Patriotism and National Strength in Israel after the Lebanon War

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Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar and Efrat Peleg

The paper reflects the opinion of the author only
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Key points

Even in Israeli terms, the past year was very intense and posed many challenges for Israeli society. For this reason, the "Patriotism Survey," which the Institute for Policy & Strategy initiated last year, has become even more important. The Institute for Policy & Strategy and the series of annual "Herzliya Conferences" have aimed to assess national strength and security with the intent of helping to formulate a national policy on contemporary issues. The basic assumption underlying this survey is that the strength of the state cannot be assessed without addressing the patriotic component of its citizens. Thus, the events of the past year, and primarily the Lebanon War, underline the essential and immediate need for a comprehensive assessment of patriotism in order to determine whether, and in which ways these events have created fractures in the Israeli spirit.

This document presents in detail the findings of the IDB survey on patriotism in Israel in 2007, comparing them to the findings of the 2006 survey and with explicit reference to the impact of the Lebanese War on the Israeli public. The methodology of the 2007 survey is similar to that of its predecessor, with revisions and adaptations made to the questionnaire.

The primary conclusion is that despite the difficult events of the past year, the level of patriotism is high. These high levels were also present in last year's findings. The fact that they did not weaken is very notable. In fact, the emotional affinity to the state even strengthened to a certain extent. At the same time, there was a significant deterioration in the public's esteem and trust in central government institutions (that is, the government and the Knesset), as well as in its attitude toward the defense establishment. These negative changes are especially salient in light of the positive assessment given to the civilian population's steadfastness. In other words, the Jewish public draws a clear line between the failures of the state's leaders and the strength of its citizens, and is not ready to relinquish its commitment to Israel as a state and as a country, or the values and symbols of Israeli nationalism, because of the failure of the current political and defense leadership. The most important findings are:
The Jewish public

- A significant majority define themselves as Israeli patriots (67%), similar to the number last year.

- There is almost a full consensus in regard to the values and activity that express patriotism, with the most important of these being: readiness to fight for the state, the Hebrew language, Jerusalem, love of the land, and life in Israel.

- The readiness to sacrifice (92% are willing to fight), the extent of pride in being Israeli (83% are proud to a great extent) and the attachment to national symbols (85-89% attribute great importance to them) remain very high. There was no change in these compared to the previous year.

- Israel's Jewish citizens are more proud to be Jews than to be Israelis (94% versus 83%, respectively).

- The Israeli public takes its greatest pride in scientific and technological achievements, as well as achievements in art and sport. It is least proud of the government and the Knesset.

- The defense forces are ranked third as a source of pride, below scientific and technological achievements and achievements in art and sport. However, pride in the defense forces has suffered the greatest erosion, from 88% who said they were very proud of them in 2006 to 64% in 2007. During the past year and a half, the IDF has disappointed various population groups, due to its performance in Lebanon as well as the way it was used in evacuating Jewish residents, a mission that went beyond its traditional missions as a defensive force against an enemy. This event was even perceived as undemocratic in the eyes of many.

- The percentage of citizens displaying a great extent of rootedness – that is, preferring Israeli citizenship (89%) and committed to encouraging their children to live in Israel (87%) – did not change. However, there was a deterioration in both the strength of the citizenship preference (that is, the percentage of those absolutely committed to Israeli citizenship), which dropped from 71% to 64%, and in the strength of the commitment to encourage children to live in Israel, which slipped from 69% to 63%.
The overwhelming majority (77%) expressed a desire to remain in Israel and are not ready to emigrate. The principal motives that are liable to encourage emigration are the economic situation (32%), the security situations (26%), government corruption (11%), and the desire for personal development (10%).

The clear impact of the Lebanon War was expressed in a very strong decline in confidence in the government and in the Knesset, and a more moderate loss of trust in the defense forces and the media.

Contrary to this decline in confidence in the aforementioned institutions in the wake of the war, the emotional attachment to the state increased by a certain extent, and the Jewish public even gave a high grade to the civilian population's steadfastness.

Among the residents of Haifa and the North, Israeli patriotism and the emotional connection to the state strengthened even more in comparison to residents of other regions. They also expressed greater readiness to go to battle if necessary, and awarded higher grades to the civilian population's steadfastness during wartime.

There was no difference between the residents of Haifa and the North and residents of the other regions in regard to the negative impact of the war on the level of confidence in the government, the Knesset and the media. On the other hand, the negative impact on the confidence in the defense forces was more moderate among residents of Haifa and the North.

The level of patriotism among young people is lower than among their elders in all of the dimensions, as indicated in last year's surveys as well. In regard to sacrifice, there was even a decline in the strength of patriotism: The percentage of 20-year-olds who are sure they would mobilize for battle slipped from 59% in 2006 to 55% in 2007. The rootedness of the young people also remained lower than that of other age groups, though there was some increase compared to 2006. The percentage of those who prefer Israeli citizenship rose from 50% to 53%, but a more salient finding was that the percentage of those who are very interested in persuading their children to live in Israel rose from 49% to 56%.

As in 2006, the highest level of patriotism, as expressed in various ways, was found among the religious, and the lowest among the ultra-Orthodox. The disparity between the ultra-Orthodox and the other religious groups even widened: Their
self-definition as patriots weakened; their readiness to sacrifice declined; their justification of the right to conscientious objection rose; and their rootedness weakened, as did their pride in being of Israeli nationality.

- The right-wing camp indeed was and remains more patriotic than the left-wing camp. However, in comparison to 2006, there was a rise in Israeli patriotism among the left: Members of the left-wing camp showed a greater tendency to define themselves as patriots; their readiness to mobilize for battle increased; and their support for conscientious objection weakened. At the same time, the percentage of right-wingers who regard themselves as patriots declined, and the erosion in their preference for Israeli citizenship was much greater.

- Among those with higher education, the findings are mixed: On one hand, they define themselves as patriots more than members of other groups do; they are more ready to fight than the other groups; and their support for conscientious objection declined. On the other hand, their level of rootedness is the lowest. In regard to their readiness to sacrifice, despite showing the highest readiness to fight, and despite the fact that this readiness has remained constant (94% in both years), there was a decline in the percentage of this group who said they would definitely mobilize when needed (from 70% in 2006 to 64% in 2007). At the same time, erosion was recorded in both the percentage who strongly prefer Israeli citizenship (from 64% to 54%) and in the desire to strongly encourage their offspring to remain in Israel (from 68% to 52%).

- The trend of alienation among those of low income is continuing: They tend to see themselves as patriots to a lesser extent; their readiness to sacrifice is more hesitant; they are less proud of being Israeli and also less attached to the country's symbols.

- There is a diminution in the patriotism of new immigrants (who have arrived since 1990), and they are less patriotic than long-time citizens in most of the dimensions of patriotism, with the exception of pride.
The Arab public

- The Arab citizens identify themselves first and foremost as Arab patriots (85%), and then as Palestinian patriots (52%), and least of all as Israeli patriots (32%).

- There was erosion in most of the dimensions of Israeli patriotism compared to the previous year. For example, 44% of the Arab public said they are proud of being Israeli, compared to 50% in 2006. Similarly, 45% would strongly encourage their children to continue to live in Israel, compared to 58% in 2006.

- The war weakened the emotional attachment of the Arab public to the state, and most of them did not give high grades to the civilian population's steadfastness. These trends are opposite to those found among the Jewish public, as noted above.

- The weakening of the emotional attachment to the state is more widespread among the Arab residents of Haifa and the North (43%) compared to the Arab residents of other regions (33%). In addition, their assessment of civilian steadfastness is lower: 26% of the Arabs in Haifa and the North believe that the steadfastness was very poor, compared to 9% of the Arabs in other regions. These trends are also opposite to those found among the Jewish residents of Haifa and North.

The chapter "Patriotism and its Connection to National Strength" is based on the chapters "Patriotism and National Strength in Israel" and "Conceptual Outlines for Patriotic Affinity," which were written by Uzi Arad and Gal Alon in the 2006 Patriotism Survey, with some revisions. In the 2007 Herzliya Conference, a working paper will be presented that focuses on surveying the differences in patriotism between Jews and Arabs. The working paper is entitled "Patriotic Views in the Jewish and Arab Public: A Comparative Look." This paper was prepared by Ephraim (Effie) Ya'ar and Efrat Peleg.

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Patriotism and National Strength in Israel

"National strength," a term that has already taken root in the Israeli public, partly thanks to the annual series of "Herzliya Conferences," seeks to encompass a range of dimensions of strength that are regarded as vital for a state's existence and prosperity. This concept expands the borders of the older concept of "national security" because it also includes more abstract dimensions that are essential for a state's strength, such as national morale, a feeling of purpose, steadfastness and faith in the justness of the cause – beyond the well-known dimensions of strength such as economic, political, international, social and governmental dimensions. A state's material strength cannot be maintained without spiritual strength. Therefore, these two components together comprise the balance of national strength.

The generic name "patriotism" is given to these abstract dimensions that express a commitment and emotional affinity of the individual toward his community. Thus, we have also sought to borrow this term in order to describe and analyze the Israeli public's spirit of affinity and loyalty. We preferred using the concept of "patriotism" to the concept of "Zionism," which is not only a loaded term but is also unique to Israeli, making it less suitable for comparative purposes.

An historical study indicates that the discussion of patriotism began as early as the 4th century BCE, when the Greeks argued about the primary attributes of the desirable citizen and the morality of preferring the nation to the human race in general (Stewart 1917). The word "patriotism" derives for the Greco-Latin concept "patria," which means "father" and "fatherland," and in Latin the concept also refers to fellow citizens. In other words, the term patriotism is directed toward the feeling of affinity, identification and loyalty to a "fatherland" and to the "heritage of the fathers" to the extent of being ready to defend them from an enemy.

Despite the fact that the essence of patriotic feeling is clearly a particularistic affinity for a human group that shares common characteristics, there is a disagreement on the question of whom and what the patriotic affinity is directed toward. The classic view, reflected in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville and George Orwell, maintains that it is an affinity to land, to founding fathers and to the heritage of the past. On the other hand, Abraham Lincoln described a different type of affinity, based on a way of life, a constitution and system of government, and less on territory and blood relations. According to Lincoln, patriotic affinity is based on consensual agreement on a political idea. Thus, he argued that a more precise term would be "covenanted patriotism" because of the importance of the social covenant that unites a political community (Schaar 1973).

Despite the differences between these two approaches, they still regard patriotism as a particularistic emotion directed toward a distinct community. Another interpretation of patriotism, which breaks through the walls of particularism, was proposed by the contemporary philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Martha Nussbaum. They both call for replacing the attachment to homeland and nation with a cosmopolitan attachment by making humanistic-universal values the glue that links people (Canovan 2000, Markell 2000, McClay 2003). This proposal has not become popularly accepted and patriotism remains
based on an affinity toward a specific political entity that is connected by bonds of language, culture, history and ethnicity.

In light of the attempt to get to the roots of patriotic attachment, also in contemporary Western democracies, there is a salient lack of research literature on this topic in Israel. Samuel Johnson's oft-quoted witticism that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," is especially prevalent in Israel, and has served as the first refuge for those here who wish to evade any study or discussion of the subject. Perhaps researchers in Israel have refrained from addressing patriotism because in the Israeli context it has largely been associated with a nationalistic and aggressive character, ignoring the fact that patriotism includes an essential and defensive foundation that expresses affinity, pride and commitment to the collective. Indeed, the research literature in the world makes a clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism expresses a positive value, unites and builds for the national group, while nationalism expresses aggressiveness and downplays the value of other nations. (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001, Antony 2003, Blank & Schmidt 2003, McClay 2003, Federico, Golec & Dial 2005.) Perhaps trendy forces of relativism, post-modernism, post-Zionism and privatization have contributed to the erosion of the value of patriotism in academia and among publicists in Israel.

The lack of discussion in Israel about patriotism does not mean it does not exist. As an instinctive emotion, it is alive and well in Israel, and is reflected in many ways. However, the dearth of academic and public discussion is outrageous because the role of leaders and guides is to continue to instill patriotic spirit. Pericles' oration describing his pride in the Athenian democracy, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Churchill's writings and speeches, and Kennedy's inaugural address were all sources of inspiration and served as milestones in developing constructive and defensive patriotic feeling. In Israel, it seems that leaders are weary of patriotic inspiration, except when it comes to justifying the sacrifice of the fallen on Memorial Day or in soliciting contributions.

In order to fill the deep vacuum in addressing patriotic feeling, it is essential to break down this emotion into parts and to make it the subject of empirical study. The in-depth academic discussion that began overseas in recent decades showed that patriotism can be directed to various channels and that there are various expressions of patriotism. Schats & Stauc (1997) and later Parker (2003) identified three prevalent types of patriotism. They called the first type "symbolic patriotism" because of the emphasis on the attachment to symbols and to America itself. The second was defined as "constructive patriotism," which is channeled toward constructive and rationale criticism of the regime and its actions; and the third was identified as "blind patriotism," which represents blind and irrational loyalty.

Sullivan, Fried & Diez (1992) expanded this, pointing to five types of patriotism: "rebellious patriots," who regard the symbolic attachment as something dangerous and channel their love for the state through critical activism; "environmental patriots," who sanctify the environment and the land, and regard polluters of the environment as traitors; "capitalist patriots," who champion the giants of the American economy and see economic growth as the fulfillment of the patriotic vision; "symbolic patriots," who display a strong and uncritical emotional attachment to the state; and "national symbolic patriots," who hold more extreme views, placing American at the top of universe and rejecting the possibility that it might err.
All of this shows that in our attempt to study the patriotic spirit, we should take into account a range of views and behaviors that are likely to express different aspects of patriotism. For this reason, the Patriotism Surveys are based on a series of diverse questions taken from the studies mentioned above, as well as from additional international (ISSP, WVS) and American (AEI 2005) research. From this pool of research, we identified the four most relevant dimensions for the phenomenon of Israeli patriotism: the dimension of sacrifice; the dimension of rootedness; the dimension of pride; and the dimension of symbolism. Each of these dimensions represents a different aspect of patriotism and is expressed in the survey in a series of questions and statements aimed at indirectly examining each aspect.

A short discussion of the spheres of patriotism is also necessary. Differences in opinion regarding the object of patriotic affinity and the complexity of the Israeli case require us to clarify which spheres the respondents could channel their patriotic feeling toward. We identified three principal and separate spheres of identify that are relevant to the Israeli case: the Israeli sphere; the Palestinian/Arab sphere; and the sphere of foreign citizenship, which is relevant to those living outside of the state or to those living within it who hold foreign citizenship.

In this context, it must be noted that while the patriotic affinity and the channels toward which it is directed have been widely discussed in the academic literature, the discussion about spheres of patriotism and the situation of "multi-patriotism" is still at an early stage. Thus, the Israeli patriotic affinity of an Israeli who emigrated from Israel or of a Jew who never resided here might pass the tests of operative patriotism and become independent of time and place.
Patriotism and National Strength in Israel

Methodology
The current survey was conducted against the background of the events that occurred during the past year, and it can be assumed that these events influenced every citizen of the state in one way or another. There is no disputing that the central event Israeli society had to contend with last year was the Lebanon War, including the IDF's lack of preparedness for war after long years of training for confronting the Palestinians in the territories. Therefore, an attempt was made in the survey to assess some of the war's potential impact on patriotic spirit. Nonetheless, the importance of other significant developments should not be underestimated, especially the disappointing results of the disengagement plan on the political and security level, of which the firing of Qassams is only one of the most prominent; the deployment of the IDF as a force to evacuate Jewish settlements, an integral part of the nation; the growing signs of moral corruption in the government system; the intensification of the internal Palestinian battle between Hamas and Fatah; and the escalation of the Iranian threat.

In order to examine whether changes occurred in the various aspects of Israeli patriotism as a result of these developments, the 2007 survey – while mainly based on the 2006 survey – includes a number of revisions and adaptations. These changes were necessary in order to add relevant aspects to the content of patriotism, as well as to include a specific discussion on the results of the war. The revisions were also the result of statistical tests conducted on the questions of the previous survey.

The survey was conducted in late December 2006 among a random sample of about 800 people, who comprise a representative sample of the adult population in Israel. The questionnaires were also translated to Russian and Arabic in order to ensure accessibility for these sectors. The sampling work, translation of questionnaires and collection of data were performed by Midgam Research and Consulting. The questionnaire, which appears as an appendix, includes a series of questions and statements pertaining to relevant dimensions of Israeli patriotism: levels, spheres and subjective perceptions of patriotism; readiness to sacrifice; rootedness; national pride; attachment to national symbols; and the Lebanon War's influence on aspects related to patriotism. The chapters of the survey also appear in this order.
Subjective strengths of patriotism, its spheres and components

The overwhelming majority of the citizens in Israel say they are patriots to some extent. Among Jews – adults, the wealthy, those with higher education, and those who are not ultra-Orthodox or new immigrants tend to attribute themselves with a stronger level of patriotism. An in-depth study of the level of patriotism among various groups in the Jewish public indicates that some have experienced erosion in patriotic affinity, while other groups show an increase.

60% of the survey respondents define themselves as patriots "to a great extent." Among the Jewish public, 67% define themselves as patriots to a great extent, while 36% define themselves as patriots "to a very great extent." Only 7% of the Jews regard themselves as explicitly non-patriotic. In comparison to the United States, the percentage of patriots in Israel is slightly lower: 72% of American citizens declared in 2005 that they are patriots to a great extent (Gallup 2005).

To what extent do you see yourself as an Israeli patriot?

Illustration 1: Israeli patriotism in the Jewish public, 2007

Older people are more patriotic than younger people. Among the youngest age group (18-29), the percentage of those who define themselves as patriots to a great extent is 51%, compared to 84% among the oldest age group (60 and older). The percentage of young patriots significantly declined compared to the previous year, when the percentage stood at 60%. The difference between the youngest and the oldest is also prominent when comparing the percentage of very ardent patriots in these age groups: The percentage of
very ardent patriots among those 60 and over is double (48% versus 24%). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the percentage of very ardent patriots among those 60 and over declined compared to the previous year (57%). At the same time, there was an increase (from 69% to 73%) in the percentage of those in the 50-59 age bracket who regard themselves as patriots to a great extent.

Illustration 2: Patriotism according to age, in the Jewish public 2006, 2007

Patriotism is strengthening among the left, but weakening in the right and center. In the right-wing bloc, 67% regard themselves as patriots to a great extent, compared to 69% in the center and 68% in the left. The percentage of non-patriots is also similar, ranging from 4% to 7%. The group within the left that rejects Israeli patriotism shrank from 9% in 2006 to 5% in 2007. The increasing similarity between the political groups is accompanied by a diminution of the high level of patriotism among the right (down from 74% in 2006) and center (down from 75% in 2006), and a rise in the highest rating of patriotism among the left (up from 62% in 2006). Two explanations were found for the decline in the self-definition of patriotism among the right: First, this may be a result of the criticism of the disengagement plan by the right, including the deployment of the IDF to evacuate a Jewish civilian population – a use considered undemocratic by many. In addition, the decline in patriotism among the right may be linked to the change in the political map, since the right-wing camp has grown since 2006. In 2007, 52% of the Jewish public said that they belonged to the right-wing camp, 30% in the center and 18% in the left. In 2006, 45% classified themselves as right-wing, compared to 36% in the center and 20% in the left. Perhaps the entry of new population groups into the right-wing camp is one of the factors that contributed to the process in which the political camps became more similar.
Illustration 3: Patriotism according to political views, in the Jewish public 2006, 2007

Religious Israelis are the most patriotic, followed by the traditional and the secular, with the ultra-Orthodox last by a large margin. The religious stand out in defining themselves as patriots "to a great extent" (80%), compared to the traditional (68%), secular (67%) and ultra-Orthodox (46%). The relative weakness of patriotism among the ultra-Orthodox is also expressed in that 26% of the ultra-Orthodox say they are not patriots at all, compared to 4% to 6% among the other groups. In comparison to the previous year, there was a decline in the percentage of ultra-Orthodox and traditional Israelis who said they were patriots to a great extent (52% and 74%, respectively, in 2006). It is interesting to find that despite the religious public's harsh criticism of the disengagement plan and the role the IDF played as an evacuating force, this did not lead to erosion in its patriotism (as saliently reflected throughout the survey). On the other hand, the ultra-Orthodox public's opposition to the disengagement plan, with all of its ramifications, may have profoundly affected this community and thus explain its decline in patriotism (which is also salient throughout the survey).

The disparity widened between the patriotism of high-income and low-income Israelis. In contrast to the pattern of similarity between the politic blocs in regard to patriotism, there is a clear gap between those who earn a high income (81% are patriotic to a great extent) and those who earn a low income (57% are patriotic to a great extent). This disparity between high-income and low-income Israelis becomes more strongly discernible in light of the finding that 16% of low-income Israelis are not patriots, compared to only 1% among those with high incomes. In 2006, the percentage of non-patriots with high income was greater (6%).

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University-educated Israelis are the most patriotic. 72% of those with university education see themselves as patriots to a great extent, compared to 64% of those with high school education and 62% of those with post-secondary education. Among the university educated, the percentage of those who reject patriotism declined from 9% in 2006 to 3% in 2007.

Long-time citizens tend to be more patriotic than new immigrants. Israelis who were born in Israel or arrived prior to 1990 tend to be patriots to a greater extent than immigrants who arrived in 1990 or afterwards: 69% versus 58%, respectively. This difference becomes more acute in light of the finding that for every new immigrant who is a patriot to a very great extent (17%) there are about two long-time Israelis who defined their level of patriotism in this way (39%). This finding indicates a different pattern than the one found in last year's survey, which showed greater similarity between long-time Israelis and new immigrants, with even a slightly higher percentage of new immigrants describing themselves as patriots to a great extent (66% of long-time Israelis versus 69% of new immigrants).

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1 The analysis will mainly focus on groups with at least high school education because of the tiny percentage of those with only elementary education or less in the Jewish public (2.7%).
In the Jewish public, there is almost complete consensus in regard to the activities and values most connected to Israeli patriotism, especially the willingness to fight for the state, the Hebrew language, Jerusalem, love of the land and life in Israel. 96% of the Jews declared that the willingness to fight plays a central role in patriotism and 95% of the Jewish attributed similar importance to the Hebrew language, Jerusalem, love of the land of Israel and life in Israel.

Questions about the importance of Jerusalem and the Hebrew language were only asked in 2007.

Illustration 5: Patriotism according to length of citizenship, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007
The ultra-Orthodox, religious, traditional and secular Israelis all agree on the importance of Jerusalem and life in Israel. As expected, the secular public attributes less importance to the Jewish components in its perception of Israeli patriotism. 100% of the ultra-Orthodox and the religious and 99% of the traditional stated that respect for the Jewish tradition is quite important, at least, compared to 83% of the secular. An even larger disparity between the secular and the other groups was revealed in regard to the importance attributed to the Bible and the heritage of Israel’s prophets. 93% of the ultra-Orthodox, 96% of the religious and 93% of the traditional believe that there is a significant link between the Bible and Israeli patriotism, compared to 68% of the secular. 91% of the ultra-Orthodox, 94% of the religious and 84% of the traditional emphasized the importance of the Jewish heritage, compared to 57% of the secular. On the other hand, all of the sectors attributed the same level of great importance to voting in elections, with 89% of the ultra-Orthodox and religious, 85% of the traditional and 91% of the secular Israelis. In comparison to the 2006 survey, an increase in the importance of voting in elections was recorded among the ultra-Orthodox, the religious and the secular: In 2006, 81% of the ultra-Orthodox, 71% of the religious and 84% of the secular attributed a high level of importance to voting. It seems that due to the abundance of events during the past year, the public sees greater importance in participating in the decision-making process. It will be worthwhile examining this stance over time in light of the continuous decline in the voting rate in Knesset elections; the 2006 elections witnessed the lowest percentage of voting in the history of the state, about 63%. Similarly, it is worth noting that the level of importance attributed to voting by the various groups in Israel does not reach the level of importance attributed to this activity by the public in the United States, where 97% said that voting constitutes an important part of patriotism (Gallup/Harwood 2002).

The importance of the readiness to fight and voting in elections increases as the level of education increases. A lower percentage of those with elementary education and less defined the willingness to fight as a value that is quite important for Israeli patriotism: 62%. This compares to 85% among those with a high school education, 95% of those with post-secondary education and 93% of those with university education. Those with low levels of education also regard voting in elections as a value of lesser importance in comparison with the other education groups: 75% define voting in elections as important
for patriotism versus 83% of those with high school education, 87% of those with post-secondary education and 91% of those with university education.

**Those with above-average income place greater emphasis on the centrality of fighting for the state than those with low income.** 95% of those with high income regard fighting for the state as an important subject for patriotism, compared to 79% of those with low income. This finding corresponds with the growing trend of alienation toward Israeli patriotism on the part of those who earn low incomes.

**How important are the following things for Israeli patriotism?**

![Illustration 6: The important of various activities for patriotism, in the Jewish public, 2007](image-url)
How important are the following values for Israeli patriotism?

Illustration 7: The important of patriotic values in the Jewish public, 2007
The dimension of sacrifice

The overwhelming majority of the Jewish public declares that it would be ready to go to battle if required to do so. The greatest level of willingness is found among older Israelis, the religious, those with high income, the university educated, long-time Israelis and men.

The readiness of individuals in the Israeli public to sacrifice their lives for the collective is very high: 92% tend to agree to fight for the state, while 70% are definitely sure that they would defend it in time of need.

Would you be ready to fight for the state?

![Pie chart showing the readiness of the Jewish public to fight for the state.](image)

Illustration 8: The readiness for sacrifice in the Jewish public, 2007

The willingness to fight for the state is inversely related to the age of the group, and the readiness of young people to fight has weakened. In the oldest group (60+), 80% definitely agree to fight, while the percentage among the youngest group (18-29) is only 55%. While the readiness to fight among young people did not change significantly (rising from 86% in 2006 to 87% in 2007), the percentage of those who say they would definitely mobilize for battle declined from 59% in 2006.
The left's willingness to fight strengthened, while the readiness of the right weakened. The left's tendency to mobilize and fight is higher (97%) than that of the right and center (both 91%). However, this should be qualified by noting that in terms of those who are "definitely" ready to fight for the state, the right is in first place with 73%, followed by the center with 67% and the left with 62%. Nonetheless, the general trend is a strengthening of the readiness of the left-wing camp and a weakening of the willingness of the right-wing camp, as also found in regard to the level of patriotism. In 2006, the readiness of the right-wing camp to fight was 96%, compared to 86% in the left. Among those who would definitely fight, the right also was more represented in 2006, with 77% compared to 55% in the left.

Illustration 9: The readiness for sacrifice by age, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007

The general willingness to fight tends to be slightly higher among those with university education. 94% of the university-educated say they would mobilize in time of need (the same percentage as last year), compared to 88% of those with post-secondary education and 90% of those with high school education. However, the percentage of university-educated who said they would definitely mobilize in time of need declined from 70% in 2006 to 64% in 2007.
Illustration 10: The readiness for sacrifice by education, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007

The **highest readiness for sacrifice is in the religious public and the lowest is in the ultra-Orthodox public**. The ultra-Orthodox are exceptional in both their more limited readiness to mobilize (64%) and in the significant erosion in their readiness to mobilize for the war effort, which fell from 87% in 2006. The readiness of the three other groups ranges from 93% to 96%. These differences between the sectors become more clear when examining the “definite” readiness to sacrifice: The religious are much surer that they would mobilize in time of need (85%), followed by the traditional (74%) and the secular (66%).

**Those with high incomes are most ready to be called to the flag and go to fight.** The highest readiness for sacrifice is among those with high incomes (96%), though the readiness to fight among those with low incomes is still high (82%). In comparison to the previous survey, the gap between the rich and poor widened further: In 2006, 91% of those with low incomes said they would almost certainly agree to go to war, while the percentage of those with high incomes did not change significantly (95%). This pattern corresponds to the trend reflected throughout the survey of a decline in patriotism among the poor.
Illustration 11: The readiness for sacrifice by income, in the Jewish public, 2007

The level of readiness for sacrifice among new immigrants is lower than that of long-time Israelis. The readiness of new immigrants stands at 86% compared to 92% among long-time Israelis. In 2006, the two groups expressed the same readiness (94%). Thus, there was apparently significant erosion in the preparedness to fight for the state. Moreover, when examining the percentage of those who express a high degree of readiness, it becomes clear that the erosion among new immigrants was even greater – from 74% to 58%, while no change was recorded among long-time Israelis.

The readiness for sacrifice among men is higher than among women. The gender gap in regard to the tendency to agree to fight is relatively small, 94% versus 89%, but it is much wider at the highest level of readiness: 81% of men definitely agree to fight for the state, compared to 59% of the women. It is almost certain that the gender gap in this area does not mean that Israeli women are less patriotic than Israeli men. Rather, it is because women in Israeli society usually do not serve in combat positions. The fact that in most cases no patriotic weakness was found among women makes it clear that this indeed is not an expression of lack of patriotism but rather a response to the prevalent norm of non-combat service for women.

A mirror image of the readiness for sacrifice is the justification of an individual's right to conscientious objection to war. It was found that half of the Jewish public recognizes the right to conscientious objection, while the other half rejects this (as in the previous survey). A strong tendency to support conscientious objection is apparent among those in their 20s and 30s, the ultra-Orthodox, leftists, those with low income and new immigrants.
Do you agree that there is justification for refusing to fight in a war that you believe to be immoral?

Illustration 12: The justification of the right to conscientious objection in the Jewish public, 2007

The two youngest age groups support conscientious objection to a greater extent than the two oldest age groups, with levels of support of 53% and 45%, respectively, among the two youngest groups. Last year, no differences were found between the groups; that is, support for the right to refuse strengthened among young people, while it weakened among their elders.

The ultra-Orthodox public diametrically changed its view and is conspicuous in its strong support for conscientious objection. 64% of the ultra-Orthodox justify the right to refuse, compared to 45% to 50% in the other groups. This represents a dramatic change, because in 2006 the ultra-Orthodox group had the lowest percentage of those justifying refusal, 32%. At the same time, the percentage of secular Israelis who support the right to refusal declined from 57% to 50%. It seems that in this case also, the disengagement plan and the anger over it in the ultra-Orthodox public led it to become a supporter of conscientious objection.
The justification of the right to refuse to fight for ethical reasons is more prevalent in the left, though there was a decline in the proportion of leftists who support this right. The level of support in the right, center and left for conscientious objection is now 43%, 53% and 57%, respectively. However, in comparison to the previous year, the gap between the left and right narrowed, particularly because the left's support for the right to refuse significantly diminished – this support stood at 68% last year. As in the findings on patriotism and sacrifice, a strengthening was evident in at least some of the dimensions of patriotism among the left; thus, the political blocs became closer.

Among those with low incomes, there is more recognition of the right to refuse than among those of moderate and high income (55% versus 47%). Last year, a similar pattern emerged, though the disparities were smaller then.

There was a decline in support for conscientious objection among the university educated, while this support rose among those with high school education. In the current survey, no significant differences were found between groups of different education in regard to the justification of the right of refusal. Still, two changes should be noted that occurred since last year on this subject – a decline in the support for the right to refuse among those with university education (from 58% to 49%), as opposed to an increase in support among those with high school education (from 41% to 50%).

Illustration 13: The justification of the right to conscientious objection by level of religiousness, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007
The positions of new immigrants and long-time Israelis grew further apart in regard to the right to refusal. The new immigrants agree more so than long-time Israelis that there is justification for the refusal to fight in a war that does not seem moral, at 57% and 48%, respectively. In 2006, this gap was only 2% (53% and 51%, respectively). Still, when examining the strength of support for the right to refuse, it turns out that among new immigrants it was higher last year than today. In 2006, 42% strongly justified conscientious objection, compared to only 15% in 2007.

Men express less support than women for the right to refuse to fight for reasons of morality, with respective levels of support of 43% and 54%. Still, it should be noted that the percentage of support among women last year was higher (61%), while this support among men was a bit lower (40%). These trends led to a narrowing of the gender gap on this issue.
The dimension of rootedness

The rootedness among the Jewish public is indeed very strong, but there has been consistent erosion in its strength – that is, a smaller percentage of the population expressed a rooted connection to a very large extent.

Nearly all of the Jewish public (89%) greatly prefer or quite prefer Israeli citizenship to any other citizenship. A similar level of preference was also found last year, though there was a decline in the strongest preference from 71% to 64%.

How much do you prefer being an Israeli citizen and not a citizen of another state?

Illustration 15: The preference for Israeli citizenship in the Jewish public, 2007

The right attributes more importance to being an Israeli citizen, though it also experienced the highest level of erosion compared to 2006. The percentage of those preferring to be Israeli citizens is higher in the right (92%) than in the left (85%), with the center in between, at 88%. The difference between the right and left is more substantial among those who strongly prefer Israeli citizenship. Among the right, 69% belong to this category, with the center at 64% and the left at 50%. However, while the strength of affinity for Israeli citizenship eroded among all three groups, this was more significant in the right and center: Among the right, the decline was from 80% to 69%, with the center slipping from 71% to 64% and the left from 54% to 50%.
Except for the religious, erosion in the strength of preference for Israeli citizenship was found among all of the groups. The lowest level of preference for Israeli citizenship was among the ultra-Orthodox (82%) and the highest was among the religious (100%). However, among those who strongly prefer to be an Israeli citizen, the secular public appears in last place with 53%, while the ultra-Orthodox are next-to-last with 60%. A comparison between the two years shows that –except for the religious – there was erosion in the strength of preference for being citizens of the State of Israel: from 75% to 60% among the ultra-Orthodox, from 84% to 74% among the traditional and from 61% to 53% among the secular.

The strength of preference for Israeli citizenship is lower among young people. The disparities between the age groups are mainly expressed in the strength of preference for Israeli citizenship. The young people express a weaker preference, with only 53% strongly preferring to be an Israeli citizen, while this strong preference characterizes 75% of the oldest group. Still, in comparison to last year, there was a slight rise (albeit an insignificant one of 3%) in the percentage of young people declaring that they prefer Israeli citizenship to a very great extent. In all of the other age groups, there was erosion in the strength of this preference. Thus, the gap between the youngest age group and the other groups narrowed slightly.

Illustration 16: The preference for Israeli citizenship by age, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007
The strength of patriotism declined in all of the income groups, especially in the higher ones. While there were no consistent or salient disparities according to income level, there was erosion in the strength of commitment to Israeli citizenship at all income levels, especially among those of high income – from 65% to 50%.

The disparity grew between the strength of rootedness of long-time Israelis and new immigrants. The preference for Israeli citizenship is higher among the long-time Israelis, especially at the highest level of commitment. While the level of highest commitment declined from 73% to 62% among the long-time Israelis, the gap between them and new immigrants still widened on this question as a very large decline was recorded among the latter: from 69% to 30%.

A similar decline occurred in regard to this element of rootedness among both genders. No real differences were found between men and women; a similar decline occurred during this time period in the strength of commitment to Israeli citizenship.

The higher the level of education, the lower the strength of preference for Israeli citizenship. Among the university educated, 54% greatly prefer Israeli citizenship, while among those with high school education this stands at 73%. Moreover, while there was no erosion in the latter group, the percentage of those who greatly prefer Israeli citizenship declined from 78% to 67% among those with post-secondary education and from 64% (to 54%) among those with university education.

Illustration 17: The preference for Israeli citizenship by education, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007
Like the findings on the preference for Israeli citizenship, there is also a trend toward lesser commitment to encouraging one's children to live in Israel, though the general tendency to encourage is still very high.

In the Jewish public, the readiness to encourage children to live in Israel is high and is similar to the commitment to Israeli citizenship: 87% express a desire to encourage their children to live in Israel. But similar to the trend found in regard to citizenship, here also erosion was recorded in the strength of the readiness to encourage children to remain on Israeli soil. Today, 63% would strongly encourage their children to live here, while last year the percentage was 69%.

Would you encourage your children to live in Israel despite the fact that there are more prosperous and secure places where they could live?

Illustration 18: The readiness to encourage children to live in Israel, in the Jewish public, 2007

Those in their 20s show the lowest readiness to encourage their children to remain in Israel, but in comparison to last year, they are the only group to show an increase in this readiness. The youngest age group exhibits a weaker tendency to encourage its children to live in Israel: 85% would encourage this, compared to 90% of the oldest age group. There are also considerable disparities in the strength of this tendency: Among the youngest age group, 56% would strongly encourage their children to remain in Israel, while in the rest of the groups the percentages range from 61% to 79%. Still, in comparison to last year, the youngest age group is the only one to record an increase in the desire to encourage offspring to live in Israel, from 78% to 85%, while the proportion of those who express this desire very strongly rose from 49% to 56%.
The ultra-Orthodox and religious Israelis are not considering encouraging their children to emigrate, while the religious camp is the only one in which there is no erosion in the high commitment not to encourage emigration. Nearly everyone affiliated with the religious (97%) or ultra-Orthodox (95%) communities would encourage their children to live in Israel, while the levels are lower among the traditional (89%) and especially the secular (79%). In comparison to the previous year, there was erosion in all of the groups, with the exception of the religious public. This was particularly evident regarding those who would strongly encourage their children to live in Israel. This erosion was more salient among the ultra-Orthodox (a drop of 15%) and the secular (a decline of 11%). Among the religious, on the other hand, there was an increase in this category from 72% to 88% - that is, an increase of 12%.

A higher percentage of those in the right-wing camp would try to ensure that their offspring remain in Israel, and there was also an increase in "high" readiness to do so among this group. The aspiration to encourage children to live in Israel is higher in the right (91%) than in the left (80%), with the center in the middle (86%). Moreover, while there was an increase from 83% to 91% of right-wingers who would make a special effort to discourage emigration, there was erosion in this category among the center (from 70% to 60%) and in the left (from 59% to 48%).

Among all income groups, there was erosion among those who would strongly encourage their children to live in Israel. Today there are no salient or consistent differences between the income groups. In comparison to last year, there is a consistent trend of erosion in all three groups regarding those who would strongly encourage their
offspring to live in Israel. In the lowest income group, there was erosion of 5% (from 68% to 63%), compared to 10% in the middle income group (from 71% to 61%) and 6% in the upper income group (from 65% to 59%). A similar pattern was also found, as noted, in regard to the preference for Israeli citizenship.

The strength of commitment to encourage children to live in Israel decreases as the level education increases. There was erosion in "high" commitment among the university educated. The level of encouragement among those with high school education is 89%, compared to 82% among those with university education. In comparison to last year, there was erosion (from 68% to 52%) among the university-educated who would strongly encourage their children to live in Israel. On the other hand, among those with high school education, there was an increase of 10% in this category.

Illustration 20: The readiness to encourage children to live in Israel, by education, in the Jewish public, 2006, 2007

New immigrants are less likely to encourage their children to live in Israel, and there was even larger erosion among this group in this category. The aspiration to have their children live in Israel is stronger among long-time Israelis (90%) than among new immigrants (71%). The differences are much more salient in the category of "would strongly encourage," with 69% and 31%, respectively. These disparities are larger than in last year's survey, when they stood at 72% and 57%. According to this criterion, the rootedness of new immigrants was relatively weak in the past and has weakened even further.
There was an increase among men who intend to encourage their children to live in Israel, compared to a decrease in this intention among women. There are no real differences today between men and women in regard to encouraging children to live in Israel, with the levels standing at 88% and 86%, respectively. However, in comparison to the previous year, opposite trends are evident: Among the men, there was an increase of 9% in the desire to encourage their children to live in Israel, while among women there was a decline of 4%. Moreover, while in the category of "would encourage very much" there was erosion of just 1% among men, the decline among women was 11%.

Another criterion of rootedness is the non-readiness of the individual himself to emigrate and not only to encourage his child to refrain from doing so. The overwhelming majority of Jews is not considering leaving at all, though there is a trend of greater willingness among young people, the secular, the left, the university-educated, and new immigrants to leave Israel if certain conditions develop. These groups already expressed a lower level of rootedness in previous aspects.

A clear majority of 77% versus 23% in the Jewish public is unwilling to relocate to another country. Among those who do agree to consider this possibility, only 6% would definitely agree to emigrate.\(^3\)

Illustration 21: The readiness to emigrate to another country, in the Jewish public, 2007

\(^3\) The question was only asked in 2007.
There is a consistent pattern of greater readiness to emigrate among the younger age groups. In the youngest age group, 33% are prepared to take this step, while in the oldest group only 13% are prepared to do so. In this sense also, the rootedness of the young people is much weaker.

A much larger percentage of secular Israelis are ready to leave. About a third of the secular public is leaning toward emigration, while in the other groups, and especially in the religious public, the tendency toward this is much lower: It stands at 17% among the traditional, 14% among the ultra-Orthodox and just 8% among the religious.

There is a correlation between a left-wing tendency and the tendency to emigrate. The tendency to emigrate among the right is 16%, in the center 28% and in the left 39%. In other words, a substantial part of the Israeli left would prefer to emigrate.

The wealthy are less definite about their unwillingness to emigrate. In terms of the tendency to emigrate, without addressing the differences in the strength of this tendency, we see that among those with moderate incomes the tendency to emigrate (19%) is a bit lower than among those with low (23% and 25%) and high (25%) income. When examining the strength of the unwillingness to emigrate, the following pattern emerges: The percentage of those who would definitely not agree to live in another country stands at 44% among the rich, compared to 65% among the poor.

Illustration 22: The readiness to emigrate to another country, by income, in the Jewish public, 2007
The university-educated tend to be less definite about their unwillingness to leave. The disparities by level of education are salient when examining the determination not to emigrate. Among the university-educated, only 45% are definitely not ready to take this step, while among those with post-secondary and high school education the figures are 68% and 66%. As previously demonstrated, the affinity for living in Israel among those with university education is weaker than those with lower educational levels.

Illustration 23: The readiness to emigrate to another country, by age, in the Jewish public, 2007

Illustration 24: The readiness to emigrate to another country, by education, in the Jewish public, 2007
The tendency to emigrate is more prevalent among new immigrants than among long-time Israelis. The disparity in this tendency is 31% among new immigrants versus 22% among long-time Israelis. Also in this case, the differences between the two groups are more salient when examining the percentage of those who strongly reject the possibility of leaving. The percentage of this group among new immigrants stands at 40%, compared to 61% among long-time Israelis. Thus, it seems that a prior emigration experience does not weaken the tendency to emigrate a second time.

Among those who are ready to give positive consideration to leaving, two principal motives were found for emigration from Israel: the economic situation and the security situation. The primary factor likely to encourage emigration is the economic situation, which was cited by about a third of the public that is liable to emigrate (32%); the security situation was cited by about a quarter of the public (26%). Significantly fewer cited government corruption (11%) and the aspiration for personal development (10%). It should be noted that these reasons were cited in the same order by all of the groups analyzed in the survey, with the exception of three groups, where the security factor took precedence over the economic factor: the ultra-Orthodox, new immigrants and women. ¹

Illustration 25: The prevalence of the motives for emigration, in the Jewish public, 2007

¹ The question was only asked in 2007.
The element of pride

The level of pride among Israelis for their state is higher than the patriotic feeling they display. The pride in Israeliness is higher than the concurrence with the assertion that Israel is a better state than others. The pride in Jewishness is higher than the pride in Israeliness.

In the Jewish public, 83% are proud to be Israelis, while 66% believe that their state is better than other states. Perhaps the reason for the disparity between a declaration of patriotism and an expression of pride lies in the fact that patriotism is a more obligating concept, which in some circles even has a negative connotation, especially of narrow-minded nationalism.

From an international perspective, the pride of Jews in their state is relatively lower than the pride of most citizens of Western countries. Ireland tops the list with 99% of its citizens proud to a great extent, followed by the U.S. (98%), New Zealand and Canada (97%) and Australia (96%). The states whose citizenry expresses less pride than the Jewish public include the Czech Republic, with 81% proud to a great extent (ISSP 2003) and Germany, with 65%.

The strength of pride in belonging to the Jewish people is significantly higher than the pride in Israeli citizenship: 94% of the Jews declare pride in being Jewish, while 75% are very proud of this affiliation. A possible explanation for this disparity is that Israel, as a political body, faces tests of performance on a daily basis and is subject to more potential criticism. Judaism, on the other hand, is not subject to this type of testing.  

How proud are you to be an Israeli and Jewish, and is Israel a better state?

Illustration 26: The percentage of those who are proud to a great extent in being Israeli and Jewish, and the percentage concurring that Israel is a relatively good state, in the Jewish public, 2007

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5 The question on pride in Jewishness was only asked in 2007.
Leftists are less proud of their Israeliness and Jewishness, and believe less that Israel is better than other states. 84% of those on the right, 86% of the center and 77% of the left are proud of being Israeli. 73% of the right, 65% of the center and 46% of the left concur that Israel is a better state. 97% of the right, 93% of the center and 88% of the left are proud of being Jewish.

Illustration 27: The percentage of those who are proud to a great extent in being Israeli and Jewish, and the percentage concurring that Israel is a relatively good state, by political orientation, in the Jewish public, 2007

In some aspects related to pride, the ultra-Orthodox are those who are distinct from the other groups, while in other aspects the secular are the ones who are distinct. The religious are the proudest. As in the rankings of patriotic affinity, here also there is a pattern of the religious being proudest of the State of Israel, followed by traditional Israelis, the secular and, lastly, the ultra-Orthodox. 95% of the religious are proud of their state, as are 88% of the traditional and 80% of the secular, while the ultra-Orthodox are exceptional with a 59% level of pride. In 2006, the religious group's level of pride stood at 88%; thus, their pride strengthened, while the pride of the ultra-Orthodox in their state weakened, falling from 72%. Among the religious, there was also an increase of those who concur that Israel is better than other states, from 79% to 87%. But the secular concurred with this statement less than the other three groups (55%). The secular also stand out in being less proud in being Jewish, with a level of 88% versus 93%-100% among the others. (Still, the level of pride in being Jewish among the secular is also very high).
There is a disparity between those with high income and those with low income in regard to pride in Israeliness. 77% of the those whose income is much below average are proud to be Israelis, compared to 87% of those with income that is much higher than average. This pattern of disparity is also found, as noted, in regard to Israeli patriotism.

Nonetheless, the two groups are identical in their attitude toward Israel's advantages vis-à-vis other countries: 67% of each group believes that Israel is better.
The level of those who are proud to be Israelis and Jews, and the level of those concurring that Israel is a better state are similar between long-time Israelis and new immigrants: 83% and 81%, respectively. However, the percentage of those who are very proud among the long-time Israelis is 56% versus 34% among the new immigrants. A similar picture emerges when examining the concurrence with the statement that Israel is better than other states. Among the two populations, the level of support for this statement is similar (67% and 66%, respectively), but 41% of the long-time Israelis versus 24% of the new immigrants agree very strongly with this statement. Among new immigrants, this signifies a significant decline in the level of those who strongly concur, which was recorded at 41% last year. In addition, the pride in affiliation with the Jewish people is identical among long-time Israelis and new immigrants (94%), but here also 78% of the long-time Israelis are very proud of this affiliation, versus 58% of the new immigrants.
Men are more proud of being Israelis (85%) than women are (81%). This is contrary to the pattern that appeared last year, when 87% of the women were proud to be Israelis, versus 79% of the men.

There is significant diversity in the Jewish public's assessment of the society's institutions and the way they function in various aspects. The lowest level of pride was recorded in the regard to the Knesset and the government, as opposed to an increase in pride in the functioning of civic society. The largest decline in the Jewish public's pride since 2006 was measured in regard to the security forces and scientific and technological achievements, though the Israeli public is still proud of them to a relatively great extent. The low level of pride in the Knesset and government and the decline in pride in the security forces, compared to the high level of pride in Israeliness and in the society's conduct, indicate that the public distinguishes between its perception of the political and security institutions as responsible for the failure in Lebanon and other blunders (and the disengagement), on one hand, and its affinity for Israeliness and its appreciation of the way Israeli society coped with the events of the past year.

Among the Jewish public, the level of those who are proud of the institutions and conduct of the state and society ranges from 7% (pride in the Knesset) to 91% (pride in scientific
and technological achievements). That is, the Knesset, as well as the government (in which 9% of the Jews take pride), are at the bottom of the ladder of pride, while scientific and technological achievements are at the top. Contrary to the low assessment of state institutions, it was found that the Jewish public's pride in the way the society conducted itself actually increased slightly, apparently due to the expressions of solidarity during the Lebanon War and the high assessment of the civilian population's steadfastness during the war. (See the chapter on the impact of the Lebanon War.) 39% of the Jewish public is proud of the social solidarity in Israel, while 35% were proud of this in 2006.6

The most significant decline was recorded in the level of pride in the defense forces. While in the previous survey 88% of the Jews responded that they were proud of the defense forces, 64% responded in this way in the current survey. The picture becomes clearer when examining the percentage of those who say they are "very proud." In 2006, about two of every four were very proud (57%), compared to one of every four today (25%). Nonetheless, in regard to the other components of pride, the public's pride in the defense forces is still quite high.

A significant decline was also detected in regard to achievements in science and technology, despite the fact that they still constitute the source of greatest pride for the Jewish public. In the 2006 survey, 99% of the Jewish citizens said they were proud of the scientific and technological developments of Israel, compared to 91% in the 2007 survey. Also in this case, the picture becomes clearer when looking at the decline in the level of "very proud" – from 70% in 2006 to 57% in 2007. The explanation for the decline in pride in the army almost certainly derives from the public's disappointment in the results of the Lebanon War (including the IDF's lack of preparedness after years of confrontations with the Palestinians) and is also related to role the IDF played in evacuating a civilian population, an integral part of the Jewish nation, during the disengagement operation. Perhaps the decline in pride about technological achievements stems from the bitter disappointment regarding the limits of the use of advanced technologies, which was shamefully exposed in the war.

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6 The questions about pride in the government, the Knesset and the Supreme Court were only asked in 2007.
How proud are you of the State of Israel in regard to each of the following things?

Illustration 31: Pride in the institutions and conduct of the state, in the Jewish public, 2007

Areas in which the Jews are proudest

Science and technology
Art and literature
The defense forces
Ethical heritage
The Jewish character
Those in the political center report a higher level in most components of pride. There is a large gap between the pride in the Supreme Court expressed by the left and center, versus the pride in the court among the right. The center is prouder of the defense forces (69%), compared to the right (64%) and the left (59%). The center is also the proudest of the economic achievements of Israel (62%), but this time the left is next (56%) followed by the right (51%). This pattern is also found in regard to the way Israeli democracy functions, with 46% of the center proud of this, compared to 36% of the left and 29% of the right. The right-wingers are significantly less proud of the Supreme Court (37%) compared to the center (64%) and the left (68%).

The ultra-Orthodox are not proud of the functioning of Israel's democracy, and together with the religious, are not proud of the Jewish character of the state and of the Supreme Court. 17% of the ultra-Orthodox and 45% of the religious expressed pride in the Jewish character of the state. That is, they are not satisfied with the way in which Judaism is established in Israel. However, there was a significant increase in their pride in the state's Jewish character when compared to 2006, when 3% of the ultra-Orthodox and 29% of the religious were proud of the character of Judaism in Israel. The ultra-Orthodox are also not proud of the way the Israeli democracy functions (16%) compared to levels of pride of 33% to 38% among the other groups. The difference is underlined by the fact that not a single one of the ultra-Orthodox respondents was "very proud" of the Israeli democracy. The disparity between the ultra-Orthodox, in particular, and the religious, on one hand, and the traditional and secular, on the other hand, is also evident in regard to the level of pride in the Supreme Court: 7% of the ultra-Orthodox are quite proud of the court, but not a single one is "very proud" of it. 32% of the religious are proud of the Supreme Court, compared to 51% of traditional Israelis and 62% of the secular. The religious are the proudest of the defense forces (70%), compared to the traditional and secular (both at 64%) and the ultra-Orthodox (51%).

Those with high incomes are prouder than the other income groups about Israel's social welfare policy, economic achievements and the way its democracy functions. At the same time, as income increases, so does the level of pride in the Supreme Court. There is a clear difference between the high income group and the other groups in regard to Israel's social welfare policy: 64% of those with income that is much higher than average are proud of the social welfare policy, compared to 12% to15% of the other income groups. The high income earners are also the proudest of the economic achievements of Israel (63%), but the gap between them and the other income groups on this subject is smaller; the most salient disparity is between their pride and that of the lowest income group (34%). A similar pattern is found in regard to pride in the way the democracy functions. Here also there was a gap between those with high incomes (43%) and the other groups, but especially between them and the low-income group (24%). Apparently, those who do not have high incomes, and especially those with very low incomes, link their dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and social welfare policy with their dissatisfaction with the way the political institutions operate and represent them. In addition, as the level of income increases, the pride in the Supreme Court is greater. Perhaps in this case also, there is a correlation between pride in the Supreme Court and the level of confidence in its ability to provide support.
As the level of education increases, the pride in the economic achievements of the State of Israel also strengthens, and the university-educated are prouder of the Supreme Court. The higher the education, the greater the pride in the economic achievements of the State of Israel: 31% among those with little education and 60% among those with university education. Those with university education are also the proudest of the Supreme Court (58%), compared to those with high school education (43%) and post-secondary education (44%).

Except for pride in the Supreme Court, new immigrants feel a greater level of pride in the various categories. The new immigrants are prouder of the Jewish character of the state (54%) than long-time Israelis (48%). They are also prouder of the democracy (39% versus 33%, respectively), of the social welfare policy (25% versus 13%, respectively) and the economic achievements (57% versus 52%, respectively). Only in regard to the Supreme Court do the long-time Israelis display a greater level of pride (51%) than the new immigrants (41%).
The Jewish public attributes very great importance to its national symbols – the anthem "Hatikva," the flag and the siren on Memorial Day. However, there are groups whose affinity to the symbols of the state, all or some of them, is weaker and sometimes even exceptionally weak, as evident among the ultra-Orthodox.

The centrality of the symbolic dimension in the Jewish society stands out both in light of the fact that the affinity for the national symbols is very high and in light of the fact that the public in general tends to regard them as a single piece and honors them similarly. 85% of the Jewish public said that they would be angry to see the anthem disrespected; 89% would be angered by seeing people fail to stand at attention during the Memorial Day siren, and 89% consider it a great honor to wear the uniform of the IDF.

As expected, the ultra-Orthodox do not attribute the same level of importance as the other sectors do. Disrespect for the anthem would anger 44% of the ultra-Orthodox, compared to 86% to 91% of the other groups. Disrespect for the Memorial Day siren would arouse the anger of 52% of the ultra-Orthodox, compared to 89% to 93% of the other sectors, and 54% of the ultra-Orthodox believe that wearing the IDF uniform is an honor, compared to 89% to 97% of the other groups. The traditional Israelis are the most sensitive about disrespect for each of the symbols.

Illustration 32: Percentage of those honoring the symbols, by religiousness, in the Jewish public, 2007
The left is sensitive to the Memorial Day siren, but more moderate in regard to the national anthem. The left would be angrier about disrespect for the siren (96%), compared to the center (89%) and the right (87%). On the other hand, the left is more moderate in regard to the IDF uniform, with 79% saying they would be upset by a display of disrespect for the uniform, compared to 93% of the center and 90% of the right.

The youngest group expresses relatively less affinity for symbols, though its affinity for them is quite high. 73% of those in their 20s are sensitive to honoring the anthem, compared to 92% of those 60 and over. 82% of those in their 20s are sensitive to honoring the siren, compared to 93% of those 60 and over. 76% of the younger group attributes very high importance to the IDF uniform, compared to 96% of the older group.

Illustration 33: Percentage of those honoring the symbols, by political orientation, in the Jewish public, 2007
Long-time Israelis are more sensitive to "Hatikva" and to the siren. 86% of the long-time Israelis are sensitive to disrespect for the "Hatikva," compared to 78% of the new immigrants. Similarly, 82% of the long-time Israelis are sensitive to the Memorial Day siren, compared to 75% of the new immigrants. The importance attributed to the IDF uniform is the same (88% among long-time Israelis and 87% among new immigrants).

A lower percentage of low-income Israelis would be upset by disrespect for the national symbols. 77% of those with low incomes would not remain indifferent about disrespect for the anthem, compared to 85% of those with high incomes. Disrespect for the siren would anger 82% of those with low incomes, versus 92% of those with high incomes. 83% of those with low incomes attribute a fairly high value to the army uniform, compared to 91% of those with high incomes. Despite the generally strong affinity for the symbols among those with lower-than-average income, their relatively weaker affinity might indicate greater indifference toward Israeli patriotism, a trend that was already evident in the perception of patriotism, the readiness for sacrifice and the pride in Israeliness.
The level of sensitivity for disrespect of the symbols is similar between groups with different levels of education, but the percentage of those who are "very sensitive" decreases as the level of education rises. 78% of those with a low level of education "agree very much" that it is a great honor to wear the IDF uniform, compared to 70% of those with high school education, 65% of those with post-secondary education, and 60% of those with university education. However, the level of those who "agree" with this statement is similar, ranging from 87% to 90% among all of the groups.
In the Jewish public, the Lebanon War strengthened the emotional attachment to the state to some extent. At the same time, it appears that this attachment, relative to other components, was least influenced by the war and its consequences because the main change was expressed in the erosion of the public's confidence in government institutions, primarily the government and the Knesset. The Jewish public also seems to make a clear distinction between its negative assessment of the institutions, especially the political ones, and its assessment of the steadfastness of the civilian population.

Among 32% of the Jewish citizens, the emotional connection with the state strengthened, compared to 26% of the citizens whose connection weakened. That is, the emotional attachment strengthened, though only to a small extent. On the other hand, there is a much broader consensus about the assessment of the civilian population's steadfastness, with 90% of the entire Jewish public assessing this steadfastness as quite good. In regard to confidence in the institutions, there is also broad agreement, though in the opposite direction – a decline in confidence: 80% of the Jewish public says that their confidence in the government declined in the wake of the war, with 57% of this public stating that their confidence "weakened a lot." Confidence in the Knesset declined among 73% of the Jewish public, including 50% who said this confidence "weakened a lot." Among 57% of the Jewish citizenry, the confidence in the defense forces eroded; 27% said their confidence declined by a very large extent. Among a much smaller part of the population (24%), the confidence in the defense forces actually increased. This picture of disappointment in the defense forces corresponds to the significant decline in the pride expressed in them.

Despite the fact that the media is not a state institution, the level of pride in the media was examined in order to compare and identity a general trend in the public's perception of institutions in Israel. The analysis indicates that the media is not exempt from the decline in confidence in these institutions. However, as in the case of the defense forces, the extent of this loss of confidence was smaller than that of political institutions. Among 51% of the Jews, there was erosion in confidence in the media, with 36% saying their confidence "weakened a lot." Among 20% of the Jewish public, confidence in the media grew stronger.

It is also important to examine the dimensions of stability in regard to the impact of the war. This analysis indicates that the emotional attachment to the state enjoys the greatest level of stability. Two of every five Jewish citizens say that their attachment to the state was not at all influenced by the war and its results. Among the institutions, the attitude toward the media changed the least, with 29% saying that their perception of it did not change. 19% said their perception of the defense forces was not influenced by the war. The institution that suffered the most fluctuation was the government, with only 13% remaining firm in their opinion of it.

The emotional attachment to the state strengthened more among long-time Israelis and their faith in the defense forces eroded less, but new immigrants have a higher assessment of civilian steadfastness. The war further strengthened the emotional attachment to the state among 33% of the long-time Israelis, compared to 21% of the new
immigrants. The picture becomes clearer when recognizing that the war weakened the attachment to the state among more than twice as many new immigrants in comparison to long-time Israelis: 50% versus 23%, respectively. The confidence of new immigrants in the defense forces also eroded more: It weakened among 68% of new immigrants, compared to 55% of long-time Israelis. However, the new immigrants gave a higher assessment to the civilian population’s steadfastness: 95% versus 89%.

In the political center and right, the emotional attachment to Israel grew, but the left and center have a higher assessment of the civilian population's steadfastness. The emotional attachment strengthened among 38% of the right, 30% of the center and 18% of the left. Nonetheless, a similar level of erosion in this emotional attachment was recorded among all three groups following the war. However, the right has a lower assessment of civilian steadfastness than the center or left: 87%, 92% and 93%, respectively.

The emotional connection to the state and confidence in the defense forces strengthened more among those with high school or lower levels of education, compared to those with post-secondary or university education. The feeling of emotional affiliation strengthened among 40% of those with less than a high school education, and 43% of those with a high school education, compared to 26% among those with post-secondary education and 22% among those with university education. The confidence in the security forces strengthened among 35% of those in the lowest education group and among 37% of those with high school education, compared to 12% of those with post-secondary education and 16% of those with university education.

Among both the ultra-Orthodox and the secular, the percentage of Israelis whose affinity to the state and confidence in the defense forces strengthened was more moderate. The ultra-Orthodox gave a lower assessment of the civilian population's steadfastness than the other sectors did. Among 27% of the ultra-Orthodox and 24% of the secular, the feeling of affiliation with the state strengthened, compared to 40% of the religious and 41% of traditional Israelis. Among 13% of the ultra-Orthodox and 17% of the secular, confidence in the defense forces strengthened, compared to 33% of the religious and 34% of the tradition. While the general population appreciates the steadfastness displayed during the Lebanon War, 80% of the ultra-Orthodox were impressed by this steadfastness, compared to 89% to 91% among the other sectors.

Those with high incomes are more critical of the defense forces. The confidence in the defense forces weakened among 71% of the highest income group, compared to a range of 46% to 55% in the other groups.

Among the youngest and oldest groups, the confidence in the defense forces strengthened more. The confidence in the defense forces increased among 30% of those in their 20s and those 60 and above, while this confidence grew among 23% of those in their 30s, and 17% to 18% among those in their 40s and 50s.
How did the Lebanon War affect your emotional attachment to the state and your confidence in its institutions?

Illustration 36: The impact of the Lebanon War on the emotional attachment to the state and the confidence in its institutions, in the Jewish public, 2007

A comparison between the Jewish residents of Haifa and the North and the Jewish residents of other regions of Israel indicates that Israeli patriotism and the emotional attachment to the state strengthened more in Haifa and the North, and that residents of this region also have a higher assessment of the civilian population's steadfastness. Residents of Haifa and the North also give higher grades to the defense forces and express a greater readiness to go to battle.

Since the war concentrated on the northern region of the state, it is vital to check how the war affected the Jewish residents of Haifa and the North in comparison to the Jewish residents of the rest of the country. It was found that 71% of the Jewish residents of Haifa and the North define themselves as Israeli patriots, compared to 66% of the rest of the Jewish citizenry. This finding corresponds to the fact that the emotional attachment to the state strengthened among 42% of the Jewish citizens living in Haifa and the North, compared to 32% in the other regions. In addition, 93% of the Jewish residents of Haifa and the North state that the steadfastness of the civilian population was good, compared to 89% of the rest of Israel's residents. There was also less erosion of confidence in the defense forces among residents of Haifa and the North, with 29% declaring that their faith
in the defense forces increased, compared to 23% in the other regions. There was also a lower percentage among residents of Haifa and the North reporting a decline in confidence in the defense forces: 52% versus 57% in the other regions of Israel. Finally, these residents are also more willing to fight for the state in time of need, though the general readiness of the Jewish public to do so is also very high. 95% of the Jewish citizens of Haifa and the North declare that they would defend the state, compared to 90% of the Jewish citizens living in other regions.

**Did the Lebanon War affect your emotional attachment to the state?**

**Haifa and the North**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Strengthened a lot</th>
<th>Strengthened it a little</th>
<th>Had no affect</th>
<th>Weakened it a little</th>
<th>Weakened it a lot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Strengthened a lot</th>
<th>Strengthened it a little</th>
<th>Had no affect</th>
<th>Weakened it a little</th>
<th>Weakened it a lot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 37: The impact of the Lebanon War on the emotional attachment to the state among residents of Haifa and the North compared to other regions, in the Jewish public, 2007
How do you assess the steadfastness of the civilian population?

Haifa and the North

Illustration 38: The assessment of civilian steadfastness among residents of Haifa and the North compared to other regions, in the Jewish public, 2007
As expected, significant disparities were found between the Jewish and Arab communities in most aspects related to patriotism. In comparison to 2006, there was even some erosion in the overwhelming majority of parameters that express patriotism and an increase in the alienation between the two nations. Therefore, the Patriotism Survey will not include an in-depth discussion of the Arabs' views on Israeli patriotism. Instead, this will be addressed briefly in order to characterize trends that appeared throughout the survey.7

Of three possible focuses of patriotism, the Arab public in Israel clearly prefers identifying itself as Arab, rather than Palestinian or Israeli. The strength of Arab patriotism was found to be most dominant among the Arabs of Israel, with 85% of them defining themselves as Arab patriots "to a great extent." A distant second after Arab patriotism comes Palestinian patriotism, with 52%, followed by Israeli patriotism, at 32%. A comparison with the 2006 survey, which could only be done in regard to Palestinian patriotism and Israeli patriotism, indicates a 3% increase in those defining themselves as Palestinian patriots "to a great extent." This is not a large increase, but on average Palestinian patriotism significantly strengthened in comparison to 2006. This is best illustrated by the percentage of Arab respondents who reject Palestinian patriotism, which fell from 22% in 2006 to 12% in 2007. On the other hand, there was no erosion in the percentage of Arabs who regard themselves as Israeli patriots "to a large extent."

How much do you see yourself as a patriot in the following aspects?

![Illustration 39: Spheres of patriotism among the Arab public, 2007](image)

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7 At the 2007 Herzliya Conference, a working paper will be presented that focuses entirely on surveying the differences in patriotism between Jews and Arabs. The working paper is entitled: "Patriotic Views in the Jewish and Arab Public: A Comparative Look." This paper was prepared by Effie Ya'ar and Efrat Peleg.
The pride of Arabs in their Israeliness has declined, as well as their rootedness. 44% of the Arabs say that they are proud to be Israelis, compared to 50% in 2006, and 64% think that Israel is relatively better than other countries, compared to 76% in 2006. The strength of concurrence with this statement also weakened, with 28% agreeing with it "to a large extent," compared to 37% last year. Despite this, the Arabs are prouder than the Jews in regard to several aspects of Israeli society and the way it functions, such as the social welfare system, the government, the Knesset and Supreme Court. But this is the exception to the rule.

In regard to rootedness, 72% prefer to remain citizens of Israel, compared to 82% in 2006. The strength of this preference also declined: 33% now prefer Israeli citizenship to a great extent, compared to 49% in 2006. Some 82% of the Arab public would encourage their children to live in Israel, compared to 88% in 2006. In this case too, the strength of rootedness declined, with 45% strongly encouraging their children to continue to live in Israel, compared to 58% in 2006. As noted, rootedness also declined somewhat among the general Jewish public, but not at a similar scope or strength.

The war affected the Arabs in a different way. It significantly weakened their emotional attachment to the state and made them doubt the steadfastness of the civilian population. 41% of the Arab respondents say that their attachment to the state weakened. At the same time, the war strengthened the feeling of affiliation with the state among only 11% of the Arabs. The fluctuation in the Arabs' stance is also apparent in the finding that only 13% of them stated that the war had no impact on their connection to the state. In addition, the Arabs do not give high grades to the steadfastness of the civilian population during the war; 62% of them say that this steadfastness was quite bad, or worse.

**Did the Lebanon War affect your emotional attachment to the state?**

Illustration 40: The impact of the Lebanon War on the emotional attachment to the state, in the Arab public, 2007

[Diagram showing the distribution of responses to the question: 48% strengthened a lot, 2% strengthened a little, 9% had no affect, 28% weakened it a little, 13% weakened it a lot.]
Among the Arabs in Haifa and the North, there was greater erosion than among the Arab residents of other regions in Israel. The emotional attachment to Israel weakened more among the Arab residents of Haifa and the North (43%), compared to the rest of the Arabs (33%). There is no significant difference between the Arabs of Haifa and the North and the Arabs of other regions in regard to the percentage of those who think that civilian steadfastness did not pass the ultimate test (58% and 55%, respectively). However, the Arabs living in Haifa and the North are much more decisive in their assessment: 36% of the Arabs of Haifa and the North believe that the conduct of the civilian population was "definitely bad," compared to 9% of the Arabs of other regions.
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Illustration 39: Spheres of patriotism among the Arab public, 2007

Illustration 40: The impact of the Lebanon War on the emotional attachment to the state, in the Arab public, 2007
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**Research Institutes and Organizations:**

ISR – Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan ([www.isr.umich.edu/](http://www.isr.umich.edu/)).

NES – National Election Survey at the University of Michigan ([www.umich.edu/~nes/](http://www.umich.edu/~nes/))
NORC – National Organization of Research at the University of Chicago (www.norc.uchicago.edu).


PRSA – Public Relations Society of America (http://www.prsa.org/)

WVS – World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

ISSP – International Social Survey Program (http://www.issp.org)

AIE – American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (http://www.aei.org)
Appendix: The Patriotism Questionnaire

1. How proud are you to be an Israeli?
   1. Very proud
   2. Quite proud
   3. Not very proud
   4. Not proud at all
   5. do not read: Don’t know

2. (for Jews only) How proud are you to be a Jew?
   1. Very proud
   2. Quite proud
   3. Not very proud
   4. Not proud at all
   5. do not read: Don’t know

3. How proud are you of the State of Israel in regard to each of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Proud</th>
<th>Quite Proud</th>
<th>Not very proud</th>
<th>Not proud at all</th>
<th>(do not read)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3a.</td>
<td>The way its democracy functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b.</td>
<td>Israel’s economic achievements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c.</td>
<td>Its social welfare policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d.</td>
<td>Its scientific and technological achievements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3e.</td>
<td>Its achievements in arts and literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3f.</td>
<td>Its Jewish character</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3g.</td>
<td>Its government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3h.</td>
<td>Its Knesset</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3i.</td>
<td>Its Supreme Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3j.</td>
<td>Its defense forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3k.</td>
<td>Its social solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3l.</td>
<td>Its ethical and cultural heritage (for Jews)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. (for Jews) To what extent do you see yourself as an Israeli patriot?
   1. A patriot to a very large extent
   2. A patriot to a large extent
   3. A patriot to some extent
   4. Not especially a patriot / Not a patriot at all
   5. do not read: Don’t know (because I am not familiar with the concept)
   6. do not read: Don’t know (because of other reasons) / Refuse to answer

(fore Arba) To what extent do you see yourself as a patriot in the following aspects?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patriot</th>
<th>To a very large extent</th>
<th>To a large extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>Not especially a patriot / Not a patriot at all</th>
<th>do not read: Don’t know (not familiar with the concept)</th>
<th>do not read: Don’t know (other reasons) / Refuse to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4a. Israeli patriot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b. Palestinian patriot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c. Arab patriot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Israeli Patriotism means many things to different people. How important, in your opinion, are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>5a. Contributing to social organizations that help the needy</th>
<th>5b. Flying the Israeli flag</th>
<th>5c. Demonstrating against a policy that endangers the state's future, even if you are in the minority</th>
<th>5d. Readiness to fight for the state</th>
<th>5e. Buying Israeli products</th>
<th>5f. Establishing a new village in the Negev or Galilee (for Jews)</th>
<th>5g. Respecting the Jewish tradition</th>
<th>5h. Voting in elections</th>
<th>5i. Living in Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiet important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not read: Don't know / Refuse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Patriotism is also related to values. I will now read a number of terms that some people believe are related to Israeli patriotism. In your view, how much is each of them indeed related to Israeli patriotism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Very related</th>
<th>Quiet related</th>
<th>Not so related</th>
<th>Not related at all</th>
<th>Do not read: Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love of the Land of Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The heritage of Israel's prophets (for Jews)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ingathering of exiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hebrew language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if another war erupts, will you agree to fight for the state?
   1. Definitely agree
   2. Almost certainly agree
   3. Almost certainly not agree
   4. Definitely not agree
   5. do not read: Don't know

8. Would you be ready to move and live in a different country?
   1. Definitely agree
   2. I think so
   3. I don’t think so
   4. Definitely not agree
   5. do not read: Don't know

9. What is the main reason that would make you ready to move to another country to live?
   1. The economic situation
   2. Security for you and your family
   3. Government corruption
   4. Lack of social solidarity and equality
   5. Not ready for any reason
   6. Other: ________________
   7. do not read: Don't know
10. I am now going to read you a number of statements. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree very much</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
<th>Do not read: Don't know / Refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10a. I would rather be a citizen of Israel than of any other country in the world.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10b. It angers me when people disrespect &quot;Hatikva&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10c. It is justified to refuse to fight in a war you believe to be immoral.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10d. I will encourage my children to live in Israel, even though there are more secure and prosperous places where they could live.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10e. Wearing the uniform of the IDF is a great privilege.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10f. In general, Israel is better than most other countries.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

11. Did the recent Lebanon War affect your emotional connection to the state?

1. Strengthened the emotional connection very much
2. Strengthened it a little
3. Had no affect
4. Weakened it a little
5. Weakened it a lot. 6. do not read: Don't know

12. How did the recent Lebanon War affect your confidence in the following institutions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Strengthened it a lot</th>
<th>Strengthened it a little</th>
<th>Had no affect</th>
<th>Weakened it a little</th>
<th>Weakened it a lot</th>
<th>do not read: Don’t know / Refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12a. The government</td>
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<td>12b. The Knesset</td>
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<td>12c. The defense forces</td>
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<td>12d. The media</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
13. How do you assess the steadfastness of the civilian population during the recent Lebanon War?

1. Very good
2. Quite good
3. Quite bad
4. Bad

5. do not read: Don't know