



# Survey Findings

## March 2026



## Summary

### **Initiation of War with Iran and Achievement of its Objectives**

The public exhibits an ambivalent stance toward the war with Iran. On the one hand, there is declared support for initiating the war—approaching a consensus among the Jewish public. On the other hand, there is skepticism regarding the ability to achieve the war’s objectives, as well as a doubt concerning the leadership’s capabilities and judgment.

Broad support for initiating the war is shared by both opposition and coalition voters. In contrast, only 15% of the Arab public in Israel supports such a move.

Slightly more than two-thirds of the coalition voters express a high level of confidence that the war will impair Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missiles at Israel and to develop nuclear weapons, compared to only around 40% of opposition voters who hold this view. Only half of Israelis believe that the war will lead to regime change in Iran.

### **Public Confidence in the Israeli Leadership**

Less than half of Israelis trust the current leadership in managing the war with Iran. Only 39% of Israelis believe that the considerations guiding Netanyahu’s decision to initiate the war with Iran were primarily strategic, while 54% believe that his decision was driven at least in part by personal considerations.

### **Impact of the War on Israel’s International Standing**

Approximately half of Israelis believe that the war will strengthen Israel’s international standing. Two-thirds of Israelis believe that the war will strengthen Israel–United States relations.


### **Public Trust**

One and a half weeks into the Second Iran War, public trust in the government and in security institutions is rising.

*The data are based on a survey conducted between March 9 and 11 by iPanel among a sample of 812 respondents (658 Jews and 154 Arabs). The data are presented with voting weights.*

One and a half weeks into the Second Iran War, Israeli Jews expressed near-unanimous support (90%) for Israel’s decision to initiate the war. In contrast, only 15% of Israeli Arabs support the decision to go to war. Broad support is among both political groups.

Do you support or oppose the State of Israel’s decision to initiate a war against Iran?




The survey was conducted for the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility between March 9–11, 2026, by iPanel, among 812 respondents (658 Jews, 154 Arabs). The total sample also includes respondents who voted for parties that did not pass the electoral threshold or did not vote at all; the remaining respondents answered “don’t know.”

# Achievement of the War's Objectives

Slightly more than two-thirds of coalition voters express a high level of confidence that the war will impair Iran's ability to launch ballistic missiles at Israel and to develop nuclear weapons, compared to only around 40% of opposition voters who hold this view. Only half of Israelis believe that the war will lead to regime change in Iran.

The data indicate a certain shift among coalition voters. During the First Iran War in June 2025, nearly 80% expressed a high level of confidence that Iran's nuclear weapons production capability would be impaired by the end of the war, compared to 71% who hold this view today.

Express a high level of confidence that the war will impair Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons and launch ballistic missiles at Israel; believe that the war will lead to regime change.




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# Public Confidence in the Israeli Leadership

Less than half of Israelis trust the current Israeli leadership in managing the war against Iran. Opposition voters exhibit significantly lower levels of trust: only 30% report a high level of confidence in the leadership's management of the war against Iran.


To what extent do you trust the current leadership in managing the war against Iran?



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Only 39% of Israelis believe that the considerations guiding Netanyahu's decision to initiate the war with Iran were primarily strategic. In contrast, 54% believe that his decision was driven, at least in part, by personal considerations. This is up by 5 percentage points from June 2025, when 49% of the public held this view.

The considerations that guided Netanyahu in his decision to initiate the war with Iran




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# Perceived Existential Threat and Concerns for Personal Safety




One and a half weeks into the Second Iran War, only about one-third of Israelis report a sense of existential threat, similar to the share of Israelis who felt this way shortly after the conclusion of the First Iran War in July 2025. Differences between coalition and opposition voters are small.

Do you think the State of Israel is currently facing an existential threat?



Despite the relatively low level of perceived existential threat (over the past 18 months), the Institute's data indicate a high level of concern among Israelis for their personal safety and the safety of their families. This represents the highest level of concern since the First Iran War in July 2025.


To what extent are you currently concerned for your personal safety and the safety of your immediate family?






The share of Israelis who believe that the state of the country is good is at its highest level in more than three years. Similar to the First Iran War, it appears that against the backdrop of the Second Iran War with Iran—and in continuation of trends observed in recent months—more Israelis assess the state of the country positively.

The share of Israelis who believe that the state of the country is good



Approximately half of Israelis believe that the war will strengthen Israel's international standing. Coalition voters are significantly more optimistic: roughly three-quarters of them believe that the war will strengthen Israel's position in the world.


In your view, how will the war affect Israel–United States relations?



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Two-thirds of Israelis believe that the war will strengthen Israel–United States relations. A majority of opposition voters share this view.

In your view, how will the war affect Israel–United States relations?




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One and a half weeks into the Second Iran War, public trust in the security institutions is increasing, as is public trust in the government and the Knesset. The Supreme Court and the Attorney General maintain the highest levels of trust among state institutions, while the Knesset and the government continue to have the lowest levels of public trust.

## Public Trust In State Institutions (March 26)



For details on the [methodology](#) of the trust surveys, see the Institute's website.



# The Institute for Liberty & Responsibility

The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University (IDC Herzliya) is a platform for academic research of Israeli politics and democracy. The Institute seeks to advance the values, policies, and institutions vital to the survival of liberal democracy in Israel. It is a place of research and university instruction, but also an active participant in the public discourse on political institutions and political behavior.

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