The Jewish People as a Strategic Asset

Seminar Report of the The "Jewish People as a Strategic Asset"
Task Force of the Second Herzliya Conference

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Working Group: The Jewish People as a Strategic Asset

In the context of the Herzliya Conference on National Security the Jewish Agency has established a working group on the subject of the “Jewish People in Time of Trial” inasmuch as the Jewish People is considered a strategic asset of Israel.

Aims

The objectives of the working group are:

To explore parameters of the Jewish People as an element of National Strength from a quantitative, and qualitative perspective;

To analyze evolutionary trends of the relationship between the Jewish People and Israel in recent years;

To analyze factors that promote internal cohesiveness and solidarity with Israel and undermine such solidarity; and

To draw conclusions for the future.

Relationship to National Security

Strategists take into consideration many qualitative and quantitative components in evaluating National Security. A nation’s strength may be expressed as a function of its staying power and military power.

Staying power includes, inter alia, such factors as the totality of a nation’s human resources, its economy, national leadership, its national goals, purpose and aspirations, the educational level, quality and unity of its population, its technology, industrial base, social and political structure, national ethos, will, as well as the scope and strength of its international relations, political and military alliances.

Israel’s staying power is enhanced by the relationship it enjoys with the Jewish People. To a minor extent the human resources of the Israel Defense Forces (hence military power) may be also enhanced as a result of this relationship.

The Jewish People constitute a strategic reserve for Israel. The Jewish people’s support for Israel in time of peace and war has increased Israel’s pecuniary and human resources and has contributed to its economy, the quality of its population base, leadership, sense of mission, international political standing and deterrence. This support has included political influence and assistance in public information and public affairs, in addition to monetary contributions, direct involvement between Diaspora communities and Israeli development towns and disadvantaged areas, joint planning of community projects, fostering educational and cultural endeavors, and immigration. This partnership has enhanced the quality of leadership, the educational and cultural level and strength of Israel’s society and economy.

During Israel’s formative years, Diaspora Jewry made important contributions to the manpower levels and quality of the IDF. In Israel’s 1948 War of Independence some 2,000 volunteers from abroad, mostly Jews, served in the nascent Israel Defense Forces (in addition to the new immigrants who arrived during Israel’s first year of existence and were drafted into the armed forces). They made important contributions to specialized services such as the Air Force, Navy, Signals and Medical
Corps. Today the ranks of the IDF’s conscript army have swelled with new immigrants who have arrived during the recent wave of immigration. Their numbers was one of the considerations prompting the reduction of the cutoff age for reserve combat service. The presence of a larger manpower base has raised for public debate the question of whether the IDF should continue to be a people’s army as conceived by Ben-Gurion.

The relationship between the Jewish People and Israel is, moreover, a symbiotic one, inasmuch as Israel’s military and political achievements or difficulties affect the condition of Jewish communities abroad.

Methodology

The Jewish Agency for Israel is in a unique position to monitor the trends in the Jewish People’s identification with Israel and with Jewish religious and communal institutions abroad. The Jewish Agency has adopted enhancing “Peoplehood” as a one of its major strategic goals. Due to its role as an actor, the Jewish Agency (through its departments and component organizations – United Jewish Communities, Keren Hayesod / UIA and WZO) can contribute quantitative data concerning indices of support and involvement with Judaism and Israel, and to monitor the interaction between events in Israel and involvement levels of support in the Diaspora. The Agency may also contribute to the discussion concerning ways for increasing the Jewish People’s “involvement” with Israel. In addition to Jewish Agency and component organization data our study will make use of demographic studies of the Jewish People. These include national censuses, such as that of the USSR in 1989, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand (1991 and 1996); independent socio-demographic surveys, such as the National Jewish Population Survey in the US (1990, and current data of 2000 currently being completed by the UJC), France (1989), South Africa (1991 and 1998), and the United Kingdom (1995); as well as academic analyses1

Data will include:
- Demographic studies and projections of the Jewish Population;
- Surveys conducted by UJC, Keren Hayesod, and
- Quantitative analyses by Jewish Agency Departments (Aliyah & Klitah, Israel, Jewish Zionist Education, FSU and Eastern Europe, Israel Education Fund, etc),

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Statistics from other Jewish philanthropic organizations, and from the
Government of Israel (Liaison Bureau, Central Bureau of Statistics
eetc.).
Evaluation of Israel and Jewish identity programs and
indices of inter communal solidarity and advocacy on behalf of Israel
by the departments themselves, outside organizations and academic
experts.

Elements Studied

The working group, which will be composed of academic experts and some Jewish
leaders, will examine such issues as:

- Demographic projections of Jews in the Diaspora and Israel
- Identification of Jews abroad with Judaism, Israel, Jewish Organizations.
  Indicators of levels of identification, *inter alia* include:
  - Aliyah figures and projections
  - Fundraising, as an expression of solidarity
  - Community involvement in Israel
  - Visits to Israel/Israel Experience programs/educational programs
  - Israeli outreach abroad: emissaries, teaching emissaries/educational
    programs/workshops for teachers etc.
  - Anti-Semitism as a factor uniting communities and its effects on
    increased cooperation with Israel
  - Lobbying & PR
  - Self-help and mutual assistance between Jewish communities of the
    Diaspora, and mutual assistance between Israel and Jewish communities
    abroad
  - Means of Increasing identification with Jewish communal institutions and
    with Israel
  - Data and evaluation of Israel's outreach to communities
  - Elements which may undermine solidarity
  - The question of physical security (effects of the situation in the Middle
    East upon Diaspora communities, cooperation between Diaspora
    communities and cooperation with Israel)
  - Ideas for deepening the dialogue and interaction between Israel and the
    Diaspora
  - Ways of strengthening the ties to the Land, History, Tradition of Israel,
    and Diaspora amongst Israelis --as a means of forging the infrastructure
    for Jewish solidarity in time of trial
  - Contribution of above to Israel's National Security
Executive Summary and Main Conclusions

Demography

The Jewish population on the whole is close to zero population growth (negative in the Diaspora and positive in Israel). In the Diaspora the inverted triangle age structure with its ensuing negative population growth, threatens the existence of the Jewish People. Those eligible under the Law of Return to immigrate to Israel who are not Jewish greatly outnumber those who are Jewish.

In the States, the definition of who is a Jew is becoming more blurred. Pending the NJPS results, which should be ready before the year’s end, the trend has been to a loss of Orthodox fringe, which has blended into Conservative, and a fading away of more liberal elements into the non-defined status (which is growing). There is a tendency of disassociating oneself with the community and this must be addressed.

European Jewry is also becoming lost in the ever-increasing non-identified category and to aging. Mixed marriages, now 50% prevalent in the USA and in Europe constitute a danger to Jewish existence. Only 18% of the offspring of mixed marriages retain a Jewish consciousness.

The aging of the Jewish population of the Diaspora is extremely worrisome since the ratio of vital events will be more negative in the future. The large ratio of non-Jews to Jews among population of those eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return in the FSU, and the attrition of Jews in the European areas of the FSU makes it imperative to increase Jewish awareness and identification within the FSU. Liberalization of personal status determinants and conversions, which should be carried out under the combined aegis of the three denominations, should be allowed for in Israel so as to attract and keep would-be immigrants and reduce social problems ensuing from large numbers of citizens not recognized as Jews (“the non-Jewish fringe”).

By the year 2010 Israel will eclipse the United States as the country with the largest Jewish population. Between 2030-2050 Most of World Jewry will reside in Israel. Jewish immigration to Israel is a means of increasing the Jewish population and constitutes a guarantee of Jewish survival. However, despite its positive (1.9) Jewish population growth, Israel faces a demographical challenge, since this growth rate is eroded by the population growth of the Arabs. In 2050 Jews (and the non-Jewish fringe e.g. immigrants from the FSU who are not Jewish) will number 8.7 million by medium prediction, the West Bank population 6.4 million the Gaza Strip 5.14 million and Israeli Arabs 3.1 million making a total of Palestinian Arabs 14.68 million. (An overall high procreation estimate might place the total Palestinian Arab population at 26 million vs. 10.3million Jews). Within the pre-67 boundaries of Israel, Jewish population will vary between 63% to 71% by 2050 according to different predictions for medium TFR.

The increased population (over 23million) and longer life spans will cause grave ecological and infrastructure problems in Israel. If this trend will continue at the present rate, most government National Insurance Institute payments in Israel

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3 Total Fertility Rate: a measure of the average number of children expected to be born per woman.
would go be used to supporting social services for Arab youthful population and Jewish retirees. Gainful employment for a growing work force must be planned for.

Aliyah
While one possible target goal would be to bring the maximum number of eligible candidates for immigration from the FSU to Israel, the motivation of those remaining is less pronounced as improved economic conditions gradually appear in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

All things being equal, we may expect a decrease in aliyah over the next decade.

In the FSU the Jewish Agency’s strategy should be: to invest in increasing Jewish identity programs especially in the population centers; to capitalize on areas of unrest for short-term boosts in immigration, and to increase operations in the periphery (Asian Republics). However the population base is lesser there and the numbers of immigrants will not approach those of previous years.

The influx of large numbers of non-Jewish FSU elements into Israeli society would cause grave social problems in Israel and constitute a social time bomb. Greater emphasis must be placed on increasing knowledge of and identification with Judaism, Israel and Jewish culture within the FSU, and conditioning immigration or naturalization on demonstrated knowledge. Parallel liberalized conversion procedures under joint tri-denominational aegis (as per the recommendations of the Neeman Commission) should be increased in Israel so as to minimize future social problems.

Jewishness, and in all cases of nuclear family members, demonstrated knowledge of Jewish and Israeli culture and traditions should be introduced as a prerequisite for obtaining Israeli nationality, in order to reduce social pressure in Israel.

Immigration from Ethiopia, Argentina and France should be encouraged and efforts must be made on the social and economic planes to develop Israel as a magnet for encouraging ideologically motivated immigration. Likewise measures should be taken to encourage Jewish procreation. Israel must do more within its borders to promote Jewish education and cultural awareness and identification with the Jewish Diaspora, inasmuch as there is an estrangement from Jewish praxis and identification with Jewish values amongst native Israelis as well as amongst new immigrants from the FSU.

Fundraising
Jewish communities abroad gain more from fund raising campaigns than does Israel. Such gains are both tangible monetary revenues and intangible “community building” benefits.

There has been a tendency for a decreasing percentage of funds collected abroad to be transferred to Israel, as well as a decrease in absolute terms. This may appear on the surface to reflect lower levels of identification and less communal cohesiveness. When comparing the sums of monies collected to the total budget of the State of Israel, funds collected abroad amount to an ever-decreasing portion of Israel’s real needs. It is necessary to analyze the age brackets of the donors. An empirical survey indicates that the age is relatively higher than in the past. Hence the older donors continue to maintain their status by contributing to Israel; however this generation is not being replaced sufficiently by a younger
leadership generation. Likewise Israel “competes” with other charitable causes, educational and cultural institutions.

Inasmuch as campaigns for national challenges attract increased contribution levels, there is evidence that Jewish communities may still be mobilized by challenges to Israel. Such campaigns are necessary for building community in the Diaspora as well as for supplying assistance to Israel. These fundraising campaigns should hence be encouraged. However donations are an expression of commitment, and this in turn is a function of education. The culture of giving as an element of identification and community building must be transmitted. The new generation must be educated to strengthen both their own community and Israel. Israel, will indirectly benefit from a strengthened Diaspora communities inasmuch as she will be able to reap dividends in the future in the form of improved Jewish Zionist education, political influence, aliyah, partnerships in economic and social ventures, etc. Young leadership imbued with an appreciation of the importance and centrality of Israel must be nurtured and contribution must be seen as one of the elements essential of communal leadership.

Education

Improving and increasing the scope of Jewish education abroad is an important tactical goal supporting the strategic objectives of retaining in the fold as many of the Jewish population as possible and obtaining future support for Israel. The relatively limited percentage of Jewish youth exposed to some form of Jewish education, is regrettable and portends badly for the future. Especially worrisome are the less than 50% figures for the largest concentrations of Jews: the USA, and France, and Argentina (once the crown jewel of Jewish education in South America). The lack of Jewish education will increase the non-identifiable fringe, which is ever growing. Though education can be expressed in quantifiable terms, it is the quality and content of education which is important and must not be overlooked.

If the FSU has made inroads in formal Jewish education, it is relative to the inexistence of such frameworks prior to the glasnost. In the FSU the focus should be on the major cities where Jewish communities will likely exist in the foreseeable future and that have begun to develop the basis of local communal institutions.

Long-term programs, which have a more serious educational impact, build future leadership and are more immune to security considerations should be emphasized. Likewise efforts should be made to expand Jewish awareness programs. Technology in the service of Jewish education should be developed to provide connections and links between the various sectors of the world Jewish population.

Inasmuch as most of the Jewish education system in the FSU depends on local personnel who are not certified, efforts should be made to train local teachers and to deploy teaching emissaries to the FSU. Similarly a paramount effort must be made to both develop local capacity to train educational personnel with a connection to Israel (long-term) and to increase the number of Israeli educators in the Diaspora as the most effective
means of enhancing Israel’s role in the Diaspora Jewish educational agenda. These policies would serve as force multipliers. Along with this, more resources need to be devoted to enhancing the educational quality and impact of these Israeli educators and in providing ongoing educational support and training to them during their tenure in Diaspora communities.

Efforts should be devoted to countries with large Jewish populations (USA, France and Argentina (which is presently undergoing a financial crisis) and in these areas to seek force multipliers (training educators, developing e-learning,). The trends for participation in short term programs must be monitored carefully this coming year to determine if this year’s partial reduction in participants was due to the Intifadat-al Aksa. The effectiveness of current increases of shlichim for Jewish awareness and camp activities should be examined. Upon an evaluation of these results and after taking into considerations assessments of the prospects for regional stability a decision should be taken regarding increasing the number of such short-term emissaries to be deployed this coming year. Special attention must also be devoted in Israel for educating youth in the traditions and values of Judaism and Zionism, and imbuing them with an appreciation of and sense of responsibility for Jews in the Diaspora.

Diaspora Community involvement in Israel
In the context of the Jewish Agency’s Partnership 2000 program, approximately 550 Diaspora communities throughout the world (among them some 400 small communities) are currently involved in 640 projects within Israeli communities and development towns in thirty areas of national priority. Projects were in the field of education, regional development, society building, leadership development, and Diaspora-Israel relations. In addition “communities of interest” along professional lines have been formed between Diaspora Jews and Israelis. This networking is beneficial both socially and professionally. These projects have contributed to the Diaspora communities’ cohesiveness by providing them with focal issues. They have been important elements in building communities in Israel and in the Diaspora. This personal involvement has enhanced the level of education and culture, and the quality of leadership within participating Israeli communities. Such mutually beneficial involvement has forged bonds of understanding, and has been growing in scope, and is a most important element in forging a global Jewish partnership.

Anti-Semitism, Terrorism and Emergency Situations
Anti-Semitism has always been a factor, which has united the Jewish People. However in recent months the sense of mutual responsibility received new significance against the backdrop of the new regional and international situation. The so-called Intifadat el Aksa provoked a wave of anti-Semitic incidents abroad. Likewise, terrorist attacks in Israel claimed victims among new immigrants and tourists. On the other hand the terror attacks in the United States evoked within
Israel expressions of solidarity with the people of the United States and in particular with the Jewish community.

The number of anti-Semitic acts increased during 2000 and 2002. In addition to classic right wing or neo Nazi anti-Semitism was added anti-Semitism from Islamic and Arab sources. The latter blur the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel. These acts not only included firebombs and arson, and other physical attacks on Jewish facilities, but also harassment and anti-Jewish mass demonstrations. The French Jewish community was particularly hard-hit by anti-Semitic incidents related to the political situation in Israel. The organization by Jewish groups to deal with the anti-Semitic aspects of the UN WCAR Conference held at Durban in the summer of 2001, was an optimistic harbinger for future cooperation. **There must be continued cooperation between Jewish organizations to fight anti-Semitism.** Elements in such cooperation may include collecting intelligence and establishing shared databases of anti-Semitic manifestations and actors, increasing public awareness to the phenomenon and to the fact that anti-Semitism constitutes a threat to Democracy, lobbying public officials and the international diplomatic community, coordinating the fight with local and national law enforcement agencies, and organizing improved security measures within individual communities and inter-community security cooperation. Israel should assist these efforts. The interactive website being established by the Forum for Coordinating the Fight Against Anti-Semitism sponsored by the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency, is a first step in this direction.

The Jewish People is faced with the challenge of maintaining manifestations of solidarity, generated by crises into permanent partnerships. Emergency situations have united the Jewish community and increased support for Israel the challenge will be to maintain this unity and support.

**Factors Undermining Solidarity**

*Physical Security:* As the number of attacks on Jewish facilities related to Israel’s policies increase, so does the danger that individual Jewish communities might disassociate themselves from Israel. Continued exposure to harm, without sufficient supportive activities on the part of Israel might result in erosion of the support base for Israel. The Palestinian violence of the past year reduced tourism to Israel (inclusive of Jewish tourism) and placed the issue of travel to Israel on the agenda of some Jewish organizations

*Divergence of Political Interest:* Divergence of policy between Israel and the United States might alienate some Jewish communities should Israel determine that compliance to US pressure would be detrimental to Israel’s national interest and act in a manner that blatantly contradicts American interests.

*Relations between the Israeli Religious Establishment and Jewish Denominations.* Lack of recognition of Conservative and Reform religious leaders by Israel’s Orthodox religious hierarchy will alienate members of non-Orthodox denominations abroad. Creative ways should be found to recognize functions of Conservative and Reformed denominations and involving them in the religious dialogue (e.g. the tri-denominational conversion institute).
Ways of Increasing Identification With Israel: Making Israel into a Magnet

Inasmuch as ideology plays an important role in attracting prospective immigrants and in exercising influence in the national and international arenas, Israel must devote considerable effort to developing its democratic, economic and cultural institutions so that it will become a magnet for prospective immigrants and a model for emulation among nations. The support of Jewish Education and personal and communal involvement in the ongoings of homologous communities in Israelis are essential not only for Israel but also for the continued survival of the Jewish people.

Methodological Problems

The term “Jewish People” must be defined for the purposes of the study. Many studies of Jewish demography employ different terms of reference in referring to the Jewish population base, which they examine. The halachic definition, while relevant, must be expanded to include families with non-Jewish spouses the offspring of mixed marriages and/or partnerships, non-Orthodox conversions, etc. Prof. Sergio DellaPergola in his research has referred to the terms core Jewish population (which he aims to document and generally cites), extended Jewish population, and enlarged Jewish population. The core Jewish population refers to those who define themselves as Jews. The extended Jewish population refers to the core Jewish Population and all other persons of Jewish parentage who are not Jews. The enlarged Jewish Population refers to the extended Jewish population and non-

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4 For a concise review of the rules of attribution of Jewish personal status in Rabbinic and Israeli laws, including reference to Jewish sects, isolated communities, and apostates, see: Michael Corinaldi, “Jewish Identity”, Ch. 2 in his Jewish Identity: The Case of Ethiopian Jewry (Jerusalem, 1998).

5 The core Jewish population includes all those who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews. This is an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic approach. Such definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting subjective feelings, broadly overlaps but does not necessarily coincide with Halakhah (Rabbinic law) or other normatively binding definitions. It does not depend on any measure of that person’s Jewish commitment or behavior—in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. Included in the core Jewish population are all those who converted to Judaism by any procedure, or joined the Jewish group informally and declare to be Jewish. Persons of Jewish descent who adopted another religion are excluded, as well as other individuals who did not convert out but currently refuse to acknowledge their Jewish identification. In Israel personal status is subject to the ruling of the Ministry of the Interior which relies on rabbinical authorities.

The extended Jewish population includes the sum of (a) the core Jewish population and (b) all other persons of Jewish parentage who are not Jews currently (or at the time of investigation). These non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have themselves adopted another religion, even though they may claim still to be Jews ethnically; (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim to be Jews. It is customary in socio-demographic surveys to consider the religious-ethnic identification of parents. Some censuses, however, do ask about more distant ancestry. The enlarged Jewish population, in addition to all those who belong in the extended Jewish population, also includes all of the respective further non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). For both conceptual and practical reasons, this definition does not include any other non-Jewish relatives living elsewhere in exclusively non-Jewish households.
Jewish household members. This number is inferior to the Jewish population base under Israel’s Law of Return.

The eligibility criteria for immigration to Israel according to the Law of Return is of particular relevance since it constitutes a largest common denominator (or terminus ad quem) for immigration to Israel and a basis upon which many Jewish Agency Jewish Identity and Israel programs are developed. Inasmuch as the number of immigrants to Israel exerts a direct influence on Israel’s National Strength, the population base of those eligible to immigrate under the Law of return is of vital importance for the present study. The law extends its provisions to all current Jews and to their Jewish or non-Jewish spouses, children, and grandchildren, as well as to the spouses of such children and grandchildren.

It actually quite difficult to estimate what the total size of the Law of Return population could be. Jewish Agency statistics, especially those referring to aliyah and activities in the Former Soviet Union employ this figure. These figures, based on registration and estimates by 27 Jewish Agency legations covering 330 cities of the FSU, will be cited in all references to the FSU.

“Identification” with Judaism and Israel is also difficult to quantify. On the individual level, frequency of synagogue attendance, frequentation of Jewish clubs (JCCs), communal organizations and institutions, donations to Jewish and Israel appeals, enrollment in Jewish/Hebrew language and educational frameworks, participation in Israel identity programs visits to Israel, family and business relationships with Israel and individual involvement with Israel, dossiers opened in Jewish Agency Aliyah centers, and Aliyah and must be taken into account inter alia as indicators of identification. On the communal level, the organization of Israel appeals and Jewish educational and cultural frameworks and programs, religious frameworks the presence of Israeli Shlichim and educators, advocacy activities on behalf of Israel, partnerships with Israeli communities and visits to Israel (for educational, social, and solidarity purposes), serve as indicators.

On the macro level there will be a problem of integrating qualitative and quantitative elements and then demonstrating their integration into the concept of National Strength, which itself contains not only demographic and economic components but also qualitative elements such as the quality of manpower and leadership, national unity of purpose and will (to name but a few).

The present paper is written in the midst of two events that have influenced, the relationship between World Jewry and Israel and will no doubt continue to do so in

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6 The Law of Return, Israel’s distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants, awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. According to the current, amended version of the Law of Return, a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother, or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform), who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel’s Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for Law of Return purposes. The law, per se, does not affect a person's Jewish status, which as noted is adjudicated by Israel’s Ministry of Interior and rabbinical authorities. The law extends its provisions to all current Jews and to their Jewish or non-Jewish spouses, children, and grandchildren, as well as to the spouses of such children and grandchildren. As a result of its three-generation time perspective and lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a wide population, one of significantly wider scope than core, extended and enlarged Jewish populations defined above. Though Prof. DellaPergola does not refer uniformly to the Jewish population eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return, and only gives notions regarding some countries this criterion is of particular importance to the present study.
the future. These are the upsurge in Palestinian violence which has already entered its second year; and the unprecedented terror attacks on the United States of America and the consequent “war on terrorism” being waged by the United States and a coalition of countries. These events have influenced, and will continue to exercise an influence on travel, participation in Israel programs, physical security in home communities, financial assistance, and immigration to Israel. These events will have to be taken into consideration in analyzing the data since they may artificially drag estimates downwards during the 2000-2001-2002 periods.

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Office of the Spokesman

II. Demographic Trends

THE WORLD’S JEWISH POPULATION was estimated at 13.25 million at the beginning of 2001—an increase of about 40,000 over the previous year’s revised estimate. World Jewry constituted about 2.19 per 1,000 of the world’s total population in 2000. One in about 457 people in the world is a Jew. According to the revised figures, between 2000 and 2001 the Jewish population grew by an estimated 41,300 people, or about 0.3 percent. The world’s total population annual rate of population growth is 1.4 percent (0.1 percent in more developed countries, 1.7 percent in less developed countries). Despite all the imperfections in the estimates, world Jewry continued to be close to “zero population growth” with the natural increase in Israel slightly overcoming the decline in the Diaspora.

The revised figures in table 2 clearly portray the slowing down of Jewish population growth globally since World War II. Based on a post-Holocaust world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by growths of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 344,000 in the 1990s. While it took 13 years to add one million to world Jewry’s post-war size, it took 38 years to add another million. The modest recovery of the 1990s mostly reflects the already noted cases of individuals first entering or returning to Judaism, especially from Eastern Europe, as well as a short-lived “echo effect” of the post-war “baby-boom” (see below).

Over 80 percent of World Jewry live in two countries, the United States and Israel, and 95 percent are concentrated in ten countries. The aggregate of these major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry’s total size.

Recent findings basically confirmed the previous estimates and, perhaps more importantly, trends now prevailing in the demography of world Jewry.8

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7Sergio DellaPergola, “World Jewish Population, 2001,” American Jewish Yearbook, Vol.101.(New York: American Jewish Committee) ms. We are indebted to Prof. DellaPergola for much of the data presented in this section. The previous estimates, as of 1.1.2000, were published in AJYB 2000, vol. 100, pp. 484-495. See also Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, Mark Tolts, “Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections 2000-2080”, ibid, pp. 103-146; and previous AJYB volumes for further details on earlier estimates.

8See Roberto Bachi, Population Trends of World Jewry (Jerusalem, 1976); U.O. Schmelz, “Jewish
stated, these involve a positive balance of vital events in Israel and a negative one in nearly all other Jewish communities; a positive migration balance for Israel, the United States and a few other western countries, and a negative one in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Muslim countries, and some western countries as well; a positive balance of accessions and secessions in Israel, and an often negative or in any event rather mixed one elsewhere. While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2001 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of the sociodemographic and identificational processes underlying the definition of Jewish populations, hence the estimates of their sizes. This is the more so at a time of enhanced international migration often implying double counts of people on the move. Consequently, the analyst has to come to terms with the paradox of the permanently provisional character of Jewish population estimates.

DISTRIBUTION BY MAJOR REGIONS

Just about half of the world’s Jews reside in the Americas, with about 46 percent in North America. Over 37 percent live in Asia, including the Asian Republics of the former USSR (but not the Asian parts of the Russian Republic and Turkey)—most of them in Israel. Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Republic and Turkey, accounts for about 12 percent the total. Less than 2 percent of the world’s Jews live in Africa and Oceania. Among the major geographical regions listed in table 1, the number of Jews in Israel—and, consequently, in total Asia—increased in 2000. Moderate Jewish population gains were also estimated for North America, the European Union (including 15 member countries), and Oceania. Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Asian countries out of Israel, and Africa sustained decreases in Jewish population size.

North America

United States

The estimate starts from the 1989-1990 National Jewish Population Survey benchmark core Jewish population of 5,515,000, accounts for a positive balance of immigration net of emigration, and assumes some quantitative erosion in the light of recent marriage, fertility, and age-composition trends. After reaching a level of 5,700,000 at the end of 1996, a stable population total for the U.S. core Jewish population has been assumed 9.

Canada

For the beginning of 2001 we updated the 1991 baseline of 356,300 to 364,000, making the Canadian Jewish population the World’s fourth-largest 10.


10 Ibid. The 1996 Canadian census provided new evidence for the estimate of the local Jewish population. In 1996, 351,705 Canadians reported a Jewish ethnic origin, thereof 195,810 as a single response, and 155,900 as one selection in a multiple response with up to four options. The sum inconsistency appears in the original report: Statistics Canada, Top 25 Ethnic Origins in Canada, Showing Single and Multiple Responses, for Canada, 1996 Census (20% Sample Data) (Ottawa, 1998). The 1991 census equivalent of the 1996 census figure of ethnic Jews (including those
South America. The Jewish population of Argentina, the largest in Latin America and seventh largest in the world, was marked by a negative balance of internal evolution. Since the early 1960s, when the Jewish population was estimated at 310,000, the pace of emigration and return migration was significantly affected by the variable nature of economic and political trends in the country, generating a negative balance of external migrations. Between 1990 and 2000, over 10,000 persons migrated to Israel, while unspecified numbers moved to other countries. Accordingly, the estimate for Argentinean Jewry was reduced to 197,000 in 2001.

Europe

About 1.6 million Jews lived in Europe at the beginning of 2001; 66 percent lived in Western Europe and 34 percent in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries—including the Asian territories of the Russian Republic and Turkey (see table 4). In 2000 Europe lost 1.9 percent of its Jewish population, mainly through the continuing emigration from the European republics of the FSU.

The European Union, incorporating fifteen countries since the 1995 accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the European Union (EU) had an estimated combined Jewish population of 1,032,100—an increase of 0.3 percent over the previous year. Different trends affected the Jewish populations in each member country.

France

With the breakup of the USSR, France had the third largest Jewish population in the world, after the United States and Israel. The estimated size of French Jewry was assessed at 530,000 since the major survey that was taken in the 1970s. Over the following 20 years, monitoring the plausible trends of both the internal evolution and external migrations of Jews in France suggested little net change in Jewish population size.

In view of these trends, our French Jewish population estimate was revised to 525,000 in 1995, and 520,000 at the beginning of 2001.

Germany

In 1990, Germany was politically reunited. In the former (West) German Federal Republic, the 1987 population census reported 32,319 Jews. Immigration compensated for the surplus of deaths over births in this aging Jewish population.


Over 100,000 immigrants from the FSU settled in united Germany since the end of 1989, including non-Jewish family members.\textsuperscript{16} Assuming a time lag between immigration and registration with the Jewish Community, resulting in a failure of about 10,000 Jews to report, an estimate of 98,000 core Jews (not including non-Jewish members of households) obtained for 2001, brings Germany to the position of ninth largest Jewish community worldwide.

Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands each had Jewish populations ranging around 30,000. There was a tendency toward internal shrinkage of all these Jewries, but in some instances this was offset by immigration.

\textbf{Other West Europe.}

Few countries remain in Western Europe which have not joined the EU. In 2001 they accounted for a combined Jewish population of 19,700.

\textbf{Former USSR (European parts).} Since 1989, the demographic situation of East European Jewry was radically transformed as a consequence of the dramatic geopolitical changes in the region.\textsuperscript{17} Data from the last all-Soviet population census, carried out in January 1989, revealed a total of 1,450,500 Jews,\textsuperscript{18} confirming the declining trend shown by the previous three USSR censuses: 2,267,800 in 1959, 2,150,700 in 1970, and 1,810,900 in 1979.

Some underreporting is not impossible, but it cannot be easily quantified and should not be exaggerated. Jewish emigration played the major role among demographic changes intervening since 1989.\textsuperscript{19} The economic and political crisis that culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a state in 1991 generated a major emigration upsurge in 1990 and 1991. Emigration continued at lower but significant levels throughout 2000. Over the whole 1990-2000 period, over 1.4 million people emigrated from the FSU defined by the enlarged Law of Return Jewish population definition. Of these, nearly 900,000 went to Israel, about 300,000 to the United States, and over 200,000 chose other countries, mainly

\textsuperscript{16}See Madeleine Tress, “Welfare state type, labour markets and refugees: a comparison of Jews from the former Soviet Union in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany”, \textit{Ethnic and Racial Studies}, 21,1, 1998, 116-137. There are enough incentives for most newcomers to be willing to affiliate with the Jewish community, but allow for some time lag between immigration and registration with the organized Jewish community, and take into account a certain amount of permanent non-affiliation.


\textsuperscript{18}Goskomstat SSSR, \textit{Vestnik Statistiki}, 10 (1990), pp. 69-71. This figure does not include about 30,000 Tats who were in fact Mountain Jews—a group mostly concentrated in the Caucasus area that enjoys fully Jewish status and the prerogatives granted by Israel’s Law of Return. N.B. Official governmental sources provide the fundamental basis of information on the number of Jews in the FSU. The Soviet Union’s and subsequent data distinguish the Jews as one recognized “nationality” (ethnic groups).

Germany. Out of the total migrants, about 980,000 were Jewish by the core definition. Periodical declines in the volume of emigration should not be misconstrued: when compared to the fast declining Jewish population figures in the FSU, the emigration trend remained remarkably stable. While mass emigration was an obvious factor in Jewish population decrease, a heavy deficit of internal population dynamics developed and even intensified due to the great aging which is known to have prevailed for many decades among FSU Jewry. The data was based on a 5 percent sample.

The total core Jewish population for the FSU was estimated at 462,000 at the beginning of 2001. Of this total, 434,000 lived in the European republics and 28,000 in the Asian republics (see below). Jewish Agency estimates of those eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return are over double this amount and higher than the enlarged Jewish population cited below.

Russia kept the largest Jewish population in any of the FSU republics—currently the fifth largest in the world. Prof. DellaPergola’s 2001 estimate for Russian core Jews was 275,000 (as against census-based estimates of 570,000 for 1989, including Tats, and 410,000 for 1994). In spite of decline, Russia’s share of the total Jewish population of the FSU significantly increased over time due to lower emigration frequencies.

The respective figures for the enlarged Jewish population—including all current Jews as well as other persons of Jewish parentage and their non-Jewish household members—are substantially higher in the FSU where high intermarriage rates have prevailed for several tens of years. While a definitive estimate for the total USSR cannot be provided for lack of appropriate data, evidence for Russia and other Slavic republics indicated a high ratio of non-Jews to Jews in the enlarged Jewish population. In 2001, the 275,000 core Jews and their 245,000 non-Jewish household members produced an enlarged population of 520,000. The ratio of enlarged to core therefore increased from 1.6 in 1989 to 1.9 in 2001. Due to the highly self-selective character of aliyah, non-Jews constituted a relatively smaller share of all new immigrants from the FSU than their share among the Jewish population in the countries of origin, but such share was rapidly increasing.

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20 On the strength of these considerations, our estimate of the core Jewish population in the USSR (including the Asian regions) was reduced from the census figure of 1,480,000 at the beginning of 1989 (including Tats) to 890,000 in 1993. The February 1994 national Microcensus of the Russian republic confirmed the known trends. See V. Aleksandrova, “Mikroperepensis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Voprosy Statistiki, 1994 (1), p. 37 (Moscow, 1994). See also Mark Tolts, “The Interrelationship Between Emigration and the Socio-Demographic Profile of Russian Jewry”, in Russian Jews on Three Continents, ed. Noah Levin-Epstein, Paul Ritterband, Yaakov Ro’i (London, 1996) pp. 147-176.


23 Israel’s Ministry of Interior records the religion-nationality of each person, including new
The total number of individuals eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return is considerably higher as reported by the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency’s Unit for the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe estimates that in 2001 there is a total of 864,000 individuals eligible to emigrate to Israel from the FSU. Of these 839,000 are from European Russia and the Caucasus and 25,000 from the Asian republics. An additional 30,000 reside in the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.24 A population summary of the population from the FSU and Baltic states eligible to immigrate to Israel is found in Table A--.

Israel

At the beginning of 2001, Israel’s Jewish population was 4,952,200.25 This was half a million more than the 4,459,696 Jews enumerated in the November 1995 census. Adding the about 250,000 non-Jewish members of immigrant families, mostly from the FSU but also from Ethiopia and other countries, an enlarged Jewish population of 5.2 million was obtained,26 out of a total population of 6,363,800.

Israel accounted for 99 percent of the 5 million Jews in Asia, including the Asian republics of the former USSR but excluding the Asian territories of the Russian Republic and Turkey (see table 5). By the beginning of 2001, Israel Jews constituted 37.4 percent of total world Jewry.27 Israel’s Jewish population grew in 2001 by 79,400, or 1.6 percent. The pace of growth was slowing down after reaching growth rates of 6.2 percent in 1990, 5 percent in 1991, and 2-2.5 percent between 1992 and 1996. The number of new immigrants in 2000 (60,130) declined by 21.7 percent versus 1999 (76,766) which in turn represented a 35 percent increase over 1998 (56,730). About 25 percent of Jewish population growth in 2000 derived from conversion in Israel in 1999, and 4,600 were attending conversion classes in 2000—mostly of them immigrants from Ethiopia and the FSU and their children who were previously listed as non-Jews.28

Former USSR (Asian parts). The total Jewish population in the Asian republics of the former USSR was estimated at 28,000 at the beginning of 2001. Ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus area, and the fear of Muslim fundamentalism in Central Asia continued to cause concern and stimulated Jewish emigration.29 At the beginning of

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26 The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics refers to such enlarged population as “Jews and others”.
29 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Immigration to Israel 1998 (Jerusalem, 2000); Ministry of
the 1990s, minimal rates of natural increase still existed among the more traditional sections of these Jewish communities, but conditions were rapidly eroding this residual surplus.\textsuperscript{30} Reflecting these trends, the largest community remained in Azerbaijan (8,900 according to the 1999 census and 7,500 in 2001\textsuperscript{31} versus 30,800 in 1989), followed by Uzbekistan (7,000 in 2001 vs. 94,900), Georgia (5,500 vs. 24,800), Kazakhstan (6,800 according to the 1999 census\textsuperscript{32} and 5,200 in 2001, vs. 19,900 in 1989), and the remaining republics (2,800 overall, thereof 1,600 in Kyrgyzstan according to the 1999 census, vs. 24,000 in 1989). The figures of those eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return are close to double this amount (See Table A--).

**Africa**

About 88,000 Jews were estimated to remain in Africa at the beginning of 2001, of which about 90 percent in the Republic of South Africa (see table 6). According to the 1980 national census, there were about 118,000 Jews among South Africa’s white population.\textsuperscript{33} Continuing Jewish emigration from South Africa to Israel and other Western countries (especially Australia), stimulated by personal insecurity and other fears about the future, was reflected in a new survey carried out in 1998.\textsuperscript{34} A new estimate was suggested of 80,000 for 2000, lowered to 79,000 in 2001, making South Africa the 12th largest Jewish population worldwide.

It was assumed that only few Jews had remained in Ethiopia, but in subsequent years the small remaining core Jewish population appeared to be larger than previously estimated. Between 1992 and 2000, 17,700 immigrants from Ethiopia arrived in Israel—mostly non-Jews immigrants seeking reunification with their Jewish relatives. These so-called *Falashmura* or ‘conversos’ are currently being “reconfirmed” in their Jewish faith and are currently being brought to Israel. The Jewish Agency has brought some 2,000 Ethiopian immigrants to Israel in the first half of 2001 and hopes to reach a rate of 5,000 per year. It is possible that more Jews may appear asking to emigrate to Israel, and that more Christian relatives of Jews already in Israel will press for emigration before Israel terminates the family reunification program for such relatives.

Table 9 demonstrates the magnitude of Jewish dispersion. The 94 individual countries listed above as each having at least 100 Jews are scattered over six continents. In 2001, 8 countries had a Jewish population of 100,000 or more;

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\textsuperscript{30} Tolts, “The Balance...”, cit.
\textsuperscript{31} Not including the Jewish portion of the Tat group.
\textsuperscript{33} Sergio DellaPergola, Allie A. Dubb, “South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile”, *AJYB*, 1988, vol. 88, pp. 59-140. The results of a Jewish-sponsored survey of the Jewish population in the five major South African urban centers, completed—like the census—in 1991, confirmed the ongoing demographic decline. Based on that evidence, the most likely range of Jewish population size was estimated at 92,000 to 106,000 for 1991 with a central value of 100,000. According to the 1996 census there were 55,734 white Jews, 10,449 black Jews, 1,058 “coloured” (mixed race) Jews, and 359 Indian Jews. The study was directed by Dr. Allie A. Dubb and supported by the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies, University of Cape Town. See Allie A. Dubb, *The Jewish Population of South Africa: The 1991 Sociodemographic Survey* (Cape Town, 1994).
another 5 countries had 50,000 or more; 15 countries had 10,000-50,000;

CONCENTRATION IN MAJOR CITIES

Intensive international and internal migrations led to the concentration of an overwhelming majority of the Jews into large urban areas. Table 10 ranks the cities where the largest Jewish populations were found in 2001. These 20 central places and their suburban and satellite areas altogether comprised over 70 percent of the whole world Jewish population. Ten of these cities were in the U.S., four in Israel, two in Canada, and one each in France, the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Russia. The ten metropolitan areas in the United States included 78 percent of the total U.S. Jewry, and the four Israeli major urban areas included 80 percent of Israel’s Jewish population.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS

If medium fertility levels are assumed, without migration, World Jewish population will increase from 13.1 million to 13.8 by 2020, 14 million by the beginning of the ‘30s and 15 million by 2080. With migration, and according to different fertility rates, World Jewish population would vary by 2050 from 14.1 million to 15.5 million, and in 2080 vary from 15.5 to 21.65 million. Israeli Jewish population, without immigration, would increase to about 6 million by 2020, slightly less than 8 million by 2050 and over 10 million in 2080. With immigration mid-1990 levels, Israeli Jewish population would vary between 5.8 million to 6.6 million in 2020, between 6.8 and 9.7 million in 2050, and between 7.5 and 14.3 million in 2080: at medium fertility levels Israel’s Jewish population for 2010 would be 5.56 million, at 2020 6.23 million, at 2050 8.23 million and by 2080 10.56 million. (See Table 11)

Even at high fertility levels and assuming migration, North American Jewry would peak at 6.2 million at 2020 and then decline to 5.8 million in 2080. A steady and modest decline in European Jewry is predicted over the next 80 years, and a dramatic decline to near zero is predicted in the FSU by 2080. If no migration is anticipated FSU Jewry might number 100,000 by 2080.

By 2010 the size of the of U.S. and Israel Jewry will converge and thereafter the World’s largest reservoir of Jewish population will be in Israel. By all predictions the majority of World Jewry will reside in Israel well before the middle of the millennium.

However, despite its positive (1.9) Jewish population growth (2.4 TFR), Israel faces a demographical challenge, since this growth rate is eroded by the over population growth of the Arabs. Israeli Arabs have a 4.7 fertility rate, West Bank Arabs a 5.4 and the Gaza Strip Arabs a 7.4 TFR. In 2050 Jews (and the non-Jewish fringe (e.g. immigrants from the FSU who are not Jewish) will number 8.7 million by medium prediction, the West Bank population 6.4 million the Gaza Strip 5.14 and Israeli Arabs 3.1 million making a total of Palestinian Arabs 14.68 million. (An overall high procreation estimate might place the total Palestinian Arab population at 26 million

35 Definitions of metropolitan statistical areas vary across countries. Estimates reported here reflect the criteria adopted in each place. For U.S. estimates, see Schwartz and Scheckner, cit., AJYB 1998; for Canadian estimates see Torczyner and Brotman, cit.; for other diaspora estimates, A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry; for Israeli estimates see Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Population and Vital Statistics 1999, cit.; Monthly Bulletin, cit. Following the 1995 population census in Israel, major metropolitan urban areas were redefined. The two cities of Netanya and Ashdod, each with a Jewish population exceeding 100,000, were included in the outer ring of the expanded Greater Tel Aviv area.
Within the pre-67 boundaries of Israel, Jewish population will vary between 63% to 71% by 2050 according to different predictions for medium TFR.

CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING DEMOGRAPHY
The Jewish population on the whole is close to zero population growth (negative in the Diaspora and positive in Israel). In the Diaspora the inverted triangle age structure with its ensuing negative population growth, threatens the existence of the Jewish People. With the exception of Latin America, which has a younger population, and hence a slight population gain, any population gains are due to ex-Soviet migrations. The FSU itself has an aging population and most of the ideologically oriented members had emigrated with the 1973 or 1990-92 waves of immigration. The remaining FSU Jewish population shows a much higher extended Jewish population to core Jewish population ratio. Those eligible under the Law of Return to immigrate to Israel who are not Jewish greatly outnumber those who are Jewish. In the States the definition of who is a Jew is becoming more blurred. Pending the NJPS results, which should be ready before the year’s end, the trend is to a loss of Orthodox fringe which becomes blended into Conservative, and a fading away of more liberal elements into the non-defined status (which is growing).

European Jewry is also becoming lost in the ever-increasing non-identified category and to aging. Mixed marriages, now 50% prevalent in the USA and in Europe constitute a danger to Jewish existence. Only 18% of the offspring of mixed marriages retain a Jewish consciousness.

The aging of the Jewish population of the Diaspora is extremely worrisome since the ratio of vital events will be more negative in the future. The large ratio of non-Jews to Jews among population of those eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return in the FSU, and the attrition of Jews in the European areas of the FSU makes it imperative to increase Jewish awareness and identification within the FSU, the USA, the largest reservoir of World Jewry. Liberalization of personal status determinants and conversions, which should be carried out under the combined aegis of the three denominations, should be allowed for in Israel so as to attract and keep would-be immigrants and reduce social problems ensuing from large numbers of citizens not recognized as Jews (“the non-Jewish fringe”).

By 2010 Israel will become the country with the largest Jewish population, and by 2050 most of world Jewry will reside in Israel. Jewish immigration to Israel is a means of increasing the Jewish population and constitutes a guarantee of Jewish survival. However, Israel faces a demographic challenge. Shortly after 2010 the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian Authority population will outnumber Israel’s enlarged Jewish population (at medium fertility estimates) and within Israel’s pre-67 boarders, Israel’s enlarged Jewish population will drop from 81.4% to 73.8% projections by 2050.

The increased population (over 23million) and longer life spans will cause grave ecological and infrastructure problems in Israel. If this trend will continue at the present rate, most government National Insurance Institution payments in Israel,

would go be used to supporting social services for Arab youthful population and Jewish retirees. Gainful employment for a growing work force must be planned for. While one possible target goal would be to bring the maximum number of eligible candidates for immigration from the FSU to Israel, the motivation of those remaining is less pronounced as improved economic conditions gradually appear in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan (see below under “Aliyah”). Likewise the influx of large numbers of non-Jewish FSU elements into Israeli society would cause grave social problems in Israel and constitute a social time bomb. Greater emphasis must be placed on increasing knowledge of and identification with Judaism, Israel and Jewish culture within the FSU, and conditioning immigration or naturalization on demonstrated knowledge. Parallel liberalized conversion procedures under the conjoint tri-denominational aegis (as per the recommendations of the Neeman Commission) should be increased. For the short term, Israel should capitalize on areas of instability in the FSU and target these areas for recruiting new immigrants. Immigration from Ethiopia, Argentina and France should be encouraged (see “Aliyah” below) and efforts must be made on the social and economic planes to develop Israel as a magnet for encouraging ideologically-motivated immigration. Likewise measures should be taken to encourage Jewish procreation. Increasing assistance to families with two to four children should be envisaged. Israel must do more within its borders to promote Jewish education and cultural awareness and identification with the Jewish Diaspora, inasmuch as there is an estrangement from Jewish praxis and identification with Jewish values amongst native Israelis as well as amongst new immigrants from the FSU.

II. FUNDRAISING AS A MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION AND ASSISTANCE

An analysis of philanthropic contributions to the Jewish Agency through the intermediary of the United Jewish Appeal/United Jewish Communities in North America and the Keren Hayesod/United Israel Appeals gives expression to the adage that “when the going gets tough the tough get going.” Jewish communities contribute substantially greater sums when Israel is faced by a national challenge or emergency. However over the last half decade, revenues from contributions received by the Jewish Agency has decreased and a larger percentage has been retained by the Diaspora communities. Special fundraising campaigns are a means of not only transferring pecuniary resources to Israel but also for building community abroad and increasing income in local communities who “hitch a ride” on Israel campaigns, inasmuch as varying percentages of UJA-collected funds are retained by the collecting communities for their own needs. There has been general tendency to retain a higher percentage of revenues for the needs of Diaspora communities.

The Six Day War was a watershed in Diaspora-Israel relations. In that period alone North American Jewry raised $100m in three weeks time, and 300m during that

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The Six-Day war inaugurated a trend in which larger sums were collected and slightly higher percentages were transferred to Israel. Prior to that war funds transferred to Israel had dropped from some 40% to 20% (with the exception of the Sinai Campaign period). The Yom Kippur War was another such watershed. In that year a total of ca. $700m was raised. During the 1990 “Operation Exodus” UJA campaign revenues reached a peak of 1,100m.

A survey of Contributions made by the fundraising organizations to the Jewish Agency from 1987-88 onward, which we have conducted, show substantial increases during periods of crisis or national challenge. Income from North America more than doubled when comparing 1990-91 (the first major year of increased immigration) to that of 1988-89, while income from the European fund-raising component trebled when comparing those two fiscal years. Total income available to the Jewish Agency jumped from $382.4m to $843.5m. Much of this added income came from special Exodus Campaigns conducted on behalf of the Jewish Agency, increased US Government grants for immigration and resettlement, and smaller increases due to Youth Aliyah and “Passage to Freedom” contributions.

In North America there has been a trend over recent years for a larger percentage of funds raised in the United States (ca. 70%) to remain in the States for local community needs (with the exception of the major campaign periods: 1967 close to 90% was transferred to Israel, in 1973 slightly over 60% was transferred and in 1991-19 almost 60% was transferred). These contributions are portrayed in Figures B1 and B2.

There has, however, been a gradual drop in Jewish Agency income over the last six years. Total Jewish Agency income remained over, or close to $500m till 1994 and then remained at a level that approached $400m. (characteristic of pre-Exodus years) until 2001, for which a drop beneath $400m. is expected (to a large extent due to the financial and hi-tech crises). When these sums are adjusted against inflation, less dramatic intakes occur (v. Figure 3). The trend is indeed worrisome, since it indicates a reduction in commitment and a reduction in real income at a time when expenses must increase. A table of Jewish Agency income and sources, from 1987-8 to 2001 is appended.

In the face of the so-called Intifadat al-Aksa, and upon the request of Prime Minister Sharon, the Jewish Agency has launched a special Solidarity Campaign (which includes information, lobbying and public relations elements, but also a major multi-million dollar fundraising drive) and a $660m. nine-year (program together with the Government of Israel) to favor immigration and absorption from France Argentina and Ethiopia. This program, which would begin in 2002, was approved by the Jewish Agency Assembly in its June, 2001 session. However by the October 2001 Board of Governors, meeting the Government of Israel had not yet budgeted their half of the

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funds for the 2002 budget. The Government decided to study the issue of increased benefits to all Western immigrants.

The solidarity campaign may increase the 2001 income slightly. However, the impact of the terrorist attacks on the United States upon the level of donorship is too early to assess. It is reasonable to assume that pressing local philanthropic needs emanating from the attack will eclipse donations earmarked for Israel. The financial setbacks incurred by major donors, levies to be imposed by the Federal Government to underwrite the $40b. emergency aid package voted by Congress as well as increased security and defense expenditures, and the sacrifices to be made by the American people in the war against terror will no doubt detract from the readiness to contribute to Israel. In the wake of the tragedy, the Jewish Agency has already cancelled a series of preliminary world-wide communal rallies for Israel which were to have culminated with a September 23rd mega-rally in New York City\(^41\). These cancellations, will undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the 2001 income. The challenge will be to maintain high-enough communal concern for Israel to translate itself in donations exceeding the pre- and post-Exodus baseline.

Conclusions Concerning Fundraising

Jewish communities abroad gain more from fund raising campaigns than does Israel. Such gains are both tangible monetary revenues and intangible “community building” benefits. There has been a tendency for a decreasing percentage of funds collected abroad to be transferred to Israel, as well as a decrease in absolute terms. This may reflect lower levels of identification and less communal cohesiveness. When comparing the sums of monies collected to the total budget of the State of Israel, funds collected abroad amount to an ever-decreasing portion of Israel’s real needs. It is interesting to analyze the age brackets of the donors. An empirical survey indicates that the age is relatively higher than in the past. Hence the older donors continue to maintain their status by contributing to Israel; however this generation is not being replaced sufficiently by a younger leadership generation.

Inasmuch as campaigns for national challenges attract increased contribution levels, there is evidence that Jewish communities are still mobilized by challenges to Israel. Such campaigns are necessary for building community in the Diaspora as well as for supplying assistance to Israel. These fundraising campaigns should be hence encouraged. However, donations are an expression of commitment, and this in turn is a function of education. The culture of giving, as an element of identification and community building, must be transmitted to new generations. Israel will benefit indirectly from strengthened Diaspora communities inasmuch as she will reap benefits in the form of improved Jewish Zionist education, political influence, aliya, partnership in economic and social ventures, etc. Young leadership with an appreciation for Israel and its centrality must be nurtured and contribution must be seen as one of the elements essential of communal leadership.

\(^41\) Several communities, notably those of London, Pittsburgh and Melbourne did hold rallies attended by several thousand individuals.
According to figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics, 2,874,416 immigrants came to Israel since it declared its independence. During the first three and a half years of its existence Israel experienced an immigration boom. Its population more than doubled, with new immigrants arriving from Europe, Middle East and North Africa. From 1948 to 1951 some 700,000 Jews flooded Israel. Such absolute numbers and, a fortiori, proportions were not to be seen again. Later waves of immigrants from de-colonized North Africa during the early sixties (see Table A1) added close to 200,000 additional immigrants (some 50-60,000 a year). Thereafter aliyah fell to a low of 15,000 in 1966.

In the wake of the Six Day War, there was a general jump in aliyah, which peaked in 1972-73 with over 50,000 immigrants arriving during each of these two years. The increase in aliyah during the Seventies, was due to push and pull factors. In the USSR, the push of external political pressure and the pull of grass roots ideological pressure resulted in the liberalization of emigration policies. Though aliyah from the West was essentially ideologically motivated, there were many practical push influences at play. Aliyah from Argentina was politically and economically-motivated. The high rate of immigration from France during the late Sixties and early Seventies, which was not to be seen again, may be attributed to ideological motives as well as to the fact that the Jewish population of France was comprised of North African Jews who where still immigrants or rapatriés and who had not yet reestablished roots in France. More recent increases from France have also been influenced by the economic situation and right-Wing anti-Semitism. The post-Six Day War immigration from North America while ideologically motivated towards Israel, came at a time when there was a generally similar-in-scope emigration wave from the USA towards other Western countries. Push factors for the increased immigration to Israel may have included the Viet-Nam war and deteriorating Black-Jewish relations, in addition to the pull factors of awakened national pride and the concern for preventing a second Shoah, which the Six Day War generated. The South African increased aliyah of the Seventies came in the wake of social unrest (just as other peaks in South African aliyah had come in 1963, 1987, and in 1992, on the eve of the change of regime). Argentinian aliyah peaks came not only in 1977, with the return of Peron, but also in 1963 (at the time of an economic crisis and a wave of terrorism) and again in the Nineties with economic problems and terrorism).42

During the Eighties, the wave of general aliyah tapered off to a baseline which hovered around 10,000 per annum and actually dropped beneath that number in 1986.

We are currently in the continuation of the unprecedented wave of immigration, of the last decade of the 20th Century. This wave, the harbinger of which had been visible already in 1989, is characterized by large numbers of Former Soviet Union Jews (and their family members eligible to immigrate to Israel under the provisions of the Law of Return [see above]), and also large numbers of immigrants from Ethiopia. The peak of this wave was during 1990 and 1991 in which 370,000 immigrants arrived in Israel. The 1990-91 peak in aliyah was 700% greater than the immigration level of the previous year. Thereafter the immigration steadied off at the upper 70,000 level. Though it dropped in 1997 and 1998, it picked up again the following year, related, no doubt, to the 1999 economic problems of the FSU. This period has seen a rebounding of immigration levels from France (motivated for ideological reasons, and out of concern for right-wing extremism) the United States and from Argentina (where economic reasons played an important factor) and Ethiopia.

It is still too early to assess the influence of the Palestinian uprising on immigration. Though midyear figures for 2001 show an overall slump of about 20%, this slump is not evenly spread out. Throughout the past three years there has been an increase in aliyah from Argentina and Ethiopia. Trends in the FSU show a gradual tapering off of immigration following the 1990-91 boom of close to 70,000 immigrants per annum to a baseline of about 20,000 (with the exception of 1999 as mentioned above) See Table A2 and an eight-month figure for 2001 which would project on a purely arithmetic basis to 60% of that amount, with a slightly higher projection for Ukraine and Moldova and a 73% projection for the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the latter regions only Armenia, with a negligible aliyah showed a projected gain and Uzbekistan showed a projected lesser decline. Inasmuch as the last trimester of the year is generally 35% higher in the FSU and as much as 40% higher in Russia and the Ukraine (see Table A3), the total of FSU aliyah for 2001 may amount to over 35,000. Given increased immigration from Argentina, Ethiopia and slight declines in North America, France, total aliyah might come this year to some 45,000 or somewhat higher.

Conclusions and Predictions

Predictions for FSU immigration to Israel in the future are less than optimistic. As noted, The Jewish population in the FSU has decreased and there are much smaller percentages of idealistically-motivated candidates for aliyah in the FSU, though the aliyah rate was stable until this past year. Likewise the ratio of Jewish to non-Jewish candidates for aliyah has decreased. Moreover economic conditions in Russia and the Ukraine appear to be stabilizing. Consequently the incentive for Jews to emigrate will be less than it was in the past. In Russia Putin succeeded in centralizing power and stabilizing the economy in 2000. According to the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 2000 was the best year in the decade for economic achievement. In the Ukraine the GDP, which had fallen by 60% between 1991 and 1999, rose by 6% in 2000 and by 7.7% in the first quarter of 2001.
Nonetheless inflation continued and the standard of living remained low. A political crisis and the sense of uncertainty might increase immigration to Israel in the future. Other regions of the FSU, while showing some signs of economic growth still have indications of instability, which might harbor increased aliyah in the future. Moldova, which reverted to a communist regime, may increased Jewish emigration in the future. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan showed economic growth. However there is an armed conflict in the former country against Islamic militias and there is mismanagement. The Jewish Agency will be increasing its efforts in the Asian republics and periphery in order to find apt candidates for immigration.43

As shown in the first chapter of our study, there has been a growing percentage of non Jewish candidates for aliyah under the provisions of the Law of Return remaining in the FSU. Thus ideological motivation, which was strong during the ’70s and early ‘90s is missing under the present immigration waves. Much must be accomplished to increase Jewish awareness within the FSU prior to immigration. The Jewish Agency has already begun an expanded “Jewish Identity Program” in the FSU, which will be discussed below. Once in Israel, study should be continued in appropriate frameworks.

The poor economic conditions in Argentina, coupled with strong Jewish identification has already translated themselves into increased immigration this past year (despite the problems associated with the Intifadat el-Aksa). The Jewish Agency must capitalize on this important reservoir of Jewish population and make efforts to assist immigrants from Argentina financially. The economic conditions in South Africa are poor and the currency rate of exchange is dropping. Though most South African Jews have preferred to immigrate to Australia because of linguistic affinity, there is a strong cultural affinity with Israel, which had even been officially recognized by the South African Government. The Jewish Agency must make provisions to encourage South African immigration and support immigrants financially. Perhaps this might make a difference in their decision to immigrate to Israel. Highly-motivated immigrants from Ethiopia (remaining Jews, and Falashmura reaffirmed Jews) are desirous to come to Israel and the Jewish Agency is making provisions for their immigration and absorption. Likewise motivation to come to Israel from French Jews has not subsided and the Agency should labor to attract immigrants from France.

The increased solidarity demonstrated by American Jewry in the wake of the current unrest in Israel, coupled with a growing feeling of insecurity in the United States may result in some increased immigration from the USA during the next year. It is of course too early to draw any conclusions.

43 The Jewish Agency for Israel, Department or the Former Soviet Union, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, “JAFI Activities in the FSU: Interim Report Submitted to the Board of Governors,” June 2001
Conclusions
All things being equal, we may expect a decrease in *aliyah* over the next decade. In the FSU the Jewish Agency’s strategy should be: to invest in increasing Jewish identity programs especially in the population centers; to capitalize on areas of unrest for short-term boosts in immigration, and to increase operations in the periphery (Asian Republics) in the short term. However the population base is lesser there and the results will not approach those of previous years. Jewishness, and in all cases of nuclear family members, demonstrated knowledge of Jewish and Israeli culture and traditions should be introduced as a prerequisite for obtaining Israeli nationality, in order to reduce social pressure in Israel. Conversion under tri-denominational aegis should be expanded upon. Israel should expand its efforts in to increase *aliyah* from Argentina, and from Ethiopia as well as from South Africa and France, by increasing incentives, assistance, and employment opportunities.

T. Education as an Indicator of Solidarity

**Background**
The quantity and quality of formal and informal Jewish and Zionist education currently being received by Jewish youth and young adults is a harbinger of future levels of identification with the Jewish Community and with the State of Israel. As of 1998 the Jewish Agency Department for Jewish Zionist Education coordinates formal and informal Jewish Zionist education in the Diaspora (inclusive the FSU and Eastern Europe) and programs in Israel for Diaspora populations. From 1991-1998, the Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education provided an umbrella structure for the coordinated efforts of three distinct Jewish Diaspora education departments which had existed previously: The Department for Education and Culture in the Diaspora, The Department for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora and the Youth and Chelutz Department.

The Goals of JAFI’s Department of Education

The mission statement of the Department of Education is to deepen the multi-faceted and unique significance of Israel in the connection of young Jews to their Judaism and to the Jewish People. The Department furthers this mission statement in the following major areas of activity:

1) The development of a world-wide system of Jewish educational personnel to address the most serious problem in Jewish education: the shortage of personnel. This world-wide system consists of two components:
a) Israeli educators who are recruited, trained, placed and supported in a wide variety of world Jewish educational formal and informal institutions. For example, the Department dispatches community and youth movement *shlichim* ("emissaries") to communities abroad, licensed teachers and senior educators to positions in Jewish day schools, Zionist Higher Religious Academy students to religious institutions and communities abroad, young women performing National Service to youth movements and communities for the coordination of Jewish educational programs and Israeli activities, young Israelis in communal educational service in programs like *Areivim* and *Amitim*, and over 1300 Israeli counselors for Jewish summer and winter camps around the world. Moreover, the Zionist Seminars Program places specially trained young Israelis in world Jewish schools and communities with tailor made informal educational programs focusing on Israel, Zionism and Jewish identity.

b) Professional development programs, both pre-service and in-service for Jewish educators, both in Israel and in local communities. For example, the Department works with Israeli institutions on professional development programs for senior educators, conducts in-service training programs for teachers in Israel and coordinates on-going in-service training for teachers in local communities. In addition, the Department has initiated several programs targeting young Israelis for future careers in world Jewish education.

2) The Provision of a Jewish educational experience of Israel as the core of enhancing and strengthening Jewish identity. The Department is involved in the advancement of such experiences in three major ways:

a) Through the strengthening of short-term educational programs in Israel. Although the Department does not directly implement such programs, it provides resources such as marketing, recruitment, tuition assistance, training, and standard setting for the wealth of program providers operating in the field.

b) Through the advancement of long-term educational programs in Israel. One of the chief strategic aims of the Department is to create a communal norm for Jewish high-school graduates of participation in long-term programs in Israel, similar to what exists in the Orthodox world.

c) Through the development of new models, approaches and content areas in the field of “teaching Israel” as part of the Jewish educational agenda around the world. Included in this area of activity are the development of on-line materials by the Department’s Pedagogic Center, the use of distance learning technology, the above-mentioned Zionist Seminars and the presence of the wealth of Israeli educators within educational institutions as described earlier.
In addition, the Department is also involved in the strengthening of young Israelis’ connection to the Jewish People through cooperation with the Ministry of Education.

3) The creation of a global platform linking the wealth of educational resources in Israel to the diverse needs of Jewish education around the world. The Department’s representatives around the world provide global reach and expanse, while the Department’s positioning within Israeli society provides access to Israel’s educational assets. In particular, the development of technology in the service of Jewish education is a critical component of this emerging global platform.

4) The Direct implementation of educational services for the Jewish population of the FSU. The Department focuses on providing basic Jewish literacy both for future Olim and for those Jews who have not yet decided to move to Israel. Examples of Jewish education and identity programs in the FSU include the Jewish Identity project and Hebrew Language Ulpanim, the training of local educational personnel and the placement of Israeli educators, ongoing educational activities in youth clubs and camps, educational experiences in Israel and tri-lateral partnerships between communities in the FSU, Israel and the rest of the Jewish world.

Findings

The Activities of the Department for 2001 are summarized in Table C1 C1A(update) and C1B(FSU).

1. Formal Jewish Education
According to statistics supplied by the Jewish Agency’s Department of Jewish Zionist Education, only a fraction of Jewish youth abroad receive any form of Jewish education. In the West, percentages vary from 90% in Venezuela and South Africa to 20-25% in the EU (exclusive of France) 25-30% in France and 42% in the United States. In Great Britain 50% of students in lower grades and 30-40% of those in higher grades, receive Jewish education. Among the adult populations, considerably higher percentages identify with the community or are active in the community (though statistics are not accurate in this domain). Table C2 summarizes these findings.

As we have chosen to look at the “more than half cup” which is empty, these figures are worrisome since they show an erosion of the base for future identification with Judaism. If this trend continues we may predict an increase in the already growing fringe, which does not identify with Judaism and a drop in future identification of Jews around the world with Israel.

The situation in the FSU is likewise worrisome but not as desperate as might be believed, since some inroads have been made in promoting Jewish and education. As we have seen from the demographic analyses cited above in Chapter 1, fewer of the “core Jewish” population (those who define themselves as Jews) are left in the
FSU. Hence it is essential that much be done to promote Jewish identity. The situation in the FSU is promising. At present, there are 287 Jewish schools in the FSU as follows: 50 Jewish day schools serving 11,399 pupils, with ten more expected to open in the near future. These schools are served by 1,790 teachers, of which only about 90 of the teachers are accredited. In addition there are 12 special elementary schools serving kindergarten through grade 6. There are 37 kindergartens with 1,229 pupils, and 213 teachers. In addition, there are 188 Sunday schools, with 10,272 pupils and 1,186 teachers. The 11,399 students in FSU Jewish schools is an extremely optimistic figure. According to Prof. DellaPergola 5.6% of the 2000 FSU Jewish population, which he originally defined as 468,000 but in a later article updated to 462,000 (hence 25,872) is comprised of the 0-14 age group. If we assume that the same holds true for the remaining two years of high school, we could assume a 20,328 school-age (5-16 year-old) population of core Jews in the USSR, or double that amount of total candidates eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return (see Chapt. 1). According to the Jewish Agency Department of Jewish Zionist Education figures the percentage of core Jewish children studying in Jewish schools would thus be over 56% of the core Jewish population and 25.5% of the total pool of school-aged children eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return. A similar number of youngsters receive partial Jewish education. However, the vast majority of teachers that dispense education are not accredited. Inasmuch as Jewish education was almost non-existent under the communist regime there is a great hiatus to overcome.

On the other hand the percentage of adults studying in ulpanim in the FSU is ca. 9% of the total core population and 4.5% of the total eligible population of the FSU and those enrolled in Jewish identity courses constitute some 7.5% of the core population and 3.7% of the eligible population. Other figures transmitted by the Unit for FSU and Eastern Europe indicate that 130,000 individuals in the FSU have approached Jewish Agency emissaries and 100,000 have participated in Jewish holiday celebrations organized by the Agency (hence about one fourth of the core Jews and an eighth of those eligible to immigrate under the Law of Return) had some contact with the Agency or with a modicum of Jewish tradition.

2. Participation in short and long-term programs
According to the figures presented by the Department for Jewish Zionist Education, there was a dramatic 60% drop in youngsters participating in short-term programs in Israel. However the numbers of young adults participation in Birthright programs showed a remarkable resilience in 2000 and 2001 despite the security situation. [see Tables C2 and C3]
At first glance it would seem that the total level of participation in short-term programs did not drop significantly. When compared with the number of participants in short term Israel programs in 2000 (22,564 short term program participants) the drop in 2001 to 19,096 participants would appear not significant. The largest drops came from South American candidates and from British candidates. On the other hand the number of participants from the FSU and from Canada increased

[see Table C3]. However the expectations had been that in 2001 the number of participants in Birthright would have actually grown in 2001. A total of 7,690 youngsters participated in short term programs as of September 3, 2001 and an additional 1,670 participants are expected before the year’s end. The most dramatic drops were from the USA and Europe. South Africa and Australia declined moderately, and participants from the FSU actually increased.

Long-term programs in Israel were not affected by the Palestinian violence during the year 2001. When compared with the 2,314 participants in the year 2000, the drop to 2090 is not significant. Table C4

3. Educational Shlichim

If the mountain does not come to Mohammed, then Mohammad comes to the Mountain. Table C5

The Department recruits, screens, trains and places a variety of different types of Israeli educational personnel in Jewish educational institutions around the world:

Community educators work in community centers, Federations and other communal institutions on Israel education and Jewish identity enhancement with all sectors of the population.

Youth educators work with youth movements and organizations and student groups in developing young leadership, providing educational resources and strengthening the connection to Israel of young Jews.

Israeli Teachers work in formal educational settings teaching subjects related to Israel, Zionism and Judaism and in setting educational policy of schools and central educational agencies.

Areivim are young Israeli adults who work in small relatively isolated Jewish communities providing a wealth of educational services and deepening the community’s connection to Israel.

Amitim are pairs of Israelis and North Americans who work in Jewish communities, including the FSU, by providing a variety of educational services and resources.

The Zionist Kollelim are educational institutions comprised of Israelis who combine Torah study with communal involvement.

Sherut Leumi is a program for army-age religious girls serving one year in Jewish educational institutions around the world.

Camp counselors fill a wide variety of educational and cultural positions in Jewish day and overnight camps, providing thousands of campers and local counselors a direct connection with young Israelis.
New projects include sending IDF Education officers to work as teachers within Jewish communities as part of their military service.

Over the past four years, there has been a general tendency to increase the number of educational emissaries sent abroad. This is especially true of teachers, camp counselors, higher religious educational emissaries (Kollel Zioni), and women performing civilian National Service. This outreach abroad is of extreme importance since we are undergoing a period in which identification with Judaism and Israel is waning.

The large jump in the number of emissaries sent to Jewish summer camps was intentionally planned to compensate for an anticipated drop due to the so-called Intifadat el Aksa. Likewise the increase in number of Diaspora educators and Hebrew language teachers trained in Israel by the Department of Jewish Zionist Education (TABLE C 6) is of importance.

If, however, we compare the number of teaching emissaries currently being sent abroad to those of the last thirty years, their number is substantially lower at the present time. Following the jump in Department of Torah Education shlichim after the Six Day War the number remained in the 200-250 range throughout the Eightees and early Nineties, then dropped in the mid-Nineties to ca.170. The Education and Culture Department shlichim hovered around the 200 mark since the late Sixtees early-Seventies. We thus have an annual benchmark figure of about 400 emissaries.44 This is higher than the 200 teaching emissaries dispatched in 2001. If we add to these the Zionist Kollel (Religious Higher Education) emissaries sent abroad this year, their number is still less than that base number. Most of this decline stems from the inability of local communities to bear the financial cost of absorbing Israeli educators.

4.Conclusions

Improving and increasing the scope of Jewish education abroad is an important tactical goal supporting the strategic objectives of retaining in the fold as many of the Jewish population as possible and obtaining future support for Israel. The relatively limited percentage of Jewish youth exposed to some form of Jewish education, is regrettable and portends badly for the future. Especially worrisome are the less than 50% figures for the largest concentrations of Jews: the USA, and France, and Argentina (once the crown jewel of Jewish education in South America). The lack of Jewish education will increase the non-identifiable fringe, which is ever growing.

If the FSU has made inroads in formal Jewish education, it is relative to the inexistence of such frameworks prior to the glasnost.

In the FSU the focus should be on the major cities where Jewish communities will likely exist in the foreseeable future and that have begun to develop the basis of local communal institutions.

Long-term programs, which have a more serious educational impact, build future leadership and are more immune to security considerations should be emphasized. Likewise efforts should be made to expand Jewish awareness programs. Technology in the service of Jewish education should be developed to provide connections and links between the various sectors of the world Jewish population.

Inasmuch as most of the Jewish education system in the FSU depends on local personnel who are not certified, efforts should be made to train local teachers and to deploy teaching emissaries to the FSU. Similarly a paramount effort must be made to both develop local capacity to train educational personnel with a connection to Israel (long-term) and to increase the number of Israeli educators in the Diaspora as the most effective means of enhancing Israel’s role in the Diaspora Jewish educational agenda. These policies would serve as force multipliers.

Along with this, more resources need to be devoted to enhancing the educational quality and impact of these Israeli educators and in providing on-going educational support and training to them during their tenure in Diaspora communities.

Efforts should be devoted to countries with large Jewish populations (USA, France and Argentina) which is presently undergoing a financial crisis) and in these areas to seek force multipliers (training educators, developing e-learning,). The trends for participation in short term-programs must be monitored carefully this coming year to determine if this year’s partial reduction in participants was due to the Intifadat-al Aksa. The effectiveness of current increases of shlichim for Jewish awareness and camp activities should be examined. Upon an evaluation of these results and after taking into considerations assessments of the prospects for regional stability a decision should be taken regarding increasing the number of such short-term emissaries to be deployed this coming year.

Special attention must also be devoted in Israel for educating youth in the traditions and values of Judaism and Zionism, and imbuing them with an appreciation of and sense of responsibility for Jews in the Diaspora.

V. Community Involvement: A Key Element in Building Community and Promoting Solidarity
PARTNERSHIP 2000

INTRODUCTION

Partnership 2000, the flagship program of the Israel Department in recent years, is based on the vision of direct involvement of the world’s Jewish communities in the building of the Jewish nation-state. Partnership 2000 utilizes an innovative formula: a joint steering committee of Israelis and Diaspora Jews who come together at regular intervals to discuss, choose and implement projects intended to strengthen Israel and the Diaspora.

From the program’s onset, several models of partnership were employed. In North America either a single or multiple communities were linked with either a single or multiple Israeli communities, while in non English-speaking Keren Hayesod communities there was even greater diversity.

The program took on a pluralistic character in its implementation, with this trend intensifying. Each steering committee exerted its autonomy to develop unique partnership characteristics – based on the particular needs of the communities and regions, and the mutual desires and goals they set for themselves.

Partnership 2000 became an elective program in 2001. Due to the program’s continuing success, the Department’s efforts to maintain Partnership 2000 commitments on the part of the Partnered communities were successful. Almost all of the communities elected to continue with their Partnerships, while a few others opted out – while continuing to fund other Jewish Agency programs. This underscores Partnership 2000’s long-term potential, along with the need to adapt implementation somewhat.

Much of our work in the year 2000 focused on strengthening Israeli society by way of community building, community empowerment, bolstering disadvantaged populations, bridging social and ethnic gaps, social integration, and encouraging volunteerism. The number of programs implemented through Partnership 2000 was reduced, with more of them reflecting the goals of the strategic planning process. This allows the Jewish Agency to attain a greater impact. Concurrently, “people-to-people” programs that build Jewish peoplehood – with Israel at the center – continue to expand.

Our work plan for the 2001 calls for the amplification of these trends. A new aspect of the plan is redrafting Partnership opportunities for non English-speaking Keren Hayesod communities and developing new Partnership models.

To date there are 29 partnerships (see enclosed list – Annex I). Next year 6 new partnerships will be established. Most of them are in the center of the country.
On the Diaspora side – nearly 500 communities are participating. In Israel 77 municipalities are involved with hundreds of communities: urban and rural – especially in the Negev and the Galil, along the borders of the State of Israel.

Last year 200 lay leaders and professionals came to Israel to meet 1000 Israeli members of the steering committees of the partnerships.

10,000 people from the Diaspora and Israel were directly involved last year in different activities initiated by the partnerships, with thousands of others benefiting from them.

Number of Projects – Between the years 1995-2000, 1,408 projects were initiated and run within the framework of Partnership 2000. 
Budget: 87.5 million (enclosed see budgetary analysis – Annex II)

TRENDS

Tentative findings of a preliminary study shows that the project has contributed to increasing Jewish brotherhood, mutual relations and understanding between the communities abroad and in Israel. This finding is reflected in a trend showing an impressive growth rate of 37% in the field of Living Bridge activities, representing an average of 26% of the budget of the various partnerships. This testifies to the widening circle of participation in the various projects and the number of individuals influenced by that participating.

As such, the partnerships have special significance in a reality where the gap between Israel and the Diaspora is ever widening, our shared cultural baggage is weakened and our mutual destiny is undermined, particularly regarding the younger generation.

VI. Other Elements which may increase Solidarity: Antisemitism

Anti-Semitism has traditionally been a force that has unified diverse members of the Jewish Community. During 2000 there was an increase in anti-Semitic activity every kind. The year can be divided into two distinct periods. from January to late September, during which the radical right arena dominated from October to the year-end in which the Islamic/Arab elements led the violent struggle. Following the events in Israel in October, various communities throughout the world became a target for attacks by residents by Arab or Muslim origin. These attacks included torchings and attempted arson of synagogues, attacks against Jewish institutions, damage to Jewish facilities (cemeteries, synagogues) venomous propaganda and harassment and demonstrations. In October 180 anti-Semitic
incidents were recorded. The largest number was in France (62), followed by Canada (29), the US (22) and Great Britain (20).

In November, there was a reduction of violence in Israel. This was followed by a paralleled reduction in anti-Semitic acts abroad. Neo-Nazi elements drew “inspiration” from these anti-Semitic acts and continued with their own activity, parallel to the anti-Israeli activity of Islamic and Arab elements.

During 2001 there was an increase in the number of anti-Semitic events throughout the world, which were related to the so-called Intifadat el-Aksa. In France there were, by the end of August, 250 anti-Semitic acts. The culmination of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel intensity was in the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Prejudices, which was held in Durban, South Africa from August 31st to September 8th. The conference, which included student, NGO, parliamentarian and governmental components, was used by hijacked by the Palestinians to serve as a sounding board for presenting Israel as a racist state. The conference, especially the NGO component was accompanied by massive anti-Israel demonstrations press conferences and interviews which eclipsed the legitimate aims of the conference organizers of creating standards for putting an end to Racism and prejudice at the onset of the new millennium. Resolutions adopted by the NGO Conference were extremely harsh and condemned Israel for Racist practices, approved resistance to Israel, the imposition of sanctions and the institution of special tribunals to try and convict Israelis for crimes against humanity. Though the NGO resolutions had only moral and educational significance, they serve as the exegesis for the more moderate anti-Israel resolutions adopted by the governmental conference only thanks to a compromise achieved by the European delegation after the Israeli and US delegations (who sent low-ranking officials, out of protest) walked out of the conference.

Major Jewish Organizations coordinated by the Deputy Foreign Minister for Diaspora Affairs, rallied to Israel’s side by preparing ripostes in a series of preliminary meetings, and by monitoring and lobbying at the UN preliminary organization conferences. Though many Jewish organizations, following the lead of Jewish Agency Chairman Sallai Meridor, and the National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, Abe Foxman, boycotted the Durban Conference, a number of international Jewish organizations (e.g. Hadassah, World Union of Jewish Students, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Bnai Brith, South African Jewish Board of Deputies) did attend and formed a caucus to combat the attacks on Israel.

Conclusions on Anti-Semitism

The number of anti-Semitic acts increased during 2000 and 2002. In addition to classic right wing or neo Nazi anti-Semitism was added anti-Semitism from Islamic and Arab sources. The latter blur the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel. These acts not only included firebombs and arson, and other physical attacks on Jewish facilities, but also harassment and anti-Jewish mass demonstrations. The

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organization by Jewish organizations to deal with the anti-Semitic aspects of the UN WCAR Conference held at Durban in the summer of 2001, was an optimistic harbinger for future cooperation. There must be continued cooperation between Jewish organizations to fight anti-Semitism. Elements in such cooperation may include collecting intelligence and establishing shared databases of anti-Semitic manifestations and actors, increasing public awareness to the phenomenon and to the fact that anti-Semitism constitutes a threat to Democracy, lobbying public officials and the international diplomatic community, coordinating the fight with local and national law enforcement agencies, and organizing improved security measures within individual communities and inter-community security cooperation. Israel should assist in these efforts. The interactive website being established by the Coordination Forum for Countering Anti-Semitism, sponsored by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Jewish Agency (www.jafi.org.il/forum or www.antisemitism.org.il), is a first step in this direction.

VII. Factors Undermining Solidarity

Physical Security: As the number of attacks on Jewish facilities related to Israel’s policies increase, so does the danger that individual Jewish communities might disassociate themselves from Israel. We have already taken note of the incidence of anti-Semitic violence in France during the past two years. Continued exposure to harm, without sufficient supportive activities on the part of Israel might result in erosion of the support base for Israel. The Palestinian violence of the past year reduced tourism to Israel (inclusive of Jewish tourism) and placed the issue of travel to Israel on the agenda of some Jewish organizations. The year 2001 saw a drop in Jewish tourism and Jewish youngsters on Israel experience programs, out of fear for physical security.

Divergence of Political Interest: Divergence of policy between Israel and the United States (e.g. the U.S. pressure on Israel to refrain from anticipatory self defense activities against the Palestinian Authority, so as not to harm the U.S.’s chances to build a coalition of Arab states for its “war against terror”) might alienate some Jewish communities should Israel determine that compliance to U.S. pressure would be detrimental to Israel’s national interest and act in a manner that blatantly contravenes American interests.

Relations between the Israeli Religious Establishment and Jewish Denominations. The relations between the Israeli religious establishment and Reformed and Conservative denominations established in Israel constitute a litmus test. Though religious conversions and marriages performed abroad by a non-Orthodox clergyman are recognized de facto under the Law of Return, non-Orthodox rabbis (for the most part) do not possess any official status in the religious hierarchy.

Lack of recognition of Conservative and Reform religious leaders by Israel’s Orthodox religious hierarchy will alienate members of non-Orthodox denominations abroad. Creative ways should be found to recognize functions of Conservative and Reformed denominations and involve them in the religious dialogue (e.g. the tri-denominational conversion institute).
VIII. Ways of Increasing Identification With Israel: Making Israel into a Magnet

Inasmuch as ideology plays an important role in attracting prospective immigrants and in exercising influence in the national and international arenas, Israel must devote considerable effort to developing its democratic, economic and cultural institutions so that it will become a magnet for prospective immigrants and a model for emulation among nations. The support of Jewish Education and personal and communal involvement in the ongoings of homologous communities in Israelis are essential not only for Israel but also for the continued survival of the Jewish people.