The Balance of Israel’s National Security

2–4 December 2002

Alternative Scenarios for the Middle East (ME) in 2020

-Working Paper-

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November 12, 2002

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Introduction

The first section of this report presents five alternative scenarios designed to fulfill the assignment of considering what kinds of issues the ME might be presenting in 2020 that the DoD could be called on to respond to.

To make a set of scenarios useful they should illustrate the main issues that will influence the policy challenges likely to face the US. Therefore they have to be based on judgments about the world. The judgments used to select these scenarios are:

1. The most important question about the ME in 2020 is the condition of militant Islam (MI), that is, that part of the Islamic world that believes that Moslems should be trying to attack and defeat the US.
   - Where, if anywhere, does MI have strong popular support?
   - Which if any governments are part of MI?

2. Other major issues are:
   - The distribution of biological and nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
   - Progress toward modernization in the area
   - Will Europe begin to resist MI?

The scenarios are intended to be alternative descriptions of what conditions in the ME might be like in 2020 – ordered from the most desirable to the least.

Section II of the report presents a discussion of two key issues related to the scenarios.

- The nature of MI and the likelihood of its growth.
- The connections between MI and the question of Moslems in Europe and European policy toward MI and terrorism.

Section III is an example of a list of measures the US could take now to prevent the spread of militant Islam.

By dividing the report in this way we reduce the extent to which questions about current policy influence the description of the range of possible alternatives in 2020. That is, the scenarios themselves are designed to be useful by people with different views about policy.
Section I: Scenarios

**Scenario 1: Militant Islam Subsides; Old Stability Shattered by Something Better**

a. Iran moves toward democracy and modernity.
b. Modernizing Iraq leads to overthrow of the Saudi family in Arabia and replacement of the regimes in Qatar and Bahrein and Kuwait.
c. Turkey’s modernizing path is strengthened by the weakness of militant Islam
d. Egypt changes more slowly, although modernizers are strengthened by the weakening of the threat from militant Islam.
e. By 2020 Syria has started on a modernizing path.

(“Modernizing” does not mean that these countries have become stable democracies. Perhaps Latin America today is a good analogy to what we will see in the ME in 2020. There the old universal pattern of autocracy (military rule) has been broken, but the path to various forms of democracy is uneven.)

In 2020 MI has run its course as a major player on the world stage. It had chosen to attack the US as the leader of the West and when its attack failed, after the initial success on 9/11 2001, it was discredited. Leadership within the ME against militant Islam was provided by Iran and Iraq each rebounding from its bad experiences under the Ayatollahs and Saddam Hussein in its own way.

Iraq could get to the position assumed in this scenario in several ways. For example, without the US removing Saddam, if he were replaced in some other way, or by a natural death, and there was an inconclusive struggle for succession. Or the US might have removed Saddam and tried to bring a new military-led government to power, and seen that program fail as the population demanded to move on. After several years of instability following either of these beginnings, a group of younger officers – majors and colonels – gained power on the basis of a program of writing a constitution and electing a civilian government. Since the Iraqi public could see that they meant what they proposed, there was no opposition to the new government and people could begin to work and make investments. At the same time oil production capacity increases came on line and there was plenty of money to finance the rebuilding and catch-up after the depredations of the Saddam regime. The opportunities created because of clean and open government brought back thousands of Iraqis who had been successful in Europe and the U.S. Iraq took off and the new government stood in the Arab world for traditional ethnic tolerance, minimal central government interference in personal life (leaving room for community control of traditional matters), civil liberties, and non-aggression – plus prosperity and opportunity. The result is that Baghdad became the business center for the ME. Iraq also formed a small modern military force with civilian control. Because the force maintained civilian control by Western democratic techniques and not ME divide-
and-manipulate devices, the officers were selected and promoted on the basis of merit and their incentive was to build an effective force. Therefore, although the force had only 3 divisions and 10 squadrons of planes it is the most powerful military force in the Arab world. Furthermore the high technical and management standards of the military served as an example and source of managers that helped the civilian economy. (No money was spent on ballistic missiles or WMD.)

Or the scenario could have happened if the US removed Saddam Hussein with the support of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and supported the INC’s program of establishing a pluralist government.

This is not to say that such a positive development in Iraq is inevitable. (Other results appear in other scenarios.) The claim here is only that it is possible, and might come about in a number of ways. Obviously it is more likely if the US tries to make it happen, but it might happen even if we try to prevent it. And something very different could result even if we tried to bring this scenario about.

Iran also came out of the initial turbulence that followed the popular overthrow of the ayatollahs after only a few years. A basic social compromise was reached on religion, partly because some of the most senior ayatollahs who had become disillusioned with clerical rule of the country supported the uprising against Khameini. The new government adopted a policy that respected Islam but left it to private consciences. The Iranian style became a mixture of secular and religious people in both government agencies and private companies. Many young people had become anti-clerical during the Khameini regime, but they were pressured to avoid acting against non-political religious expression and people. Iran also prospered from the combination of expanded oil revenues and the bounceback from the period of oppression and isolation. Partly because of the delicacy of the government/political regime the government adopted a policy of minimal government intervention, which resulted in rapid economic growth, increase in middle class and a sense that they had found the way to restore Iranian greatness and pride.

Leadership in the Shia world returned to the traditional Iraqi cities and the Shia-based Islamist branch of Militant Islam became an uninfluential minority.

The new examples in Iraq and Iran led to the overthrow of the royal families in the Gulf states, and then in Saudi Arabia. The multi-sided conflict in Saudi Arabia among family factions, Wahhabi clerics, radical followers of UBL, and new proto-democratic popular movements, led to the breakup of the Saudi state and the creation of a Moslem Republic of Eastern Arabia, free of Wahhabi control, which gave citizenship to long-term residents from other Moslem countries and allied with Oman under the spiritual flag of traditional Arab cosmopolitanism, and used the oil money to secure international Moslem support by vast charitable works in all Moslem countries.

There are of course many paths that could lead to the downfall of the Saudi family. It would be harder to explain its continuation in power to 2020. Similarly the
end of the Wahhabi-led growth of MI could have happened either as a result of events in Arabia cutting off the flow of funds, or the Moslem world could have developed resistance to this extreme form of the religion. The rapid expansion of Wahhabi influence has only been happening for some 10 years, it may contain the seeds of its own defeat, and subside even if no action is taken against it, although it now shows no substantial sign of subsiding.

But despite the end of Wahhabi expansion in the early years of the century, in 2020 there are still tens of thousands of men in a number of countries who had been caught up by Wahhabi indoctrination in the 1990s and the first years of this century and who continued to be loyal to Militant Islam, seeing the US, Israel, and the West, as the enemy of their religion, and viewing modernizing Moslems who reject jihad as infidels. Through the years they had succeeded in assassinating many leaders and conducting many acts of terror, mostly in Moslem countries. But they were without governmental support, riven by factional conflicts, weakened by popular rejection, became too old to appeal to youth, and never succeeded in putting together a competent conspiratorial organization combined with an effective political/religious face.

Islam is in turmoil as many different schools and leaders use different approaches to preserve its vitality as a source of identity, personal strength, and spiritual connection while allowing it to become more compatible with freedom and non-violent competition. But in no significant country does violent and intolerant Islam control the government. Governments are able to play various Moslem movements against each other to protect openness to all and to gain support for the suppression of Militant Islam and political/religious violence.

Turkey continues to be Europe-oriented and modernizing. Egypt has changed more slowly than Iraq and Iran, but in order to compete with Iraq for leadership of the Arab world had to move toward modernization and prosperity faster, rather than try to be more extreme in opposing the West or Israel.

There is an accommodation between Israel and the Palestinians that is good enough to keep the conflict from interfering with regional politics.

Oil supply and demand still fluctuates unpredictably enough, when combined with local political vagaries, to cause oil prices to fluctuate at least as much as wheat prices, but partly because consumers have gradually built reserves up to 120 days supply there is no political problem of oil supply.

After the defeat of MI in the first years of the century the major dynamic had been the fitful spread of new approaches. This is a dramatic break with the past, where for the last 40 years of the 20th century the ME was almost completely dominated by autocracies – except Israel and Turkey. And from 1979 to 1999 the main dynamic was the threat to regimes from militant Islam.
One of the important “new” approaches is a rejection of Arab-Nationalism in favor of some form of traditional (i.e., Ottoman) ME treatment of Muslim minorities. (“Arab-Nationalism” is a specific ideology, not a generic name for the nationalism of Arabs.) And one of the reasons for believing that such a new dynamic is plausible is that it builds on regional traditions and is not just an imposition from the US or the West.

While autocracy is deeply entrenched in Arab experience and culture, the systematic oppression and marginalization of non-Sunni Arab minorities is primarily a post WW II phenomenon, and it is not unreasonable to think that the trend during the next 20 years could go in the opposite direction. Furthermore there are other elements in Arab tradition and culture that provide some potential support for movement toward some form of democracy. These include a social egalitarianism and a tradition of consultation by leaders with people. And Islam teaches that the government is not the supreme power, that it and society must live according to law. These principles were reflected in the “soft autocracy” that was the Arab norm before WWII.

At the beginning of the century there was a real potential for aggression in the Middle East – apart from the Arab-Israel clash. There were no general conditions that protected weak states like Jordan or Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States from stronger neighbors, or the bigger states from each other; they had to be protected or they were in danger of being attacked. In this scenario it is likely that there would be a much smaller propensity for aggression in the area; that is, it would be more like the rest of the world. One basic reason is that in these scenarios most states began in 2004 on an uneven path toward modernization and democracy. When a country has spent some years on such a path a large part of the population begins to think in terms of progress and not of conquest. Even in a country where there is a temporary failure and a dictator gains power he is less likely to find conquest a feasible and useful tool. The spirit of the region will be against it, and while this is no guarantee, it is a factor. The strong barriers against starting international terror operations will also inhibit the possibility of aggression.

Economic growth rates (per capita) for the countries of the region from 2002 to 2020 ranged from 1-6%, averaging 3%.

Fertility throughout the region, except in Yemen and Palestine, had fallen to below replacement level. But because the population is so young birth rates in 2020 continue to be well above death rates and the aging of the population had just begun.

In this scenario there is a sharp decline in military expenditures and no country has mid-or-long range missiles or weapons of mass destruction.

In this scenario by 2020 the ME is no longer a unique part of the world. The level of arms and political troubles is comparable to Latin America or Asia. None of the countries except Israel and Turkey are settled democracies, so there is still a good deal of sturm and drang, but it can be regarded as statistical fluctuation, not requiring any regional policy. Basically things worked out well, either because we did the right thing or because problems solved themselves.
Scenario 2: Militant Islam Fails but the ME Has Other Troubles

In this scenario also, MI runs out of steam early in the century, either because the US defeats it, or because it was not as serious a force as some people thought it was.

In Scenario 1, generally, it is vigorous developments in the direction of modernization led by Iraq and Iran that are involved in the failure of MI. In this scenario, by contrast, it is the power of repressive and conservative governments that are the main dampeners of support for MI. The result is that the ME continues to present the bleak landscape of political stagnation and conflict that we see today.

Saddam Hussein had been succeeded by series of military dictators each of whom had a weaker grasp on power, and less skill and ambition than Saddam. In 2020 Iraq is an unstable but not terribly oppressive autocratic regime in which the conditions for the Iraqi people had improved substantially, and oil revenues were the basis of a measure of prosperity.

The biggest change in the region is in the character and orientation of Turkey which in 2010 had overthrown the heirs of Ataturk and returned to the Islamic world – although not as a Sharia state. Internal Army conflict and scandals, economic weakness, and rejection by Europe combined to weaken the regime and bring to power the Moslem middle class who want to be first class citizens and to have their country act in a region where it is respected as a leading power. Because of the failure of MI, Turkey could turn toward the Islamic world without rejecting the US and without necessarily falling into the hands of religious extremists. The Turkish economic and political modernizing continued although there were new kinds of strains in the society, and a danger that Islamic influence would become more radical and disruptive.

Although US efforts at accommodation with Khameini in 2002-3 had given the clerical regime a new lease on life, the lease ran out 5 years later and the ayatollahs were overthrown. Iran’s return to secular rule made it easier for Turkey to move into a central position in the ME. While Iran’s government is secular, much of the population continues to be religious. Iran in effect takes Turkey’s place as the major ME power that is secular, modernizing, and moving toward democracy, and not very interested in Arab affairs.

The Arab world continues to be in the hands of military or other dictators. The Turks operate a skilled traditional ME style of diplomacy, seeing themselves as the natural leader, with a role as the mediator or arbitrator of conflicts and as power broker and spokesperson for the region, a new version of their former imperial role. Their traditional contempt for Arabs is reinforced by their conception of themselves as more advanced as well as more powerful. Turkey also uses its power and influence to work against development and use in the area of WMD. As a strong power Turkey sees WMD as weapons of the weak, undesirable equalizers. And they argue that they are not for civilized powers. However Turkey does not make its effort against such weapons a crusade, and it has only limited effect.
While Turkey cannot be excluded by the Arabs, the only matter concerning which it is really welcomed is in the struggle against Israel. Because Israel cannot afford Turkish military intervention, Turkey becomes the force limiting Israeli reaction to Arab attacks against Israel. Turkey, however, is reluctant to use military force against Israel, preferring to use its potential as a diplomatic asset in the region.

In 2020 the issue of the American role in the protection of Israel continues. Israel lost an ally in Turkey but also lost an active enemy in Iran, whose new government had little interest in organizing attacks against Israel. With the decline of MI the struggle against Israel became again an Arab affair, and the one subject on which Arab countries could agree, and which each could use to divert attention from their own internal failures. As a result any effort by Palestinians to create a government that might make peace with Israel was defeated by outside Arab governments determined that the Palestinians would keep fighting Israel until it was removed from the center of the Arab world. The Arab countries continue to keep the Palestinian refugees unsettled, so their unfortunate condition can be maintained as a weapon against Israel. The number of refugees has grown to 5 million.

By 2020 the Saudi regime had fallen apart as a result of a series of internal conflicts over succession within the royal family leading to a struggle for power among various factions, each representing various Arabian tribes. When Iraq threatened to intervene to grab the oil, and the US to protect it, Turkey organized a “peace” effort and sponsored the independence of the Eastern Province, so that the oil would not go to any of the regional powers. (The same result might be achieved if Turkey wanted to act against the Saudis and show its power in the region by creating an independence movement in the Eastern Province.)

Note: While no particular chain of events for the end of the Saudi family control of Arabia is terribly plausible, neither is it anything like inevitable that the fragile and anachronistic Saudi regime continue for another 18 years. Other possible successors to control the oil are Iraq, Iran, Egypt, the US (as trustee). While the bigger regional powers have an obvious advantage, other powers would resist these countries changing the regional balance by acquiring the oil. Each would prefer that a relatively “sterile” or unchallenging regime have the oil if it cannot have it itself. Since the Turks are the most powerful, as well as the most “neutral” contender, except for the US, which would not be contending for itself, they or an independent Eastern Province may be as good a bet as any to be the successor to the Saud family as controller of the oil wealth. (If the oil is removed there is little international interest in what becomes of the rest of Saudi Arabia.)

The US interest is that Gulf oil continue to be divided among as many separate powers as possible. Therefore if the Saudis were no longer a viable contender the US would oppose either Iraq or Iran gaining control of the Saudi oil, and would prefer an independent Eastern Province to either Egypt or Turkey.
Economic growth rates (per capita) for the countries of the region from 2002 to 2020 ranged from 0-4%, averaging 1.5% (excluding oil revenue), but without much sense of progress. Iraq had good results because of the removal of Saddam Hussein. But all countries were held back by the effects of their political regimes.

Fertility throughout the region, except in Yemen and Palestine, had fallen to below replacement level. But because the population is so young birth rates in 2020 continue to be well above death rates and the aging of the population had just begun.

**Comment on Scenario 2.**

In some ways it is hard to believe that the region could be so little changed 18 years from now. But surely such relative stability is one possibility, especially since it mirrors the experience of the past 18 years, or longer.
Scenario 3: Militant Islam Largely Limited to Arabs

Militant Islam has been rejected by Asian Moslems, but by 2020 it has grown steadily stronger in the Arab world, even spreading from Algeria to Tunisia and Morocco. The believers in MI have convinced Arabs that if one is Arab one must be anti-American, combining Arabism with Wahhabi Islam. Arab Christians are also increasingly made unwelcome, or even persecuted, and many of them have emigrated or converted.

For a long time most of the Arab governments resisted the growth of MI, and when it had become too popular to oppose they first followed a policy of working with MI while officially maintaining friendly relations with the US. But gradually each country’s relations with the US became colder and then gradually hostile. The excuse was often US support for Israel’s existence, but conflicts over US attempts to prevent terror attacks, and other issues, also aggravated the problems. By 2020 only Egypt maintained a facade of not treating the US as an enemy. The others had public stances to the US comparable to Iraq in 2002.

Because of Arab terror attacks in the US the US gradually increased its restrictions on Arab travel in the US, and its surveillance over Arabs with permission to be in the US. After 30 attacks by MI, in many of which Arabs were directly involved and caught, and which killed more than 10,000 Americans, the number of people with Arab passports in the US was down to 100,000(?), most of them long-term residents or US citizens, many married to Americans. Arab entries to the US were down to perhaps a few thousand per year, and great scrutiny was given to travelers from other countries whose passports showed entry to Arab countries.

Arab countries continue to sell oil for delivery to the US but they do it through companies incorporated outside the US. Oil industry technology and services are imported from European countries. Essentially the oil business in the ME is as it was in 2002 except for a modest drop in efficiency from the loss of direct American participation and the costs of concealing American connections. Because of popular MI anti-American feelings and actions it had become dangerous or at least very unpleasant for Americans to travel or live in Arab countries. Tourism from the US had completely disappeared and there are very few active business connections, although US consumer products are imported by foreign middlemen.

Militant Islam’s relations with Europe are somewhat paradoxical. For political reasons, and to appease their local Moslems, Europe has not supported the US in its struggle against MI. (see discussion in Section II) In principle MI objects as much to Europeans as to the Americans; they are equally infidels, and equally sinful. But the governments and major leaders of MI have adopted a divide and conquer strategy in their fight against the West. Officially the Arab countries maintain good relations with Europe. And many Arabs who don’t want to cut themselves off from the pleasures and benefits of Western life say, in effect, “America evil, Europe OK” without worrying
about consistency. However this distinction works imperfectly, so European presence in the Arab world is somewhat reduced from that in 2002, but by no means eliminated.

Since the Arab governments have been afraid of the US they have worked hard to prevent terror attacks on the US that are traceable to Arab sources. By 2020 the pretense of cooperation by Arab governments with US efforts to act against terrorist organization activities in Arab countries has gradually become impossible to maintain, and the US has had to recognize that terrorist organizations are able to operate inconspicuously in most of the Arab world with the connivance of Arab governments, despite official denials.

In 2020 20,000 Americans were killed by attacks by MI terrorists – also 2,000 Europeans and 500 Israelis. This more than doubled the rate of previous years, which had been growing slowly. Most of the direct participants in the attacks on the US were either Arabs with US or European citizenship, European or American converts to Islam, or non-Arab Muslims acting completely independently of their governments. Some of the terrorist organizations’ planning and preparations were conducted in Europe, although this was limited because European security organizations quietly cooperated with the US in working against the terrorists.

Despite the more-or-less parallel positions of the Arab countries concerning MI, the US, and Europe, there has been no reduction in the rivalries, enmities, and conflicts among the Arab countries.

Nuclear weapons are in the hands of Iraq, which produced their own, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt, each of which bought a few from Pakistan. All of the countries of the region have BW weapons, and they have been used several times in conflicts among Arab countries. Thus far there have been no attacks with nuclear weapons.

The scenario has two branches. In one branch the US has deployed a system of anti-missile satellites and no Arab country has any IRBMs or ICBMs. In the other branch the US has not deployed such an ABM system and five of the Arab countries have IRBMs and Iraq also has several ICBMs. The reliability of the Arab missiles varies from almost fair to poor. They have accurate guidance systems with uncertain reliability.

Comments on Scenario 3

This scenario is not meant to be anti-Arab. It was chosen to represent a class of possibilities in which MI has become a dominant force in a minority of the Moslem World, not including any of the giant Moslem countries, all of which are in Asia. The idea is that MI could be strong in none of the Moslem world (Scenarios 1 & 2), or in part of the Moslem world (Scenarios 3 & 4), or in most of the Moslem world (Scenario 5).

If someone thinks that it is implausible for MI to be dominant in the Arab world and not the rest of Islam, they can choose another selection from the Moslem world for MI, and the challenge to the US would probably be comparable to that provided in this scenario. I don’t think one can argue that MI has to dominate either all Islamic countries
or none. Therefore it could dominate some – which is what this scenario is an example of.

The scenario is meant to present an unstable situation, not one that could last for a number of years. I don’t believe the US could or would tolerate 20,000 fatalities a year from a movement largely limited to the Arab world, which is too weak to resist determined US action. So the scenario arbitrarily makes the problem come to a head in 2020. Current events make it seem more likely that such a scenario would come sooner, but it is hard to predict such matters. And if the scenario is possible sooner, it is also possible in 2020.
Scenario 4: Militant Islam Also Infects Asia

By 2020 Militant Islam has become a major or dominant force in the ME through Iran, and in Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and a fragmented Indonesia. It is also strong in the Moslem communities in Europe and Africa. Turkey and the Central Asian countries have resisted MI. As have India’s Moslems, BanglaDesh and Malaysia, and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).

Thus MI is strong in Moslem countries with a total population of nearly 900 million, but rejected in Moslem countries with a total population of about 400 million. Of the nearly 300 million Moslems living as minorities, about 160 million live in India and generally reject MI. The next largest group, some 100 million, live in Nigeria. The others are scattered over most parts of the world. (These numbers are based on rough population estimates for 2020.)

This is very different from saying that Islam was split 2:1 in favor of MI. At the individual level, commitment one way or the other is often less clear, but it would be fair to say that in this scenario in 2020 a clear majority of individual Moslems are probably against MI, depending on the day and the exact question.

For a long time most of the governments followed a policy of not officially aligning with MI and of maintaining friendly relations with the US. But by 2020 this tactic had lost its utility and was too unpopular to continue, and most of the governments had gradually become as overtly anti-US as Iraq had been in 2002, although, of course, none had declared war against the US. A number of governments adopted the tactic of accommodating to MI’s popularity, by removing American presence from the country and verbally attacking the US, in order to reduce pressure for religious organizations to take over the government.

This situation raises the question of how Islam could be so divided. Why should half the Moslem world believe that Islam requires Moslems to attack the US and the other half believe that it does not? There are a number of answers.

First, there was much more Islamic unity about the West being evil. The real disagreement was about whether it is too strong to attack, which is a practical not a religious question.

Second, there have always been profound differences among Moslems (as among believers in all religions).

Third, the division is a result of a great debate among scholars and leaders of Islam in every country, about both theology and politics. Like all such debates this is partly a battle of ideas and partly a set of political struggles among parties and factions concerned with power and various practical interests much more than the intellectual substance of the debate.
Naturally, in each country some Moslems ended on each side of the debate, but once a country clearly tipped in one direction or the other, there were great pressures for conformity. MI strongly believed in compelling Moslems to join its war, and wherever it had the power to do so it prevented opposing views from being heard, and excluded opponents from any position of power. In countries which had rejected MI, individuals who argued for MI were in effect accusing their countrymen of being bad Moslems and accusing their government of helping infidels. Naturally there was a pulling together to reject such charges and to exclude the people who made them.

Fourth, therefore in the MI-dominated countries there are many Moslems who do not believe in MI, and in the countries that rejected MI there are many covert believers in MI.

In 2020 terror attacks by MI produced 50,000 fatal casualties in the US, 1,000 in Europe and 500 in Israel.

While the organizations responsible for these attacks had more presence in the countries where MI was strongest, many of the individuals involved were citizens of other Moslem countries or of Europe or the US. And some of the planning and preparations by the terrorists were carried out in Europe.

Europe refused to join the US war against terrorism (and against MI). In return the principal governments and organizations of MI swallowed their theoretical complaints against Europe and adopted a divide and conquer strategy of not attacking Europe until after the US would be defeated. (See discussion of Europe in Section II of the report)

There is an almost complete separation between the US and the countries listed above where MI is a dominant force. That is, virtually no business or tourism to those countries, partly because it is unsafe for Americans to be there. Also the US has very strongly restricted entry to the US of citizens of those countries.

It is difficult for the US to avoid a large degree of separation even from the Moslem countries which have rejected MI. While the governments of these countries are eager to make American tourism and business possible, they cannot make travel there completely safe, because they have suppressed MI groups within their country. Also most Americans are not comfortable in relying on the distinctions among Moslems. The prominent appearance among terrorists caught in the US of citizens of those countries that have rejected MI also makes the distinctions more difficult. However the US government makes great efforts to reward the Moslem countries that reject MI, by maintaining good relations and as much contact as possible. Europe, on the other hand, tries to compensate for the American isolation of the MI countries by keeping open its connections to them as much as possible.
Many of Moslem minorities throughout the world agitate strongly in support of MI and against US actions to defend against terror. They act as a pressure group against government support of the US, and in some cases use violence against politicians or public figures who support the US against MI. The role of Moslem minorities in W.Europe is discussed in Section II. Elsewhere Moslem minorities have serious effects in a number of African countries, including S. Africa, and a few other places. In any country with a substantial number of Moslems, if the government does not work actively to protect Americans, the Muslim minority makes it unpleasant – and occasionally dangerous – for Americans to visit. Roughly speaking Moslems are able to make Africa unfriendly to the US, but not Latin America or East Asia.

Among American Muslims there has been a clear separation between MI and its enemies. Growing public antagonism to Moslems because of the string of terror attacks had forced the majority of American Moslems who were opposed to attacks on Americans to create new Muslim organizations that firmly and strongly support the fight against MI and exclude any individual who supports MI. There was a struggle for control of each of the major Muslim organizations, after which all of them were clearly on one side or the other. (Like the struggle between communists and anti-communists for control of liberal organizations in the 40s.) American security organizations work with the Moslem organizations controlled by patriots against MI because they find that these organizations can be trusted. (This development among American Moslems would also be part of Scenario 3 and 5, and perhaps 1 and 2.)

Because Muslim organizations in America clearly expressed their patriotic commitment to the US, and could be seen to be fighting MI, and especially against terrorism, most Americans continued to accept Islam as a religion welcome in the US, and to protect Moslems against a backlash against MI. Generally Americans are able to understand that they are at war with MI, not with the religion of Islam. The early softness on this issue was gradually replaced by more realistic distinctions – as well as an acceptance of appropriate “profiling.” Of course there are endless excesses and injustices, and many difficult conflicts, causing much suffering to innocent patriotic Moslems in the US (although perhaps not as much as to Japanese-Americans in WWII).

Nuclear weapons are in the hands of Iraq and Iran, which produced their own, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt, each of which bought a few from Pakistan. All of the countries of the region have BW weapons, and they have been used several times in conflicts among Arab countries. Thus far there have been no attacks with nuclear weapons.

Modernization has proceeded slowly. Iraq benefited from Saddam’s replacement by a less extreme dictatorship and less ambitious foreign and weapons policy. But none of the ME countries, except Turkey and Israel, open their systems enough to experience their real potential growth, or to create a sense of progress and hope in most of the population. The loss of connection to the US also hurts their economies, although Europe is able partly to fill the gap.
Comment on Scenario 4

The big difference between Scenarios 3 & 4 is that the US has much more possibility in Scenario 3 of responding to its problem with military force, because MI only controls small and weak countries (except Egypt, which is large and weak). The US could easily remove any of the governments concerned, and if necessary occupy some of the countries, or at least dominate their governments. This “imperial” option is much less available if MI has Pakistan and Indonesia, as well as Iran and Afghanistan.

Also the distinction between Arabs and other Muslims is easier to maintain than the distinction between the almost random set of Moslem nationalities that support MI and those that do not.
Scenario 5: Militant Islam Dominates the Whole Moslem World

Moslems had watched believers in MI kill Americans for nearly 20 years. While there were some dramatic strike-backs, beginning with Afghanistan in 2001, only a few Moslem governments were brought down, no populations were decimated, and overall Islam had only suffered moderately from its fight against the US. And even while fighting back the US continued what Bernard Lewis had called its “anxious propitiation” of Moslem countries, trying to convince them that the US was not an enemy of Islam. Clearly the US was very reluctant to fight against Islam and it was easy to see that Western confidence was shaken, and its internal disputes were bitter.

And the actions that the US did take to try to protect itself against, or to respond to, terrorist attacks by MI created martyrs and additional reasons for hating the US. They were enough to cause anger but not big enough to cause fear.

The American retreat was immensely encouraging to Moslems everywhere. While many Moslems saw the triumph of MI and the separation of Islamic countries from the world society and economy as a disaster for Islam, they could not stand against MI when it seemed to be winning. (Europe had by 2020 realized that it had to either stand with the US or become dominated by the Moslems and be second class citizens in their own countries.) The greatest costs to Islam were opportunity costs, and most Moslems had no sense of how much they could have gained by continuing even their slow movement into the modern world. (Instead, because of their partial isolation they moved backward.) The psychological momentum toward MI was reinforced by vigorous repression of any Moslem voices that tried to speak in favor of the US or the West.

The psychological rewards to Moslems from their battle with America were very large. For most Moslems their submission to Islam is the center of their identity. They cannot imagine living without being Moslem. But Islam, which had once been the dominant and most advanced civilization in the world (especially to someone not aware of China), had lost its place, creating a permanent wound to the spirit of all Moslems. So when it seemed as if Islam might be able to bring down the society that had surpassed it, and there were hopes that a new time of Moslem conquest and expansion was at hand, Moslems’ pride was uplifted and they felt better. The sense of purpose and coming triumph from the struggle with the US more than made up for the worsening of their personal conditions which were, in any case, at best modest and more often bleak. They lived by emotions, and emotionally they gained from the war.

In 2020 every country with a Moslem majority is controlled by MI. The form of MI varies from country to country, as does as the degree of control, and the extent of internal resistance to MI. But a wave of emotion has swept the Moslem world. This does not mean that all, or even the great majority of Moslems have been caught up in this movement. But minorities who feel strongly and are willing to act can dominate their societies. And the believers in MI reinforce each other and brook no opposition. It is enough for them to succeed if the majority lacks conviction in opposing them.
While many Moslems, Christians and Jews continued to understand the common elements of faith in their religions, as a practical matter Islamic society cut itself off from and committed itself to attacking the non-Muslim world. In 2020 the element of fierceness in Islam gets out of hand and rejects any attempt at compromise with the West. Islamic governments understand that militarily they are weak, so their physical attacks against the US are in the form of terrorism by organizations with which the governments are careful not to become visibly connected.

India had been unable to survive the triumph of MI in its Moslem minority and broke into several Moslem and several Hindu states, with a vast exchange of population like that when Pakistan and India were created in the 1940s. [NOTE: This is a major issue which is outside the main focus of this analysis, and I’m not sure how plausible this item is. But it is hard to think of India’s Moslems as the only large Moslem population in the world that resists MI.]

Israel still survived in 2020 by virtue of naked nuclear deterrence. While everyone realized that Israel could be destroyed by Moslem nuclear weapons, and its retaliatory strike could kill, at most 5% of Moslems, no regime had yet had the impatience to try to destroy Israel with NW.

This scenario implies that all countries with Moslem minorities would have had problems. In some, as in the US, the local Moslems would have rejected MI and demonstrated loyalty to the host country. In others the Moslems would have been thrown out or severely repressed. But in all cases it would be a very difficult process. By 2020 there might still be countries where local Moslem minorities present a potential security problem.

The rest of the world doesn’t need Islam or the Islamic countries. (See below about oil.) By 2020, in this scenario, the world had in effect largely divided into the Moslem world and the rest of the world (ROW) with relatively few contacts. A driving force in the separation is terror attacks against the US and Europe, which in response have to restrict Moslem access, and are forced to recognize that the Islamic countries are not cooperating in preventing terrorist organizations from operating in their territories. Western Europe decides that it can live without young Moslem workers, although it allows most families who have lived for a long time to stay. (Generally they are replaced by East Europeans, Asians, and South Americans.) Tourism is gone. There is practically no investment and little trade. Diplomatic relations continue. Scholarly exchange continues almost entirely by email and the internet with very little travel. There are no students going from one side to the other. The result is a small reduction in the size of the world market, and a great reduction in the market within which Islam trades. Technology continues to advance in the ROW and moves backwards in Islam.

Islam wants to sell its oil to the world, and much oil moves across the divide. But the total demand is somewhat reduced because of the contraction of the world economy, and there is a very rapid growth of oil supply from non-Moslem sources, especially Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan heavy oil, but also FSU and West Africa.
By 2020 a cut-off of Moslem sources would still be a major problem for the rest of the world, but the Moslems would suffer more from such a cut-off, and the strong trend is toward making their oil unnecessary. Moslem oil capacity had declined from lack of investment and lack of first class technology, but their demand would be down in any case. [A specific oil scenario can be supplied if desired.]

Islam is willing to maintain relations with Asia, even though the Asians too are infidels. But the Asians see more dangers than advantages in relations with the Islamic world. The only thing Islam has that they want is oil, and that can be obtained on an arms length basis. Why should Asians jeopardize or complicate their relations with the part of the world that has money and doesn’t regard them as infidels in order to have contacts with the Moslem world?

Therefore the main connection between Islam and the ROW is terror attacks by MI and responses by the West. As the separation between Islam and the ROW becomes more complete it becomes much harder for MI to organize terror attacks. There are very few citizens of Moslem countries in the ROW, especially the US, other than those who have cut their ties with the countries from which they came. The few visitors from these countries are closely watched. The main danger is from European or American converts to Islam who do not disclose their religion. (The absolute number of Moslems in the US and other countries may continue to be in the millions – perhaps typically a reduction by half – but over the years it will be possible to create relations and systems that prevent those who remain from being an asset to terrorists.

By 2020 MI may be forced to move to using military delivery vehicles instead of covert agents to attack the West. It is unclear how much terror could be inflicted on the well-prepared US despite the separation from the Moslem world. But if terrorism were not possible they might try to use cruise missiles, UAVs, or ship-launched ballistic missiles, but their relative cut-off from Western technology and sources of supply would be a serious handicap, as would be the effort to prevent government connections to the attacks to avoid retaliation. Western defense would probably become dominant.

Nuclear weapons are in the hands of Iraq and Iran, which produced their own, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt, each of which bought a few from Pakistan. Many countries have BW weapons, and they have been used several times in conflicts among Moslem countries. Thus far there have been no attacks with nuclear weapons.

**Comments on Scenario 5.**

It is not clear whether it is possible for the conflict with MI to go so far by 2020 or ever. It certainly would be a catastrophe for Islam. And the number of terror casualties before the separation became complete, and before Western security practices were fully developed, could be very large. Western responses might also produce many casualties. Furthermore, this kind of war, like all major wars, also creates all kinds of unexpected side effects, most of which are negative. So the world would probably pay a heavy price even after it learned to isolate and protect itself from the Moslem world.
If this kind of radical separation did happen, it seems likely that it would be temporary phenomenon. Sooner or later, and probably sooner, the Islamic world would find a way to change itself – probably piece by piece – so that it could reestablish relationship with the ROW. And very gradually the conditions of 2002 would be restored, although quite possibly with a good many more nuclear and biological weapons around the world.

It would be wonderful if people with the best understanding of Islam can find reasons for confidence that this kind of scenario is impossible. But if they have to accept – as it seems they might – that such a scenario is only unlikely, but not impossible, then it becomes important to try to understand what should be done to minimize the chances of it coming to pass.

It seems likely that one of the dangers of a scenario like Scenario 4 is that it could lead in the direction of Scenario 5, although protection of the US might be even more difficult in Scenario 4 than Scenario 5.
Appendix to Scenarios: Israel’s Survival to 2020 and the Possibility of Nuclear War

All the scenarios assume that Israel is still an independent Jewish state in 2020 because it seems unlikely that Israel will be removed except as a result either of a missile attack which delivers enough weapons of mass destruction to kill a large share of the Israeli population (and military forces), or loss of US support. While these are possible it seems more likely that the first will be prevented by some combination of Israeli deterrence, counterforce, and missile defense, and US dissuasion. While there are plausible scenarios involving great harm and danger to Israel, including drastic decline in living standards and substantial emigration, as well as substantial casualties from attacks, these seem likely to lead to a strong defense by the remaining citizenry, involving whatever actions are necessary to protect against Palestinian attacks, rather than to an internal collapse or to a disguised surrender from which it is impossible to recover. (Israel might well make a disastrous agreement either because of error or American pressure, but the result would probably be a difficult and bloody response to Palestinian efforts to exploit the agreement to take control of the country, rather than a collapse.)

Basically Israel can only be destroyed if the Israeli army is defeated. While it seems possible that Israel could be weakened enough so that the army might be defeated, particularly if combined with missile attacks, it seems likely that Israel would be able to use its nuclear forces to stop the attacks before the country was completely overrun, although this would require action within hours of the failure of the Israeli ground forces.

One of the more plausible dangers of nuclear war in the Middle East would come if Israel were so weakened that its army might not be able to defend against an attacking Arab army and it could only prevent its population from being slaughtered by using nuclear weapons to compel its attacker to stop. If the attacker also had nuclear weapons this would mean a two-sided nuclear war. And if the US had let this situation develop and wanted to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, it would have to act within a few hours to stop the army about to overrun Israeli population centers.

Another scenario for nuclear war would arise if Iran or one of the Arab countries tried to use nuclear weapons against Israel. The special features of such a potential nuclear confrontation – compared to classic nuclear warfare analysis – are (i) because Israel is so small it can be relatively easily destroyed, and therefore its counter-threats are inevitably less than the threat to it, and (ii) the emotional quality of some of the governments (or others) that may threaten to use nuclear weapons against Israel give a special quality to the relationship.
Section II. Special Issues

A. Militant Islam: Introducing a Central New Issue for Defense Policy

This section discusses what may be the threat from MI and the questions that need to be answered to determine how great a threat it is, and how we need to respond.\(^1\)

The enemy who attacked the US on 9/11 was neither a gang of individuals acting for themselves, nor the religion of Islam, nor any nation or alliance of nations or states. We need to understand who is attacking us, what they want, and who they represent.

Like the other major religions, Islam is a complex and sometimes contradictory set of ideas and practices, with great variations from one age to another and among the many cultures and societies where it is found. It is not strong on quality control. That is, there is no strong system to ensure that the Sheiks, religious leaders, and teachers who speak for Islam and teach Islam are well educated in Islamic thought. And there have always been strong divisions within Islam, including the more than a thousand year old split between Shia and Sunni. Most Moslems have limited religious education and rely on, and can be influenced by, people who have very limited understanding of Islam and may present ideological concepts from secular sources as Islamic doctrine.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) It should be noted that MI is not the only terrorist threat, although it is by a wide margin the most dangerous.

\(^2\) The following is a notional estimate of the distribution of Moslem populations in 2020:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ME (Morocco thru Iran &amp; Cent. Asia)</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangla Desh</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asia</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Moslem countries</td>
<td>1,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-Moslem minorities have not been deducted from this total)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Moslem minorities</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Moslems</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(year 2000: 1,250)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(year 2000: 6,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our concept of “Militant Islam,” which is not generally used, classifies Moslem publics in three groups:

1. those who don’t believe that the West is an enemy of Islam;
2. those who believe that the West is an enemy of Islam, but an enemy too strong to attack; and
3. militant Islam, that part of Moslem publics who believe that Islam should be violently attacking the US and the West.

Our problem is with the last two groups. Of course any such simple categories ignore important distinctions. Many different kinds of people with various conflicting ideas are within each group.  

Islam classically divides the world into the territory of Islam and the territory of war, and generally sees non-Moslems as infidels with whom Islam should be at war if possible unless they are tolerated minorities in Islamic countries. Therefore Moslems who don’t see the West as an enemy must either have a sophisticated understanding of Islam, or not care about Islamic thinking. While there are numerous Moslem thinkers, some with very good credentials, who teach various theories about why the West is not an enemy of Islam that should be attacked if possible, they are not now mainstream (and many of them are afraid to express their ideas publicly).

Of course for many Moslems the idea that Islam should be attacking the West is very distant from their personal lives – a political equivalent of the idea that they should be good people who follow all the laws of Islam. Regardless of the division of the 1.2 billion Moslems between these three categories very few individual Moslems will actually engage in violent attacks against the West. But the division between the two main groups of Moslems – those who do and those who do not believe that Islam should be attacking the West – has important effects.

The structure that threatens us includes: (i) publics (that is categories of people), (ii) some sets of ideas, (iii) organizations that support and carry out terrorist attacks and spread the ideas, and possibly (iv) Moslem states. The main point of this analysis is to emphasize the need to minimize the size of the publics that favor violent attacks against the US and the West. We call these publics, “militant Islam (MI),” and define them by

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3 This definition of MI derives from Daniel Pipes’ article in Commentary, “Who Is the Enemy,” January, 2002, but is not the same as Pipes’ definition. Pipes defines MI in terms of three constituencies: (i) a core network of violent groups numbering in the thousands; (ii) believers in various forms of Islamist ideology, an “aggressive, totalitarian ideology” which makes the US its enemy on the basis of a combination of Moslem and political reasons, and includes some 10-15% of Moslems; and (iii) Moslems who hate the US on various broader grounds, which he estimates as half of all Moslems. Pipes’ definition is appropriate for the battle of ideas, which is a major part of the struggle. But it downplays the possible division between those who believe the US should be attacked and those who don’t, which in the short-run is the division that is most important for us, and the one that is easiest for us to work on. Although Pipes is among those who argue that the highest priority for the US is to make itself feared, his definition doesn’t reflect that approach to influencing Moslem minds.
their belief that it is the duty of the Moslem nation to attack the West. And we emphasize the importance of the publics as well as governments and in addition to specific organizations. The defining measure of a supporter of Moslem attacks on the West is that when such attacks result in harm to himself or other Moslems the supporter continues to favor more attacks rather than calling for attacks to stop.

There are two elements of the idea systems in the structure threatening the US:

- One element is Moslem reasons for disapproving or hating the US and the West. These ideas are based partly on classical Islamic ideas, partly on various combinations of variants of Islamic thinking and Western political ideas, and partly on current political issues.

- The other element is the conclusion that because of these ideas Islam should be attacking the West now, which depends on the judgment that such attacks are not essentially hopeless and therefore are required.

We could define our enemy as those who hate the West because of its conflicts with Islam, and who believe that Islam declares the US to be evil, but there are two reasons not to focus on these ideas. First, to challenge these ideas on the grounds that they are not the true teaching of Islam would require that we who are not Moslems argue about the meaning of Islam, which is not possible. While for our own thinking we need to understand Islam, we can only modestly influence an Islamic discussion on the meaning of Islam. Although, as Daniel Pipes has pointed out, we often make the mistake of trying. (See http://www.danielpipes.org/article/86.) Second, there is no chance of convincing enough Moslems to change their mind on this soon enough to be useful. Our interest in changing basic Moslem thinking about the West must be a long-term concern.

Nor can we change Moslem anti-Western ideas that are based on current Moslem policy grievances, or more fundamentally, on their civilizational frustration. We cannot make their societies rich or successful, any more than we can restore Islam’s lost glory. We could remove US presence from Saudi Arabia, but we cannot give up US interests in the ME. And we cannot satisfy – except perhaps for a few moments – Arab complaints against US support for Israel, because the Arab goal is to eliminate Israel. This makes the US conflict with the Arabs concerning Israel fundamental and unresolvable. The US policy of seeking temporary agreement with the Arabs on objections to particular Israeli policies – such as “settlements” – can not reduce the Arab grievance against the US concerning Israel because any such agreement that does not lead to the destruction of Israel will be followed by new Arab demands designed to further weaken Israel.\footnote{Theoretically we might avoid this problem by giving up US support for Israel, but such a desertion by the US would cause immense damage to the US position in the world and the US’s future influence, in the ME and elsewhere – apart from moral objections and US public opinion.}

Therefore to minimize the threat against us we must focus on the second element of the idea system supporting MI’s threat, the issue of whether the US and the West are
too powerful to attack. So we define MI as those who believe that Islam should be attacking the West now, and define our primary goal for Moslem publics as reducing the size of MI.

MI combines religious and non-religious appeals. Islam is a “whole-life” religion. Many people to whom Moslem identity is central do not consider themselves “religious.” Therefore even though MI’s message is ostensibly a religious message, firmly secular political leaders and sectors of the Moslem publics can respond to its appeal. And distinctly secular leaders can gain support from religious Moslems if they are defiant of the West. Secular leaders in Moslem countries (e.g., Saddam or Assad) who are enemies of the US are part of MI when they use Islamic appeals to gain support – even though their “real” motivation is anti-democracy or some other secular concern.

Defining the enemy who is attacking us, MI, in this way is based on the strategic idea of taking advantage of the fact that Islamic thinking and practice clearly recognize that Islam does not require Moslems to fight against enemies who are too strong to defeat. The idea is that since we want to stop being attacked we should define our target group as those who support attacks, and use the most effective approach to convincing them to switch to the group that believes we are too powerful to attack.

This strategy also has the advantage of focusing on a question whose answer is influenced by our actions – the question of Western power – rather than on questions of Moslem doctrine and theology. It also has the advantage of treating a smaller share of Moslems as our enemy – not all those who hate us, only those who believe we should be attacked.

This definition has the disadvantage that it prejudices the discussion against the State Department/University prescription for US policy, which is to strengthen and accommodate Arab and Moslem governments and remove sources of disagreement, such as US “tilting toward” Israel. This school of thought has to object to this definition of MI. Or they have to argue that the way to convince Moslems not to attack the US is to convince enough of them that we are not so bad.

Therefore this definition gets to the heart of the disagreement about the basic approach to the problem of protection from Islamic terror. Should we try to make Moslems like us more (hate us less), or should be try to make them fear us more? While defining our enemy as those who believe we should be attacked now, leaves some room for trying to reduce Moslem reasons for wanting to attack us, it inevitably leads to a focus on convincing Moslems that it is too dangerous to attack us, however much they want to.

Already with this definition of MI there is a paradox. Obviously most believers in MI are not getting on boats or planes to personally bomb the US or kill Americans. Nor do most believers argue that their government should immediately declare war on the US. So they do not believe that Islam requires an absolute and immediate violent attack against the US. MI believes in a general policy of attacking the US, but that the policy should be implemented with due caution and with different people having different roles,
and with most not required to personally take up arms. But this is a soft definition for a major threat to the US, because there is such a slippery slope between “it is not prudent to attack today” to “the question of attacking is not on the agenda until there is a change in circumstances.” And it is a little strange to be worried about the threat from people whose belief is defined in terms of what they think someone else should do. Nevertheless, despite the softness, we believe the distinction between those Moslems who believe that Islam should be attacking the US and those who believe that in the current circumstance it is too dangerous and unwise to attack the US catches the issue that is of the greatest importance to the US and the one that we can do the most to influence.

With this definition the size of MI can change dramatically from day to day – as was seen after 9/11 and then again after US defeat of the Taliban. It is awkward to be concerned about a population that can multiply or divide overnight, but that is the reality of the problem. We need to keep in mind the relationship between the volatility of opinion and the long-term perseverance of governments. The governments understand the volatility as a rare potential danger. They live with a background fear of a sudden consensus against them – although they understand that almost always they can protect themselves until the threat passes by. Because of this character of many ME political environments these countries have a quasi-stability. Nothing happens for many years, and then suddenly there can be a big change. This pattern of rigidity and brittleness applies both to policy and to political power.

It would be easy to decide not to pay attention to the evanescent rise and fall of public support for MI. But the danger of that practical policy is that it does not fail gracefully (and it has some other disadvantages in fighting terror, as discussed below).

Normally in order to protect our security we pay attention to what governments do, not to what people think. Why should we care whether MI is popular? Why must US policy seek to influence Moslem publics as well as Moslem governments? For two reasons: first, Moslem governments may come around to doing what enough of their people want; second, and more important, it will be more difficult to protect ourselves against Islamic terror attacks if MI is strong, that is, if large Moslem publics believe that Islam should be attacking the US.

The reasons that we need to weaken MI in order to fight terrorism are:

1. In any country where MI is strong the government is not likely to be able to prevent terrorists from being harbored unless it is almost as dedicated to preventing the harboring of anti-US terrorists as it is to preventing itself from being overthrown.

   It is not enough for the government to make a decision not to harbor terrorists, because terrorist organizations can operate with so little footprint that they will not be caught without loyal and active work by security services. If the government acts to control terrorists with no more skill and energy than it devotes
to most of its goals the terrorists will have a safe enough harbor in any country where MI is strong.

2. It will require stronger incentives (threats) to motivate Moslem governments to act against terrorism against the US if MI is strong in their countries.

3. If militant Islam is large then those who are ready to act against the West are selected from an ordinary population and see themselves as supported by something like a majority; they do not feel like outsiders, or special people. Instead they feel more like American soldiers who see themselves as ordinary people doing a necessary job. This is a more dangerous group of people.

4. When terrorists attack the US the US will need to do things which inconvenience or hurt the communities from which the terrorists come – whether the harm to the community is intentional or a by-product of measures designed to provide protection against future attacks. If the community disapproved of the attacks on the US, that is, if MI was weak, then the US responses are likely to make the community help defeat the terrorists in order to avoid further US reactions. But if MI is strong, then US responses are less likely to produce community action against the terrorists.

The current situation with terrorist organizations is misleading because it is dominated by the many well-known terrorist organizations. While the US has so far had only limited success in getting governments to close down these recognized terrorist organizations, doing so is a feasible task; because the demand we need to make is clear. (Turkey demonstrated how this works by forcing Syria to throw the PKK out of Damascus.)

But shutting down (or forcing underground) existing recognized terrorist organizations is only the first step. If MI is strong, new terrorist organizations will be formed that are less visible, or whose terrorist program is better concealed. After all, it is difficult to demonstrate that an organization that has never perpetrated a terrorist attack is a terrorist organization. But such organizations have to be suppressed or else any new organization will have at least one free attack.

If MI continues attacking the US, the truly difficult problem will come after all the Moslem governments agree to oppose terrorism against the US. If the US has to be the initiator and active supporter of action against people planning or supporting terror attacks then we cannot succeed. The only hope is for all the governments to internalize the need to prevent terrorist attacks against the US – presumably because they fear the consequences to their own survival if they fail to prevent the attacks. The US message will have to be, not “close down the XYZ group and arrest Mr. Q,” but, “you will be in big trouble if anyone connected to your country is involved in terror attacks on the US.”
At the heart of the problem are questions about the interactions between MI and governments. Can governments prevent MI from becoming strong in their country? If MI is strong in a country, in what way does the government have to take that strength into account? How strong does a popular movement like MI have to be to have a chance to take over a government?

The Arab governments are tight governments – mostly with fairly small populations – which have demonstrated for many years their ability to prevent internal opponents from threatening their power, and to know what is happening throughout their country. So MI is not likely to gain control by creating popular organizations with which to replace governments. And those governments are likely to be able to prevent the operation of terrorist organizations if they feel that their safety depends on it. In big, diverse, countries like Pakistan, and especially Indonesia, even if the government is able to protect itself against overthrow there are more holes in its control. In such countries the government often has at most limited ability to prevent activities in some areas.

But even where governments maintain tight control MI might gain important power by converting people to its message. MI’s message can catch on first with the civilian and military “junior officers” and others within Arab governments, and gradually become widely accepted within governments and among key supporters – as is apparently the case in Pakistan today. While much of MI’s message is critical of particular policies of Arab governments, it is not automatically rejected by government supporters, because it is criticism from essentially the same side, urging them to fulfill their own purposes. Frequently when MI tells their government “we should be fighting the West,” the real reaction of government leaders, which they can’t say, is “that would be great, but if we do that we’ll get in trouble and might lose power.” This position leaves room for MI to build support within the government. But it is also true that in many cases the main concern of the leaders of MI is to take power away from their own governments, using the flag of MI to attack those in power.

What Are the Differences Between Fighting Against Islam and Fighting Against Militant Islam?

While it is certainly not true that good Moslems have to be at war with the West, it is important to recognize that most of the ideas of MI build on mainstream Islamic doctrine and tradition. Although we insist that there is no war between the US and Islam, MI strongly believes that Islam is and should be at war with the West. When they attack us they claim to be acting not as sectarians but for Islam as a whole. Their appeal is principally to Moslems, as Moslems. In principle their goal is to convert us to Islam and make our countries become Moslem states – even though to us this seems so obviously impossible as to be absurd. (Often their leaders are more motivated by using this goal to attain power at home than by expectation of victory.)
In fighting the West as Moslems MI is acting in the spirit of a thousand year old tradition of Moslem wars against the infidel, able to call on the literature and memory of Moslem history with a strong hold in the consciousness of Moslem publics. The main difference is that traditionally Islam’s enemy was backward and despised, and Moslems expected to win by force of arms. Now Islam has to fight with the weapons and tactics of the weak, expecting to win because of the West’s psychological vulnerability, and Allah’s punishment of Western sin.

All of this is asymmetric. We have no desire to convert Moslems to Christianity or away from Islam. We don’t think they are sinners, or pagans. We are not troubled if most people have a different religion. In fact we have a strong trained inhibition against fighting on the basis of religion. Therefore we say both to ourselves and to Moslems that we are not fighting against Islam.

But we have another reason to deny that we are fighting against Islam. We are afraid of being at war with Islam and its 1.2 billion adherents. Partly this is because we are generally much more opposed to war of any kind than the Moslem world is. We have trained ourselves to pretend to believe that wars hurt both sides and accomplish nothing.

Our desire not to be at war with Islam creates a certain dilemma and contradiction for us. To the extent that we want to avoid war with Islam because we have nothing against it there is no dilemma – although Moslems will be skeptical about our lack of malevolence toward them. But to the extent that Moslems see us as wanting to avoid war with Islam because we are afraid of such a war, our fear will stimulate their hope and make that war more likely.

Our best argument against MI is that they shouldn’t start (continue) the war they are tempted to fight, because they have no chance of winning; because they are not strong enough to hurt us as much as we will hurt them. But our fear of such a war seems to show that they do have a chance of winning, and they do have the power to hurt us, badly.

The conclusion is that there is some danger that we will be in a war with Islam whether we like it or not, and that one of our highest priorities now must be to prevent MI from leading the rest of Islam into war against us. The goal of preventing most of Islam from joining the war against us requires that we understand their motivations and values – which are not the same as ours. It may also require that we think about how we could fight against Islam if we have to do so. We are more powerful and can win. But we also have enough inhibitions so that we could multiply the casualties and dangers before we do.

Comparison Between 1947 and 2002

In 1947 it was possible that we would be in a long struggle – a Cold War -- with communism; now it is possible that we will be in a long war with the Moslem world. In 1947 we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and had to decide whether to use that
temporary advantage to ensure that if there were a Cold War we would not be threatened with nuclear weapons. Now the West faces a potential enemy that has virtually no nuclear weapons, and we have to decide whether to ensure that if there is a long war with the Moslem world they will not have nuclear weapons to use against us. (But now biological weapons are available.)

The Soviet Union was malevolent, basically rational, and very cautious. The character of the Soviet Union was known to some in the West from the beginning, but continued to be strongly denied by important voices in the West until the end of the Cold War. The failure of Western policy-makers to accept Soviet reality cost many people their lives.

Islam does not have a central command and is also a good deal more emotional and less cautious than the Soviets were. There are those who argue that it has characteristic ways of responding. But there is great controversy in the West about the character of Islam and how to deal with it. There is already a substantial body of academic and other opinion in the West that presents as distorted a view of militant Islam as was presented of the Soviet Union.

The two questions now are the likelihood that much of Islam will go to war with the US and the West, and which approach of two contradictory approaches would prevent such a war and which would make it more likely.

Despite the natural inclination of Islam to view the West (or any non-Moslem society) as the enemy, during the 20th century – and even before -- Moslems became used to the idea of not attacking the West. These generations demonstrate that as a practical matter Islam does not have to be at war with the West. Moslems were able to find ways to be loyal and committed to Islam without feeling that they should be fighting with the West. And at that time all the reasons now given for Moslem hatred of the West were stronger then than they are now.

The unthinkable of fighting against the West gradually began to change in the late 1970s, especially with the Khomeini victory in Iran and his successful challenge to the US, which was followed by a string of unpunished attacks on Americans, including American soldiers and diplomats. During these same years many Moslems entered the modern world at least superficially, and Moslem oil power – and the wealth it produced - - became important.

There is good reason to think that the Moslem world now could go either way. It could return to the pattern of the 20th century where Islam practically accepted the idea of coexistence with the West, or large parts of it could come to believe that the Moslem time of conquest has come again, and/or that the proper state of Islam is to be at war with infidels. There is no doubt that especially in the last 6 years or so there has been substantial movement toward MI.
The basic assumption of this set of scenarios is that the most important question about the Middle East in 2020 is the extent if any that militant Islam has taken firm root.

The main conclusion is that if militant Islam does take firm root, particularly in the giant Moslem populations of Asia, the US will not be able adequately to protect itself from terror attacks and there will be drastic change for the worse in the conditions of the world because of the resulting separation of Moslem countries from the US and possibly other parts of the West.

The Moslem world, particularly if it is at war with the West, will continue to be weak and divided. The problem comes because we are vulnerable to attacks by those who are weak but very numerous. We are not in great danger of being defeated; the danger is that the struggle will be disastrously costly to us and to the world and to our values. In the end we can expect to win, but it might take as long as the Cold War and the stress this war would put on democracy may be the greatest challenge it has ever faced, and no one can be completely sure of the outcome.

This is an unquantified conception. Inevitably beliefs in a Moslem obligation to fight the West come in many different shapes and degrees. “Taking firm root” is also a matter of degree. And it is unclear how large a fraction of Moslems in any country have to join militant Islam before the shift becomes politically decisive.

In effect, I am saying that this is a process that will cause disastrous harm if it goes too far, and we do not know how far is too far. But too far does not seem to be at all impossible.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11th militant Islam had the support of a substantial share of the Islamic world. This support was drastically reduced by the US victory in Afghanistan. The rise and fall of militant Islam will be influenced by the following primary factors:

- Whether the US is perceived as powerful and determined or not.
- Whether militant Islam is capable of hurting or threatening the US (and to a lesser extent Israel or Western Europe)
- Whether there are any governments supporting militant Islam.
- Whether some Islamic countries begin moving into the modern world clearly enough to generate a sense of excitement and direction
- Possibly by conflicts between different elements within the Moslem world.
Whether Wahhabis are able to spend over a billion dollars a year of Saudi money to promote militant Islam.\(^5\)

How Real Is the Danger of a Major Challenge to the US from Militant Islam?

Much of this report is nearly apocalyptic, contemplating a long-term struggle in which there are persistent efforts to kill Americans and in which we suffer many thousands of casualties. How likely are we to face such a grave threat? It is easy to give arguments and evidence in favor of the danger, but is the danger real or is it some kind of intellectual panic?

So far there have been a small number of attacks on Americans abroad and one large attack against the US, more than a year ago (plus the ambiguous anthrax episode). There are two Moslem governments that are overtly hostile to the US and working hard to acquire nuclear and biological weapons. The US response to 9/11 demonstrated that the US would not crack if attacked. And it also illustrated the great harm that MI could inflict on the US economy and society. The US destroyed the government of Afghanistan as a result. There have been no more attacks on the US, although clearly we have not succeeded in making such attacks impossible nor have we destroyed any major terrorist organization. Why should we think that MI will make a major war against the US? After all, all the reasons for doing so have existed for many years, and there has been no war.

The major reasons for thinking the danger is real are:

1. The depth and breadth of Moslem hostility to the US.

   A number of the scholars who have the best understanding of Islam testify strongly to this. It is support by poll results, by the widespread Moslem celebration of 9/11, and by the lack of Moslem condemnation of terror attacks on the US.

2. The meager support the US has received from Moslem countries in the war against terror.

   Saudi Arabia has done practically nothing against funding for Al Qaeda and Taliban supporters in Pakistan, and has released Al Qaeda fighters, opposed the removal of Saddam, and continued to support Palestinian terrorism. Syria has not closed down any of the terrorist organizations.

\(^5\) Wahhabism is the special form of Islam that is the official doctrine of Saudi Arabia. It rejects pluralism within Islam and advocates attacking those who do not accept Islam. Currently it is widely estimated that more than a billion dollars a year is sent abroad by Saudis to pay for Wahhabi schools (madrassas) and preachers to convert Moslems to Wahhabi ideas. These programs paid for by the Saudis have been influential in Pakistan, Caucasian countries, the US, and elsewhere.
with headquarters in Damascus. Iran has not reduced its support for terror, and also harbors Al Qaeda fighters. Pakistan has provided major help to us but also continues to help Al Qaeda. The Arab countries are making demands on the US, rather than trying anxiously to assure the US that they will be with the US against terrorists.

This may all be evidence more of US weakness or misunderstanding than of Arab/Moslem determination. But it isn’t promising for the future.

3. Our vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

As a technical matter it seems extraordinarily difficult either to protect Americans from attacks or to prevent terrorists from organizing to produce attacks. And the possibility of attacks with biological or nuclear weapons raise plausible casualty levels by two orders of magnitude. Therefore it does not seem that MI has to be very strong in order to cause us great damage, and successful attacks are likely to build support for MI.

4. The possibility of not knowing which government to hold responsible for an attack on the US.

Implementing deterrence or retaliation when attacks are made by international groups with no clear government sponsor or “harborer,” is difficult. We could well have to act against three or four or more governments at the same time and in ambiguous circumstances.

The major reasons for thinking that the danger is overstated are:

1. Most dangers are overstated.

2. Moslem governments have demonstrated that they can control their populations.

   It has been many years since a Moslem government was overthrown by public dissatisfaction. (The last case was Iran in 1979 and Iran is probably the next case.)

   Therefore the alleged vulnerability of Moslem populations to getting out of control and being captured by their emotions should not be taken too seriously. What counts is the governments, and the US is able to deal with governments.

My conclusion: I am convinced by the arguments in favor of the need for strong action to prevent the expansion of MI in the Moslem world, although I have to respect the skeptics’ case. My view is that the danger of MI is too serious to take chances with. Moslems are 20% of the world population, there are more ways in which things can get
out of hand among them than we can think of, and we are very vulnerable to terrorism. Those who seem to me to be the best experts on Islam are worried, so I am too.
B. Possible Future Developments Concerning Moslem Minorities in Western European Countries and the European Role in the Struggle Against Militant Islam

In some scenarios – particularly if MI grows stronger -- Europe’s role in the struggle against MI can become very important. Currently Europe, especially Western Europe, is at most a reluctant and limited ally of the US – although of course in principle if there has to be a choice between democracy and MI Europe stands with democracy.

In the short term European policy is more the result of the general influences that affect the US-European relationship rather than of European analysis of the future of MI, the importance of which Europeans are now quite skeptical about. Europe wants to constrain American power, and feels a need to criticize American policies. Europe is happy to take business away from the US. So Europe has opportunities to profit economically and politically by distancing itself from the American fight against MI. These policy considerations, mutually reinforced by anti-American feelings of various kinds, especially among the left, combine with anti-semitism to make the Palestinian-Israeli conflict a wedge between W. Europe and the US.

Another element for a number of European countries, especially France and England, is their Moslem populations. (In France, mostly Algerian and other Arab, in Germany, mostly Turkish, and in England, mostly Pakistani and other Asian.) These populations have achieved a modest amount of political power which they can use to oppose support for the US and resist opposition to MI.

But there is an additional dynamic which may well become more important if the struggle with MI is prolonged and expanded. That dynamic is the path toward possible Islamic domination of some W. European countries. Today it is clear that the Europeans have the power to control their countries and force their Moslem citizens and residents to do whatever the Europeans decide, or to leave. The only question is about European will to do so. It is clear however that the power of the Moslems is growing – in the ways described below – and that it will gradually become more difficult for the Europeans to assert their control. The question is whether this gradual process could ever reach a point at which in some countries the Europeans would no longer be sure that they have the potential ability to regain control of their country and have to, in effect, use their remaining power to protect themselves while submitting to limited Moslem domination.

Part of the relationship between Moslems and locals in European countries is perceptions of superiority or prestige. In the US almost all immigrants admire America and wish to become American – whether or not they are also proud of and want to stay connected to their previous culture. A large share of Moslems who have settled in W. Europe do not feel that way about their new country. Not only do they want to stay Moslem, but they do not want to become French or British or German. They typically believe that the local culture is fundamentally inferior to Islam – and probably complicit in some way in bringing Islam down from its former position of power and glory. This
attitude results partly from the strength and character of Islam as a religion, and partly from European social and other rejection of Moslems.

To some extent Moslems in Europe feel that Islam is a superior way of life; that Islam was formerly the premier power in the world; that Islam is again on the rise; that while Europe is now rich and has powerful weapons, it is decadent and has lost its will; and therefore Islam is on its way to gaining control of Europe. This triumphalism or self-confidence will be importantly influenced by the strength of MI in the Islamic countries. If MI is fighting the US, producing terror attacks that the US is not able to prevent or respond to, many W. European Moslems are going to feel they are on the winning side, and ready to stand strongly against their host government.

The base of Moslem power in Europe is the Moslem areas (suburbs) in many big cities in which the police are afraid to operate for fear of violence or political backlash. This means that these are lawless areas, in which if any justice prevails it is Islamic, not the law of the land. There is a disproportionate amount of Moslem criminality, partly because of the availability of such lawless havens. Moslems also use crowd or gang violence in the standard fascist ways for political purposes, such as attacks on Jews, or demonstrations against Israel, or to protect themselves against legal problems. Politicians who are elected with Muslim votes – or who hope to get such votes – protect these illegal activities.

So far Europeans have generally followed a policy of appeasement to their Moslem populations – through some combination of fear and guilt operating through political correctness. But European opposition to the US in the war against terrorism has been almost entirely based on other reasons than fear of its Moslem minorities. So there has not yet been a broad test of whether Moslem pressures can force European foreign policy to change, although some individual politicians have had to decide whether to tone down their own foreign policy positions to avoid trouble from Moslem protests.

Moslem populations are growing rapidly while European populations are aging fast and some have already begun to decline. So the Moslem share of population age 20-40 will grow, although not enough to make a decisive difference by 2020.

One scenario is for the Moslems to use violence and harassment gradually to advance their interests in coming years by forcing favorable bureaucratic decisions on welfare or other financial matters, or legislation that strengthens their position compared to others. For instance they may push for legislation allowing for increased immigration on the basis of family unification, and then prevent enforcement of the limitations in the laws. And they might use a campaign against “discrimination” against Moslems as an offensive weapon. This could lead to increased Moslem power based on a combination of voting power, fascist-style use of violence, victimization appeal, and Moslem role in the labor market.

This development of Moslem power may affect the US struggle to protect itself from MI in two ways. First, European Muslims may protect the European activities of
terrorist organizations, or try to hinder European counter-terror efforts. Second, European Muslims will oppose proposals for their countries to support the US in the struggle against MI. On marginal issues such Muslim opposition is likely to have some effect. The more interesting question is whether local Moslems would make a difference if a country like France were to consider a major shift towards supporting the US.

A particularly sensitive issue is likely to be raised by Moslem violence against Jews in Western Europe. While there is controversy about whether anti-semitic feelings have recently increased, or become more open, among non-Moslem Europeans, in principle Western European governments have strong commitments against overt anti-semitism and against violent attacks against any religious groups.

There seems to be a good chance that in at least some W. European countries local Moslems will gradually escalate their attacks on local Jews. There is nothing in their own culture or value system to inhibit them from attacking Jews. If they are not stopped by the government such attacks may well increase to the point where a large share of the Jews will feel that they need to leave the country. It is hard to see how Jews can feel that it is safe for them to stay if attacks keep increasing and European governments don’t begin to act strongly to defend their own values against Moslem mobs or gangs.

If the Moslem communities have confidence in their own power, and do not feel that their host government is determined to insist on its own laws and values, then attempts to prevent or punish violent attacks on Jews will lead to escalating conflict between the government and the Moslem communities. This conflict may be the issue that brings the conflict between Europeans’ values and Moslem minorities in Europe to a head. It may force the Europeans to stop appeasing and to stand up to their Moslem minorities before Moslem power grows more substantial. But if the Europeans don’t meet this challenge and their reluctance to assert their values against Moslem communities leads to a substantial flight of Jews, it will eventually profoundly shock European opinion and probably US-European relations.

Even though much of MI may well make a strategic decision not to attack Europe, there are likely to be exceptions, so that the Europeans would also have to deal with terrorist attacks against their own countries by MI, although on a much smaller scale than the US. Such attacks, and responses to them by public opinion and by security organizations, will also influence the relations between European countries and their Moslem minorities. If the terror attacks are reasonably limited they may not change an overall policy of appeasement. This demonstration of weakness would further strengthen the Moslem minority – although it might also build European resentments that later contribute to a policy reversal. On the other hand, it would seem likely that if MI makes large, repeated terror attacks the European countries would stop appeasing and take control of their Moslem minorities, in order to prevent further attacks. Although there could be a period during which the European governments respond to terror attacks by MI in the way that Israel dealt with Arafat for a long time, seeking promises from their Moslem communities to stop terrorism rather than taking full actions against terrorist
organizations. And a decision by the Europeans to stop appeasing will lead to many
difficult civil rights issues.

It is also conceivable that terror attacks in Europe would be used not just to kill
Europeans but in support of Moslem demands. (That is, attacks might be timed and
targeted to support demands, rather than used against targets of opportunity to cause pain
and fear.) These demands might begin with demands that Europe refrain from supporting
“Israeli and US aggression against Moslems.” And some Europeans would ask why they
should die to support “bloodthirsty American policies.” But while MI might be
appeasable for a while, it seems likely that if MI feels that the Europeans are afraid of it
they will not be willing to allow Moslems to be less than equal to Christians in Europe.
One can imagine them asking: “Why should Moslems have to work on Friday when
Christians don’t have to work on Sunday? Why should there be a disproportionate
number of Christian judges on the courts? Why should not Moslems have as much a
right to live in Europe as Christians? Why should Jews, who use Moslem blood in their
religious rituals, be treated as equal citizens?” To MI these are all reasonable questions.
They believe that Islam has a right and obligation to rule Europe – as well as the rest of
the world. They will not see any reason to stop themselves.

Americans find it hard to believe that any country would let itself become
dominated by a small minority population, and fail to respond to massive attacks against
its citizens for fear of such a minority. But conflict has a way of seeming more
complicated when people are in the middle of it. Such struggles are often determined
more by will than by power. Appeasement has a long history among Europeans and
there will always be people who find arguments against responding to aggression. The
Moslem culture, on the other hand, typically leads people to respond aggressively when
they sense weakness. So it may not be beyond the realm of possibility for a European
country to gradually succumb to domination by its Moslem minority and the local allies
the Moslems had gained as they acquired power.

For US planning the conclusion is probably that we cannot count on European
support against MI. Probably if the struggle becomes very severe the Europeans will=eventually recognize that a successful MI will be a grave threat that cannot be appeased.
But things may have to become very bad before they decide not to let the US fight their
battle for them and decide to join in the defense against MI. It is difficult to know when
that might happen.

While such extreme concessions to Moslem minorities seem impossible to
consider, it may be worth remembering the how far the US went in appeasing Saudi
Arabia – letting US citizens be kidnapped and kept against their will in Saudi Arabia,
forcing American female military officers to wear abayas and right in the back of cars,
and not objecting to Saudi involvement in terror attacks on the US.
Section III. Outline of a Possible Program Against Militant Islam

The following is an example of a list of measures that the US might use to prevent the spread of militant Islam (MI) and to fight against international terrorism.

This program views the current support of terrorist organizations by Arab states as an opportunity for the US to discourage MI by demonstrating US power and determination. (It is an opportunity because the facts that we have a legitimate grievance against them and they are weak make them an ideal target for displaying our power.)

The first measure is to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to turn over Iraq to a civilian provisional government organized by the Iraqi National Congress. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq is not full of private armies. The Iraqi military is very unlikely to fight for Saddam. When it surrenders, and its arms are turned over to the INC, the INC will quickly be able to have a monopoly of military force in the country, except for the weak Kurdish forces which have agreed to remain as part of Iraq with federal arrangements, and will not try to take over the government. Until Saddam is replaced the US will not have enough influence seriously to reduce terrorism or to discourage the growth of MI.

The second measure, which is simultaneous with the others, is for the US to give verbal support to the democratic opposition to the government of Iran, and to informally encourage someone to provide this opposition with communication and other non-military equipment – while avoiding any US signals of accommodation with the current government. If within a year after the fall of Saddam this does not result in the replacement of the current government, the US would need to consider further measures.

The third measure is to call on Syria to end the illegal stationing of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and for the US to support Lebanese calls for an independent Lebanon. This measure should be justified partly on its own merits and partly on the basis of Syria’s record of support for terrorism. While the US should diplomatically make it clear that it is prepared to use force to remove Syrian troops from Lebanon, there is virtually no chance that after Saddam has been removed Syria will reject a US demand that its forces leave Lebanon.

The fourth measure is to demand the expulsion of recognized terrorist organizations from Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. A variety of political and diplomatic techniques can be used to support this demand, which is designed to protect the US from terrorism by eliminating international terrorist organizations. The key feature of this measure is to be very clear that the US insists on prompt action, and will not tolerate failure to meet the demand. It is likely that if the US does this, these governments will believe they do not have the power to resist. If any government does

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7 There is also a small Shia force that has been fighting in the South, which has been cooperating with the INC. And there is a substantial Shia force that has been in Iran for some time and which has therefore been under Iran’s control. Until the US allows the Iraqi opposition to organize a military force to preserve order in Iraq, there may be a danger from the Shia force now located in Iran, although it might not oppose an effort to establish a legitimate process for establishing a new government.
resist the US must act against that government until it complies or falls, avoiding any compromises that make it appear that we are reluctant to pay the price required to get our way.

It may be appropriate to carry out this measure one country at a time – but then each country should be allowed only one or a few months to comply before action is taken. Sudan is especially vulnerable because of its use of slavery.

The fifth measure – to be started after the removal of Saddam -- is to stop the flow of Wahhabi funds abroad for the spread of Wahhabism. This can be done by some combination of a change in the relationship with the Saudi government and steps to call attention to the injustice of Wahhabi minority rule in the Eastern Province (EP) of Saudi Arabia. If necessary the US can go on to steps intended to enable the EP to become independent.

Sixth, other measures against terrorism outside of the ME, especially concerning Pakistan.

Seventh, diplomatic and political measures to emphasize US support for the spread of democracy.

Eighth, measures to support and encourage Moslem opponents of MI.

Ninth, measures against non-Moslem international terrorism.

Tenth, in the improved political environment in the ME after the fall of Saddam and the Ayatollahs and perhaps the Alewite minority government in Syria, measures to encourage a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. The key elements of these measures need to be: (i) removal of the refugee issue by resettlement of the refugees like the other refugees of the period; (ii) the unacceptability of the use of terror; (iii) promotion of pluralism and debate among Palestinians; (iv) insistence on Israel’s having secure and recognized borders; and (v) a Palestinian state based on a Palestinian authority that is committed to pluralism and peace with Israel.

These ten measures would be useful themselves, both for reducing terrorism and for improving the political environment in the ME, and equally important they would also serve the purpose of weakening MI and increasing the ability of the US to gain cooperation. They are likely to greatly reduce the strength of MI.

If despite all these measures MI continues to be strong enough to be able to carry out more than an occasional terror attack on the US, despite the removal of all currently recognized terrorist organizations from every country, then the US would need to take measures to make ME governments understand that if there are terror attacks on the US, and a government is not able to convince the US government that the terrorists had no connection with its country, the US will take steps toward its replacement. Most of the
governments have internal enemies and are of doubtful legitimacy, so the US is likely to be able to find some appropriate way to act against any government that is not careful to make sure that its territory and facilities are not used by terrorists who attack the US.

It is important to recognize that the current assumptions and discussion are based on only one major terror attack on the US. If there are many such attacks the question of US policy will move to very different ground.