDF, intelligence community, and security services)
- The strategic alliance with the United States
- Dialogue and coordination with Russia
- Defense cooperation and coordination with Arab countries
- Israel's economic resilience

→ The Response: Strategic Environment Blocking Iran and Reversing Course in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena

Policy Recommendations

- Continue resolute military operations to prevent Iran's entrenchment in Syria and the delivery of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah.
- Initiate a meaningful peace negotiation process with the Palestinians that would offer a clear political horizon designed to
 - ① Prevent a violent escalation and a direct confrontation that could
 - Strengthen Hamas and create serious security risks for Israel
 - Undermine Israel's relations with Arab countries
 - Divert Israel's military from the main effort of blocking Iran
 - Strengthen Iran's influence in the Palestinian arena.
 - ② Undermine the strategic plan of Hamas to take over the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.
 - ③ Assure the continuation of security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian security services and to be ready for the "day after" President Abbas' departure.
 - ④ Facilitate expanding relations with Arab countries towards a joint strategic alignment.
- Bolster the IDF's operational readiness and deterrence – including improving the readiness of the home front for war.
- Deepen the dialogue and strategic partnership with the United States – in order to strengthen American power and influence in the Middle East and thwart Iranian gains in Syria and Iraq.
- Deepen the dialogue and coordination with Russia.
- Support and assist Israel's neighbors – Egypt and Jordan – in their efforts to improve their socioeconomic conditions.
- Preserve Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) and mitigate the risks emanating from the regional arms race.

Israel's National Resilience – The Negative Balance

Challenges to Israel's Identity and Character

- Public assaults on “gate-keepers” and law enforcement agencies
- Attempts to undermine the constitutional separation of powers
- Weakening of Israeli sense of “togetherness”
- Growing rift between Israel and American Jews – the sense of shared destiny is unraveling

Risks and Challenges to Israel's Economy and Society

- Low workforce productivity
- Excessive regulation and bureaucracy
- High prevalence of poverty and high level of inequality
- Low public expenditure on social services
- Inefficacy of government policies to reduce societal gaps
- Failure in resolving the African migrants' issue

The negative balance is particularly glaring considering Israel strong economic resilience and the nation's accomplishments.

Israel in Face of Strategic Complexity

- ① The Iranian Threat Construction
- ② The Game of Global Powers in the Middle East
- ③ Israel and the Sunni Arab Countries: Opportunities and Risks
- ④ Israel and the Palestinians – On a Strategic Collision Course

Israel's current strategic environment contains conflicting and complex sets of interests. Unexpected developments could rapidly yield dramatic transformations. Decision-making, thus, takes place amidst high levels of uncertainty. The inability to anticipate key drivers and trends and to reliably assess intentions of allies and adversaries requires broad-ranging, and even "out-of-the-box" thinking.

1

The Iranian Threat Construction

The main threat to regional peace and security emanating from Iran and its proxies is self-evident. The Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran (JCOPA) and to impose sanctions, parallel to the negotiations between the United States and North Korea, are increasing the pressure on the Iranian regime and its dependence on Iran's main ally, Russia.

Despite the change in American policy and the damage allegedly inflicted by Israel to Iranian military assets in Syria, Iran relentlessly pursues regional hegemony. Iran is advancing its vision of a "Shiite Crescent" stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria, on to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. Parallel to its advance in the northwestern sector of the Middle East, Iran is also strengthening its foothold in the south – in Yemen – to encircle the Sunni countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. Finally, Iran remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons and continues to develop its ballistic capabilities. Aside from its ambition for regional hegemony, Iran seeks to destroy Israel.

Following the victory of the coalition of Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War, Iran is determined to expand and deepen its military presence in Syria. Iran seeks to form an additional front against Israel from the Golan Heights. **Iran is focused on constructing a multidimensional threat and aims to deter Israel from attempting to thwart this effort. Iran's ambition is to change the regional balance of power and to undermine Israeli deterrence and the standing of the Sunni-Arab countries in the region.**

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For its part, Israel is waging a resolute campaign to prevent Iran's military entrenchment in Syria and thwart transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the escalation round in May between Israel and Iran, Israel inflicted considerable damage to Iranian military infrastructure and assets in Syria. Iran attempted – unsuccessfully – to retaliate by targeting Israeli military facilities. This round did not affect Iran's unrelenting determination to entrench itself militarily in Syria. Therefore, this escalatory round will not be the last one.

However, the likelihood for a full-blown military confrontation between Israel and Iran in the foreseeable future remains low. The swift conclusion of the round in May demonstrates that both parties have no interest in a full military campaign. From an Iranian perspective, an escalation leading to an all-out military confrontation would harm its force construction process. The non-intervention of Hezbollah in the May round is noteworthy, and reinforces this assessment.

2

The Game of Global Powers in the Middle East

The power struggles between the global and regional powers in the Middle East create strategic complexities and dilemmas for Israel's decision-makers.

Close relations with the United States are a vital strategic asset for Israel. The strategic cooperation promises Israel's regional military and intelligence superiority. The uncompromising position of the Trump Administration on Iran, including America's effort to isolate Iran economically and politically, are essential to containing Iran. The manifest friendliness of the current American administration contributes to Israel's regional and international standing.

Nonetheless, **American policy in the Middle East in various regional arenas does raise concern.** The United State's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran has led to American isolation in the international arena on this issue. The new American sanctions are expected to impact severely on Iran's economy, however, these sanctions will not produce any substantive change in the policies of Iran, neither in its aspiration to achieve regional hegemony, nor in its determination to destroy Israel.

Developments in the talks between the United States and North Korea will have considerable impact on Iran's decision-making. The outcome of the U.S.-North Korean engagement might actually reinforce Iran's determination to enhance and expedite its conventional and nuclear force construction. Moreover, the declaration of President Trump of his intention to remove American military forces from Iraq and Syria was interpreted by Iran – correctly so – as a strategic opportunity to entrench Iran's own presence there. **The isolationist inclinations of the Trump administration adversely reflect upon its allies**

The isolationist inclinations of the Trump administration adversely reflect upon its allies in the Middle East.

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Furthermore, **American policies and actions have not only failed to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, they have even deepened the impasse between the parties.** The United States' recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the moving of its embassy to Jerusalem were just and worthy actions. However, the way these actions

were carried out and their timing impact negatively on American influence in promoting the peace process and further diminished the already low prospects for renewal of negotiations. The fading away of the current administration's peace initiative is yet another manifestation of declining American influence as a power broker. **Diminishment of the United States' regional position and influence could adversely affect Israel's strategic posture.**

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Despite the special relationship Israel has developed with Russia, Iran was and remains a Russian strategic ally in the region.

Russia seeks to expand its regional influence and become a regional power broker, at the expense of the United States. As the only global power capable and interested in engaging all the regional actors, Russia is relentlessly advancing its influence and interests. **Despite the special relationship Israel has developed with Russia, Iran was and remains a Russian strategic ally in the region.** Indeed, there are conflicting interests between Russia and Iran, but their

common interests are of more significant value.

Nonetheless, **Russia does not appear interested in turning the Syria arena into an arena of direct and full-blown military confrontation between Israel and Iran.** The current situation allows Russia to be the "holder of the balance" between the two adversaries in Syria. Undermining the stability in Syria after the huge military effort Russia has invested in salvaging the Assad regime could prevent Russia from realizing considerable economic interests in the energy sector.

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In this complex set of interests, so far, Russia has been willing to recognize Israel's strategic concerns and has accepted Israeli military activity designed to undermine Iran's military entrenchment in Syria and to prevent the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The reality of which Israel's ability to defend its vital interests now takes place, in essence, at the discretion of the Kremlin and its calculations – is a completely new playing field for Israel's decision-makers. In the future, Israel and Russia might have conflicting

interests regarding Israel's military operations in Syria. This possibility is particularly worrisome in light of the United States' acquiescence to Russia playing such a dominant role in Syrian affairs.

Unlike Russia, **China is not seeking to become a regional power broker in the near future.** China's dependence on

energy resources from the Middle East guides its prudence in the region, while it aims to gradually expand its influence through financial investments and infrastructure ventures. Contrary to its approach to Iran, China does not view Israel as a strategic partner and the ability to deepen political and strategic relations between China and Israel is very limited.

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3

Israel and the Sunni Arab Countries: Opportunities and Risks

The evolving relationships between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries are transforming the regional balance of power. The commonality of strategic interests is clear and evident. These relationships are based almost exclusively on security coordination and cooperation. However, considering the turmoil plaguing the region for nearly a decade and the possibility for rapid and deep domestic change in Arab countries, Israel's relationships with the Arab countries are not sufficiently entrenched.

Furthermore, **Israel's neighbors face domestic challenges that could threaten the stability of their respective regimes.** Beyond the current

socioeconomic challenges facing most of the Arab countries, climate change and the growing shortage of drinking water are forming a mounting threat on regime stability. Climate change and water scarcity impair food production and leads to abandoning of agricultural areas and internal migration. Water scarcity could escalate the power struggles over water resources and undermine regional stability in two main arenas – the Tigris and Euphrates (between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq) and the Blue Nile (between Egypt and Ethiopia).

Domestic changes in Arab countries could transform the balance of threats facing Israel in light of the intensifying regional arms race. Over the past decade, the Middle East has been

subject to an unprecedented arms race deriving from various geostrategic sources: Iran's pursuit of regional hegemony; significant arming of non-state actors; rehabilitation of armies following the "Arab Spring"; the return of Russia to the Middle East and the U.S.-Russian competition. The arms race is both qualitative and quantitative. Most Sunni Arab countries are acquiring advance weapon systems, some of which are very similar to Israel's military inventory.

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The evolving relationships between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries are transforming the regional balance of power.

This raises concern regarding the ability to preserve Israel's qualitative military edge. The Arab countries' balance of capabilities-intentions, which could rapidly and unexpectedly change, is a vivid example of the strategic complexity with which Israel has to deal.

In the future, Israel might have to address threats that are currently beyond the horizon. The occasional public-made threats in Pakistan against Israel and the open-source information regarding nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are illustrative of such potential contingencies.

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4

Israel and the Palestinians – On a Strategic Collision Course

Strategic complexity characterizes the Palestinian arena as well. Israel is on the brink of a strategic collision course with the Palestinians. The veteran Palestinian leadership – the one that endorses a political solution to the conflict and security cooperation with Israel – is declining. With the relevance of the **“two-state” solution all but eroded in disrepute and in the absence of a political horizon for the Palestinians, the void created by a waning of the veteran leadership might lead to extremism and increase the attractiveness of Hamas despite the latter’s weakness.**

The “two-state” solution all but eroded in disrepute and in the absence of a political horizon for the Palestinians, the void created by a waning of the veteran leadership might lead to extremism and increase the attractiveness of Hamas despite the latter’s weakness.

The strategic plan of Hamas to seize leadership of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority could perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and significantly harm Israel’s national security. A Hamas takeover of the Palestinian Authority would spell an end to any security coordination with Israel and turn the Palestinian security organization into a hostile force.

Should the anticipated American peace initiative – if and when it is made public – offer an arrangement that does not meet the most minimal Palestinian expectations, it could lead to a direct violent confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians. Under these circumstances, the expectation that the Arab countries would compel the Palestinians to accept the initiative is a dangerous illusion.

The risks to the stability of the Palestinian Authority are increasing in the absence of an agreed-on successor or ‘heir apparent’ to President Abbas. Israel is limited in its ability to directly influence the evolving Palestinian power struggle.

Should the anticipated American peace initiative – if and when it is made public – offer an arrangement that does not meet the most minimal Palestinian expectations, it could lead to a direct violent confrontation between Israel and

the Palestinians. Under these circumstances, the expectation that the Arab countries would compel the Palestinians to accept the initiative is a dangerous illusion. One should not ignore the limits of influence of the Arab countries on the internal Palestinian arena or overestimate the willingness of Arab leaders to act against traditional positions of Arab public opinion. **In the Middle East, the power of the weak (Palestinian) is not insignificant.**

The mounting humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip is producing a problematic strategic dilemma for Israel. On one hand, the humanitarian crisis is a major factor in Hamas' weakening stature. Hamas exploits the transfer of aid and goods into the Gaza Strip to strengthen its grip and to expand its terror

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infrastructure and weapons' arsenal. An arrangement that could be presented as a Hamas achievement might increase the attractiveness of violence and terror it champions, and bolster radical impulses in the West Bank. On the other hand, rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip is a vital interest of Israel. Further deterioration in the plight of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip will impact immediately on Israel. Furthermore, chaos in the Gaza Strip will endanger Israel's security. In the meantime, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority seeks to exploit and worsen the humanitarian crisis to weaken and defeat Hamas.

In short, as long as Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, improving living conditions is a possibility, but humanitarian rehabilitation is not in the cards because the situation in Gaza is overwhelmingly the outcome of the ongoing power struggle between Hamas and the veteran Palestinian leadership led by Fatah. Presumably, President Abbas will not allow humanitarian rehabilitation without the surrender of Hamas. For its part, Hamas will acquiesce to a temporary ceasefire, but not to a comprehensive and long-term arrangement that might jeopardize its plans to take over the PLO. Thus, Hamas will pursue its course of violence and terror against Israel.

Policy Recommendations: Shaping Israel's Strategic Environment

Israel must leverage its strategic assets to actively shape a strategic environment that blocks Iran's expansion and prevents a violent confrontation in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. In this respect, the immediate threat facing Israel is Iran's attempts to entrench itself militarily in Syria. This threat ought to top Israel's priorities, as long as Iran's nuclear program does not advance.

Israel's most vital asset is the power of its military (the IDF) and its intelligence community, both of which rest on exceptional human and technological capabilities. Bolstering the IDF's operational readiness

and deterrence, to prevent Iran's military entrenchment in Syria and further Hezbollah force construction in Lebanon, require allocation of sufficient resources and allowing the defense establishment to focus on these threats. Continuation of the effort to contain the underground threat (i.e. terror tunnels) from the Gaza Strip is a highly important supporting measure.

The regional arms race ought to be an important factor in the process of IDF force construction and operational readiness. **Preserving the IDF's qualitative military edge and mitigating the risks of the regional arms race mandate the expansion and deepening of**

Israeli military force construction. In this respect, the force construction of the IDF's ground forces and developing the capabilities of battlefield decisiveness is particularly important.

Preserving the IDF's qualitative military edge and mitigating the risks of the regional arms race mandate the expansion and deepening of Israeli military force construction.

Notwithstanding, offensive capabilities are not the sole foundation of the IDF's operational readiness and its deterrent posture. **The readiness of the home front for war is a major pillar of deterrence**

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(i.e. denying the enemy's offensive capabilities) and a crucial element in maximizing the degree of latitude and freedom of action decision-makers can maneuver in managing the military campaign.

Despite broad recognition of the importance of home front readiness, the Israeli home front does not seem to be sufficiently prepared. Multiple

civilian agencies and military units play a role in preparing the home front for war and in its ability to function on an emergency footing. The home front requires a comprehensive operational concept, a synergetic organizational system for peacetime and wartime, and the allocation of sufficient and coordinated resources.

Preserving and deepening the strategic alliance between Israel and the United States is a vital Israeli interest.

a vital Israeli interest. Israel ought to deepen the dialogue with the United States and to seek the restoration of American projection of power and influence in the Middle East. This dialogue should aim to prevent Iranian strategic achievements in Iraq and Syria, prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons and avoid deepening the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.

The regional strategic environment has made the Russian-Israeli dialogue and coordination a major tool in Israel's dealing with Iran in the Syrian arena. However, compared to its special relationship with the United States, Israel's relationship with Russia is poles apart. The Russian-Israeli relationship is not based on a historical partnership with shared values, but rather on balances of power and interests. Furthermore, Israel needs to take into account that Iran is Russia's strategic partner in the region. Therefore, **Israel must pursue the parallel course of resolute employment of military power to prevent change to the balance of power in the Syrian-Lebanese arena, alongside deepening the dialogue and coordination with Russia.**

Despite broad recognition of the importance of home front readiness, the Israeli home front does not seem to be sufficiently prepared.

The regional strategic environment has made the Russian-Israeli dialogue and coordination a major tool in Israel's dealing with Iran in the Syrian arena.

The evolving relationships between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries is a vital Israeli strategic asset. However, overall relations are not sufficiently entrenched and ought to

be expanded to the diplomatic and economic spheres. However, and contrary to certain Israeli assessments, **widening and expanding Israel's relations with the Arab world will not be possible without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.**

Furthermore, the stability of **Israel's neighboring regimes is a vital Israeli interest. In this respect, Israel ought to do all that is possible to support its neighbors' efforts to improve their socioeconomic circumstances, whether**

Israel ought to do all that is possible to support its neighbors' efforts to improve their socioeconomic circumstances, whether directly, or indirectly and tacitly.

directly, or indirectly and tacitly.

Advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is not only essential for deepening Israel's relations with the Sunni Arab countries; it is imperative for avoiding a protracted violent escalation between Israel and the Palestinians. **The apparent focal point is to deal with, and thwart, the strategic plan of Hamas to take over the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.**

Violent escalation between Israel and the Palestinians will inhibit the IDF's ability to focus on the core Iranian threat and will likely strengthen Hamas. **A full-blown frontal confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians will only serve the interests of Hamas, Iran and its proxies,** leaving Israel to contend with the security, strategic and diplomatic risks such a course of events carries.

Consequently, a genuine and honest Israeli attempt to relaunch the peace process and preserve a political horizon seems to be an essential measure, even if the prospects for reaching a comprehensive agreement are slim. In this respect, **a political horizon means reclaiming the relevance of the "two-state" solution as a realistic and viable option.**

Advancing the peace process and maintaining a political horizon for resolving the conflict are essential for ensuring continuation of cooperation between Israel and Palestinian security organizations. This is particularly important for dealing with the possible contingencies on

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the “day after” President Abbas’ departure. Moreover, violent escalation in the Palestinian arena might spill over into neighboring countries and adversely affect Israel’s relations with the Arab world.

The immediate and imperative challenge in the Palestinian arena is to address the mounting humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Israel ought to assist in alleviating the humanitarian crisis in cooperation with the international community and the Arab countries, combined with a clear deterrent message to Hamas. At this time, and **as long as Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, it will be impossible to comprehensively resolve the humanitarian crisis and rehabilitate Gaza’s economy. Nonetheless, Israel ought to seek measures that will improve living conditions and avoid exacerbating the crisis, while weakening Hamas and decreasing the attractiveness of violence and terror in the Palestinian arena.**

As long as Hamas controls the Gaza Strip, it will be impossible to comprehensively resolve the humanitarian crisis and rehabilitate Gaza’s economy. Nonetheless, Israel ought to seek measures that will improve living conditions and avoid exacerbating the crisis, while weakening Hamas and decreasing the attractiveness of violence and terror in the Palestinian arena.

Israel's National Resilience – The Negative Balance

- ① Risks and Challenges to Israel's Economy and Society
- ② Challenges to Israel's Identity and Character
- ③ Asylum-Seekers or Illegal Migrants?
- ④ National Resilience and the Unraveling of the Shared Destiny between Israel and the Diaspora

1

Risks and Challenges to Israel's Economy and Society

Israel's macroeconomic status continues to be positive and is the cornerstone of Israel's resilience. Israel's economy continued to grow even during the global economic crisis. In 2017, Israel recorded a 3.4 percent growth rate. The country's GDP – 40,000 USD per capita – places Israel among the advanced European economies. With low unemployment and a positive balance of payments, Israel's economy is resilient, allowing it to withstand global crises and local security challenges.

Despite these positive macroeconomic indicators, Israel faces several evolving challenges. The primary structural

challenge to Israel's economic growth is low workforce productivity.

to Israel's economic growth is low workforce productivity. The average workforce productivity per-hour in Israel is 27 USD, below that of Euro-based economies. While workforce productivity in the Euro zone is increasing, in Israel it remains stagnant. **Without improving workforce productivity, Israel will be unable to maintain**

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continued economic growth. In that respect, the expanding high-tech sector – the engine of Israel’s ‘start-up nation’ – will not be able to preserve Israel’s economic growth alone. Enhancing Israel’s workforce productivity will require substantial investments in physical infrastructure and in human capital, particularly in the workforce that is not part of the high-tech sector.

An additional economic challenge is excessive regulation and bureaucracy that inhibit economic growth. Although regulation is imperative for preserving consumer rights and preventing market failures, regulation ought to be smart and focused. Israel’s regulatory system is made up of several overlapping regulatory agencies that lack coordination and a comprehensive perspective.

Israel’s strong macroeconomic standing has not led to a decline in the prevalence of poverty and in the high level of inequality in income distribution. The basic working assumption of the socioeconomic policies of successive Israeli governments has been that economic growth would “trickle-down” and narrow societal gaps. Therefore, the government has refrained from direct intervention to reduce inequality and poverty, however, more than a decade later, it is safe to conclude

Israel’s strong macroeconomic standing has not led to a decline in the prevalence of poverty and in the high level of inequality in income distribution.

Without direct and effective allocation of resources by government, these deep societal gaps will continue to expand, and pose a risk to Israel’s national resilience.

that this theory did not work. **Israel holds the highest prevalence of poverty among OECD economies and the inequality in income distribution is among the highest of OECD economies.** Furthermore, since the 1970s, the rate of public expenditure on social services – education, health and welfare – has steadily declined. By contrast, private expenditure on these services has steadily rise deepening economic gaps within Israeli society. **Without direct and effective allocation of**

resources by government, these deep societal gaps will continue to expand, and pose a risk to Israel’s national resilience.

Growing doubts and concerns loom over the resilience of Israel's democracy. Two primary sources could challenge the robustness of Israel's democracy as a society based on the principles enshrined in its Declaration of Independence. First, the attempt to undermine the standing of the Supreme Court as the nation's highest constitutional tribunal that protects the checks and balances of the democracy. The second source is the growing prevalence of corruption.

Attempts to curb the power and legal authority of the Supreme Court are based on claims that the Court has asserted powers for itself that harm governance and the democratic right of elected representatives to implement their platforms. These attempts reflect the position

In Israel's parliamentary coalition system, curbing judicial review is dangerous as there is no effective separation between the executive and legislative branches.

that democracy rests primarily on majority rule. However, if these efforts prevail, it could precipitate an end to or crippling curtailment of judicial review of government. **In Israel's parliamentary coalition system, curbing judicial review is dangerous as there is no effective separation between the executive and legislative branches.**

The second source undermining Israel's democracy is the growing prevalence of public corruption among public servants and business executives. Over the past decade, corruption has infected the highest echelons of the political and business sectors. This has led to attempts to downplay the significance of these transgressions by blurring social norms and standards. One of the problematic ramifications is the diversion of attention of suspected public officials – who rather than focusing on their public duties, direct themselves to saving their reputations and their careers. Notwithstanding, it is important to underscore that corruption is not the prevalent norm and that most public officials are honest and dedicated. At this point, **corruption does not pose a threat to Israel's national security.**

For more than a decade, **successive Israeli governments have sought to address the implications of the flow of African migrants to Israel via Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.**

According to official records, by 2013, 60 thousand African migrants entered Israel through the Israeli-Egyptian border. The flow of migrants halted in 2013 after the construction of a massive land barrier that Israel set up along the border with Egypt. Currently, some 40 thousand African migrants reside in Israel; the vast majority of them reside in South Tel Aviv creating multiple socioeconomic challenges in a socially-weak community.

In accordance with international law, Israel applied the principle of “group protection” to the Eritrean and Somali migrants whom cannot be returned to their home country. However, apart from delaying deportation temporarily, the government has not officially permitted them to work and most of the migrants do not have health insurance. **A recent report of the State's Ombudsman criticized the government's dealing with the African migrants, particularly its handling of asylum requests.** To date, thousands of asylum requests remain pending and official refugee status has been granted only to 0.09 percent of requests.

Considering that the flow of migrants from Africa ended five years ago, and that it is virtually impossible to return the migrants to their home country, Israel ought to resolve this crisis once and for all.

In April, the government announced an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR took upon itself to repatriate to third Western countries nearly half of the African migrants. The government committed to allow the remaining migrants to remain in Israel and legally work. Following a political and public backlash, the government rescinded its acceptance of the agreement. **The backlash against the agreement with the UNHCR exposed fierce public opposition to African migrants. Since the debacle of the agreement, the hardly bearable status-quo persists – the migrants and the veteran residents of South Tel Aviv remain in limbo.**

Clearly, **Israel has to manage a delicate balance between its interests.** Israel has the right and duty to prevent mass illegal migration and seek the repatriation of migrants. Israel also has the duty to take care and address the welfare and well-being of the veteran residents

Successive Israeli governments have sought to address the implications of the flow of African migrants to Israel via Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.

of South Tel Aviv that were overtaken by the rapid arrival of tens-of-thousands of African migrants. Notwithstanding, Israel is committed to upholding the international law and the Refugee Convention it has ratified. This is especially important as the Refugee Convention was drafted in the aftermath of the Holocaust and as one of its main lessons.

Considering that the flow of migrants from Africa ended five years ago, and that it is virtually impossible to return the migrants to their home country, Israel ought to resolve this crisis once and for all. Five years ago, when thousands of African migrants entered Israel every month, the continued flow of migrants might have been considered a threat. However, **five years after the flow of migrants has ended, a demographic representing 0.005 percent of the general population does not pose a threat to Israel's identity as a Jewish state.**

In that respect, an economic analysis of the various options shows that an attempt to deport the migrants is inferior to permitting the migrants' absorption into the local workforce. In several sectors, there is a glaring shortage of workers – particularly low-skill and low-pay positions – that could suit the African migrants. However, the government should manage their inclusion into the workforce on the condition that it will require the vast majority of the migrants to leave South Tel Aviv and settle across the country. The government ought also to allocate the sufficient resources to redevelop South Tel Aviv to the benefit of its veteran residents.

At a time when international migration is a major policy issue around the world, sparking emotive debates, Israel ought to be a “light unto the nations”.

The way Israel manages and hopefully resolves the challenge of African migrants has an impact on Israel's international standing and on its relations with American Jews. Most American Jews disprove of the way Israeli governments treated the African migrants and the public campaign against the migrants. **At a time when international migration is a major policy issue around the world, sparking emotive debates, Israel ought to be a “light unto the nations”.**

4

National Resilience and the Unraveling of the Shared Destiny between Israel and the Diaspora

The growing gap between Israel and Jewish communities around the world – and with American Jews in particular – constitutes a **strategic threat**. The shared destiny of Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel is the cornerstone of the Jewish state, the homeland of the Jewish People. **At a time when extreme minority groups on the margins of Jewish life, seek to set agendas and promote positions that polarize and accentuate differences, one must underscore the obvious: Jews are stronger when they stand together, united.**

The growing gap between Israel and Jewish communities around the world – and with American Jews in particular – constitutes a strategic threat.

Therefore, the growing rift with American Jews is of particular concern. The ambivalence of American Jews towards Israel is not a new phenomenon. Today, 70 percent of American Jews support and identify with Israel, however, a closer review of the data reveals a worrisome trend: **the young generation of American Jews show a low level of interest and commitment to Israel.** In-depth surveys show that less than a third of American

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Jews under the age of 35 show an interest in Israel. And, only 35 percent “would consider the end of the Jewish state a personal tragedy.” **If this trend is not reversed, the sense of a shared destiny will cease to exist and Israel will lose the strategic backing that American Jews have provided Israel with since its independence.**

The main driver of this trend is the **weakening affiliation of American Jews to Judaism.** Only 15 percent of American Jews belong to any organized Jewish community. Currently, most American Jews marry non-Jews. The Jewish identity of most American Jews is weak. Future generations are moving away from Judaism and from their affinity to Israel.

In addressing and attempting to reverse this trend, Israel has a major role to play. Taglit-Birthright that every year brings to Israel thousands of young Jews for their first-ever visit to Israel demonstrates how **Israel is a source of inspiration, for deepening participants' Jewish identity and a sense of shared destiny among young Jews.** While

The young generation of American Jews show a low level of interest and commitment to Israel.

the factors fanning the divide between Israel and the Diaspora are complex, there are several barriers in establishing a renewed bond between the young generations of the Diaspora and Israel where Israel's conduct clearly undermines this goal. The measures led by the Israel's Orthodox Rabbinical Establishment – the cancellation of more inclusive-pluralistic prayer arrangements at the Western Wall, exacerbation of the conversion issue, and unnecessary insulting statements that raise doubts regarding the Jewish standing of most American Jews (the huge demographic associate with the Reform movement) – paint Israel as a theocracy. The young generation of American Jewry has no interest in identifying with or affiliating themselves with a theocracy.

Furthermore, **there are deep political gaps between Israel and Jewish communities in the Diaspora.** Most American Jews hold liberal worldviews and find it difficult to defend the policies of the government in Israel. **Jewish communities in Europe view negatively Israel's relations with radical Right-wing parties in Europe that Jews consider a threat to their security and well-being.**

There is a need to deepen the engagement and dialogue between the Diaspora and Israel at all levels.

Addressing the unraveling of the shared sense of destiny mandates a determined and long-term effort to enhance the Jewish identity of Diaspora Jews. Respecting the diversity of worldviews and beliefs, this campaign should underscore the

common heritage, history and values of all Jews and seek to instill these elements among the young generation. The Government of Israel, along with the world Jewish and Zionist organizations and Jewish communities, should lead this campaign.

In addition, **there is a need to deepen the engagement and dialogue between the Diaspora and Israel at all levels** – to involve Israel's civil society as well. Israeli and Jewish leaders should seek to establish common frameworks and networks – formal and informal – bringing together Israeli and Diaspora Jews to embed their affinity and sense of shared destiny.

Bridging the gaps between Israel and the Jews in the Diaspora ought to be considered a vital Israeli national interest and become a high priority for the government. The future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state will be a major factor in its relations with the Diaspora. Thus, reinforcing Zionist ideals and principles – as enshrined in Israel’s Declaration of Independence – appears to be a critical factor in efforts to renew and deepen the sense of shared destiny among Jews in Israel and the Diaspora.

Bridging the gaps between Israel and the Jews in the Diaspora ought to be considered a vital Israeli national interest and become a high priority for the government.

Herzliya Conference Program

May 8-10, 2018

- ① **Schedule Overview**
- ② **Speakers**



Schedule Overview

TUESDAY | May 8, 2018

The Herzliya Conference Global Simulation: Israel & the Middle East 2025

Opening Session

Special Address: Ambassador of Egypt

Opening Keynote Address: Speaker of the Knesset

Statement: Minister of Education and Diaspora Affairs

Presentation: “70 Faces of Israel” Project

One-on-One: Minister of Finance

A New World Order? Global Perspectives of Policy and Intelligence Leaders

Is Israel Ready for the Next War? Discussion with Former Ministers of Defense

Prof. Michal Schwartz: An Age of Scientific Breakthroughs

The Herzliya Conference Assessment: IPS Executive Director

The Socio-Economic Assessment: Former Member of the Bank of Israel’s Monetary Committee

Opening Reception

WEDNESDAY | May 9, 2018

Briefing for Ambassadors & Business Executives

Are Israel and Iran on the Brink of Confrontation?		Regulation in Israel: Consumer Protection vs. Anti-Business Sentiment
Keynote Address: General Commissioner of the Israel Police		
Conversation: Art, Culture, and National Resilience		
Address: Former Head of the Israel Security Agency (SHABAK)	Drifting Apart or Working Together? US-Europe Relations and What it Means for Israel?	Domestic Political "Earthquakes" in the Middle East – Regional Gamechangers
Israel and the Palestinians – The End of the "Two-State Solution"? What Comes Next?		
The Vision of the Future Campus: Revolution in Higher Education! Chair, Planning & Budgeting Com., Council for Higher Education		
Statement: Mayor of Jerusalem		
U.S.-Israel Relations: The Strategic Dimension Conversation with Senator Kirk	A Nuclear North Korea – The Fallout on the Middle East	Saudi Arabia at a Crossroads
One-on-One: Minister of Intelligence and Transportation		
Statement: Former Minister of Interior and Education		
Analysis: Public Opinion Surveys CEO & President, Geocartography		
Statement: Director-General, Prime Minister's Office	Gaza – A Light at the End of the Tunnel? A Ticking Bomb?	Iraq's Future – Independent or an Iranian Sphere of Influence?
Sweet & Sour: Israel Between Two Poles – A High-Tech Power or a Third World Country?		
Keynote Address: Chair, Board of Directors, The Museum of the Jewish People at Beit Hatfutsot & President, Nadav Foundation		
Israel and the World Jewry :On a Collision Course?		
Corruption – A Strategic Threat to Israel?	Local Government in Israel: Towards the 2018 Municipal Elections	A Strategic Volcano? Challenges in the Indian Sub-Continent – Implications for the Middle East
Challenges to U.S. Leadership in the Middle East		
Keynote Address: Assistant Secretary General of NATO		
The Comeback of the "Russian Bear" to the Middle East		
Economy is about Society: Redefining National Resilience		

Evening Reception

■ Plenary Sessions | ■ Spotlights – Policy Arenas | ■ Roundtable Sessions

THURSDAY | May 10, 2018

The Security Landscape: A Conversation with the Minister of Defense			
Keynote Address: Insights into Chinese Perspectives on the Evolving World Order	Women in the Public Space of the Military: Shifting Values in the Israeli Society	The Escalating Water Crisis – A Threat to the Future of the Middle East?	Updating Israel's National Security Doctrine
Statement: Chairwoman of "Hatnuah"			
The Global Arena: A Strategic Exchange on Opportunities, Risks, and Black Swans			
Statement: Chairman of "Yesh Atid"			
Statement: Chairman of the Labor Party			
Statement: Chair of "Meretz"			
Keynote Address: U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL			
Conversation: The Interdependence between Innovation and National Resilience	Y Now! Young Israelis Speak Out	Decision-Making in the Age of Trump	The Regional Arms Race – Is Israel Maintaining its Qualitative Military Edge?
Art and Virtual Reality in Support of Conflict Resolution?			
One-on-One: Vice President Emeritus of the Supreme Court			
Refugees or Illegal Migrants?		Towards the Next Decade - Israeli Legislatures Debate National Priorities	The New U.S. Defense Strategy: What Does it Mean for the Middle East?
Statement: Chief Rabbi of Israel			
The Challenges of the Future and Decision-Making Processes			
Statement: State Comptroller and Ombudsman			
Closing Session			
Address: President & Founder of IDC Herzliya			
The Herzliya Address: President of the State of Israel			

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Speakers

H.E. Reuven (Ruvi) Rivlin, President of the State of Israel

Prof. **Uriel Reichman**, President & Founder, IDC Herzliya

Maj. Gen. (res.) **Amos Gilead**, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) and Chairman of the Annual Herzliya Conference Series, IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Hasan Abo-Shally**, Founder of Hasoub; Founder of Ibtekar

Mr. **Elliott Abrams**, Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor of President George W. Bush

Lt. Gen. (ret.) **Orit Adato**, Founder & Managing Director, Adato Consulting; Former Commissioner of the Israel Prison Service and Former Commander of IDF Women Corp

Prof. **Dmitry Adamsky**, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Yaacov Agam**, Sculptor and Experimental Artist

Mr. **Simon Alfasi**, Mayor of Yokneam

Ms. **Elah Alkalay**, Vice President for Business Development & Chairperson, Investment Portfolio Management, IBI Investment House; Chairperson, Israel Women's Network

Prof. **Graham Allison**, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government

Prof. **Pinhas Alpert**, Department of Geophysics, Tel-Aviv University

Commissioner **Roni Alsheikh**, General Commissioner of the

Ms. **Adi Altschuler**, Founder of "Crembo Wings" and "Memories@Home"

Col. (res.) **Dov Amitay**, President, Farmers' Federation of Israel

Dr. **Amiram Appelbaum**, Chief Scientist, Ministry of Economy and Industry; Chairman, Israel Innovation Authority

Prof. **Uzi Arad**, Former Head of the National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister; Senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

Brig. Gen. (res.) **Dani Arditi**, Former Head of the National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister

Prof. **Moshe Arens**, Former Minister of Defense

Mr. **Yarom Ariav**, Executive Chairman, Lavi Capital; Former Director General of the Ministry of Finance

Ms. **Anat Asraf Chayout**, National Municipal Elections' Supervisor, Ministry of Interior

Prof. **Shlomo Avineri**, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Director General

Ms. **Galit Avishai**, Founder and Chairperson, Emun Hatzibur – Public Trust; Former CEO of the Israel Consumer Council

Amb. **Danny Ayalon**, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former Ambassador of Israel to the United States

Col. (res.) Dr. **Eitan Azani**, Deputy Executive Director, Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya

MK **Rachel Azaria**, "Kulanu"; Chairwoman, Knesset Reforms Committee

Dr. **Michael Barak**, Senior Researcher and Project Manager, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya

Amb. **Rafi Barak**, Former Ambassador of Israel to Canada and Former Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Prof. **Amatzia Baram**, Emeritus Professor, Founder and Director of the Center for Iraq, University of Haifa

Mr. **Nir Barkat**, Mayor of Jerusalem

Dr. **Samuel Barnai**, Adjunct Lecturer, European Forum, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Mr. **Ori Barzel**, Coordinator of International Programs, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy; Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya

MK **Merav Ben Ari**, “Kulanu”

Prof. **Dan Ben-David**, Department of Public Policy, Tel-Aviv University; President and Founder, Shoresh Institution for Socioeconomic Research

Adv. **Anat Ben-Dor**, Tel Aviv University

Maj Gen. (res.) **Eitan Ben-Eliahu**, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Israel Air Force

Dr. **Ayelet Ben-Ezer**, Vice President for Administration & Students, IDC Herzliya

Maj Gen. (res.) Prof. **Isaac Ben-Israel**, Director, Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center and Head of the Security Studies Program, Tel Aviv University

Prof. **Ofra Bengio**, Head of the Kurdish Studies Program, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University

MK **Naftali Bennett**, Minister of Education and Minister of Diaspora Affairs

MK Maj Gen. (res.) **Eyal Ben-Reuven**, Member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Former Commander of the IDF Northern Corps

V. Adm. (res.) **David Ben Bashat**, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Navy

Ms. **Sarit Ben-Shabbat**, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy, IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Ron Ben-Yishai**, National Security Commentator, Ynetnews; 2018 Israel Prize Laureate

Adv. **Shlomit Berhanu**, Social Activist

Dr. **Ronen Bergman**, Senior Correspondent for Military and Intelligence Affairs, Yedioth Ahronoth; Contributing Writer, New York Times

MK Dr. **Anat Berko**, Likud

Dr. Col. (res.) **Reuven Berko**, Middle East Expert

Rabbi Dr. **Ari Berman**, President, Yeshiva University

Maj. Gen. (res.) **Ilan Biran**, Former Director General of the Ministry of Defense; Former Chairman of Rafael – Advanced Defense Systems

Mr. **Michael Biton**, Mayor of Yerucham; Chairman, Negev Council

Mr. **Itzik Braverman**, Mayor of Petach Tikva

Dr. **Oded Brosh**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Brig. Gen. (res.) **Itai Brun**, Former Head of IDF Intelligence Analysis Division

Mr. **Ronnie C. Chan**, Thought Leader; Chairman, Hang Lung Properties Ltd.

Rabbi **Yuval Cherlo**, Head, Ra’anana Amit Orot Shaul Hesder Yeshiva

Dr. **Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak**, Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University

Dr. **Raphael S. Cohen**, Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

Mr. **Yoram Cohen**, Former Director of the Israeli Security Agency (SHABAK)

Dr. **Ben Connable**, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

Mr. **Pierre Dassas**, Chairman, ELNET-France

Mr. **Jonathan Davis**, Vice President for External Affairs and Head of the Raphael Recanati International School, IDC Herzliya

Prof. **Avi Degani**, CEO & President, Geocartography

Brig. Gen. (res.) **Udi Dekel**, Managing Director and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

Ms. **Antonia Dimou**, Director, Middle East & Persian Gulf Intelligence Unit, Security & Defence Analysis Institute, Athens

Ms. **Lizy Delaricha**, Mayor of Ganey Tikva

MK **Yuli-Yoel Edelstein**, Speaker of the Knesset

Prof. **Zvi Eckstein**, Dean, Tiomkin School of Economics, IDC Herzliya; Former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Israel

Dr. **Shira Efron**, Policy Researcher and Special Advisor on Israel, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND Corporation; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School

Dr. **Israel Elad-Altman**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

MK **Karin Elharrar**, “Yesh Atid”

Prof. **Haggai Erlich**, Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University

Col. (res.) Dr. **Shmuel Even**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

Lt. Col. (res.) **Alon Eviatar**, Advisor to the Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)

Mr. **Moshe Fadlon**, Mayor of Herzliya

MK **Roy Folkman**, Chair, “Kulanu” Parliamentary Group

Dr. **Anita Friedman**, President, Koret Foundation

Prof. **Doron Friedman**, Head of the Advanced Reality Lab, Sammy Ofer School of Communications, IDC Herzliya

MK **Esawi Frej**, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, “Meretz”

Mr. **Roland Freudenstein**, Policy Director, Martens Centre for European Studies

Col. (res.) **Yair Froymovich**, CEO, I2C; Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Avi Gabbay**, Chairman of the Labor Party

Prof. **Boaz Ganor**, Dean, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy; Founder & Executive Director, Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya

Adv. **Michal Gera Margalio**, Managing Director, Israel Women’s Network

Mr. **Mazin G’Nayem**, Mayor of Sakhnin; Chairman, National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel

Mr. **Ilan Goldenberg**, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; Former Chief of Staff to the Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the Office of the U.S. Secretary of State

Dr. **Ori Goldberg**, Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya; National Security Commentator, Ynetnews

Rabbi **Pinchas Goldschmidt**, President of the Conference of European Rabbis

Mr. **Oded Granot**, Journalist; Middle East and International Affairs Senior Commentator

Mr. **Eli Groner**, Director General, Prime Minister’s Office

Dr. **Yoel Guzansky**, Senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Visiting Fellow, Stanford University

Maj. Gen. (res.) **Gershon Hacohen**, Fmr. Commander of the IDF Northern Corp; Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University

Prof. **SU Hao**, Director, Center for Strategic and Peace Studies, China Foreign Affairs University

Mr. **Amos Harel**, Senior Military Correspondent and Defense Analyst, Haaretz

Dr. **Beatrice Hasler**, The Advanced Reality Lab, Sammy Ofer School of Communications, IDC Herzliya

Prof. **Hanna Herzog**, Professor Emerita of Sociology, Tel Aviv University; Co-Founder & Co-Director, “Sahvot” – Center for Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS), Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Brig. Gen. (res.) **Michael (Mike) Herzog**, Milton Fine International Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Former Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense

Ms. **Hodiya Houminer-Rosenblum**, Advisor to the Commissioner of the Civil Service

Mr. **Jacky Hugli**, Middle East Editor for Israel’s Military Radio (Galei Tzahal) and Columnist for Maariv daily

Dr. **Ofer Israeli**, Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amb. **David Ivry**, President, Boeing Israel; Former Head of the National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister; Former Director General of the Ministry of Defense

Mr. **Meir Javedanfar**, Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya; Owner and Editor, Iran-Israel Observer

Mr. **Moshe Kahlon**, Minister of Finance

Dr. **Ely Karmon**, Senior Research Scholar, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Benni Kashriel**, Mayor of Maaleh Adumim

MK **Israel Katz**, Minister of Intelligence and Transportation

Amb. **Bilahari Kausikan**, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore; and Chairman, Board of Directors, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore

Dr. **Dalia Dassa Kaye**, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, and Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

H.E. **Hazem Khairat**, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to Israel

Lt. Gen. **VG Khandare**, PVSM, AVSM SM (Retd.), Former Director General of the Indian Defence Intelligence Agency and Former Deputy Chief of the Indian Integrated Defence Staff

Hon. Senator **Mark Kirk**, Former U.S. Senator

Mr. **Yuri Kogan**, Managing Partner, Ergo Oriens Consultants; research fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Amb. Dr. **Haim Koren**, Former Ambassador of Israel to Egypt

MK **Nurit Koren**, “Likud”

Mr. **Yoav Kraiem**, Co-Director, Community Development and Social Change Department, Beit Issie Shapiro

Mr. **Ran Kunik**, Mayor of Givatayim

Mr. **Daniel Landau**, Senior Research Fellow, Advance Reality Lab, IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Edan Landau**, Researcher and Project Manager, Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya

MK **Yair Lapid**, Chairman of “Yesh Atid” Party

Rabbi **Yisrael Meir Lau**, Chairman of Yad Vashem and Former Chief Rabbi of Israel

H.E. **Hélène Le Gal**, Ambassador of France to Israel

Prof. **Leo Leiderman**, Tel-Aviv University and Chief Economic Advisor, Bank Hapoalim

Dr. **Noam Lemelshtrich Latar**, Founding Dean, Sammy Ofer School of Communications; Chair of the Daniel Pearl International Journalism Institute, IDC Herzliya

Hon. **Marcel Lettre**, Vice President for National Security, Lockheed Martin; Former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Col. (res.) **Ronit Lev**, CEO, Northern High-Tech Capital Ltd.

Dr. **Ariel (Eli) Levite**, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Principal Deputy Director General for Policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission

Dr. **Alon Levkowitz**, Chair, Department of Social Sciences and Civics, Beit-Berl College; Research Fellow, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University

MK **Orly Levy-Abekasis**, Member of Knesset

Prof. **Yagil Levy**, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication, Open University of Israel

Mr. **Avigdor Liberman**, Minister of Defense

Adv. **Avi Licht**, Deputy Attorney General for Administration and Special Functions

Amb. Dr. **Alon Liel**, Former Ambassador of Israel to Turkey; Former Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. **Tallie Lipkin-Shahak**, Journalist, Director of Military and Security programs and Chief Editor of the “Security Strip” (Retzuat Ha’Bitachon) Daily Program, Israel Military Radio

MK **Tzipi Livni**, Chairperson, “Hatnuah”, the “Zionist Union”; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon. **Mary Beth Long**, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Co-Founder & Principal, Global Alliance Advisors, LLC; Founder & Principal, M B Long & Associates, PLLC

Dr. **Esther Lopatin**, Director, Center for European Studies, IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Joey Low**, Founder of “Israel At Heart” and Star Farm Ventures

Prof. **Edward N. Luttwak**, ENL Associates

Mr. **Eric Lynn**, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security (CNAS); Former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense

Adv. **Yaela Machlis**, Mayor of Yehud-Monosson

Amb. **Zvi Magen**, Senior Research Fellow, INSS; Former Ambassador of Israel to Russia and to Ukraine

Mr. **David Makovsky**, Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and Director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Former Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the Office of the U.S. Secretary of State

Col. (res.) **Pesach Malovany**, Former Senior Researcher at the IDF Intelligence Directorate

Dr. **Yossi Mann**, Head of Department of Middle Eastern studies, Bar-Ilan University; Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Dr. **Ronit Marzan**, Researcher of Palestinian Society and Politics, University of Haifa

Dr. **Shavit Matias**, Head of the Global Affairs and Conflict Resolution Program, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy, IDC Herzliya; Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Former Deputy Attorney General of Israel

Dr. **Doron Matza**, Research Associate, Forum for Regional Thinking; Researcher, INSS

Ms. **Sharona Mazalian Levi**, Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS), Tel Aviv University

Hon. **Brett McGurk**, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. Department of State

Mr. **Ran Melamed**, Deputy Director for Communication and Social Policy, Yedid – The Association for Community Empowerment

Prof. **Rafi Melnick**, Former Provost, IDC Herzliya; Former Member of the Monetary Committee of the Bank of Israel

Mr. **Nadav Mendelson**, Chairperson, IDC Student Union

Prof. **Yoram Meital**, Department of Middle East Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

MK **Merav Michaeli**, "Zionist Union"

Ms. **Liora Minka**, Chairperson, Emunah

Prof. **Alex Mintz**, Provost, Director of the Initiative for an Inclusive Israeli Society, IDC Herzliya; President, Israeli Political Science Association

Prof. **Shaul Mishal**, Director, Middle East Division, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy; Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Dr. **Antonio Missiroli**, Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Emerging Security Challenges

MK **Shuli Moalem-Refaeli**, Chairwoman, "Habayit Hayehudi" Parliamentary Group

Dr. **Amit Mor**, CEO, Eco-Energy; Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy, IDC Herzliya

Ms. **Sigal Moran**, Head of the Bnei-Shimon Regional Council

Brig. Gen. (res.) **Hagai Mordechai**, Former Chief of Staff for the IDF Ground Forces HQ and Former Commander of the Paratroopers Special Forces Reconnaissance Unit

Brig. Gen. (res.) Prof. **Yaakov Nagel**, Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion; Former Head of the National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister

Prof. **Suzie Navot**, Haim Striks School of Law, College of Management Academic Studies

Mr. **Adi Nes**, Photographer and International Artist

Ms. **Irina Nevzlin**, Chair, Board of Directors, The Museum of the Jewish People at Beit Hatfutsot; President of The Nadav Foundation

Hon. Amb. **Victoria Nuland**, Chief Executive Officer, Center for New American Security; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

Ms. **Yuval Ofer**, Spokeswoman, Israel Women's Network

MK **Amir Ohana**, "Likud"

Mr. **Amir Oren**, Government and Defense Commentator, Walla News Digital Network

Prof. **David Passig**, Futurist; Head, Graduate Program in Information & Communication Technology, Bar-Ilan University

Mr. **Tamir Pardo**, Former Head of the Mossad

Mr. **Sami Peretz**, Senior Writer and Commentator and Former Editor, TheMarker

Ms. **Smadar Perry**, Senior Middle East Editor, Yediot Ahronot

Mr. **Ophir Pines-Paz**, Head, Institute for Local Government, Tel Aviv University; Former Minister of Interior

Amb. **Alon Pinkas**, Former Consul General of Israel in New York

Mr. **Dan Propper**, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Osem Group

Amb. **Ron Prozor**, Head, Abba Eban Institute for International Diplomacy, IDC Herzliya; Former Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. **Malka Puterkovsky**, Educator and Author

Mr. **Amir Rapaport**, Founder & Editor-in-Chief, IsraelDefense

Mr. **John Raine**, CMG OBE, Senior Advisor for Geopolitical Due Diligence, International Institute for Strategic Studies; Former Director General with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Amb. **Zvi Rav-Ner**, Former Deputy Director General for Euro-Asia Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. **Ifat Reshef**, Director, Department for Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. **Matthew Rojansky**, Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center

Prof. **Alon Rosen**, Efi Arazi School of Computer Science, IDC Herzliya

Amb. **Jacob Rosen**, Former Ambassador of Israel to Jordan

Amb. Dr. **Dennis Ross**, Counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Former Special Assistant to President Barack Obama and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region

Justice (ret.) **Elyakim Rubinstein**, Vice President Emeritus of the Supreme Court of Israel

Maj. Gen. (res.) Dr. **Yom Tov Samia**, Former Commander of IDF Southern Command; Founder & Director, Y. Sam Group

Adv. **Gideon Sarar**, Former Minister of Education and Former Minister of the Interior

Ms. **Orna Sadgat-Erez**, Advisor to the Mayor for the Advancement of Women's Status and Head of the Women Administration, Municipality of Herzliya

Dr. **Gary Samore**, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government; Former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Mr. **Gil Sapir**, CEO, Shirbit Insurance Company

Dr. **Liane Saunders**, Strategy Director and Strategic Programmes Coordinator, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Ms. **Tal Schneider**, Diplomatic & Political Correspondent, Globes

Prof. **Michal Schwartz**, The Maurice and Ilse Katz Professorial Chair in Neuroimmunology, Weizmann Institute of Science; President, International Society of Neuroimmunology

Dr. **Andrew C. Scobell**, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

Ms. **Yifat Sela**, CEO, Aluma

MK Dr. **Nachman Shai**, Chair, Knesset Lobby for Strengthening the Jewish People

Ms. **Tal Shalev**, Political correspondent, Walla! News

Maj. Gen. (res.) **Gadi Shamni**, Executive Vice President of Land Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries; Former IDF Commander of the Central Command, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister, and Defense Attaché to the U.S.

Hon. Judge (ret.) **Joseph Haim Shapira**, State Comptroller & Ombudsman

Maj. Gen. **Jonathan Shaw** CB CBE, Chairman, Optima; Former U.K. Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy)

Col. (res.) Dr. **Shaul Shay**, Director of Research, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya; Former Deputy Head of the National Security Council

Col. (res.) Adv. **Pnina Sharvit Baruch**, Senior Research Fellow and Head, Program on Law and National Security, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

Mr. **Yair Sheleg**, Researcher, Center for Religion, Nation and State, Israel Democracy Institute

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Mr. **Shimon Shiffer**, Senior Political-Diplomatic Commentator, Yediot Ahronot

MK **Itzik Shmuli**, "Zionist Union"

Mr. **Avraham Baiga Shochat**, Former Minister of Finance

Amb. **Zalman Shoval**, Former Ambassador of Israel to the U.S.

Mr. **David Siegel**, CEO, ELNET-Israel

Prof. **Arnon Soffer**, Professor Emeritus of Geography, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Haifa

Brig. Gen. (res.) **Amnon Sofrin**, Former Director of the Intelligence Directorate of the Mossad

Mr. **Attila Somfalvi**, Political Analyst and Chief Anchor, Ynetnews and YnetTV

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Mr. **Andrew J. Tabler**, Martin J. Gross Fellow, Washington Institute

Mr. **Ahmet Taçyildiz**, Chairman, Gap İnşaat; Vice President, Turkish American Businessmen Association

Mr. **Shimon Tal**, Former Water Commissioner

MK **Penina Tamanu-Shata**, "Yesh Atid"

Prof. **Charles Tenenbaum**, Director of the Conflict & Development Program, Sciences Po CERI Paris

Mr. **Nicolas Tenzer**, Former Adviser to the French Minister of Economy and Finance

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Ms. **Keren Turner-Eyal**, CEO, Ministry of Transport and Road Safety

Dr. **Matti Tzarfati Harcabi**, Head of the Yoav Regional Council

Dr. **Mira Tzoreff**, Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies and Lecturer, Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University

Lt. Col. (res.) **Yohanan Tzoref**, Ministry of Intelligence

Mr. **Chagai Tzuriel**, Director General, Ministry of Intelligence

Mr. **Peter Van Praagh**, President, Halifax International Security Forum

Mr. **Moav Vardi**, Chief International Affairs Correspondent, Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation

Ms. **Pascaline Wagemans**, Deputy Director, Forum of Strategic Dialogue

Ms. **Ruth Wasserman Lande**, Former Israeli Diplomat at the Embassy of Israel to Egypt and Middle East Affairs Commentator

Dr. **Kenneth R. Weinstein**, President and CEO, Hudson Institute

Ms. **Dana Weiss**, Chief Political Analyst and Anchor, Israel Television News Company

Dr. **Chaim B. Weizmann**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Ms. **Carice Witte**, Founder, SIGNAL – Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership

Lt. Gen. (res.) **Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon**, Former Minister of Defense and Former IDF Chief of Staff Israel Police

Dr. **Michal Yaari**, Tel Aviv University and the Open University

Prof. **Yoav Yair**, Dean, School of Sustainability Founded by Israel Corp., ICL & ORL, IDC Herzliya

Mr. **Eliyahu Yishai**, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior

Maj. Gen. (ret.) **Meni Yitshaki**, Former Head of the Investigations and Intelligence Department of the Israel Police

Mr. **Erez Yosef**, Chief Operating Officer, Member of the Board of Management, Bank Hapoalim

MK **Tamar Zandberg**, Chair of "Meretz"

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Prof. **Yaffa Zilbershats**, Chair, Planning and Budgeting Committee, Council for Higher Education

Prof. **Eyal Zisser**, Vice Rector and holder of The Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East, Tel Aviv University

Maj. Gen. (res.) **Israel Ziv**, Former Head of the IDF

Prof. **Irina Zvyagelskaya**, Chief Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Expert, Valdai Discussion Club, Moscow



About the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

The Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at IDC Herzliya, the convener of the Annual Herzliya Conference Series, aspires to contribute to Israel's national security and resilience. To that end, the Institute conducts integrative and comprehensive policy analysis on the national challenges, produces strategic insights and policy recommendations for decision-makers, and informs the public and policy discourse. The Institute's policy agenda consists of two main pillars – Israel's national security and societal resilience.

The Institute's policy analysis and deliberations on Israel's national security assesses key processes shaping the Middle East and the global arena and identifies strategic opportunities to mitigate and offset critical threats and risks. The Institute's policy work on societal resilience stems from the understanding that internal weakness could harm Israel's overall ability to tackle strategic challenges, thus making societal resilience a key building-block of Israel's national security. Connecting both pillars, the Institute also addresses the growing gap between Israel and Jewish communities around the world – and with American Jews in particular.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead heads the Institute, serves as its Executive Director, and chairs the Annual Herzliya Conference Series. General Gilead led a distinguished career for more than three decades in the IDF and in the Defense Establishment, his last position being Director of Policy and Political-Military Affairs at the Ministry of Defense. In addition, General Gilead served as Chief of the IDF Intelligence Research and Analysis Division, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, IDF Spokesperson, and Military Secretary (Aide de Camp) to Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Rabin.



About the Annual Herzliya Conference Series

The Herzliya Conference is Israel's foremost global policy annual gathering, drawing together the most senior Israeli and international participants from government, business, and academia to address pressing national, regional, and global issues.

The Herzliya Conference is the anchor of the Institute's year-long cycle of policy analysis work deliberating the key agenda issues and the Institute's policy products in various settings, including plenary sessions, roundtable discussions, and an international simulation. The Israeli and international media attention that the Conference draws allows to enhance the outreach and impact of the Institute's policy products.

Over more than a decade, the Herzliya Conference has welcomed many notable participants from abroad, including *Ban Ki-moon, Nicolas Sarkozy, Jimmy Carter, Tony Blair, Jose Manuel Barroso, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, José María Aznar, Prince Hassan bin Tallal, Robert Zoellick, Nouriel Roubini, the late Samuel R. Berger, Lawrence Summers, John McCain, General James L. Jones, Condoleezza Rice, and Salam Fayyad.*