



The Concept of Deterrence in Arab and Muslim Thought: The Various Approaches of the Muslim Brotherhood

Working paper

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Executive summary

"I was made victorious through the intimidation of the enemy, one month's journey distance away from me"¹

"And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know but whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged"²

There are three main approaches in radical Islamic thought to power, deterrence and the use of force as they appear in the Muslim Brotherhood's operational code:³

The Defensive Approach

Accepting that radical Islamic ideology serves as "a framework ... through which 'true believers' wish to stop the erosion in the religious identity, to fortify the borders of the religious community and to create viable alternatives to the secular institutions and behaviors"⁴ the terms *power*, *deterrence* and *jihad* may be interpreted in reference to the community's internal architecture and the construction of a "micro-power" with the goal of deposing "apostate" rulers, deterring deviants within the community and deterring infidels

1 A Hadith transmitted by Abu Huraira, conveyed by Muslim, Tirmidhi and Ahmad.

2 Surat Al-'Anfāl (The Spoils of War), Verse 60, this and all following Qur'an translations are from the Sahih International website, www.quran.com

3 A summary based on a doctoral thesis from Haifa University entitled "The Islamic Operational Code According to Sheikh Munir Al-Ghadban's School of Thought as a Guide to Islamic Fundamentalist Movements."

4 Sivan E., Almond G. A., Appleby R. S. (2003) *Modern Religious Extremism*, (Hebrew), Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, pp. 20 – 24.

from intervention in Muslim society. This was the approach of Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Maududi, Muhammad Rashid bin Ali-Rida and Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani. The Muslim Brotherhood's classic ideologues approach power, deterrence and jihad in a similar way, with the long-term objective of establishing Islamic rule over the world (after removing "the barriers of the rulers"). Most of the ideologues do not contend that the offensive approach to deterrence is invalid, but rather that the power of Islam is in flux and that the defensive paradigm should be applied under the current circumstances. The first priority, therefore, is restoring power to Islam from within, followed by external restoration through a gradual extension of power and jihad, according to basic patterns taken from the times of Muhammad. The defensive theory does not usually include details regarding the manner of actual execution.

The Apologetic Offensive Approach

In Islamic historiography (which serves as a key source of emulation for the Muslim Brotherhood) there exists as well an apologetic approach which presents the cases of Muslim offensive initiatives not a doctrine imposed by Islamic theology per se, but as the result of military and political exigencies: provocative actions on the part of the enemy or the need to remove obstacles in the path of the *da'wah*. This approach in Islamic historiography suggests that if the enemy does not interfere with what the Muslims define as their own interests, he will not be attacked. However since these interests include active and militant proselytization (*da'wah*), such a distinction has little relevance.

The proponents of this approach are mainly the "mainstream" clerics of Egypt's Al-Azhar University. Their commentary deals with the purpose of power and the nature of deterrence and jihad in Islam on the assumptions that: 1) Islam is destined to rule in a world where Jews and Christians will convert to Islam; but 2) Islam may not be imposed by force, and deterrence and force are meant only to eliminate obstacles preventing the advance of Islam. Another argument emanating from the same circles contends that power and deterrence were intended for defense or territorial expansion, but that those are political actions not guided by religion. According to Allah's intentions, those means were intended only for "checking one nation against the other" to avoid mutual annihilation.

The Offensive Approach

The Muslim Brotherhood's approach is not apologetic. Its offensive doctrine emphasizes outward action to bring about Islam's control over mankind. Among its supporters are Sayyid Qutb, Hassan Al-Banna, Fathi Yakan and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. They are united in the call to restore Islamic power by building an inter-Islamic micro-power system, followed by a macro-power system directed at ruling the world through jihad. Their openly-declared offensive approach is depicted as a vision to be pursued and devoid of apology. It advocates the restoration of Islamic power in stages similar to past patterns. Power should be restored by spreading Islam through the *da'wah* (preaching and good works) and using force (jihad) to deter adversaries and intimidate, threaten and persuade them into submission and eventually into converting to Islam. This approach focuses on the Arab term *irhab* in its current militant translation as terrorism⁵ but does not detail its practical application.

The Muslim Brotherhood approaches power, deterrence and the use of force in two ways, defensive and offensive. While neither is clearly defined by the movement's ideologues or phrased in terms of deterrence, they do describe an implicit doctrine of deterrence. Both approaches are inspired by the legacy of

⁵ See Footnote 2.

Muhammad and express the desire to emulate and apply, in modern times, the stages of amassing power as they are seen to have been formulated under Muhammad.

Radical Islamic ideology as propounded by the Muslim Brotherhood and its disciples generally follows a four-stage program:

The First Stage (Micro-Power): *Da'wah* and Secrecy, the defensive approach of response and restraint

The Second Stage (Micro-Power): Immigration and the founding of the Islamic state, a defensive approach of the use of force and manipulation to preserve the status quo.

The Third Stage (Macro-Power): Establishing the Islamic state: the move from defensive to offensive action

The Fourth Stage (Macro-Power): Conquering enemy strongholds and spreading the *da'wah* by force.

This program is based on emulating Muhammad and applying his military strategy and efforts to change the power of the Muslim community or Islamic state and its deterrent capabilities. Some approaches stress defense, focusing on the internal power of the Muslims to signal that the Muslim community is strong and impervious to enemy threats with the aim of projecting an image of strength, e.g. deterrence by denial.

The ideologues mentioned above do not deal with operations on the ground. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, recommended the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood's Sheikh Munir Al-Ghadban (currently supporting the uprising against Bashar Assad) as the preferred operational doctrine for the *mujahideen* (jihad fighters). This survey describes the four stages of accruing Islamic power by operating systematically within micro- and macro-power outlines as they were at the time of Muhammad and their contemporary offensive-operational applications regarding power, deterrence, force, resources and manipulation. Al-Ghadban presents a diachronic model for gradual implementation according to actual needs. His doctrine presents the enemy's image (with special reference to the Jews) and the escalating hostile attitude of Islamic radicalism to the conflict between Islam and the "others" as power is obtained. His doctrine describes the authority, image and desired characteristics of the Islamic individual as a rational leader.

Al-Ghadban's doctrine stresses offense, but unlike the defensive- and offensive-rhetoric approaches, it goes into detail regarding operational and practical aspects. By projecting an image of Muslim willingness to respond disproportionately to aggression, deterrence is achieved through punishment. However, according to Al-Ghadban, the concept presented by the Muslim Brotherhood is not satisfied with merely projecting determination to respond to the enemy after an attack, but assumes that deterrence through punishment will not be credible unless the enemy has previously experienced Muslim force, at least to a certain degree. A display of force is supposed to serve as lesson for the enemy, a preview of what his fate will be if he harms Muslim interests. This may be seen as a form of "deterrence by preemption."

According to this doctrine, throughout the first two stages of constructing the Islamic community as an enclave and founding the Islamic state (micro-power), deterrence is characterized by defense against the enemy's capabilities (deterrence by denial). During this stage, the Islamic state is in the process of gathering its resources and directing them inward. Thus the main efforts are directed towards activities of *da'wah* and community institutions. At that point, power is built through restraint, legitimized by the behavior of Muhammad during his early period, and is characterized by a low profile and minimal friction with potential rivals coupled with deterrence achieved by projecting determination to respond to an aggressor who initiates an action against Muslims. The objective, however, is not only to deter the specific aggressor but also any future potential aggressor or anyone who might interfere with Muslims' acquisition of power. At this stage the emerging Muslim state should preserve its deterrent reputation, which is still based on being

perceived as defensive. In its response to aggression it is characterized not only by punishment, but by immediate, pointed revenge, and by action exemplifying the greater value given to Muslim than to infidel blood. That is done to deter the enemy and raise the morale of the Islamic community.

Concurrently, the emerging Islamic state gathers a cadre of jihad fighters, a hard core of offensive military capabilities focused at this stage on defense. However, it is the foundation of a future aggressive-offensive approach, both as part of a concept of “defensive” deterrence and as a precursor of a doctrine of offensive preemption, and an overall offensive concept of spreading Islam. The hard core deals mainly with responding to challenges while the state and its institutions are being founded (micro-power). At a later stage, however, once the Islamic state has been founded, the hard core initiates preemptive deterrent actions when in possession of information about the enemy's possible plans (operational preemption). Hence, deterrence during the micro-power stage is a combination of the psychological effect of projecting willingness to respond on one hand, and the actual response on the other. The transition from the end of that stage to an aggressive-offensive stage expresses an increase in self-confidence, and leads to initiating attacks against a rival rather than defense. These include the elimination of enemy commanders on their own field, exacting revenge for Muslim deaths, and striking at the enemy's forces, economy and infrastructure. Those steps are intended to achieve preemptive deterrence.

The next stages of the Islamic operative operational code in amassing power deal with establishing the state institution and turning it into an established, powerful, military state (macro-power). The situation is transformed from protecting the emerging community through defensive deterrence, and Muslims now take the initiative with the intention of attacking and deterring the enemy to enforce Islam's agenda. At that stage the Islamic project undertakes a series of military raids, targeted killings, attacks and acts of revenge as preemption to frighten and convince the immediate population to convert to Islam, or to forcefully prevent the enemy from planning attacks in the future, or by using punishment as an additional element to deter hostile intentions. All of the above are meant to influence the adversary, reinforce alliances, weaken hostile coalitions, strengthen morale within the Islamic state as an element of power and deterrence, and expand the influence of the *da'wah*. For macro-power, as for micro-power, deterrence relies on the psychological element of proven readiness to take risks, initiate changes, respond to and inflict pain, all anchored in activities on the ground and the reputation acquired by Islam by previous damage done to the enemy by Muslims.

The transition from micro-power to macro-power is characterized by repeated assaults initiated by Muslims that reinforce their reputation and deterrent image. The objective of the transition is to support the aspiration of the Islamic state to quasi super-power status to weaken the enemy and strike terror in its heart in order to project an image of deterrence based on proven power and past experience, and to cause the enemy to surrender before he reaches the battlefield. At this stage, planting deterrence in the heart of the enemy is never totally achieved and continuous and reiterative operations are called for to demonstrate the Muslim military prowess to the enemy and thus reinforce and maintain deterrence. Despite the emphasis on religious authority and motivation, the radical Islamic ideologues present considerations of power and deterrence, offense and defense, which are similar to Western concepts (In many instances using modern terminology translated into Arabic). Since their strategy is aimed at reinforcing the deterrent image and reputation of the Islamic state, it is legitimate to refrain from actions that might result in defeat and impair that reputation. Hence, while the constructing the image calls for actions that may seem irrational in order to project an impression of willingness to sacrifice, the Islamic actor remains susceptible to considerations of loss of reputation and manpower that might damage the Muslims' long-term deterrent reputation of the Muslims.

Deterrence and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Various Islamic websites reflect dilemmas regarding Islam's attitude towards deterrence through the use of WMD. Postings reveal dilemmas and religious quandaries regarding power and deterrence, possession and use or non-use. The possession and use of nuclear weapons are justified by citing Muhammad's doctrine and biography, dealing with war, deterrence, the manner of killing, mercy, the divine approach to annihilation, reciprocity with the enemy according to his fighting style and justification from the Islamic tradition. According to this approach, these are tools for intimidating and deterring the enemies of Islam. The Islamic approach prohibiting the use of WMD is also explained by Islam and Muhammad, and contends that their use contradicts the Islamic elements of humanism and good works, and the prohibition against killing women and children.

The dilemmas reflected in the discussions revolve around the need to fight the enemy without harming its women and children or any Muslim. They discuss the question of the use of such weapons if the enemy is or is not in an entrenched position, and the question of using them against an enemy when the Muslims cannot win in other ways. The use of WMD tends to be advocated against fighters, but not against an enemy, even entrenched, if accompanied by his women and children, or if an enemy protects himself using Muslims as human shields, considering the exigencies of battle in instances of extreme necessity. Factors that should influence the decision include whether the Islamic collective is in danger and whether Muslim prisoners or women and children will be harmed deliberately or accidentally and as an inevitable but unintentional result.

The proponents of the use of WMD say that the decision should be made by the Muslim leader while consulting regarding constraints such as a nuclear attack initiated by the enemy and the appropriate Islamic response, the inability to win without such weapons, the inability to distinguish between civilians and belligerents as well as the existence of hostages held by the enemy. The intermediate conclusion is that the possession of WMD is a legitimate right for deterrence anchored in international law. However, there must be rules for the expression of the reservations held by those who oppose their use.

Defining nuclear deterrence in Western terminology is prominent. All of the discussions base their recommendations regarding contemporary dilemmas on Muhammad's fundamental thought and heritage, and on Shari'a rulings. Most of the above questions remain open. All of the issues reflect the absence of a final religious position, and therefore most modern thinkers leave the decision regarding the use of WMD to the Islamic leader at the time, within the given situation and on the day of command.

"I was made victorious through the intimidation of the enemy, one month's journey distance away from me"⁶

"And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know but whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged"⁷

Introduction

This paper is based on research conducted for a thesis on radical Islam's operational code.⁸ The code is based mainly on the teachings of Sheikh Muneer al-Ghadban, recommended by bin Laden's mentor Abdullah Azzam as required reading for jihad fighters. The review will examine radical Islam's various approaches to power, deterrence and the use of force, focusing on those which reflect Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

This paper discusses three main approaches in Islamic rhetoric to the issues of power, deterrence and jihad: the defensive approach, the apologetic approach and the offensive approach. It also presents an offensive approach which goes beyond rhetoric and ideological recommendations, and employs operational modes of action to achieve power, attain deterrent capabilities and exert force to carry out jihad by emulating and implementing Muhammad's four stages for acquiring power. This paper will analyze them and the use of deterrence and force in micro-and macro-power in the achievement of systemic-power, i.e., the foundation of a global Islamic state. It will also describe a desirable Muslim attitude towards a conflict, an enemy and the Jews. Due to restrictions of space the theoretical paradigms on which this analysis is based will not be included, but they can be found in the aforementioned doctoral dissertation.

A list of current references can be found at the end of the survey dealing with power, deterrence, weapons of mass destruction and jihad, despite the fact that the websites they were taken from are not specifically affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Written Muslim Brotherhood sources do not specifically deal with (WMD) weapons of mass destruction because they were not prevalent at the time.

6 A *hadith* transmitted by Abu Huraira, conveyed by Muslim, Tirmidhi and Ahmad.

7 Surat Al-Anfal, '(The Spoils of War), Verse 60, this and all following Qur'an translations are from the Sahih International website, www.quran.com

8 "The Islamic operational code emerging from the teaching of Sheikh Muneer al-Ghadban as a guide for Islamic fundamental movements," 2011, written by Reuven Berko in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a PhD degree political science at Haifa University, Faculty of Social Science.

Part One:

Islamic Power and its Objectives in Muslim Brotherhood Rhetoric

The objective of Islamic power: the defensive approach

In *Modern Religious Extremism*, Sivan, Almond and Applebee define radical Islamic fundamentalism as a prominent framework of religious militarism through which those calling themselves true believers wish to stop erosion in religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behavior.⁹

The definition relates to defense, protection and improving the situation from within. According to this approach, the terms *power*, *deterrence* and *jihad* refer mainly to designing the community's internal architecture and formulating micro-power to deal with removing disgraced rulers, deterring deviants within the community and dealing with infidels (*kuffar*), hypocrites (*munafiqun*) and "those who share [belief in Allah with the worship of other gods]" [i.e., polytheists] (*mushrikun*) from within. Islamic ideologues such as Ibn Taymiyyah,¹⁰ al-Maududi,¹¹ Muhammad Rasheed bin Ali-Rida¹² and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani¹³ emphasized the superiority of this approach:

9 Sivan E, Almond G A, Appleby R S (2003) *Modern Religious Extremism*, (Hebrew), Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, pp. 20–24.

10 Ahmad ibn A'bd al-Halim ibn A'bd as-Salām bin Abdullah Taqī ad-Dīn Abu 'I-A'bbās Al-Numairi Al-A'amiri, called Ibn Taymiyyah, (1263–1328), was a Sunni theologian and commentator who lived in Harran, Turkey in the region bordering on contemporary Syria. He came from a family of known theologians identified with the strict Hanbali school of thought, advocating life according to Qur'an and the hadith. He composed his rules during a time when the Mamluks and the Mongols ruled the Middle East. He criticized the Mongols for legislating civilian laws in addition to the Shari'a. Many fundamentalist Islamic thinkers rely on his books, despite his dictate that a bad regime is preferable to anarchy. Following the Mongol invasion in 1268 his family moved in to Damascus, ruled at the time by Mamluks from Egypt. Like his father, he studied with the best scholars of his time, including a woman called Zinab Bint Makki, from whom he learned the hadiths. Ibn Taymiyyah also dealt in secular sciences, immersed himself in Arabic literature and studied at depth grammar, lexicology, calligraphy and mathematics. Ibn Taymiyyah learned the philosophy of law from his father and despite his loyalty to the Hanbali school of thought he also studied Sufi Islamic philosophy, which he later harshly criticized. With a delegation of religious clerics he left for the Tatar Khan to demand the cessation of attacks on Muslims, and led the opposition to the Mongol invasion of Damascus in 1300. He was involved in a number of polemic activities against the Shiite regime in Lebanon and against schools of Sufi theology, which he declared to be heretic. In 1306 Ibn Taymiyyah was incarcerated in a fort in Cairo for 18 months. The last 15 years of his life were spent in Damascus surrounded by a circle of students who came from all walks of life. Between August 1302 and February 1321 he was incarcerated in a fort in Damascus because he supported a doctrine making it difficult for Muslim men to divorce their wives. In July 1326 the government in Cairo ordered he remain in prison for condemning visits to the graves of saints, despite the fact he was forbidden to do so. Ibn Taymiyyah died in prison in Damascus in September 1328 at the age of 65 and was buried in the Sufi cemetery in Damascus. (See also Sivan E., (1986), *The Zealots of Islam*, Tel-Aviv: the Ofakim Library, Am Oved, pp. 103–111, and also *The Encyclopedia for Islam and the Modern World*, 2004, p. 339).

11 Abu Ala'ala Al-Maududi was born in 1903 in the Hyderabad Province in India to a devout Muslim family. Starting in 1918 he began writing for the Baganuz Islamic newspaper and later for the Taj newspaper. He often wrote about the Islamic Caliphate. He moved to Delhi where between 1924 and 1948 he served as the editor of the Al-Muslim Islamic newspaper. He engaged in comparative studies of the western culture and Islam and composed a number of books on the subject. In 1932 he published a journal about Qur'an translation, which influenced the Islamic movement in the Indian sub-continent. He left for Lahore with the Islamic poet Muhammad Iqbal, where they collaborated to spread Islam and establish Pakistan. He headed the Islamic Front against hostile Hindu movements and published a book called *Jihad in Islam*. In 1941 he founded an organization called *Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiya* ("The Islamic Group"), was appointed its "Amir" and called for the adoption of the principles of Islam and the willingness for sacrifice in possessions, body and spirit for the sake of Islam. Beginning in 1943 he dealt with the issue of "Palestine." When Pakistan was founded in 1947 he moved together with his group to Lahore and demanded the Pakistani regime follow Islamic law. He was labeled as a government opponent and a death sentence was issued against him, later changed to a life sentence and in 1955 he was pardoned. He received the King Faisal Award and authored dozens of books on Islamic subjects including laws, religion and politics, compared Islam and the West, wrote about jihad for the sake of Allah, political Islam and more. He died in New York in 1979.

12 Muhammad Rashid bin Ali-Rida (1865–1935) was born in the village of Qamon in Lebanon, moved to Tripoli and studied at the elementary school in Rashidiya and later at the National Islamic School in Tripoli where he studied Arabic, science, philosophy and mathematics. He believed that the study of Islam and general sciences should be merged in a modern European manner, and was considered a pioneering Islamic philosopher and was very prominent in his time. He was also a journalist, author and linguist. One of Muhammad Abduh's students, he and Abduh founded Al-Manar newspaper, styled after the Islamic newspaper *Al-U'rwa Al-*

- 1) Ibn Taymiyyah defined jihad as the best way man can devote himself to Allah. He is the classic representation of Hanbali militant fundamental thought.¹⁴ One of Ibn Taymiyyah's prominent works is *An Anthology of Fatwas (majmu' al-fatawa)*,¹⁵ a collection of over twenty volumes, including a chapter dealing with jihad. Ibn Taymiyyah called for a return to the purity of ancient Islam (622–661), stating that anyone who abandoned the laws of Allah must have an all-out war waged against him. His essays were written between 1263 and 1328 and reflect the view that re-establishing the Caliphate is a long-term goal, but in the meantime a Muslim political community within a specific country should be established through implementing the Shari'a. In his book *Shari'a Governance in Reforming the Ruler and His Flock (al-siyasa al-shar'iyya fee Islah al-raa'ee wa al-raa'iyya)*, he explained the ruler's duty to uphold the commandments of Islam. Anyone not following them loses his legitimacy and should have a jihad waged against him. Thus it is no surprise that Al-Qaeda's Sheikh Abdullah Azzam relied on Ibn Taymiyyah as a definitive source and quoted him in his book commanding jihad in "Palestine" and against the infidels in any Muslim country¹⁶
- 2) Al-Maududi fought against secular Muslim nationalism. In his view, the Islamic world had reverted to a state of *jahiliyya* (the barbarism before Islam) and Muslims found themselves in a state of war with the infidels. He developed a theory called the *new jahiliyya* and is the first Islamic thinker who said modern civilization had to be completely rejected because it could not coexist with Islam. He was also the first to clearly state the danger Western civilization posed to Islam. His most prominent books – *Jihad in Islam*, *Islam in the Jahiliyya* and *The Principles of Muslim Government* – were translated from Urdu and English into Arabic only in the 1950s. Al-Maududi placed equal emphasis on the internal and external challenges facing Muslims in restoring Allah's sovereignty to all aspects of life. Thus he considered jihad a defensive response to the all-out war the new infidels waged on Islam. The followers of Islam had to separate themselves from the surrounding infidel society and become a counter society.¹⁷ His essays were translated into Arabic only in 1967.
- 3) Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, called "the philosopher of Islam in his time," favored education but mainly advocated political reform, which he believed would unite all the Islamic countries against the Western

Wuthqa. Hassan al-Banna is believed to have been influenced by him. Initially operated in his village, converting many with his popular approach and entered cafes to convince people.

13 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) was born Asadabad in Iran, grew up in Kabul, and died in Istanbul, Turkey. Al-Afghani was one of the pioneers of the modern Islamic movement. He received a Shiite Islamic upbringing at home until the age of 10, when he was sent to Tehran and the holy cities in Iraq for religious studies. He traveled in India and Iran and settled down in Kabul as a government clerk. He taught at Al-azhar, held discussions on religious reform with the editor of the "Masr" newspaper, Adib Ishak, and founded a political society. Following the Arab Mutiny he moved to Paris where he founded, together with Abduh, the *Al-U'rwa Al-Wuthqa* newspaper in 1884, focusing on calling the Muslims to reunite. The newspaper was banned from Paris. Al-Afghani's extensive body of works includes essays on history, languages of people and places. From childhood he advocated pan-Islamism and opposed the European occupation of Islamic countries. In 1856 he began his political activity in India, where he became acquainted with European science and technology. He reached Afghanistan in 1866 and was deported two years later. He was later banished from Istanbul, his next stop, in 1870. From there he went to Cairo, where he stayed for 8 years, supporting the government and formulating his anti-imperialistic and philosophical ideas, surrounded by a group of young scholars who were interested in his anti-imperialistic ideas and his work on Islamic philosophy. In 1879 he was deported to India, reaching London in 1885 in an unsuccessful attempt to cause the British to retreat from Egypt. From there he continued to Iran, Russia and back to Iran, where he served as an advisor to the Shah but in fact took part in the Tobacco Revolt against him (1890–1891). His statements regarding the need for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate aroused the sultan's concern as challenging the Ottoman empire, and he was invited by Sultan Abd Al-Hamid the Second, to Istanbul; the Sultan forbade him to leave. (See also *Al-munjid fi al-allugha waal l'im*, (1994), Beirut, p. 57).

14 Sivan, *The Zealots*, pp. 94–107.

15 Ibn Taymiyyah, Ahmad ibn A'bd al-Halim ibn A'bd as-Salām bin Abdullah Taqī ad-Dīn Abu 'l-A'bbās Al-Numairi Al-A'amiri (2000), *Majmu' al-Fatawa*, Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, Beirut, Lebanon.

16 Azzam A. (1989) *Hamas, the Historical Roots and the Charter*, Peshawar, pp. 94–96.

17 Sivan, *The Zealots*, on Al-Maududi, pp. 34–50.

world, perceived by him as a threat. He (with his disciple Muhammad Abduh) was the first Islamic reformist to develop the subject of Islam's backwardness. His essays were influenced by the tensions between rejection of Western heresy and the imperialist occupation forced on the Arab states on the one hand, and the great esteem he had for Western technological and scientific ability on the other. He understood that adopting those capabilities was essential for developing political power to improve the state of the Muslims, and held anti-imperialist viewpoints throughout his adult life.

- 4) Muhammad Rashid bin Ali-Rida was one of Ibn Taymiyyah's ideological heirs, and one of the people who caused the founding fathers of the Muslim Brotherhood to understand that time was running out and Islam was in danger of extinction. In his 1947 commentary of the Qur'an *Tafsir al-manar*, Rida adhered to the simplicity of the original text. For example, commenting on Verse 44 of Surat Al-Ma'idah (The Set Table), "*And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers,*" he wrote it referred to the Muslim rulers who had recently enacted new laws abandoning the Shari'a (Islamic religious law). However, he did not call for jihad against Muslims and westernized rulers. He belonged to the neo-Hanbali school, which was the inspiration and driving force behind the fundamentalist movements, primarily internally against rulers who, according to the proponents of those movements, were not Islamic rulers.¹⁸ This approach justified the use of violence and jihad strategy as defensive acts against belligerent military tyranny.¹⁹ The militant interpretation of Muhammad's legacy is part of the neo-Hanbali school. Rida (with Sheikh Muhammad Abduh) founded a newspaper called Al-Manar (published between 1899 and 1935) for educational purposes and Islamic reform and in 1899, under Rashid Rida's supervision, the first issue was published. The paper focused on the connections between Islam and education and between the Shari'a and contemporary problems. His articles prepared the mindset for the Islamic nation's awakening, stating that reform should begin with the *U'lama*, who were Muslim legal scholars shaping the Islamic nation and organizing its activity.
- 5) Dr. Ahmad Abu al-Wafa²⁰ also adopted a defensive approach reflecting an updated Islamic awareness manifested by contemporary websites but not, however, necessarily reflecting Muslim Brotherhood ideology. According to al-Wafa, the objective of Islamic deterrence is to make an aggressive country reflect before engaging in hostile acts. He says the objective of deterrence is psychological, as the adversary needs to understand the risks he will incur if he uses violence. The enemy will realize that the spoils do not completely equal the damage he may suffer if he uses force. Deterrence is the basis of modern strategy in the post-nuclear era, and appears in such terms as "nuclear deterrence" and "the balance of terror."

Al-Wafa says that Muslim clerics and Shari'a teachers indicated the importance of deterrence: Farabi says that the "first thing a man must strive for is to rise above his enemy in every attribute and advantage...and his enemy [must] know this and learn it, and that will weaken the enemy and thus extinguish his revolutionary spirit." Such was the case when Tariq bin Ziyad broke the Byzantine army in Wadi Lakka, when Julian the Byzantine said to him: "You have risen and already broken their army and overpowered their garrison and put fear in their hearts." There is no doubt that instilling fear in the heart of the enemy brings many benefits, the most important of which may be demonstrating the vast power at the disposal of the [Muslim] nation.

18 Azzam A., quoting the Hanbali approach, stating the conditions creating the duty to go on "jihad," in his book: *Hamas, the Historical Roots and the Charter*, Peshawar, p. 95.

19 Sivan, *The Zealots*, pp. 120–122.

20 www.islamfeqh.com/.../Nawazelltem.aspx?...121

Al-Wafa claims that for Islam, deterrence is not an act or even a threat of hostility but rather a factor for containment and a response to the enemy's desire to harm the Muslim nation or refer to it in an inappropriate manner. It has a number of goals, including caution and alertness against the enemy's greed, and strengthening morale. In addition, it spreads the *da'wah* (religious teaching, indoctrination or propaganda, an important concept in Islam) by teaching that Islam is a religion of peace, but anyone approaching the Muslim nation with hostile intentions is faced with the power of Islam, wherein Allah finds believers as they gain heaven, making others acknowledge the power of Islam and join it.

He also claims that the theory of Islamic deterrence for defense and halting the enemy is based on the Shari'a, the Qur'an, Muhammad's biography, the sayings of the *sahabah* (Muhammad's comrades) and the Shari'a teachers who follow Muhammad. The hope is that the Muslim nation will regain its former power and distinction, and that deterrence will prevent its enemies from waging war against it and be an equalizing factor in its foreign relations.

Al-Wafa, quoting Al-Tirmidhi, summarized the benefits by saying, "Fear is said to be the strongest of Allah's soldiers, and it accomplishes many achievements and benefits without tiring, without battle, trouble, equipment and supplies." He quoted the Imam Almaghili, who says that "Nothing can prevent war except preparing for war," since if the enemy knows of the Muslims' preparations and fears them, his fear can be used against him in the following ways:

It keeps him from helping another enemy;

It makes him fulfill his obligations;

It may bring him to join Islam and believe in Allah and his Messenger;

Deterrence causes the enemy to pass over Muslim lands and not conquer them, and if such an event has occurred, the force for liberating the Islamic land and expelling the oppressor is created.

Al-Wafa also said that the Imam al-Maghili²¹ also claimed the Amir (the Islamic ruler) had to exercise caution, to display power to prevent intimidation, display his will before heroes and the enemy, and go out on jihad and not postpone it with talk. That is because "fear must be repelled only by fear. One can only escape from fear by frightening it, not by fleeing or accommodating it. Do not be humiliated and call for peace, as you are superior and Allah is with you."²²

However, al-Wafa also presents Abduh's offensive approach. According to Abduh, the foundations of Islam were based on the desire for force, victory, power, conquest, the power of resources and the denial of any regime not based on the commandments of Islam. He said that examining the principles of Islam and reading any Sura from the Qur'an make it obvious that Muslims should rule the world. They must precede all nations in inventing tools of war and having command of military sciences, and must become learn the natural sciences, chemistry, physics, engineering, etc., as is written in the Qur'an, Surat Al-Anfāl (The Spoils of War), Verse 60:

"And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged."

21 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Maghili, (died ca. 1505) was an Islamic scholar from Tlemcen, a city situated in modern-day Algeria see: <http://www.djelfa.info/vb/showthread.php?t=883450>.

22 Surat Muhammad, Verse 35

According to Abduh, a Muslim lives to win and will do so by all types of force rather than relying on defense to avoid being overcome. That can be seen by the fact that Islam forbids betting except for the race track and the throwing of javelins, which show how much the ordinary person wishes to know the military arts.

However, he claimed, Muslims disparaged the Islamic viewpoint, they had no interest in excelling in the arts of war or the invention of tools of war like other nations, and as a result surrendered and became accustomed to the rule of others. They lost their deterrent power and became weak, blaming only themselves for their humiliation. Therefore they might understand the commandment of the Qur'an:

"It is possible that you hate something that is good for you and it is possible you love something when it is in fact bad for you, and this Allah knows but you do not know." (Surat al-Baqarah, Verse 215) and "It is possible you hate something but Allah makes it into something very good" (Surat an-Nisaa, Verse 18)

He agreed that Muslims must appreciate the Qur'an and aspire to power to implement deterrence.

These two approaches include elements of both defense and offense, and are the main approaches on which radical Islam has constructed its classic concepts of power and deterrence.

The Objective of Islamic Power, Deterrence and Jihad according to the Moderate Stream of Islam

A discussion of the radical view of Islamic power, deterrence and jihad requires, if only for the sake of comparison and balance, a discussion of "balanced" modern-day Islamic commentary. Its spokesmen are the clerics of the pre-Arab Spring Egyptian establishment, who are considered moderate. A study of their ideology indicates support for the argument that not all Islamic thought is radical and preaches the use of force in the service of terrorism. Their commentaries also deal with the purpose of power and the essence of deterrence and jihad in Islam.

1) Sheikh Muhammad Metwali al-Shaa'rawi,²³ on the faculty of Al-Azhar University's before the Arab Spring, explained Islam's attitude towards other religions in contemporary geopolitical conditions in his book *Al-jihad fi al-Islam*.²⁴ He rejected the attacks against Islam made by Middle East scholars and the West stating that Islam is a violent religion which lives by the sword and forces non-Muslims to accept Islam, by claiming that "Muhammad was sent with a sword."²⁵ He justifies his apologetic approach with an intricate and well-based system oral tradition known as *hadiths*, claiming that Islam bases its attitude towards non-Muslims on principles of peace, security and faith, not on war and killing. He cites the Qur'an verse:

*"There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong,"*²⁶ also quoting a verse indicating a balance in nations:

*"And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed- all of them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad,] would you compel the people in order that they become believers."*²⁷

23 Al-Shaa'rawi, Muhammad Metwali, born on April 1911 in Dakados, in Daqahlia Egypt. At the age of 11 he knew the Qur'an by heart, held a series of senior positions in the Egyptian establishment as the Waqf Minister in Mamdouh Salem's government, and as member of Al-Azhar University, and helped found the Faisal Islamic Bank in Egypt. He appeared on Egyptian television as a Qur'an commentator, was a man of literature and education, and an innovator in his approach, clear language and in Qur'an commentary. He published many books about the Shari'a and received many awards, including The Medal of the Republic. He does not belong to the Muslim Brotherhood movement. (<http://www.forsan.net/tarefat/sharawi.htm>).

24 Al-Shaa'rawi, Muhammad Metwali (1998), *Al-jihad fi al-Islam*, Maktab Al-Turat' Al-Islami, the Al-Turat' Center lihidmat Al-kitab wal Sunna, Al-Qahira.

25 Ibid, p. 3

26 Surat Al-Baqarah (The Cow), Verse 256.

He claims that jihad was meant only to repel hostility and stop oppression planning to separate people from faith. A motif that appears throughout his book is that the claim that Islam is spread by the sword is made by men who are sick at heart. The religion of Allah, he says, is spread only by words and good works. He looks beyond the Islamic arena and stresses that the commandment of faith also refers to Christians and Jews, who must believe in Muhammad.²⁸ He cites the verses:

"And whoever desires other than Islam as religion- never will it be accepted from him, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers."²⁹

"And we have not sent you, except as a mercy to the worlds."³⁰

Therefore, the individual acting as an obstacle to the mission is deemed an enemy who does not allow Allah's mercy to reach the people. Such an individual must be opposed and removed from the path of the *da'wah*. Then anyone who wants to believe, can, and whoever does not want to believe, will not. It is prohibited to coerce belief³¹ but the use of necessary force against non-Muslims is permissible. Ostensibly force is not used against someone not taking Islam upon himself but rather against someone perceived as preventing the message from being transmitted. Thus defining an obstacle and the manner of its removal is in the hands of Muslims alone. When the Islamic state was founded in Al-Medina and Muslims were already protected and strong, power had to be used to intimidate the enemies of Allah and prevent them from resisting the *da'wah*. It was necessary to keep them from standing between the *da'wah* and the people and thus denying them the ability to choose. Jihad for the sake of Allah therefore guarantees the believer that his faith will continue to eternity. That can only exist by the spread of Islam around the world.

According to al-Shaa'rawi, power is required to overcome the enemy. Preparations must be made for victory on the battlefield before a conflict, and once the war ends, the non-Muslims are to be eliminated.³² Jihad is not merely a campaign, it is life progress. If the Muslim prepares himself for the campaign and that is known to the enemy, the enemy may be deterred and avoid fighting. Al-Shaa'rawi says deterrence is what prevents the world from waging a great, destructive war. Every country seeks a balance of power with the countries around it, and that balance gives pause to anyone considering war, even if there is only one hegemonic power in the world. That is explained by saying that divine will neutralize the opposing forces.³³ Fighting is therefore a necessary condition of life and a conflict guided by Allah between nations. That is the meaning of the verse:

"And if it were not for Allah checking [some] people by means of others, the earth would have been corrupted, but Allah is full of bounty to the worlds."³⁴

Another verse regarding the necessity of war is:

"And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned."³⁵

27 Surat Junis (The Dove), Verse 99.

28 Al-Shaa'rawi, *Al-jihad*, pp. 10, 12.

29 Surat Aal Imran (House of Imran), Verse 85.

30 Surat Al-Anbiya (The Prophets), Verse 107.

31 Al-Shaa'rawi, Muhammad Metwali, *Al-jihad fi Al-Islam*, p. 15.

32 Ibid, p. 49, quoting Surat Al-Anfāl, Verse 60: "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know but whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged." See also pp. 132–133.

33 Ibid, p. 50, quoting Surat Al-Baqarah, Verse 251: "And if it were not for Allah checking people by means of others, the earth would have been corrupted, but Allah is full of bounty to the worlds."

34 Surat Al-Baqarah, Verse 251, a reference to the operational code table later on—the natural political state according to this verse is fighting, its origin is in the division of the world into nations fighting each other.

According to al-Shaa'rawi, the fact that Allah causes his creations to thrust one against another shows it is deliberate and necessary, thus there is no truth in the contention of Orientalists that Islam commands the individual to fight. He also relates to non-belligerence, negotiations and restraint, as demonstrated by Muhammad at the time of Hudaybiyyah, with the people of Mecca who stopped him at the entrance to the city. He says that Islam does not fight for conquest, coercion, tyranny, honor, money, property or land, but only to glorify the name of Allah and his religion. The enemy is to be paid back with the sword, measure for measure, but not if that entails the breach of certain Islamic prohibitions. The necessity of war is not a natural thing but rather a constraint, as by nature man hates war. Divine intention is expressed in the verse:

*"Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah Knows, while you know not."*³⁶

Al-Shaa'rawi's approach towards war is fatalistic and rests on the divine decree:

*"Therefore do not despair over what has eluded you and do not exult over what He has given you."*³⁷

He says that leaders who are believers have rational considerations. They know what the costs of jihad are in terms of lives and property, and therefore should not rush to fight unless forced to do so. Nevertheless, Allah knows things they do not regarding appearances, whether good or bad, and that is sufficient reason to fight with complete faith, even if fighting is abhorred.³⁸ However, the four months during which it is prohibited to fight are Allah's way of helping man protect himself from himself and prevent bloodshed, as this restraint may eventually bring peace, and therefore each side participates in a lull in the fighting (*hudna*), an opportunity for quiet, reason and discretion.³⁹ At times violating the sanctity of those months is permitted, depending on the relative severity of the alternatives. Thus it seems that every taboo can be violated if it can be justified. Al-Shaa'rawi's approach is one of offensive ideological activism, camouflaged by an apologetic argument. He does not, however, discuss how to acquire power.

Another example of the same approach to Islamic power, deterrence and jihad, is that of Sheikh Muhammad A'mara⁴⁰ of pre-Arab Spring Al-Azhar University. In his apologetic essay "Islam and the

35 Surat Al-Haj (The Pilgrimage), Verse 40.

36 Surat Al-Baqarah, Verse 216.

37 Surat Al-Hadid (the Iron), Verse 23.

38 Al-Shaa'rawi, Muhammad Metwali, p. 201.

39 Ibid, p. 209.

40 Sheikh Muhammad A'mara Mustafa, an Islamic ideologist, writer and scholar, member of the Islamic Research Society in Al-Azhar University. Born in Egypt, January 8, 1931. In his youth at the village school he mastered the Qur'an, and even developed national Arab political awareness as a child. *Massr Al-Fata*, a newspaper for teenagers, published his first essay, "Jihad in Palestine." A'mara completed Masters and Doctorates degree in Islamic sciences with a specialty in Islamic philosophy at the Dar Al-U'lum College at Cairo University. He also has a degree in Arabic language from Cairo University. A'mara experienced personal ideological crises including Marxism, celibacy and Salafiyya (fundamentalism). He won many awards, commendations, certificates of recognition and decorations, including the "Friends of the Book" award in Lebanon in 1972, a government encouragement award from Egypt in 1976 and the Islamic ideological movement award-leader and founder-1998. The most prominent of A'mara's scientific papers were on the figures of modern Islamic awakening, such as Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh and Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi. He authored books and research papers on Dr. Abd Al-Razik Al-Sanhuri Basha, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Rashid Rida, Khayr Al-Din Al-Tunisi, Abu Alaa'la Al-Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Al-Banna. He also studies the *sahaba* (Muhammad's companions) period, U'mar bin Al-Khatib, Abu Zur Al-Ghaffari and A'li bin Abi Talib. He wrote on ancient and modern Islamic schools of thought, including Ghilan Al-Damaski and Al-Hassan Al-Basri. His latest essays dealt with the religious dialogue between the Islamic revival and American trade, the West and Islam: error and truth, as well as issues of religion, western secularism and the Shari'a, and dealt with the future of Muslims between the Islamic revival and Western modernism, problems in Islamic innovation and cultural privatization and more. He attempted to submit a project suggesting the revival of the Arab Islamic nation at the present time. He dealt with current political problems, compared similar issues in Judaism, Islam and Christianity, and has written a total of about 200 essays. He is considered a controversial Islamic thinker, attacked by secular Muslims as being extreme, while others called him intolerant and a liar ... the Coptic Christians cursed him for his direct attacks on them, but eventually he was revered by Muslims.

Religious Wars"⁴¹ he deals with militancy, power and the use of force in Islam as related to the objectives of the Islamic state and its dictates, defense and goals. He discusses whether aggressive action in fighting and jihad are a religious or political necessity. He says that jihad is merely a political tool used by Muslims to protect the *da'wah* and freedom of faith against harassment, and to protect the Islamic homeland and its resources against aggressors. He also says that Islamic power is defensive and is not meant to forcibly convert members of other religions to Islam. However, like other radical Islamists, he defined the freedom of the *da'wah* as a reason for war and those impeding that freedom as enemies.

A'mara contended that the Qur'an denies that coercion and armed conflict can bring about faith,⁴² because coercion is an alienating factor. For that reason, he said, Muhammad Abduh stressed that the Messenger's mission was to remind people of Allah's faith, which they had forgotten, but not as a soldier or supervisor of their hearts. He said that neither jihad nor killing was a foundation of Islam, whose six foundations⁴³ are Allah, the angels, messengers, the books, fate, and judgment day. There is no jihad or killing in worshipping Allah. Even when examining faith, divinity, prophecy and judgment day,⁴⁴ it can be seen that there is neither jihad nor fighting. Therefore there is no conflict or war in religion, but rather a political tool for protecting the *da'wah* and freedom of faith against harassment. Muhammad's wars were also waged to that end and not to convert the people to Islam. He claims the wars waged by the Muslims after the death of Muhammad were directed against Muslim rebels who had renounced their religion, or rebelled against the unity of the Islamic state's rule. Their rebellion was political and therefore the war against them was not religious. The wars of occupation waged by the Islamic Arab state were also wars for extending its power beyond the borders of the Arabian Peninsula and were not religious wars, but national and cultural wars of liberation. Those who were conquered and occupied were not forced to convert to Islam. They were fined in lieu of military service, out of considerations of security and the power of the state.⁴⁵

2) Dr. Sheikh Ahmad al-Sharabassi,⁴⁶ of the pre-Arab Spring faculty of Al-Azhar, says in the preface to his book *Sacrifice in Islam*⁴⁷ that the Islamic state must continue its past, in terms of both ideologies and basic qualities, and that the future must be the outcome of the past, especially when Muslims are surrounded by enemies who conspire against them. The Islamic nation suffered blows from Allah and must undertake actions to forge the blessed chain of links between past and future jihad. The Islamic nation will succeed if it has learned from the past, that is, if it adheres to faith in the power of Allah and persuasion, while agreeing on the spirit of sacrifice and jihad unto death. Al-Sharabassi's book is a collection of the heroic events and sacrifices which appear in the Qur'an and the principles on which they are based, showing that a life of pride and freedom can be achieved only through effort and sacrifice. The book surveys Muhammad and his companions through the stages of amassing power in Islam as a lesson for our times. The first example is U'tbah bin Usayd Al-Thaqafi, known as Abu Baseer. According to Al-Sharabassi, he was an Islamic hero who served as "the first commander of the unit of sacrifice" who fought on Muhammad's behalf against the heretics of Mecca despite the Hudaybiyah

⁴¹ Sheikh Muhammad A'mara Mustafa (1996), *Islam and the Religious Wars*, Dar Al-Thaqafa Al-Jadida, Al-Qahira: Mansurat Dar A'la Al-Din lialnashr (Damascus).

⁴² Ibid, p. 11, based on the Qur'an: Surat Al-Na'hl (the Bee) Verse 125; Surat Al-Baqarah Verse 256

⁴³ Ibid, p. 14

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 14, quoting Ibn Taymiyyah (1962), *Manhaj as-Sunnah*, the Al-Qahira Ring, Volume 1, pp. 70–72.

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 15, 39, 40.

⁴⁶ Al-Sharabassi, Ahmad, (1918-1980), born in Egypt in the city of Al-Bajalat, in the Daqahliya Regional Administration, completed his studies as a graduate of the College for Arabic and received a certificate of specialization. He joined the Ministry of Education and later worked at the Zagazig Institute, the Cairo Institute, the Suhaj Institute, and later served as secretary of the Fatwa Committee in Al-Azhar. He wrote papers on literature and society and essays on conducting a better religious life for believers. At Al-Azhar he was classified as a centrist, however, his thought is considered militant.

⁴⁷ Al-Sharabassi, Ahmad (1982), *Mausua't Al-Fidaa fi Al-Islam*, Beirut, Dar Al-Jil.

treaty, in which the Muslims were forced into a *hudna* "for some time." Al-Sharabassi says that Muhammad operated a terrorist cell for robbery and murder "by proxy" against his allies, the people of Mecca. Even in his "moderate" approach, regaining power is also characterized by violent action accompanied by apologetic justifications but without details of the actual modes of action.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Offensive Approach to Power, Deterrence and Jihad

The Muslim Brotherhood's radical Islamic doctrine emphasizes the offensive aspect, relying on faith and the basic Islamic mission of action directed externally to achieve Islam's control over mankind. Among Muslim Brotherhood ideologues of global Islamic rule are Hassan Al-Banna,⁴⁸ Sayyid Qutb⁴⁹ and Fathi Yakan.⁵⁰ Hassan Al-Banna,⁵¹ known as "the Martyr Imam" (*al-imam al-shaheed*) discussed jihad in his book (1984 edition) *Majmu'at Rasa'il*,⁵² (Collection of Messages/Letters), writing that jihad is a duty imposed on every Muslim. He selected Qur'an verses and hadiths proving his thesis and discussed how the various schools of Islam interpreted jihad, describing as general and personal duties and quoted the Hanafi school, according to which it means killing infidels, confiscating their property and destroying their temples. He said that even if the infidels did not attack Muslims, at least one attack a year was to be initiated against them following the instructions of the presiding Imam after having called them, through the *da'wah*, to convert to Islam. Even if a distant, peripheral Islamic area had been attacked, all Muslims had to wage jihad in its aid, even for a woman who had fallen captive. Al-Banna also quoted the Maliki school, which calls for jihad for the glory of Allah, and is a personal duty if Muslim land has been attacked or conquered. Al-Banna stressed that jihad was meant to protect the *da'wah* and to be used as a tool for the mission to guide people to the truth, not for honor or personal gain. In addition to preparing one's immediate circle to accept Islam, Hassan al-Banna said jihad had to be waged against infidels.

48 Al-Banna, Hassan (1984), *Majmu'at Rasa'il*, Beirut: Al-Majmu'a Al-Islamia lial-Tiba'a wal Sahafa wal nashr, and also Hassan Al-Banna, (2005) *ahadeeth Al-Juma'a*, Al-Qahira: Dar Al-tawzi' wal nashr Al-Islamia.

49 Sayyid Qutb (2004), *Ma'alim fi Al-Tariq*, Al-Markaz Al-Islami lial-Thaqafa, Al-Nasra: Shihab lial-l'Im.

50 Yakan, Fathi (2001), *Mushkilat Al-da'wah wal Daiyya*, Beirut: Mu'asasat Al-Risala, and also: Fathi Yakan (1995), *Al-Islam, Fikra wahaaraka Wainkilab*, Beirut: Mu'asasat Al-Risala.

51 Hassan Ahmed Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Al-Banna Al-Sa'ati (1906–1948) born in Mahmoudiyah, Egypt. An honor student known for his charisma from the time of his youth. Operated within various groups taking it upon themselves to preserve the integrity and honesty of society, sent warning letters to people suspected of corruption and also fought the Christian mission in Egypt. Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928 in Ismai'liyya, and was its first mentor (*murshid*). Studied with Sheikh A'bd Al-Wahhab Al-Khadafy, a member of the Shadhiliya school joined the Teachers' School in Damanhur. After abandoning teaching at the School for teaching, he ran the Al-Shihab newspaper. The Egyptian parties fought his movement and in 1948 the presiding Egyptian prime minister, Nukrashi, decided to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood movement, led by Hassan Al-Banna, and he and his operatives were arrested. Hassan was assassinated. After the revolution of the Free Officers, an inquest was conducted as to his death. It was proven that the government at the time was behind the assassination.

52 Al-Banna, Hassan (1984), *Majmu'at Rasa'il*, Beirut: Al-Majmu'a Al-Islamia lial-Tiba'a wal Sahafa wal nashr, and also Hassan Al-Banna, (2005) *Ahadeeth Al-Juma'a*, Al-Qahira: Dar Al-tawzi' wal nashr Al-Islamia.

Sayyid Qutb's⁵³ essay "Milestones" (*Ma'alim fi al-tariq*)⁵⁴ clarified Islam's role and global mission, indicating the forceful path by which modern *jahiliyya* is to be overcome and the world is to be ruled, and did not apologize for the approach.⁵⁵ Only Islam can offer values alternative to the *jahiliyya*, which contradicts the rule of Allah, as it puts government in the hands of man. The Islamic nation has been chosen by Allah, therefore it must lead mankind.⁵⁶ According to Sayyid Qutb, one should not wish to live in peace with a *jahiliyya* society or be loyal to it. The nature of the Islamic order (*al-manhaj al-Islami*)⁵⁷ is the exclusive acceptance of Allah's ruling and his sole dominion, and not that of man, and rejects everything else everywhere.

The fight against *jahiliyya* is to be fought in a practical manner by the organization's members and group activity. The value of Qutb's book *Ma'alim fi al-tariq* is in its description of a state of conflict against the *jahiliyya*.⁵⁸ According to Qutb, a crushing attack, deemed as jihad, is to be struck against modernism, preparing the way for a moral revival, and the faithful must move immediately to carry out such an attack. Qutb was pan-Islamic, emphasizing that the divine intention of Muhammad's work was not to be a movement with a national Arabic nature,⁵⁹ but rather a collective, multi-national entity in a borderless territory known as is Dar al-Islam ruled by Allah. A land not governed by the Shari'a, which is Allah's law, is *jahiliyya* and belongs to Dar al-Harb, the land of heresy. Qutb's approach, while offensive, does not have an operational dimension by which the desired change can be achieved: he was an ideologue and divorced from practical action and execution.

In *Problems of Da'wah and the Propagandist (Mushkilat al-da'wah wal-dai'ya)*,⁶⁰ Fathi Yakan explains, putting the radical Islamic militant approach into practice and discusses the logic of aggression and conflict in Islam. He says that for divine reasons, only Islam has the exclusive right to power. There is a connection, he says, between the use of force and strategy, and not using force as an exclusive strategy, and using force is to be considered in terms of benefit and harm.

Even if so far the Islamic movements have not founded an Islamic state, their ideologies have laid the groundwork for the development of one global Islamic movement in conflict with what they consider the contemporary *jahiliyya*. The Islamic movement is a revolution (*inkilab*) as Islam by nature is revolution, and therefore that potential for revolution is to be encouraged. The objective is to turn *jahiliyya* into Islam,

53 Sayyid Qutb (1903–1996). Like many radical leaders after him, was the product of a modern educational system and even completed his bachelor's degree at Cairo University. Initially he dealt with innovative literary criticism, and having been directly exposed to modern civilization while in the United States to complete his studies (1948–1950), he underwent a transformation, repented and changed from a modernist to a fundamentalist. He was repulsed by the materialism and sexual permissiveness of America. Upon his return to Egypt he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and quickly became head of its propaganda department. Shortly thereafter he was arrested in the 1955 persecutions of Muslim Brotherhood members. He was inspired by the philosophy of Muslims in the Indian sub-continent and influenced by al-Maududi, as stated in Qutb's 1952 book, *The Struggle between Islam and Capitalism*. That influence is also apparent in his multi-volume commentary *Fi thil al-Qur'an (Under the Shade of the Qur'an)* written beginning in 1953. The concept of modern *jahiliyya* appears in the book for the first time, relying on al-Maududi and al-Nadawi, his student. According to Qutb, the manifestation of *jahiliyya* is man's domination of his fellow men, i.e., men are subject to man and not to Allah, as was the state before Islam came into being in 622. For example *jahiliyya* is a state deriving its legitimacy from human principles such as the sovereignty of the people hedonism and materialism, philosophical explanations of reality based on science alone where there is no place for Allah.

54 Sayyid Qutb (2004), *Ma'alim fi Al-Tariq*, Al-Nasra: Al-Markaz Al-Islami lial-Thaqafa, Shihab lil-l'Im.

55 Ibid, p. 140.

56 Ibid, p. 11, quoting the *Aal l'mran* (House of Imran) Sura, verse 110 "You are the best nation produced for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah."

57 Ibid, p. 38.

58 Sivan, *The Zealots*, pp. 37–43.

59 In the argument between the Arabic and pan-Islamic approaches, great use was made of Qur'an verses as guides to which Muhammad was directed in his mission. See Sivan, *Zealots*, pp. 42, 43, 48 (Allah's chosen people).

60 Yakan, Fathi (2001), *Mushkilat Al-da'wah wal Dai'ya*, Beirut: Mu'asasat Al-Risala, and also: Fathi Yakan (1995), *Al-Islam, Fikra waharaka Wainkilab*, Beirut: Mu'asasat Al-Risala.

and that will be accomplished through jihad, just as the Islamic state was founded in the time of Muhammad through jihad. Action should not be taken within an artificial framework of territorial affinity: the Islamic movement should be decentralized (*la markazia*). Before the conflict with *jahiliyya*, its ideas, principles, means and strategy should be studied and harnessed for the benefit of mankind. They include organization, propaganda and activities of all the other popular movements, whether student, political or other. The movement should be based on extensive, exact knowledge of the society in which it exists, its psychological, ideological, political, governmental and partisan conditions and its foreign relations.

Yakan quotes Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna on the forceful approach in Islam's struggle. Al-Banna asks if Muslims are determined to use force to realize their objectives and whether they plan an overall revolution against the existing political and social order. His answer is Surat Al-Anfāl, Verse 60 "*And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows.*" The objective will be realized through jihad just as the Islamic state was founded in the times of Muhammad through jihad. It is the motivating ideology for the Islamic movement, which does not rely only on preaching (*waa'th wa-irshad*). Jihad must shatter the sham of materialism and the philosophy of evil and tyranny, and oppose lies. The Islamic movement, as noted, should be decentralized.⁶¹

According to Yakan, constructing an Islamic identity is a cornerstone for realizing the Islamic revolution and establishing the Islamic state. The Islamic movement everywhere is called on to confront its collective fate in the face of enormous responsibility. It must reexamine its lessons and rewrite the rules of its conduct in light of current conditions and with an eye to its future. This must be done with the speed, precision and skill required for a conflict against *jahiliyya*, which is the essence of cunning and evil. Only then will a true interpretation of the words of the Messenger occur within the Islamic movement. Yakan does not detail how the Islamic takeover is to be carried out in operational terms.

In *In Order to March Forward in the Path of the Blessed Jihad*⁶² Sa'id Hawwa⁶³ says that Islam is the only completely integrative framework for the world. Islam is the only order which commits all humanity and the only religion. Anyone learning of the existence of Islam and not accepting it will be damned. The Christians and the Jews who hear of Islam are also obliged to follow it. Islam is a political, economic, social and moral organization. No exception can be made regarding any of its aspects. Anyone calling for the isolation of Islam from political action is calling for its neutralization. For that reason, any organization not accepting the totality of Islam becomes its enemy. Muslims are duty-bound to bring about the victory of Islam so that Allah's word may be supreme. Anyone fighting for that cause is fighting for Allah. The official state religion and president must be Muslim and they, not the infidels, must rule. Islam has given mankind a choice between war and Islam, or the payment of *jizya*, a tax on able-bodied males. The duty of Islam is to glorify Allah on earth. Allah has given the Muslims the right to fight and kill, and killing an infidel is right and

61 Yakan, *Mushkilat Al-da'wah wal dai'ya*, Beirut: Mu'asasat Al-Risala, pp. 231–232, 223, 234, 236, 220, 234.

62 Hawwa, Sa'id (1979), *In Order to March Forward in the Path of the Blessed Jihad*, second edition (unknown printing house), p. 8.

63 Sheikh Sa'id bin Muhammad Dib bin Muhammad Hawwa Al-Nai'mi, born September 27, 1935 in Hama, Syria. In his youth he worked with his father in agriculture and commerce. He graduated from the Shari'a college in Damascus and taught Islamic education and Arabic in Saudi Arabia, and in Syria between 1970 and 1973. In 1952 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood, participating in a number of political activities, and writing an opinion paper demanding that Syria and the Syrian constitution be Islamic, for which he was jailed. He belonged to the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood between 1979 and 1982 and to its global leadership between 1982 and 1984. In 1985 he participated in the Islamic Popular Committee in Baghdad to stop the Iran–Iraq war. His ideas included forming the identity of the Muslim in every country, uniting the Islamic nation and reviving the Caliphate. His essays include "The Foundations of Commentary (for the Qur'an)," "The Foundations of the Sunnah," and a series of essays on the *da'wah*, education and heritage. He died of a muscular illness in Amman in 1989.

just, for the reign of the Muslims over the world is in the interest of the world itself.⁶⁴ The Islamic group is the Truth, and when it takes over the world it will impose perfect justice. There is no escape from accepting Islam as the state religion, there is no room for heresy in the Islamic state, and political freedom exists only with Muslims and according to agreements entered into with them. The Muslim also has political freedom only within the framework of Islam. Those conditions are essential for the renewal of the Islamic nation. Every Muslim must know that the Islamic group is mindful of local and international public opinion, and takes the situation into account but operates without fear within jihad. The balance of power has no importance in the struggle to reinstate Islamic power, as a small group will overcome a larger group, Allah willing, as Allah is with the patient. Allah must be relied upon but one must be well prepared for the campaign as "power is in the ability to shoot." The love of death for the sake of Allah cannot be denied, but effort must be invested in training, exercise, rule and order, planning and research. They are necessary but one must rely on Allah. An Islamic state must be established, there must be an Islamic group with an Imam and there can be no deviation. The Muslims gave up their heritage and thus lost their deterrence and were humiliated by their love of this world and their hatred of death (the *hadith* of Abu Daud). Hawwa says Muhammad used war and trickery, and regarding non-Muslims, flexibility means the ability and determination to lie, deceive and kill. One must fight only to glorify Allah's name, and anyone who does is acting for Allah.⁶⁵

Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi⁶⁶ is one of the most prominent contemporary religious authorities affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. He based his 1987 book *Islam and Secularism Face to Face (Al-Islam wa al-I'maniyyah wajhan li wajh)*⁶⁷ on Islam's primary sources (the Qur'an, the *hadiths* and *Al-sira al-nabawiyya* [Muhammad's biography]), which he regarded as illustrating a model period of consensus. He preaches emulating and implementing those lessons to restore power globally to Muslims, as it was in the past. In his view, Islam's next target should be Europe, which will be "liberated" in the near future without battle by the Muslims living there and with the help of the *da'wah*, part of Islam's expected takeover of the world. In his lectures he calls on the Arabs to obtain nuclear weapons to instill fear in the hearts of the enemies of Islam, but not to actually use them.⁶⁸ He depicts the Jews in a negative light,⁶⁹ while stressing that Islam is tolerant of Judaism. He claims that the hostility between Muslims and Jews is unrelated to the Jewish religion, but rather to the Jews themselves and the conflict with Israel. He claims that the Jews betrayed Muhammad by wanting to destroy the Muslims in Medina during the battle against the pagan coalition and were greedy for Palestine, which they robbed and whose people they exiled. He says that "with these

⁶⁴ Hawwa, *In Order to March Forward*.

⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 15, 16, 20, 23, 24, 27, 29-31, 36, 41.

⁶⁶ A publication of the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, February 27, 2011 describes Al-Qaradawi's persona and views. Sheikh Al-Qaradawi was born in 1926, studied in Tanta where was influenced by the writings of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. He completed his studies at Al-Azhar University in 1953, and received his doctoral degree in 1973. He has written about 50 books, the most famous of which is *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*. Because of tension between him and the Egyptian government, he has lived in Qatar since 1961, where he has held various positions in the Islamic academic and religious hierarchy. He issued fatwas permitting attacks on Jews around the world, claiming that there is no difference between Judaism and Zionism. Following Mubarak's fall he gave a speech in Liberation Square. He is considered by many as the Muslim Brotherhood's religious and ideological authority but does not officially hold a position within the movement. He appears on the popular show "Islamic Shari'a and Life" and manages the Islam Online website. In his various fatwas he allowed Muslim minorities to live under non-Islamic rule, called for attack on American troops in Iraq, supported jihad and suicide bombing attacks against Jews and Israelis and permitted the harming of civilians, women and children, stating that every Israeli was either a soldier or a potential soldier. He referred to suicide bombing as *istishhad*, martyrdom for the sake of Allah, rather than terrorism, and an act imposed on all Muslims. In his book, "Jurisprudence and jihad" he justified jihad against the tyrannical regime as the most exalted jihad, more important than jihad against outside enemies.

⁶⁷ Al-Qaradawi Y. (1987) *Al-Islam wa al-I'maniyyah wajhan li wajh*, Al-Qahira: Dar Al-Sahwa lil-Nashr wal Tawzi'.

⁶⁸ According to Memri (the Middle East Media Research Institute): Qatar TV, October 18th 2002.

⁶⁹ Al-Qaradawi Y., Al-Jazeera , Qatar, January 16, 2005.

criminal Jews we have no dialogue... but are speaking with those amongst them who oppose the establishment of Israel." In a Friday sermon broadcast on Qatar's Al-Jazeera TV he said, "Allah, help the jihad fighters with the spirit that comes from within you and help them with your many soldiers...Allah, harm your enemies, the enemies of Islam. Allah, harm the treacherous and aggressive Jews. Allah harms the allies of the usurpers and condescending. Allah, harm all of the enemies of Islam and the Muslims."⁷⁰

The factor common to the aforementioned Islamic radical thinkers who form the pantheon which helped create the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, is the call to build an intra-Islamic micro-power system while emulating the model period of Islam under Muhammad, and then to continue the restoration of the Islamic vision and power as a macro-power system confronting the world, as it was in the past. The concept of the restoration of the Islamic power, deterrence and the exercise of power through jihad is shared by most of the classical Islamic thinkers. Their rhetoric relies on the Qur'an, the *hadiths* and Muhammad's biography. The approach contains no hint of apology and does not question the violent restoration of the power of Islam either internally or externally (through jihad). It advocates the return to the ancient times of glory by gradually restoring Islamic power. According to this doctrine, restoring and using power should be attained through the *da'wah* and using force and jihad fighters to deter, intimidate, threaten and persuade adversaries to submit and eventually convert to Islam.

In conclusion, the approach to Islamic power and deterrence shared by these Muslim Brotherhood ideologues revolves around the Arab term *irhab* in its current militant translation into terrorism. It is defined as "instilling intimidation, fear and terror," and can also be referred to in the sense of deterrence. This term appears in the Qur'an in Surat Al-Anfāl, Verse 60, as noted above. According to the aforementioned ideologues, the verse is the explicit and focused expression of Muhammad's mission regarding those who are not Muslim, and serves as a source for the rhetoric of Islamic radicalism advocating power, deterrence and jihad against the infidels and the enemies of Allah. The entire verse reads:

"And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know but whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged."

70 Al-Jazeera, January 14th 2005, according to <http://www.memri.org.il>.

Part Two: The Muslim Brotherhood's Operational Approach to Islamic Power, Deterrence and Jihad

The Expression of Power, Deterrence and Jihad

Most of the Islamic ideologues noted above deal with radical religious theory, however, they do not provide operational "end expressions" which can be put into practice. In their defensive, offensive and "moderate" apologetic forms they show that Islam does not adhere to the status quo but rather advocates aggressive revisionism.

The reason that no practical guidelines for realizing the vision and using deterrence and jihad in their practical sense may be objective and related to security at the time of their conceptualization. It is also possible that the operational ideas of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues were disseminated only in small, secret religious classes and gatherings or in internal pamphlets, in closed sermons or on mosque bulletin boards. It is probable that detailing practical issues was not appropriate for the public religious roles of the ideologues at the time, as they may have been exposed to hostile Arab and Western security and intelligence services, particularly in recent years. Another reason may have been the Islamic principle regarding war, according to which surprise, ruse and concealment are implicit (*al-harb hida'a*).⁷¹

This section will discuss the current, overt, operational expression of the doctrine of power, deterrence and jihad as expressed by Islamic ideologues such as Sheikhs Abdullah Azzam and Muneer al-Ghadban, and references to those issues in radical Islamic websites.

Sheikh Abdullah Azzam,⁷² Osama bin Laden's mentor, in *Hamas: the Historical Roots and the Charter* (1989) (*Hamas: al-judhur al-tarikhiyya wa al-mithaq*)⁷³ mentions Sheikh Muneer al-Ghadban's⁷⁴ book *The Operational Way—According to the Messenger's Biography (Al-manhaj al-haraki lil-sira al-nabawiyya)*⁷⁵ as the doctrine recommended for fighters on their path to wage jihad for Islam and restore its glory and

71 A hadith from Muhammad interpreted to mean that war includes tricking the enemy.

72 Azzam, Abdullah, 1941–1989, known as Sheikh Azzam or "the father of jihad," is one of Al-Qaeda's founders. He was born in the village of Silat al-Harithya in the Jenin district, received a BA in Islamic studies from the University of Damascus in 1966 and he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in 1969. He was influenced by Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He received an MA from Al-Azhar University in Islamic studies and a PhD in 1973. He left with Bin Laden for Pakistan in 1980 to fight the Soviet forces which had invaded Afghanistan. He taught at the Islamic University in Islamabad, and in 1984 he moved to Peshawar, founded The Office for Mujahideen Services (*maktab khidamat al-mujahideen*), and with financing obtained by bin Laden founded a volunteer organization of over 40,000 fighters. In 1986 Azzam opened the first branch of his organization for recruiting Islamic volunteers in Tucson Arizona. Azzam was killed on November 24, 1989, when a car he was riding in was blown up. Bin Laden accused the Israeli Mossad. After his death bin Laden became head of Al-Qaeda.

73 Azzam, Abdullah (1989) *Hamas: Al-Judhur Al-Tarikhiyya wa Al-Mithaq*, Peshawar (Publisher unknown. Distributed at the Islamic Science and Culture Committee Society, Bait Al-Maqdis, Jerusalem), p. 117.

74 Sheikh Muneer Al-Ghadban was born in Al-Tall, Damascus, in 1942. Was one of the leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Won the University of Damascus Shari'a award in 1967, received a BA in education from the University of Damascus in 1968, an MA in the Arabic language from the Arab Research and Study Institute in Cairo in 1972, and a PhD in the Arabic language from Al-Qur'an Al-Karim University in Sudan in 1997. He won the Brunei government's Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya award (a biography of Muhammad) in 2000, was a visiting lecturer at elementary, junior high and high schools in Damascus in 1972, served as a cultural tutor at the Girl's Education Administration in Al-Ta'if in Saudi Arabia and as a religious propagandist for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as a cultural researcher at the Umm Al-Qura University at the Islamic Study Center in Mecca. He was also a cultural researcher at the World Center for Islamic Youth and wrote books in various fields of Islamic political thought and the rulings of Muhammad. According to his book, Al-Ghadban himself was involved in the bloody conflicts during which President Hafez Assad's army massacred Muslim Brotherhood members in Homs and Hama in Syria in 1982. Today he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Shura Council and of the General Secretariat of the religious Clerics Society (U'lama) in Syria. In his speeches he calls for the ousting of Bashar Assad's regime and supports the rebellion against him.

75 Muneer Al-Ghadban (1989), *Al-Manhaj Al-Haraki lil-Sira Al-Nabawiyya*, Maktab Al-Manar, Al-Urdun-Zarka, fifth edition.

power. He also recommends that *mujahideen* wishing to recreate of the power of Islam read other doctrines issued by the Muslim Brotherhood's *da'wah*,⁷⁶ mentioning Sayyid Qutb,⁷⁷ Hassan Al-Banna,⁷⁸ Fathi Yakan⁷⁹ and others.

Azzam wrote numerous books about jihad, the most prominent of which was *Defending Muslim Lands, the Personal Duty of Every Muslim*, published in Amman, Jordan and considered one of the most important books for global jihad. Its main thesis is that every country which was ever under Muslim rule must be reconquered by jihad. An essay entitled "*Join the Qur'an*" is a call to Islamic youth to go to war in Afghanistan. His book *The Red Cancer* (published in Amman) is a scorching criticism of Communism. It has an anti-Semitic chapter accusing the Jews (and Zionists) of responsibility for spreading international Communism, including to the Arab world. Abdullah Azzam's recommendation of al-Ghadban emphasizes the importance of his book in the operative concept of radical Islam. Al-Ghadban's book contains much practical material on how to restore Islamic power, which is apparently the reason Abdullah Azzam recommended the book to jihad fighters several years prior to the attack on the World Trade Center.⁸⁰ That makes the book a primary tool for understanding the perception of Islamic power and its practical aspects, i.e., deterrence, the use of power and jihad.

Al-Ghadban provides an ideological summary of the radical Islamic ideologues mentioned above (presented as role models) as well as the practical stages for amassing Islamic power. He currently supports the rebellion against Bashar Assad, and is also important because his doctrine is the source of Muslim Brotherhood strategy and its jihad branch, first recommended by one of the main figures shaping bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's path. Al-Ghadban is a proponent of the idea that the Islamic march towards power is at the heart of the Islamic aspiration. The march is not a theoretical idea or a utopian or nostalgic statement, but rather a dictate to be executed militantly both internally and externally. It challenges non-Muslims worldwide and professes to enforce itself on humanity. Regarding that outlook, Sayyid Qutb says that any other interpretation or outlook is apologetic and defeatist, and its objective is the appeasement of non-Muslims.⁸¹

Presumably, radical Islamic elements do not want information about their operational perceptions brought to the attention of the infidel intelligence services. Many radicals depict the Islamic view as striving for world peace. However, al-Ghadban clearly describes the Muslim Brotherhood's doctrine for amassing and applying power, and his doctrine reveals changes in the enemy's image as power is amassed and the image of the aspired-to Islamic leader.

Restoring Power and Constructing Islamic Deterrence in Stages⁸²

Al-Ghadban presents an evolutionary approach for acquiring power and performing the task of eradicating heresy and evil, subordinating people to Allah alone and bringing them out of slavery to the worship of Allah. His intention is not to force people to accept Islam but rather to remove the barrier between them and the Islamic faith. That will be possible after the destruction of the ruling regimes or their defeat and the

76 Ibid, p. 117.

77 Sayyid Qutb (2004), *Ma'alem fi Al-Tariq*, Al-Markaz Al-Islami liAl-Thaqafa, Al-Nasra: Shihab liAl-'Im.

78 Al-Banna, Hassan (1984), *Majmu'at Rasa'il*, Beirut: Al-Majmu'a Al-Islamia liAl-Tibaa'a wal Sahafa walNshr, and also Hassan Al-Banna, (2005) *Ahadith Al-Juma'a*, Al-Qahira: Dar Al-tawzi' walnashr Al-Islamia.

79 Yakan, Fathi (2001), *Mushkilat Al-da'wah wal Dai'ya*, Beirut: *Mu'asasat Al-Risala*, and also: Fathi Yakan (1995), *Al-Islam, Fikra waharaka Wainkilab*, Beirut: *Mu'asasat Al-Risala*.

80 Azzam, Abdullah (1989) *Hamas: the Historical Roots and the Charter*, Peshawar, p. 117.

81 Sayyid Qutb (2004), *Ma'alem fi Al-Tariq*, Al-Markaz Al-Islami li Al-Thaqafa, Al-Nasra: Shihab liAl-'Im, p. 140.

82 Al-Ghadban, pp. 9–12, 15–16, 19, 32.

payment of the head tax (*jizya*). Thus, the masses will decide of their own free will whether or not to convert to Islam.⁸³

According to Al-Ghadban, *Al-sira al-nabawiyya* has to be studied in depth, as it explicitly defines the necessary operational actions and describes the practical implementation of Islam, and is an exemplary format for the establishment of the Islamic state. To reinforce contemporary copying of the Messenger's example, al-Ghadban quotes the Qur'an:

*"There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent pattern for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the Last Day and [who] remembers Allah often."*⁸⁴

Al-Ghadban stresses the learning of ancient lessons and the duty to implement them. He says that model conduct seems clearer in the prophetic *Sira*, Muhammad's biography. Al-Ghadban's book *Al-manhaj al-haraki li-al-sira al-nabawiyya* deals with the path which must be followed, citing the historical development of Muhammad's heritage.

As the Islamic movement (i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood) needs to attain its goals of establishing the rule of Allah on earth (that is, the founding of an Islamic state), then *Al-manhaj al-haraki* is divine guidance, as Allah guided his messenger Muhammad in everything, and is not merely responses to specific crises Muhammad had to cope with.

Al-Ghadban defines five stages in the process of implementing Allah's rule on earth, but says the first two stages are in fact one stage:

- 1) The first stage: The secrecy of the *da'wah* and the organization. It begins with a prophetic mission in Mecca and is directed first at the individual and then at the family circle. It is not applicable today because Islam has already been revealed.⁸⁵

*"And warn your closest kindred."*⁸⁶

The stage began with Muhammad's prophetic experience at the Hira cave and ended three years later when he presented the mission to his family and stayed away from the polytheists who shared their faith with idols, as was written:

*"Declare what you are commanded and turn away from the polytheists."*⁸⁷

It ends in the tenth year of the prophetic mission.⁸⁸

- 2) The second stage: The founding of the state, ending at the beginning of the first Hijra year.
- 3) The third stage: Establishing the state and securing its foundations; it ends with the Hudaibiyyah treaty.
- 4) The fourth stage: Conquering Mecca and spreading the *da'wah*; it ends with Muhammad's death.

83 Al-Ghadban, p. 9, quoting from Sayyid Qutb's book: "*Ma'alam fi al-tariq*," p. 58.

84 Surat Al-Ahzab (The Combined Forces), Verse 21.

85 Al-Ghadban, p. 19, explains that the period of inspiration lasted between two and a half and three years. Al-Ghadban contends that this period has no dimension of emulation for Muslims today. Therefore it must not be understood that the Islamic movement today must undergo a secret stage lasting three years. According to him there is no text calling on Muslims to emulate this aspect.

86 Surat Ash-Shu'ara' (The Poets), Verse 214.

87 Surat Al-Hijr (The Rocky Tract), Verse 94.

88 Thus the two parts were included in the first stage presented by Al-Ghadban.

The Four Operative Stages of Amassing Power and Using Force (Jihad) and Deterrence

The First Stage (Micro-Power): *Da'wah* and Secrecy, the Defensive Approach of Response and Restraint

- 1) The founding of hard cores and the use of violence should only come as a response:⁸⁹ the enemy talks to Muslims only when Muslims become stronger.
- 2) Take a defensive, preventive approach of avoidance and ensure the security of the community, migrating if necessary to alternative bases.⁹⁰
- 3) Regarding espionage and impersonation,⁹¹ covert operatives, directed by the commanders, are to be planted within organizations hostile to Islam, concealing their Islam and pretending to belong to the *jahiliyya*. A Muslim can operate in the service of organizations hostile to Islam only if he is under a direct existential threat requiring him to assume the position of an infidel.⁹²
- 4) Manage a secret organization: secret meetings of the commanders and soldiers must be held to prevent exposure to the enemy. An unlikely place should be selected, not identified with Muslims or hostile to them (*dar al-arqam*).
- 5) Psychological warfare⁹³ should be used to mislead and deceive the enemy⁹⁴ as part of jihad's political cover. In war the enemy is to be weakened as much as possible, his violence is to be defused and his ranks are to be collapsed, neutralizing those who can be neutralized.

The Second Stage (Micro-Power): Immigration and the Foundation of the Islamic State, a Defensive Approach of the Use of Force and Manipulation to Preserve the Status Quo

- 1) It is the leadership's responsibility to determine the time for fighting and the birth of the Islamic state according to the circumstances on the ground.⁹⁵ On Judgment Day the leader will be asked to explain the shedding of every drop of blood.
- 2) Lulls in the fighting (*hudnas*) with non-Muslims are partial and based on self-interest only.
- 3) Preparing alternative bases for immigration is part of the Islamic movement's jihad strategy.
- 4) The right to fight is reserved for the period after the values of jihad and war have been properly constructed.⁹⁶ Only after the Muslim internalizes Islam and its values may he be called to jihad. Because of attacks, persecutions, exile and the attempt to turn believers away from Islam, Allah has permitted Muslims to fight oppression.⁹⁷
- 5) The war is total, but entering into it requires preparation and restraint.⁹⁸
- 6) In conducting a dialogue with adversaries, select skilled negotiators with manipulative abilities.⁹⁹
- 7) Conduct covert activities¹⁰⁰ (See above).

89 Ibid, pp. 21, 30–32, 41, 56–57, 63, 87, 106.

90 Ibid, pp. 41, 43, 56, 63–68.

91 Ibid, pp. 33–35, 41, 48–49, 65, 70–71, 77.

92 Ibid, p. 33, quoting the Al-Naĥl (the Bee) Sura, verse 106.

93 Ibid, pp. 70, 81, 109.

94 Ibid, pp. 28, 30, 52–53, 60, 68–70, 72–74, 81–83, 88, 94, 112, 116, 121, 127.

95 Ibid, pp. 178, 180, 197.

96 Ibid, pp. 156–160.

97 At this stage referring to the defensive approach.

98 Ibid, pp. 167, 170–172, 177, 187, 189.

99 Ibid, pp. 151, 154.

100 Ibid, pp. 160, 164–165.

- 8) A propaganda war (*harb li'lamiyya*) should be waged.¹⁰¹
- 9) Exploit license to lie, mislead and deceive,¹⁰² as one of the principles of dealing with an enemy when it is in one's interests to pretend he is a friend, as (*al-a'du al-sadeeq*) in dire times there is no choice but to lie.¹⁰³

The Third Stage (Macro-Power): Establishing an Islamic State: the Move from Defensive to Offensive Action

- 1) Protect Islam's deliberately aggressive and deterrent reputation.¹⁰⁴ a Muslim does not promise or threaten without keeping his promises or fulfilling his threats, as his words would then lose their effectiveness, and if defeated in battle the great reputation the Muslim won through victory would collapse. The enemy's plans must be confronted before they are executed and struck down at the planning stage.
- 2) The use of force is Allah's commandment and will.¹⁰⁵ Islamic victory and the fate of the campaign are ensured and will be obtained by faith according to divine will and aid.¹⁰⁶ The objective at this stage is to make the religion of truth victorious and defeat the rule of lies.¹⁰⁷
- 3) Infidels must be fought until they say there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet. If they do, their blood and property will be saved according to Islamic decree. Salvation from death comes through acceptance of Islam.¹⁰⁸ Thus the defensive stage ends and the offensive stage begins, in which Islam is spread throughout the land and takes root, as Muhammad said, "*We will now raid them and not they raid us.*"
- 4) Continued fighting and jihad must be waged until Judgment Day to implement Islam worldwide:¹⁰⁹ the transition between two periods in Islamic history, between that of patience, restraint, convergence and waiting, and that of force, movement, initiative and breakthrough is to be implemented. One must not wait for the material balance of force but rather rely on the superiority of faith in Allah. All wars, raids and heresy against Islam occur only after the Islamic state is established. The end of each round means preparing for the next round.
- 5) The *hudna* is temporary: all relationships and alliances with non-Muslims are temporary and self-serving, achieved to concentrate power and attack a specific enemy.¹¹⁰
- 6) The Islamic leadership has the authority to bear the burden of resolutions and conflict.¹¹¹
- 7) The deliberate raid is both defensive and deterrent,¹¹² as there is need to strike those raising their heads against Muslims through raid (*ghazwa*), a deliberate deterrent, aggressive counter-attack. Its

101 Ibid, p. 183.

102 Ibid, pp. 187, 189, 191–192, 194.

103 Ibid, p. 194. Al-Ghadban supports this idea when quoting the hadith brought by Ibn 'Adi in the collection of hadiths *Al-kamil wal bayhaki* in his book *Sha'ab Al-Iman* (no details available).

104 Al-Ghadban, pp. 290, 297, 300, 335, 401–402.

105 Ibid, pp. 238, 239.

106 Ibid, pp. 322, 325–326, 343–345, 358, 396, 415–418, 428, 431, 435.

107 Ibid, pp. 241–242, 248–249, 304, 315, 442.

108 Ibid, p. 304, quoting al-Buhari.

109 Ibid, pp. 212, 217–219, 231–232, 239.

110 Ibid, pp. 211–212, 233, 283, 292, 402, 415, 428.

111 Ibid, pp. 223, 271, 315.

112 Ibid, pp. 212, 232–233, 235, 339–341.

objective is to deter tangential opponents or potential support for the adversary; a declaration of war and attack are the strongest possible defenses.

- 8) The balance of power in the campaign is unimportant.¹¹³
- 9) An Islamic enclave must be maintained near the enemy as a base for launching an attack.¹¹⁴ The infidels are to be harassed and their governments undermined, and the land under their feet must tremble. That is possible only when the movement has a safe area from which to deploy its fighters and attack the enemy's center of power. As soon as the enemy has been attacked its army headquarters and intelligence services will be put on alert to deflect the Islamic blow. The blow must be as painful as an earthquake, and then terror (*irhab*) will enter the enemy's heart, deterring him and/or bringing down the infidel government and causing its allies to flee. The use of force against the Jews deters others.¹¹⁵
- 10) Targeted killings intimidate the enemy and raise Muslim morale.¹¹⁶ Their effect is great and spreads terror throughout the enemy's ranks. The targeted killing of enemy leaders results in victory for Allah and Muhammad.¹¹⁷ The Jews and those opposing Muhammad and Islam are worthy targets for targeted killings,¹¹⁸ for which professional assassins must be chosen.¹¹⁹
- 11) The enemy's army commanders are to be eliminated at an early stage, either close to his country or in the heart of his fortress.¹²⁰ That will add to the Muslims' deterrent power.
- 12) Proper preparation for war:¹²¹ spies are to be used, debriefed directly, information on targets is to be obtained independently and the opposition is to be misled. A logistical evaluation of the adversary's force, the scope of his power and his possessions which can be plundered must be determined.¹²²
- 13) Good tactics are surprise, suspicion, response and pretense: the enemy must be surprised to prevent even the thought of raiding an Islamic territory; suspicion and an explicit Islamic threat are to be expressed towards the enemy; Muslims must give a forceful, bold, threatening response when the enemy threatens Islam's supporters and demand they refuse shelter to the leaders of Islam; stupidity can be feigned to gather exact intelligence about the enemy.
- 14) Operational agents from the enemy ranks are to be enticed into enlisting.¹²³ One must pretend to be an infidel to create accessibility to candidates for targeted killings.
- 15) Intimidation should be employed: "Islam wins through intimidating a distant enemy before he reaches the area of conflict."¹²⁴

113 Ibid, pp. 217, 372–373.

114 Ibid, pp. 233, 286, 288.

115 Ibid, pp. 255, 286–287, 291.

116 Ibid, pp. 291, 345.

117 Ibid, p. 347. For an example of killings on Muhammad's order—see Al-Ghadban—the murder of Khaled bin Sufian Al-Handali, p. 353, the murder of 'Asmaa bint Maruan p. 345, the murder of Abu Ifk p. 347, the Murder of Ka'ab Al-Ashraf, p. 347, the murder of Abu Snina, p. 349, the Murder of Salem bin Abu Al-Haqiq, p. 354, the murder of Assir bin Razzim, p. 356, the Murder of Kinana bin Rabi'a, the Murder of Abdullah bin Khatl and his female singer. p. 570 the murder of Alhuirath bin Nafeed' p. 570 the murder of Mkis bin Habiba p. 570 and maybe also the murder of 'Aamer bin Tufayl p.621

118 Ibid, pp. 345–358.

119 Ibid, pp. 349, 350, 353.

120 Ibid, pp. 350, 353–354, 356.

121 Ibid, pp. 372, 393–401, 409.

122 Ibid quoting Al-Makrizi *Imta' El- Asma*, pp. 76–77, the Islamic preparation is derived from the enemy's figures as his image is reflected in their eyes.

123 Ibid, pp. 292–293, 296, 340.

124 Ibid, p. 357.

- 16) Propaganda and the communications media advance war and march at its side, and should be employed.¹²⁵
- 17) Influential agents should be recruited to demoralize and discourage the enemy, creating a sense of defeatism in his ranks.¹²⁶
- 18) A policy of seduction and persuasion should be employed, for when the Islamic state is besieged, the enemy coalition must be tempted with material benefits. That will destroy unity in the ranks. When it is likely that the Islamic army will win, the Islamic leader may renege on his promises. Doubt, mistrust and suspicion are to be created among the enemies of Islam and disinformation is to be spread throughout his coalition. Thus Allah creates strife between the enemies of Islam.¹²⁷

The Fourth Stage (Macro-Power): Conquer the Enemy Strongholds and Spread the *Da'wah* through Force

- 1) Grow stronger and arm for deterrence to inflict terror and influence the political level.¹²⁸ The Messenger said: "*I was made victorious through the intimidation of the enemy, one month's journey distance away from me.*"¹²⁹ Politics are applicable only when there is sufficient power. Gaining strength and deterrence through the threat of arms enables Muslims to present their ideas and prepare the people's hearts, as they rarely listen to anyone without power. Power is useful in an ideological dialogue with the enemy and in the political arena. The Islamic movement's greatest asset is displaying its force, forcing its enemies to enter into a dialogue and acknowledge its existence.
- 2) Political jihad is to be waged in the service of *da'wah*, aided by Islam's reputation for deterrence.¹³⁰ Political jihad is a function of military power. Its objective is to make the enemy surrender without a fight to ensure his own safety, thus he will not find it unusual or humiliating to accept Islam. Injudicious use of force, however, may result in the desire for revenge.¹³¹
- 3) Non-military preparations should be made in a show of power.¹³² It is not always necessary to conduct a raid, it can be merely a show of force that despite its character (brinkmanship) may meet with military resistance, due to the need for political advancement in a new direction. The enemy's leader is to be presented with Islamic force in a way that will make him think it is invincible. The Muslims, while small in number, challenge an enemy with superior numbers. The enemy surrenders the chance to win and becomes weaker as he understands that entering into a conflict would be useless.
- 4) Prepare several alternative bases and places of reserves for forces¹³³ when military force is to be used to coerce non-Muslims into converting.¹³⁴ The *da'wah* operates in the political arena side by side with military tactics.
- 5) Strive for confrontation, enhanced reputation and deterrence, and use force when punishing the enemy.¹³⁵ If Muslims do not confront an enemy and take revenge when an ally is murdered, it might

125 Ibid, pp. 358, 368–369, 380.

126 Ibid, pp. 398, 413, 416, 423, 425.

127 Ibid, p. 425, quoting Ibn Sham's *Sira*, pp. 240–242.

128 Ibid, pp. 449, 463–464, 481–482, 528, 574–575, 589, 620.

129 Ibid, p. 357, notes the accepted hadith without mentioning the origin. (In actuality, from Abu-Huraira, conveyed by Muslim Tirmidhi and Ahmad).

130 Ibid, pp. 565–566, 596–597, 599, 608–609, 611, 624–627.

131 Ibid, pp. 479, 500.

132 Ibid, pp. 459–460, 464, 467.

133 Ibid, pp. 501–504.

134 Ibid, pp. 480, 482, 506, 529.

135 Ibid, pp. 449–450, 541, 562, 569.

motivate others to raid the Islamic state. Force is to be used to take hostages, shocking and weakening the enemy and strengthening Muslim morale. When the enemy's commander does not fight, two thirds of the enemy are neutralized. Often the purpose of intimidation (*irhab*) through force is not to kill but to destroy enemy opposition. The Islamic movement needs deterrent power to realize its objective of preventing the enemy from preparing for war. Acquiring deterrent force does not mean becoming a homicidal gang, but by using the threat of power it can conquer stubborn souls and deter inherent hostility. In most cases, defeating the enemy entails defeating its leadership, thus ending the war. In addition to deterrent force (*alkuwa alradia'h*), the Islamic movement must pose an equally powerful effective force (*alkuwa almucafiah*)

- 6) Force should be used deliberately to raise the morale of the Muslim army .
- 7) Islamic terrorist groups are to be employed in the aid of politics.¹³⁶ The so-called "war of the oppressed" or the "gang wars" (*harb ali'sabat* or *harb almustaza'feen*) begin with an aggressive Islamic force operating in the service of Muslims, changing the balance of power in their favor. Their actions affect the significance and results of international contracts. The force must strike the enemy's men, steal its goods and disable its economy.
- 8) Use terrorist groups from within a country bordering on the infidel state¹³⁷ against civilian or military enemy targets to defeat the infidels.¹³⁸ If the enemy does not sense a threat to his life, existence and safety, the Islamic revolution will be eroded and eliminated to the last of its men. Islamic revolutionaries have the right to break the back of the enemy, drive him out and weaken him and his resistance. That is to be done whether the targets are civilian or military, as the goal of the revolution is to drive out oppression and persecution, and the oppressors will continue to oppress if they are not killed and their lives, possessions and security are not destroyed.
- 9) Act according to operational models when attacking the enemy,¹³⁹ since often an attack is a powerful means of self-defense. A successful military and political operation (*irhab*) intimidates the enemy and prevents him from considering a military attack on Islam.
- 10) Use psychological warfare to intimidate the enemy.¹⁴⁰ An Islamic raid is more like psychological warfare than an organized war. Its objective is to terrorize the enemy's ranks and avenge Islam's previous losses. That is achieved once the enemy flees and fortifies himself, and does not dare enter into a confrontation. Psychological warfare has more far-reaching aspects, such as attacking near enemy bases and strongholds. The goal is clear as proximity to the enemy will make him fear the Muslim looking for him. The enemy's fear causes him to sense the danger of Muslims in the area. Psychological warfare expresses determination to fight for the Islamic mission through jihad, despite the enemy's superior force and the possibility the Muslims will panic.
- 11) Mislead the enemy.¹⁴¹ He can be deceived to neutralize his weapons and kill him. Concealment, pretense and deception (*ta'miya wataghreer*) can be employed.

136 Ibid, pp. 484–487.

137 Ibid, pp. 485–488.

138 Ibid, pp. 488, 544.

139 Ibid, pp. 531, 493, 506, 540–541, 603, 616, 631–634.

140 Ibid, pp. 449–450, 460, 616.

141 Ibid, pp. 484, 487, 513, 525, 555, 561–562, 631–632.

12) Gradually implement the enemy's conversion to Islam.¹⁴² There is a difference between negotiations when creating the Islamic State and when Islam has become equal and has power. A ceasefire agreement (*hudna*) can be reached (and broken).¹⁴³ It is meant to neutralize adversaries and be used against a common enemy. Politically, the Islamic leadership announces its wish to refrain from war and calls for calm (*muhadana*). The enemy must hear a statement his people can understand, and the main message is that the Muslims do not want war for its own sake, only for the good of Islam. A ceasefire agreement with infidels made at this stage contains an inherent acknowledgment of the Islamic state. The *muhadana* gives the Muslims the breathing space required for Islam to burst forth without opposition or conflict. Political acknowledgment and deterrent military ability tip the scales in favor of Islam and Muslims. This optimal state of security is the time to convene Muslims from their shelters as reserve forces. The infidels are to be subjected to Islam through the *jizya*,¹⁴⁴ which is enough to end the war and stop the bloodshed.¹⁴⁵

The Practical Components of Amassing Force and Deterrence¹⁴⁶

In Al-Ghadban's doctrine, based on the above four stages, the authoritative Muslim leader is motivated to recreate the power of Islam to bring about its rule over the world, its source coming from Allah and Muhammad. It expresses Allah's rule rather than the rule of man, and has "the ability to cause another [i.e., the infidel] to obey through rational persuasion,"¹⁴⁷ as well as "to bring the other to obey due to coercion, despite his resistance,"¹⁴⁸ that is, it will cause the infidels to convert to Islam so that "they will act in a manner they would not have acted in if not for the power of Islam and its influence." The four components of practical power presented by Al-Ghadban in his operational code are meant to recreate the power Islam aspires to and enforce Islam on the world. Beyond the issue of authority (which will not be discussed in this study), Al-Ghadban's mentions the following components:

1) Islamic influence:¹⁴⁹ Islamic influence is the final state of the power Islam aspires to, implemented through the *da'wah* and essential to Al-Ghadban's operational code. It is a tool for persuasion and must be used in the re-creation of power to reinforce Islam's rule internally over the movement and the Islamic enclave, and applied externally to the entire world. Influence is also to be attained through deterrence and the use of force, creating credibility, authority, the reputation of Islam and the infidels' ability to anticipate Islam's reactions.¹⁵⁰ The *da'wah*, based on a call to influence and persuade non-Muslims to join Islam, is, according to Al-Ghadban, what defines the objectives and ensures their realization. The *da'wah*, he says, cannot entirely be described as propaganda in the classic Western sense as a manipulative act despite the fact that his code contains manipulative elements.¹⁵¹

The *da'wah* is the tool for the expression, persuasion and implementation of Islamic authority. It influences and motivates Islamic power both internally and externally and can be either oral and written. Without implementing the *da'wah*'s operational code there would be no radical Islam to restore former glory, and

142 Ibid, pp. 577–578, 617, 620.

143 Ibid, pp. 460–480, 482–483, 485–486, 489–490, 501–502, 512, 524, 558–560, 577.

144 Ibid, pp. 544, 557.

145 See, Kahn, K. (1995) *Islam from Birth until the Beginning of the Othman Empire*, (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: Dvir, p. 42, relating to the fact that the Arabs demanded conquered people publicly surrender, refrain from their previous customs and pay the *jizya*, but did not demand conversion to Islam.

146 This summary is based on Berko, "The Operational Code;" see Footnote 3. See discussion beginning on p. 263.

147 Ben-Dor, G. (2004) "Frontal lecture to National Defense College students at the Haifa University," the Security Studies Faculty.

148 Blau, P. (1964) *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York, Wiley) p117

149 Berko, "The Operational Code," p. 324.

150 Dahl, R.A (1957) *The Concept of Power*, Behavioral Science, Vol.7

151 See the four stages above.

therefore *da'wah* leaders with the authority to implement the above stages are, according to Al-Ghadban, the most critical link in motivating the process of gaining power. Responsive, activist implementation must be carried out through the *da'wah*, gradually and in stages, according to the milestones of the ancient heritage as well as in response to current problems and challenges.

The *da'wah* guides the instrumental wing operating to expand the scope of influence, create alliances, use power and gain deterrence. Realizing deterrence, according to Al-Ghadban, means proving reputation and ability through military initiatives, threat, violence and force to persuade the adversary to surrender and convert to Islam, where the cost of opposition will outweigh the benefit. Threat prevents the enemy from taking action, for he fears the outcome. For the enemy leadership, deterrence creates the mindset of a credible Islamic threat against which, they must believe, there is no reasonable action. Cognizant of the threat, the leadership will either not be able or not want to deal with possible results. *Da'wah* operatives use deterrence to give momentum to spreading Islam among the enemy. At the micro-power stage the influence of the *da'wah* expands within, cohesiveness is reinforced and internal consolidation in the enclave grows stronger. As a result, the external power of Islam grows stronger and influences others to join Islam. At the macro-power stage the ability to influence, deployment and accessibility of the *da'wah* to additional non-Islamic sectors grows as a result of the expansion of Islamic power in terms of control over territories and populaces. Beginning with the third stage and throughout the fourth, the *da'wah* operates alongside the use of Islamic force, and its objective is to spread Islam around the world.

The *da'wah* must be spread in stages alongside the growth in resources and power. According to Al-Ghadban, limiting the *da'wah*'s freedom of action is reason for war. Islamic influence strives for Islam's sole rule and denies its division. *Islam accepts democracy only as a possible means for taking over governments but rejects it as a legitimate form of government. A hudna with non-Muslims is a temporary, self-serving agreement meant to be violated while striving to destroy the other party and force it to convert to Islam. The arrangement does not strive for a better agreement in relationships with non-Muslims or Islamic acknowledgment of their legitimacy, but rather postpones their resolution to a more convenient time and circumstance.*

2) Resource power¹⁵² must be based mainly on the abundance of sources and material resources, stemming in part from war, such as spoils of war including money, possessions, lands and facilities, hostages, military equipment and logistical equipment, agricultural materials, raw materials and food, but also donations and aid with available manpower or volunteers. The deliberate recruitment and Islamic inclusion of the community and of the counter-population should accompany the recruitment of these resources through persuasion, marriage, temptation, deterrence and intimidation (*targhib* and *tarhib*), employed by *da'wah* propagandists. Al-Ghadban mentions including Europe and the United States, and seeking to enlist senior government figures in those countries as agents of influence.¹⁵³

Resource power should be based on discipline, complete obedience and internal faith. resource power as described by Al-Ghadban generally ensures the fulfillment of the individual's obligations within the system

152 Berko, "The Operational Code," p. 324.

153 Al-Ghadban, p. 548, refers to the principle of inclusion when presenting its importance through the manner in which the senior members in Mecca were recruited to Islam even before the great occupation in Mecca, such as Khaled bin Al-Waleed's the *Drawn Sword of Allah*. . According to him, today the Islamic movement must locate people of quality, where the value of one is a thousand times and even a hundred thousand times higher, and those who did not stand out or whom circumstances prevented from doing so. It is possible that such a person did not find a way to be prominent or that currently he is amongst the ranks of the enemies of Islam, possibly in Europe or the United States. To cause a repetition of the experience with Mecca's honorable people, and it is possible that among its men and youth dispersed throughout foreign lands there is someone qualified for such positions; and how necessary for the *da'wah* are men like Ja'ffar Al-Tiyar and Saifallah ibn Al-Waleed.

as part of the collective goal. According to Al-Ghadban, resource power makes it possible to impose sanctions to deter and/or punish if any member of the Islamic movement opposes or violates an obligation. He describes civil war (*fitna*) as a great concern for internal Islamic integrity, and the branding Jews as a common enemy to help close Islamic ranks.

Thus the collective's goal is power, and achieving it exceeds the individual's limits of behavior beyond considerations of personal interest or expedience. Islamic resource power also includes mechanisms for social supervision to enforce acceptable social norms within the movement and the Islamic enclave, and to threaten those deviating from the norm with punishment, including excommunication and death.

The framework of resource power determines acceptable social goals, their realization, fulfilling social obligations and individual roles within the community. According to Al-Ghadban, individual response and commitment to the leadership's demands must be accepted without exception as the prescribed point of departure for coordinated Islamic activity. He presents an operational code which includes coercion excommunication which are employed only in cases of deviation. This approach does not reflect a state of conflict or non-acceptance, but a general state of acceptance reflecting ongoing, committed relationships within the Islamic social system, and the acceptance of the collective objectives of the Islamic enclave as a complete society. He says that members of the community may be motivated to obey by various rational considerations, such as benefit, constraints and simple adjustment, whether selfishly or in genuine agreement.

Al-Ghadban describes the social structure of Islamic resource power as those in positions of authority and those who obey. The system is built on ties of faith, personal and family ties, emotional ties, values, customs and at times material and utilitarian ties, the latter two considered unstable. In the Islamic enclave there is usually sympathetic agreement and not necessarily acceptance because of authority. He is aware that within groups individuals may obey hypocritically and display opportunistic or material loyalty, and they are depicted as hypocrites or as renouncing Islam. At times that is the result of weakness and lack of choice, which according to Al-Ghadban may make the believer's behavior flexible.

Resource power gives believers the moral strength to withstand the enemy's power (morale, unified manpower, supporters, loot, weapons, army, natural resources, real estate, economic power reserves, compensation, collecting or paying a price in pain). According to Al-Ghadban, power revolves around a structure of bases, or enclaves (*qaw'aid*; *qaida* in the singular). The bases are spread to reduce risk. In any formed enclave there is a simultaneous progression from micro- to macro-power, from the internal to the external arena. The internal arena within the collective system is more important than the external. Prominent attention is given to the important role of women, which is an essential component in Islamic power, building Islamic communities and collectives as enclaves and bases, refining ontological symbols to express and reinforce the faith's vision, symbolically unique against the enemy, the Jews and other non-Muslims in the periphery where the Islamic faith and influence are to be enforced.¹⁵⁴ Loot in the enclave is prominent in al-Ghadban's doctrine as an activating process, reinforcing motivation and awarding authority and power to the leadership

Crystallizing groups of immigrants into enclaves and bases is part of the principle of deploying influence and the *da'wah* both inside and outside, as a reservoir of manpower and fighters in separate reserves. The enclaves are centers of power and reserves for the expansion of Islamic influence and deterrence in infidel

154 See also Eisenstadt, (2004) *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution, the Jacobean Dimension of Modernism*, (Hebrew), Keter and Haifa University, Jerusalem.

countries. They are deployed in areas targeted for the expansion of Islam or near hostile infidel countries, not necessarily in a specific national or Islamic territory. The resource power of the Islamic enclave is reinforced from within and expands outwards through ties of marriage. The newly joined must actively alienate themselves from the symbols of their former societies to prove that their conversion to Islam is serious and irreversible, as a metaphorical step, like destroying their idols with their own hands. Islam is supposed to allow for promotion and status and to allow the newly joined who proved themselves with more openness and were given more opportunities than the old guard. Experts and advisors who were infidels who converted to Islam can be used to bring about the victory of Islam, as can weapons and tactics from the infidel world.

According to the patterns around which Islam was formed in the time of Muhammad, influential groups may form around the leadership, creating antagonism which damages rank unity, the result of different backgrounds, their contribution and lineage (similar to the groups during the time of Muhammad, such as *ahl al-bayt*, *al-muhajirun*, *al-ansar*, *al-sahaba*). The leaders are supposed to coordinate and supervise administrative headquarters where there are those who give orders and those who obey them. Throughout the process of restoration of Islamic power great importance is attributed to nurturing Islamic commanders and propagandists, and to instilling values, discipline, a sense of self-worth and fighting ability amongst fighters (the *mujahideen*).

3) Power and jihad:¹⁵⁵ according to Al-Ghadban the use of force is central to recreating Islamic power. That means absolute control over the Islamic base, movement or enclave, and the ability to deter, punish or impose sanctions both internally and externally. Force is to be expressed exhaustively even when facing more powerful enemy systems. Force is the violent, necessary expression of deterrent Islamic power, and without it the world will not take Islam seriously, or even seriously enter into discussions with it. He refers to that as a divine decree.¹⁵⁶

According to Al-Ghadban, Islam has divine permission to fight and kill as part of jihad. At first the closer enemy is to be fought, then the more distant one. The enemy is to be deterred and terrorized until he eventually accepts Islam. Targeted killings and raids to steal, kill and terrorize aid in neutralizing opposition. Guided by Muhammad's heritage in the use of terrorism,¹⁵⁷ the enemy can be suffocated economically and paralyzed with fear. Violent activity should be employed mainly in the macro-power stages of the Islamic enclave's development of power and military capabilities. Simultaneously, the rhetoric of the *da'wah* should be escalated to express hatred and hostility toward the non-Muslim world, the enemy and especially the Jews. When developed to its peak it should be intransigent regarding the conflict and deny all possibility of a peaceful resolution. In this state, force is the main means for acquiring influence and enforcing Islam. Force should mainly be used against non-Muslims to motivate them to join Islam or to harm anyone impeding Islam's progress. Force removes obstacles of heresy preventing the *da'wah* from reaching the masses. Islam must be enforced without apology when a call to convert goes unanswered. Political opponents can be assassinated and even opponents from within the Islamic camp (*murtadoun*) can be killed. Balance of power is of no importance in violent conflicts, and does not dictate a fighting style. Raids, terrorism and targeted killings best serve the process of restoring Islamic power.

According to Al-Ghadban, Muslims must be able to impose sanctions and enforce their will on others despite resistance. That should be done through deterrence and the infliction of pain, in a manner that

155 Berko, "The Operational Code, p. 324.

156 Qur'an, Sura 8, Surat Al-'Anfāl (The Spoils of War), Verse 60

157 Ghazwa/ Ghazwat.

disrupts routine and normal economic activity or through another form of punishment. The objective is to give non-Muslims no alternative to dependence and obedience. Sanctions and/or other punishments can be imposed based on the actual or potential use of violence, limiting the non-Muslim enemy's alternatives and reducing them to zero. As to whether or not to use force, losses to the Islamic ranks need to be taken into account. Trench warfare (*al-handak*) teaches that the balance of power and losses are of no importance, because Allah will help Muslims in battle and the shaheeds will be rewarded in paradise.

Another lesson in the use of force derived from trench warfare is that when the enemy concentrates all his forces against the Muslims and is halted, the balance changes dramatically. This is a turning point from which the Muslims go on the offensive and the enemy, routed and defending itself, is eventually defeated.¹⁵⁸ Al-Ghadban takes inspiration from the saying of Muhammad, "*We will now raid them and not they raid us.*"¹⁵⁹

Al-Ghadban also teaches the accumulation of Islamic deterrence and reputation through consecutive blows and small victories in low-intensity confrontations. He does not have good examples from Muhammad's era for the use of force in a successful aggressive strike to change the face of battle and resolve the conflict. Even the conquest of Mecca, in which many fighters participated, was carried out almost without bloodshed against a broken enemy with no ability to resist. Like Al-Ghadban, Palestinian Al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Qatada noted¹⁶⁰ that Islamic power based on the prophet's crystallizing period is a role model for deterrence, force and building the morale of the troops. He contends that in the trench warfare in the Arabian Peninsula, the balance of power changed because of the spirit of *jihad*, which restored order according to the faith, saying "It was the spirit of jihad blowing through a humiliated, beleaguered people that turned their humiliation into strength, respect and admiration." He also discussed how Islamic force, in the form of a collection of small victories, became part of the heritage of Islam. He criticizes those who preach a dramatic, victorious blow which will surprise the enemy, saying that "Such a situation exists only in the minds of our sheikhs and leaders, who dream in all things of an Islamic program to strike the enemy with a great surprise attack, far away from the eyes of enemies who will be surprised and defeated by a surprise blow. That approach regresses from the struggle using excuses about the need for preliminary

158 Salaheddin Abou A'rfah, in *Al-Qur'an al-karim yatanaba bidamar - al wilayat al-mutahida waghark al-jaish al-amrici*, Bait Al-Maqdis, 2001, p. 24 (Contras), expresses the idea of braking the enemy's force, after which the momentum of victory begins. He presents a kind of apocalyptic reversal (in the style of apocalypse) expected to occur in the global Islamic arena when the huge American-led Western coalition is defeated in the war against Iraq. According to the essay, "Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's leader who grew up in the West, is like Moses and Bush is like Pharaoh." Those statements are also based on the example of the trench warfare when after the hostile coalition was broken, Islam has broken out and reached its goals.

159 Al-Ghadban, p. 442.

160 www.tahed.ws/www.almagdese.co./www.alsurrah.m.Fo The website represents radical Islamists. Sheikh Omar Mahmoud Othman Abu A'mr, born in Bethlehem in 1960, known as Abu Qatada, is a fundamentalist Jordanian cleric. He resided in Jordan until 1989 but left, probably for Afghanistan or Pakistan, after being detained in Jordan and released as part of a general amnesty granted by King Abdullah the Second. Between 1989 and 1993 Abu Qatada was involved in Al-Qaeda activity. In 1993 he went from Pakistan to Britain, where he asked for political asylum, which was granted a year later. While in Britain he became one of the most prominent ideological authorities of global jihad supporters. He published his own materials, edited a magazine called "Al-Manhag" ("The System" or "Mode of Operation"). Using video tapes and in the British media he expressed his support for global jihad. Some of the tapes he distributed were found in Hamburg, Germany, in the apartment of Muhammad A'ta, who headed the terrorist group that carried out the September 11 2001 attacks. In an interview Abu Qatada admitted that he gave financial support to the Chechens. In 2001 the Spanish judge who examined the activity of an Al-Qaeda cell in Spain described him as Al-Qaeda's spiritual leader. Abu Qatada also overtly expressed his unreserved support for the *muqawama* (Palestinian terrorism) against Israel. He was also suspected of being an ideologue of Islamic terrorist organizations in North Africa, of operating in Europe as well, and of the global jihad organization in Jordan. He was sentenced in Jordan in absentia to life imprisonment after having been convicted of involvement in planning terrorist attacks against tourists arriving in Jordan for the millennium celebrations in 2000, attacks which were foiled. In October 2002 he was arrested by the British authorities for his support of global jihad and was held without trial. Released on bail on March 2005, but was arrested again in August 2005. Changes made in British law after the July 7, 2005 attacks in London made it possible to detain him without trial for an unlimited period of time. The British determined that he constituted a threat to Britain's national security as well as having ties with global terrorism. He is currently detained in Britain.

preparations and slogans. The idea is beautiful but empty, as it professes to give the Muslims victory and glory on silver platter, a product of dreams and illusions without thought."

Abu Qatada rejects dreams of power and a one-strike defeat. He prefers defeat resulting from the highest possible order of power, preaching that instead of seeking a decisive Islamic victory, it is better to understand that Muslims are willing to be killed and that the enemy suffers similar pain. He prefers a prolonged confrontation rather than one decisive blow.¹⁶¹ He also rejects the need for the balance of power to be tipped in favor of Islam, advocating not superior power but deterrence stemming from the willingness to kill and be killed. He claims that the Islamic countries are guided by conciliation and forgiveness because of the infidels in the government and armies, and attacks compromise and despair, which lead religious rulers to accommodate contemporary failure-saturated political willingness and to issue conciliatory, flexible fatwas, anything not to be perceived as adhering to past extremism.

Abu Qatada embraces the concept of repeated Islamic blows, saying that in a state of prolonged conflict there is no need to declare war. There will then be no need for political pluralism which respects the ideas of others and political parties, and they will be eliminated. Those conditions will pave the way for the rule of the Islamic Amir and the way of Islam. "Anyone," he says, "who raises his head will be beheaded, as Allah alone brought us to power, and it is his wish only we seek to satisfy... we will not deal with the East and the West for concessions of principle and we will not attain what is possible through a decision from the White or the Black House...." Thus the appropriate strategy is the use of force in a continuous war, the voice of one decision-making Islamic leader, immediate action and no postponement to vague dates when preparations have been completed, rational planning rather than dreams and illusions, determined action without negotiation or concession to the super-powers, modesty and determination backed by Allah's will.

4) Deception and manipulation in the service of deterrence:¹⁶² Deception and manipulation appear many times in Al-Ghadban when he refers to war as a ruse (*al-harb hida'a*).¹⁶³ He provides many cases of deception, concealment and misdirection as part of the Islamic concept of power, saying that Islamic power has aspects of lies, pretense, deception and deterrence.¹⁶⁴ Deception, misdirection and manipulation are part of the Islamic psychological warfare doctrine presented by Al-Ghadban as a legitimate tool of faith and part of the Islamic heritage, common internally and externally to help unite the ranks and amass deterrent power, and for coercion and intimidation (*tarhib* and *targhib*).¹⁶⁵ The way Muhammad dealt with his political enemies, as described by Al-Ghadban, serves as an operational code to be used today and in the future.¹⁶⁶

Two Constructs for Power and Deterrence in Establishing the Global Islamic State

An analysis of Al-Ghadban's doctrine of four stages for reconstructing Islamic power reveals two constructs for building power and deterrence, originating in the time of Muhammad and appropriate for implementation in the present and the future. They are micro-power and macro-power and describe how to recreate Islamic power and establish the global Islamic state.

161 Avi Kober, (2000), "Low-Intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap Between Theory and Practice?," Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 15- 38.

162 Berko, "The Operational Code," p. 324.

163 See stages 1-4 above, ruse and manipulation.

164 Al-Ghadban, pp. 187, 189, 191–192, 194 and also see Said Hawwa above.

165 Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, *Fiqh al-Sira*, (1988), Dar Alfikr (Egypt?) p. 218 dealing with deception and surprise in the trench battle.

166 It also appears in A'wis, Mansur, Muhammad, *Al-Rasul wal Harb Al-Nafasiya*, Tripoli, Libya: Maktab Al-Najah Publications, p. 130, detailing the elimination of the Jewish tribes in Khaybar and gives many examples of the targeting killings of Muhammad's adversaries, according to his instructions.

Micro-power deals mainly with the internal arena while macro-power deals mainly with the external. Both are expressed in the following table:

Two outlines for systematically retaking power

	Micro-power		Macro-power	
Stages	Stage 1: Covert and overt organizations	Stage 2: Concentrating overt effort at the bases	Stage 3 (the state): Establishing the Islamic state at a base (<i>qaida</i>) and helping other bases	Stage 4 (globally): Connecting the bases, political jihad and victory
Characteristics	The <i>da'wah</i> leadership makes changes, offers a governmental alternative and plan of action to realize it and challenges the existing order. The <i>da'wah</i> leadership dictates the actions of those close to it and provides an administrative headquarters in a civilian Islamic enclave, which is isolated and has collective values, norms and objectives, holds covert and overt activities and has a non-violent mechanism for social supervision.	In face of opposition and risks, the leadership founds enclaves and populates them with immigrants, and also founds alternative communities to minimize risk should catastrophe befall the enclaves. ¹⁶⁷ These enclaves are also separated from the outside world. ¹⁶⁸ The leadership builds itself and its administrative headquarters as the authority, focusing on religious rituals. A transition is made from passivism to activism, preparing for future jihad and defending the community.	The leadership is based in a selected Islamic enclave that has grown stronger, and as a sanctuary receives refugees, creates alternative social structures, exploits opportunities, crises or dangers, entrenches and prepares for defense, establishes unity within the community and divides between the "good" and the "bad." Enemies are clearly defined and the limits of the redeemed and sinners are clearly outlined. The leadership rejects the outside world, is charismatic and promises victory, deals with opposing minorities, builds an egalitarian environment and deals with reinforcement and preparation for creating an alternative to the existing establishment by fortifying itself and accumulating power. It builds its power and manipulates within its sphere of influence. It is militant and violent in its dealings with infidels, and prepares itself to take over other countries by mobilizing forces or recruiting and receiving aid from other Islamic enclaves located in those countries, according to opportunity and its own power.	The leadership takes over the enclave that served as a sanctuary and becomes a theocratic military authority, equipped with the promise of divine victory; it imposes sanctions and rewards, and operates to convert the world to Islam. The leadership determines militant doctrine and those obligated to it. It eliminates the enemy by taking over his venues and resources or engulfs him by winning his heart through coercion, persuasion and seduction. Militarism is a main part of the leadership and internal unity. Friction with the outside world is increased, military operations are waged and models of physical sacrifice and faith for conquering enemy strongholds are perfected and established. The <i>da'wah</i> leadership derives its power from victories and uses the momentum thus created for other conquests. Force and terror continue to be widely used. .

The first two stages include establishing and training *da'wah* operatives in the Islamic community and building a base in the host territory. According to Al-Ghadban, the stages are partially covert within the enclave, organized around its mosques and *da'wah* operatives. They are compartmentalized and secret, and deceive the host society and its leaders, are restrained to reduce friction with the enemy and form ties

167 Al-Ghadban, p. 504.

168 Ibid.

within the host society through marriage and by converting members of the host society to Islam. They expand the circle and reinforce the *da'wah* through example and persuasion, by granting material rewards and imposing sanctions on rebels, construct hard cores for future militant actions and recruit socially and economically influential agents from within the host society as symbols and role models.

In the first two stages, the *da'wah* operatives engage in ongoing subversive propaganda activities against the host country within the enclave using the laws and norms of the infidel host to fight it and cause it to collapse. The activity should be conducted simultaneously in neighboring enclaves to decentralize risk, increase the possibility of expansion and deploy Islamic power and influence.

Al-Ghadban shows that from the third but especially in the fourth stage a change has occurred: Islamic power has ripened and behavior towards the enemy and the Jews becomes more extreme. In the transition from micro-power, macro-power undergoes a metamorphosis into overt violence, as was customary under Muhammad's leadership, and includes militant coalitions, military force, the targeted killings of adversaries, theft, terrorism by proxy, fraud, propaganda, abduction, destroying enemy agriculture and murder.¹⁶⁹ These are legitimate means, authorized by Islam to realize objectives and amass influence, enhance reputation and power, and deter and coerce, persuade and achieve objectives despite opposition from non-Muslims. Al-Ghadban describes the extensive use of force, propaganda and deceit as legitimate in the Islamic acquisition of power, mainly at the macro-power stage.

The change from micro-power to macro-power is expressed by a change in the center of gravity of Islamic action from the internal to the external arena. As aggression towards non-Islamic society increases in the last two stages of acquiring power, micro-power remains intact within the enclave itself throughout the four stages. That is also true regarding the secrecy of *da'wah* activities and the secret organization and construction of hard cores for future militant action, mainly in the first two stages but later on as well.

The last two stages include increasingly aggressive militant activity and the construction of a system of enclaves (similar to those founded in Al-Medina and Ethiopia alongside the one remaining in Mecca) while selecting a base where the establishment was more successful (i.e., the one in Al-Medina). Macro-power includes managing distant bases close to the border of the attacked country, establishing bases in various locations, and thus not running the risk losing everything,¹⁷⁰ maintaining violent deterrent capabilities under the aegis of the host country, mobilizing and activating forces and armament for the purpose of takeover, and deploying army forces and terrorist gangs in raids (*harb ali'sabat*). These two stages include activities such as the terrorist force of Abu Baseer (noted above), occupation, violence and militancy, targeted killings, terror by proxy, raids and theft (*ghazwa*), and demands to conversion to Islam of the non-Muslims while destroying their symbols of their previous rituals and taking over their assets

An Islamic enclave that has established a base must function as a centralized militant Islamic state, serve as a point of departure for wider control over its inter-enclave activities, and increase its capabilities as an Islamic super-structure, i.e., state.¹⁷¹ As such, it must determine the policy of all Muslims, provide aid to other Islamic enclaves and expand their militant activity and influence as systemic power.

Al-Ghadban states that the Islamic movement needs to locate commanders of quality from the ranks of the infidels, where, he says, the value of one is a thousand times and even one hundred thousand times higher.

169 See Kober for different definitions of this type of warfare which is "not a war" but has the characteristics of guerilla warfare of the weak fighting the strong, as a small war, different from a conventional war in its use of power. It is common as an internal conflict, including ethnic conflicts.

170 Al-Ghadban, p. 504.

171 Such as a Caliphate, but this framework was only formed after Muhammad.

They should be those who did not stand out or whom circumstance prevented from prominence and they should be recruited for Islam. He says that it is possible that such a person did not find a way to prominence or that he is currently among the ranks of the enemies of Islam, perhaps in Europe or the United States. He says among the men and youth dispersed throughout Europe and America there are those qualified for the positions, such as Ja'ffer Al-Tiyar, and Khaled ibn Al-Walid, *saifallah* (two men who were in the service of the infidels in Mecca and later converted to Islam and became prominent in the time of Muhammad) and they are necessary for the *da'wah*.¹⁷² For Al-Ghadban, the correct application of this code can be found in the Islamic state founded by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.¹⁷³

How Radical Islam Regards Politics, and Relates to the Enemy and the Jews¹⁷⁴

The image of the enemy in the amassing of Islamic power

Al-Ghadban has a radical Islamic perspective of politics, the conflict and the enemy, who is anyone who is not a Muslim or who is planning to fight Islam. Radical Islam, its actions and the decisions it makes during changing situations can be traced through his code. Al-Ghadban includes an analysis of how he regards the Jews as part of the enemy camp, the result of the history of the Jews in Hijaz and their fate at the time of Muhammad and the formulation of Islam. It reveals that his doctrine, which preaches hatred for the Jews and a vision of their elimination, is similar to other radical Islamic doctrines and will be introduced here.

Throughout the last two stages of the restoration of Islamic power, the construction, escalation and final fruition of that hatred is evident. According to Al-Ghadban et al., the Jews have been enemies of Islam since the time of Muhammad, and serve as common enemies for forming the Islamic community, which is exposed, according to the doctrine, to the Jews' incessant efforts to cause internal strife (*fitna*) and convert the Muslims.¹⁷⁵

Al-Ghadban's code shows the change in the Muslims' outlook and attitude towards the conflict in general and the enemy and the Jews in particular. He instills Muslims with a religious-political worldview, escalating in hostility towards the enemy and the Jews.

Changes in the image of the enemy and the Jews during the stages of reinforcement

	Perception of the enemy	Perception of the Jews
Stage 1	The enemy conspires and understands only force, and wages psychological warfare against Islam. <i>Jahiliyya</i> wishes to eliminate the Islamic leadership, the Muslim individual and the <i>da'wah</i> . <i>Jahiliyya</i> allows Islam to exploit its laws of protection and defense. A <i>jahiliyya</i> democracy is a volatile government but it can be used by Islam to take over the government.	

172 Al-Ghadban, p. 548.

173 Ibid, p. 653.

174 Berko, "The Operational Code," p. 307.

175 See Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations*, where he says that people use politics not only to promote their affairs, but also to define their identity. We know who we are, he says, only when we know who we are different from, and often only when we know who we are against. As for the claim that Judaism is attempting to convert the Muslims, it can be said that as far as is known, Judaism is not a proselytizing religion, but rather the opposite, and therefore does not aspire to convert Muslims from Islam to Judaism.

	Perception of the enemy	Perception of the Jews
Stage 2	<p>The governments in the non-Islamic and Arab world have an inherent hatred of the <i>da'wah</i> and aim to prevent Islam from reaching the governmental level. The enemy's main objective is the complete elimination of the Islamic leadership, as the <i>jahiliyya</i> fears Islam's ideological power.</p>	
Stage 3	<p>The enemy is treacherous, murderous and total in its hatred of Islam.</p> <p>There are evil Islamic governments collaborating with the enemies of Islam.</p> <p>The evil governments operate against the <i>mujahideen</i> for the sake of their own government.</p> <p>The enemy uses anti-Muslim propaganda to incite the populace against Islam.</p> <p>The enemy uses force against those sheltering the leaders of Islam, instigates fights and steals the Muslims' assets.</p> <p>The enemy of Islam is the enemy of Allah; he has no principles, fears retribution and wages a psychological war against Islam.</p>	<p>The Jews conspire against Islam, cause strife, lead people astray to paganism and attempt to eliminate the leadership of Islam. They have a hand in the attempts to break down the "Islamic line." They distance the believers from the Islamic faith and in encourage in-fighting. They aspire to return the Muslims to heresy, and are hostile and treacherous. They also hurt Muhammad and tried to kill him. Victory over them soothes the hearts of believers</p> <p>Jews confront Muslims only from behind fortifications. They declared war and denied Islam. They spy from within the Muslim ranks and pretend to be Muslims. The Jews must be eliminated. By their very nature they violate agreements and lust after Muslim women.</p> <p>The Jews avenge their historical defeats, and today use the same plans Muhammad used against them. They are the most evil creatures on earth, and it is in their nature to refuse to recognize accords and patronages, to kill prophets and violate agreements. The Jews try to kill the Islamic leadership, and they kill prophets because prophecy and dominion were denied to them and are now in the hands of the sons of Ishmael. The Jews think they can return victorious to the Promised Land and banish its native Islamic sons, and they believe they can buy the world's leaders for their objectives. They invest money to fight the Muslims.</p>
Stage 4	<p>The enemy wishes to destroy the leadership by demoralizing it with rumors. When the enemy sees that the Muslims are ready to do battle, his fear increases and he rushes to solve the problem. His objective in negotiations is to preserve his military reputation. Some infidel rulers wish to convert to Islam but they fear they will lose their rule. They battle Islam in part of their own will and in part due to the force of the sword. When the enemy loses the symbols dear to him, he no longer makes demands and he is no longer influential.</p> <p>The enemy declares that he will defeat the Muslims by tempting them with wine and women, and tries to infiltrate the Islamic ranks through the family ties and women. Only when the enemy understands that his people have no defense against the Islamic gangs does he begin sending delegations to negotiate with the Muslims. When the enemy is powerful he tries deception. There must be no flexibility with the enemy when he wishes to express his opinion against Allah and his Messenger.</p>	<p>Most hostile against the <i>da'wah</i> are the Jews, and their negative traits will cause their elimination. The Jews think every one of their heroes is worth one thousand men. They do not break out as one to fight the Muslims but rather barricade themselves inside fortified towns.</p> <p>The Jews cause strife, are divided amongst themselves and fight one another bravely.</p> <p>The Jews' are the center of conspiracy, fraud and military provocations against the Islamic leadership. They are the fifth column operating with the enemies of Islam against Muslims.</p> <p>If Jews suffer a decisive defeat in a battle with Muslims they flee, leaving behind their women and children. Only when the Islamic leadership uses catapults against the Jews and only when they are convinced they are doomed do they ask for an agreement with the Islamic leadership.</p> <p>The Jews are never satisfied, and say that Muslims do not treat them justly and harass them. The Jews have always fought the <i>da'wah</i> and Muhammad.</p>

The Radical Muslim Actor and His View of Deterrence and Aggression (Jihad) in Politics¹⁷⁶

The following is a review of Al-Ghadban's statements reflecting political strategy in the four stages of recreating Islamic power, making it possible to give a general description of the Muslim Brotherhood's attitudes regarding politics, power and deterrence:¹⁷⁷

According to Al-Ghadban, opponents are rational and can be deterred, and the state of conflict in the world is temporary. The Muslim actor is optimistic because Allah has promised Islam a divine victory and eventual rule over mankind. He operates in the knowledge that the nations' leaders reject Islam and want to eliminate Muslims because that is their nature. The rulers of the infidel countries are responsible for the conflict and want war. They prefer their own rule, the rule of man, over the rule of Allah and they prevent their people from hearing the true Islamic message. The political future is relatively foreseeable and can be managed, and historical development can be controlled.

Therefore, a state of war is the result of the nature of the nations' rulers, as they wish to preserve their power and prevent masses from accessing the *da'wah*. For radical Islam deterrence and power are matters of supreme importance, and only because of them do the enemies of Islam take it seriously. The radical Muslim is convinced that the enemy seeks an opportunity to harm Islam and will do so only when Islam is weak. The enemy only understands force and therefore preparations must be made to become as strong as possible to intimidate and deter him, and eventually make him accept Islam. In any negotiations and as part of the balance of power, Islam must be victorious, even initiating punitive campaigns and raids to preserve its deterrence. Acceding to demands and conciliation invite an attack, for the enemy will believe he has found an opportunity to attack weakened Muslims.

The principles of Islam are not to be compromised, and as the enemy only understands force, force must be prepared for deterrence. The enemy will regard willingness to compromise as weakness, resulting in further aggression. The enemy is cowardly and his motivations are earthly and materialistic, thus he can be deterred because Islam is motivated by the divine concept. Some enemy leaders convert to Islam because they are convinced of its power and future. They convert because they secretly know that Islam is the true mission and will prevail. Since the enemy is a coward and does not enjoy Allah's protection, his fate is eventual defeat. Deterrence is also enhanced when the enemy suffers a series of defeats at the hands of Islam. Historical development can be directed if Muslims adhere to the divine plan and lessons of Muhammad, and they will thus recreate Islamic power.

The radical Muslim actor conscientiously looks for the best targets. He limits risks but not targets. Any tactic or resource can be appropriate, including power (i.e., jihad) when it can be used with the expectation of great winnings with few risks. The radical Muslim is optimistic regarding his objectives, is mission-oriented and completely motivated by faith. He believes that Allah appreciates his political and military efforts, and that belief impels him toward his goals, thus he successfully influences historical development for the sake of Islamic interests.

The radical Muslim actor operates within the collective of the Islamic *umma* and its objectives. He seeks the best targets, believing his final objective will be realized. He is a revisionist because his task is to convert the world to Islam. He uses violence, terrorism, deceit and murder to achieve his mission, which he defines as religious and one facet of the overall, long-term Islamic interest; he is tirelessly patient. His view is dictated

176 Berko, "The Operational Code," p. 307.

177 This is a generalized definition, a result of Al-Ghadban's statements, which does not profess to characterize nuances and exceptions for each type of radical Islamic leader.

by a code that has proven victorious and instructs him not to limit his targets. On the other hand, he will prefer to limit risks if the chance of victory is small, for he must preserve Islam's reputation as powerful and deterrent. He must not gamble on an outcome that will risk that reputation.

The radical Muslim actor will use every tactic and invest whatever needed to promote the success of the plan, according to the lessons of Muhammad. He will aspire to use force, believing it essential for promoting Islamic interests. He will not use frontal force if it may end in a colossal defeat, but will rather conduct terrorist raids, providing several small victories which will have a positive effect of the Islamic rank and file and a cumulative negative impact on the enemy, and he will have risked little. He will worry over loss of fighters as "the drop of blood of a Muslim is more important than the Kaa'ba"¹⁷⁸ and will seek to retaliate for every loss.

The radical Muslim actor values Islamic goals more than human life and encourages risking lives, with rewards in this world and promises of rewards in the next, stressing that the action required is for the sake of Allah. He will revenge any harm done to a Muslim as part of deterrence. He will select both tactics and resources appropriate for realizing his ambitions, and will take any path that does not expressly contradict Islam. He will use force without hesitation when it offers him the possibility of a clear victory and enhanced reputation, and involves few risks.

The radical Muslim actor described by Al-Ghadban views the conflict as a result of national character because that was how Allah originally formed the nations. According to Al-Ghadban, political life and the enemy are characterized by lack of harmony and the presence of conflict in an ongoing struggle to bring about the global rule of Islam despite the resistance of the nations' rulers. His view is dictated by Islam's self-image as permanently threatened and persecuted by non-Muslims who wish to humiliate, corrupt and eradicate Islam, and who covertly and overtly conspire to assassinate the leaders of Islam.

Threat and persecution are translated into hatred and hostility towards non-Muslims, especially the Jews, and peak in the fourth stage, when Islam realizes its greatest power. It is no longer hatred caused by the threat of physical annihilation, but by the need to provide Muslims with an object at which to direct their negative emotions and thus close their ranks. Al-Ghadban accuses the Jews of conspiracy and arrogance, claiming that they do not accept that the right of prophecy and kingdom has been taken from them and transferred to the descendents of the slave Hagar, as prophesied by Islam.

Al-Ghadban formulates an increasingly violent and uncompromising Islamic approach toward the political world, the enemies of Islam and the Jews, not seeking dialogue but rather a conflict ending with a complete Islamic victory.

178 According to the *hadith*, the destruction of the Kaa'ba, one stone at a time, is deemed less severe than the shedding of even one drop of Muslim blood.

Part Three:

Islam's Attitude towards the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

This section provides a discussion of Islam's attitude toward the use of non-conventional weapons as reflected by postings on radical Islamic websites. They indicate the current radical Islamic mindset, while not necessarily representing the Muslim Brotherhood specifically. They are all based on sources referring to Muhammad's heritage as a model for an operational code.

Does Islam Permit the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction?

Sheikh Hir a-Din Mubarak Oueir¹⁷⁹ begins with a *hadith* according to which Muhammad says that he was sent armed with a sword to bring people to worship Allah alone. Anyone disobeying his orders was humiliated and shared the infidels' fate. Since then humanity has progressed to a great degree, and one aspect of that progress was the advances made in military armament, including the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to Hir a-Din, WMDs were only made possible in the last century, the result of technological and scientific developments. Since then states have strived to acquire such weapons, sometimes for deterrence, sometimes for self-defense, and the threat of employing WMDs is currently used as a form of blackmail by various countries.

According to Hir a-Din, anyone attempting to obtain such weapons encounters difficulties and is threatened in order to make him abandon his ambition and obey what is called international will or international law. He says that anyone examining the Muslim' situation finds they suffered humiliation when regions were cut off from their territories. That was because they abandoned Islam and thus became wretched, and were passed from one master to another. If the Muslim nation desires dominion in this world and paradise in the next, it must return to Islam, possess the foundations of deterrent force, repel oppression and restore its lost rights and lands.

Since nuclear weapons were unknown at the dawn of Islam, a Shari'a ruling is necessary so Muslims know how to conduct themselves: are they permissible, mandatory or prohibited (in which case alternatives must be found). A religious decision is necessary for the following reasons: (1) Technological progress has been alarming; (2) The arms race can be both defensive and offensive (3) The five basic Islamic principles must be preserved (religion, the mind, the soul, property and the honor of women); (4) Warfare has changed from the sword to the missile. The relevant terms are *weapons*, *destruction*, and *total or mass destruction*. There are three types of WMDs: chemical, biological and nuclear. According to Hir a-Din, in 1925 the Geneva convention banned the use of chemical weapons after the German army used gas against the Allied Forces in WWI. International decisions permitting the use of the threat of nuclear weapons and even permitting its use were issued only on July 8, 1996.

The decisions relied on the following: (1) International law does not specifically prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons; (2) International law regarding human rights during armed conflict does not apply to nuclear weapons; (3) There are no authorized international resolutions regarding nuclear weapons; (4) A country under attack has the legitimate right to self-defense. In the current state of affairs, countries already in possession of nuclear weapons try to have other countries sign non-proliferation agreements.

179 http://www.manareldjazair.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=555&itemid=21

They use various political and economic means of extortion sometimes accompanied by military lessons. According to Sheikh a-Din, Islamic clerics do not agree regarding the use of MWDs.

The Islamic Approach Permitting Deterrence, Deployment and Use of WMD

According to this above, possession of nuclear weapons is necessary, as Muslims were ordered to prepare themselves to confront their enemies¹⁸⁰ Hir a-Din quotes from Muhammad bin Nasser Al-Jaa'wan's *War in Islam—Its Rulings and Laws*, Ahmad Nar's *Fighting in Islam*, and Muhammad Hir Haykal's *Jihad and Fighting in Religious Politics*, and presents the arguments permitting the use of weapons of mass destruction based on Surat Al-'Anfāl (The Spoils of War), Verse 60, and the following:

1) Al-Alusi¹⁸¹ interpreted the above verse as permitting the Muslims to use any means to wage war. Sheikh Muhammad Rasheed Rida¹⁸² said that the *U'lama* (the Islamic clerics) have already ruled that the verse is binding. Al-Sa'di¹⁸³ says it refers to all types of industries manufacturing weapons and tools of war used by Muslims to advance, as they reject the evil of their enemies by using them.

2) These tools intimidate and deter the enemies of Islam from harassing Muslims. The principle is taken from the words of Allah, as they appear in the verse quoted. It is currently relevant and intimidates enemies. Decisions must be based on the principle that anything causing fear is to be used against the enemy, and if such means are out of reach and can be obtained by study, the study must be made. Hir a-Din adds that deterrence is a political principle, adopted by states as a contemporary military strategic defensive, and that implements the intention of Islamic law. It is clear today how valuable the possession of such weapons is and how they can deter acts of hostility. The threat of nuclear retaliation prevented the Cold War from becoming an armed conflict, creating a balance of deterrence in which each side feared the other's nuclear capabilities.

3) The word of Allah in Surat Al-Aa`rāf (The Heights), Verse 133: "*So We sent upon them the flood and locusts and lice and frogs and blood as distinct signs, but they were arrogant and were a criminal people.*" This punishment inflicted by Allah on Pharaoh and the Egyptians can be regarded as a metaphor for biological weapons, and thus such weapons can be used to attack infidels. Hir a-Din says that the Imam Al-Khatib Al-Sharbi'ni Al-Shafi'i added that it was also permitted to use fire, destroy their homes, cut off drinking water and throw snakes and scorpions at infidels, a metaphor for chemical and biological weapons, even if there were women and children, but was allowed only if they could not be separated from the men: According to Surat Al-Naĥl (The Bee), Verse 126, "*And if you punish, punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed*" allows Muslims to repay those harming them in kind. Hir a-Din adds that al-Alusi says that if aggressors are not repaid in kind, disaster will spread and the land will be ruled by infidels. Thus it is the duty of Muslim leaders and the defenders of Islam to respond in like manner.

4) The total burning of the Jewish Bani Nazir tribe's date plantations by Muhammad shows that WMD are derived from the overall destruction of plants and animals by fire and destruction. Hir a-Din says that the Imam Abu Hanifa said that there was nothing wrong with cutting down trees and date plantations of polytheists and burning them, as Allah said in the Qur'an in Surat Al-Ĥashr (The Exile), Verse 5 "*Whatever you have cut down of their palm trees or left standing on their trunks, it was by permission of Allah and so*

180 Surat Al-'Anfāl (The Spoils of War), Verse 60

181 Mahmoud Al-Alusi: *The Spirit of Meanings in the Interpretation of the Great Qur'an*. Al-Alusi was an Iraqi Hanafi Qur'an commentator who was pragmatic and innovative.

182 See above.

183 Abdel Rahman bin Nasir bin Abdullah Al-Sa'di Al-Tamim, was a Hanbali commentator from Najed.

He would disgrace the defiantly disobedient." However, that is contingent upon whether taking such steps is necessary to achieve the goal.

5) According to the tradition, Muhammad bombarded the people of the city of Ta'if with catapults,¹⁸⁴ which are similar to WMD. Hir a-Din says that Ibn Kadama said that catapults could be placed against the enemy, meaning they could be used whether necessary or not, as Muhammad placed catapults against the people of Ta'if. Hir a-Din says that Al-Sharbini added that Muhammad laid siege to Ta'if and bombarded it with catapults, meaning he intended to destroy it (*ihlac*).

6) Hir a-Din says that in a *hadith* attributed to Muhammad, he said "You are more knowledgeable in all matters pertaining to this world," and WMD pertain to this world.

7) The principle of the ends justifying the means, that is, if the end is power and security for Muslims, then using them is a result of Islamic religious intent.

8) If a goal can only be achieved by certain means, then obtaining and using them is mandatory. As preparation for jihad and guarding the *Umma* from its enemies are mandatory, then both of these objectives can only be realized by use of WMD.

9) Since the above list of Islamic sources is authorized, it constitutes a permit to use WMD.

10) "Necessity legitimizes prohibitions," which means that even if the Shari'a prohibits the use of WMD, the prohibition is lifted when necessary if it is the only way to vanquish the enemy.

The Islamic Approach Prohibiting the Use of WMD

Dr. Ismail Ibrahim Abu Sharifa advocates this approach in *The Perception of War in Islamic Shari'a*. He relies on the following:

1) Surat Al-Baqarah (The Cow), Verse 195 "*And do good; indeed, Allah loves the doers of good,*" includes war as part of the jihad against infidels, but using WMD has no aspect of doing good.

2) According to a *hadith* passed down by Muslim, Muhammad said, "Allah has commanded to do good in everything, and therefore when you kill, do good in even in the manner of killing,"¹⁸⁵ thus using WMD is not good or appropriate.

3) According to the *hadith* conveyed by Muslim, Muhammad forbade abuse, and therefore using WMD is akin to abusing those killed by it.

4) According to the Al-Bukhari *hadith* collection, Muhammad forbade the killing of women and children and therefore using WMD is a ruse to kill them, but the argument can be answered by saying that the result, while inevitable, is not intentional. The principle of the religious clerics is that a result can be justified, but not a deliberate action. That argument is based on a *hadith* by Saab Bin Juthama, who said, "Muhammad passed through a place called Abuaa, or Wadan, and was asked about an instance where Muslims raid 'those who share [belief in Allah with worshipping other gods]' at night and the women and children of [polytheists] are also hurt. Muhammad answered, They [are] also [polytheists]." Thus according to the *hadith* their fate is one, and killing them is permitted and contingent on its being impossible to distinguish them, in which case their death is not deliberate. That approach is taken by all of the religious rulers.

184 Attributed to Tirmidhi and Abu Daud, who conveyed the traditions.

185 Refers to the *hadith* explaining the need of killing in a proper manner and sharpening the knife so that the beast does not suffer.

5) According to a hadith conveyed by Abu Huraira (the Al-Bukhari collection), "Muhammad sent us on a mission and said, 'if you find so and so and so and so, burn them with fire.' Later on, when we wanted to leave, Muhammad said, 'I ordered you to burn so and so and so and so but the punishment of burning is imposed as punishment only by Allah, and therefore if you find them, kill them.'" Muhammad therefore forbade the use of fire, and since one aspect of WMD is that they burn like fire, therefore their use should be banned. On the other hand, if the enemy uses them, Muslims have the right to repel the attack using the same weapons.

6) Repelling and preventing destructive weapons is preferable to any other possible benefits. Manufacturing and storing WMD entails environmental and human hazards, such as the results of the Chernobyl catastrophe, felt to this day. WMD can be used if the corrupting agent causes greater damage than its use will bring, however if its beneficial elements are more numerous, then it is better to obtain it. In addition, developing nuclear power is not purely evil, since it has beneficial uses.

The Recommended Islamic Way

According to Sheikh Hir a-Din, weapons of mass destruction can be opted for but there must be rules to express the reservations of their opponents:

- 1) The first is that the enemy can only be repelled by their use. If the enemy can be overcome by regular means he should be, and there is no known religious disagreement on the matter.
- 2) The second is that the use of WMD does not entail damage to Muslims, and the need to repel damages must be more important than deriving benefits, and will exceed the damages caused by its use.
- 3) The third is that using them will entail the acquisition of money and equipment left behind by the enemy, i.e., the spoils of war (probably only for the sake of deterrence, in order not to damage the spoils by exposure to radiation).
- 4) The fourth is not to use WMD where women and children live, unless it is necessary to punish the enemy in kind, or when their being harmed is not premeditated but a result they could not be distanced from.

Hir a-Din also has doubts: If someone were to say that as Islam is a religion of mercy, how does it permit the use of nuclear weapons? He says the answer lies in Sheikh Rasheed Rida's response, who said, "Indeed Islam is a religion of mercy, but it is stupid and folly for Islam to prepare conventional weapons for a war against enemies using nuclear weapons. The fact that Islam is a religion of mercy does not mean it orders us to suffer their killing us with these means, and that we not use this weapon because of our mercy for them. One must remember that Allah has allowed us to retaliate in the same manner as the aggressor. The Qur'an said in this matter in Surat Al-Na'hl (The Bee) Sura, Verse 126:

"And if you punish, punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed."

Hir a-Din contends that Muslims may use the same form of justice with their enemies that they use with their brothers. He says that a close examination of the war in Iraq and the recent (end of 2008-beginning of 2009) war in the Gaza Strip shows unequivocally that Muslims have the duty to use the most extreme forms of force, and must have no mercy for those relishing killing children and women and destroying Muslim land, as mercy in such instances would be weak and indicate lack of tricks and ruses. The Shari'a has answers for all contemporary needs. He says that all of the texts are to be examined before other references are sought. Before entering into a jihad, material preparations must be made, including acquiring good equipment and the products of modern military industries. He emphasizes that intimidation and deterrence are at the core of jihad, and legitimized by international law.

The Circumstances for Using WMD according to the Shari'a

Sheikh al-Maqdisi¹⁸⁶ relies on reliable Sunni Islam to reference his position on the armaments race and the global acquisition of weapons, include WMD, psychological warfare and the exploitation of the media, especially in the twentieth century.¹⁸⁷ Initially, he says, it was incorrectly thought, that the atom would help humanity. He compared the use of past and present destructive weapons, and had the following reservations regarding WMD: They are to be used against fighters without harming their wives, their children or Muslims.

Al-Maqdisi presents the two schools of thought advocated by clerics.¹⁸⁸ The first allows their use whether the enemy is fortified or not. Permission is also valid even if the enemy can be defeated by lesser means. This approach is supported by the Shafi'i and Hanafi schools and is also accepted by the Maliki and Hanbali schools.

The second forbids the use of non-conventional weapons unless the enemy cannot be defeated in other ways. This approach has a majority within the Hanafi school. Those permitting the use of non-conventional weapons rely on the Qur'an verse "*Kill those who share [i.e., polytheists] wherever you can find them, take them and lay siege on them.*"¹⁸⁹ That means Allah has commanded killing polytheists but has not determined the specific manner for doing so, thus every means may be used. The example used of those supporting their use is the siege of Ta'if, in which catapults were used. The Caliph Omar also instructed Abu Musa Al-Asha'ri, who laid siege to a fortified city, to bombard it, as did A'mr bin al-A'as who laid siege to Alexandria. Muhammad laid siege to the Fort of Nataa, which was part of the Jews' fortification in Khaybar, blocking its water supplies and forcing it to surrender, after which he killed its inhabitants. Thus as in the historical model, WMD can be used for jihad.

Using WMD against a Fortified Enemy Accompanied by his Wives and Children

As Islam is merciful and does not have as its objective killing and bloodshed, the instructions of Islam are not to kill women and children. And indeed, in the *hadith* conveyed by Al-A'bbas, Muhammad instructed the armies going into battle not to kill children. According to Rabah bin Hant'ala Al-Katib, he went on a raid with the army commanded by Khaled bin Al-Walid, where they met Muhammad. They released woman, whom they treated as dead, and Muhammad sent Khaled bin Al-Walid an order forbidding the killing of women and children. Sai'd Al-Hud'ari also said Muhammad forbade the killing of women and children, saying they belonged to the victor. Kaa'b bin Malik reported that Muhammad forbade those going on a mission on his behalf to assassinate Ibn Abi al-Haqiq (a Jewish leader) to kill the women and children. Yazid bin Hirmiz supported the prohibition. As there is no disagreement among clerics regarding the prohibition on killing women and children, the question is what to do when the enemy knows of the prohibition and hides behind them, knowing he will not be harmed. In this matter the clerics disagree. Most of the Hanafi and Shafi'i allow killing them, even if there is no extreme necessity to do so. Another version of the Maliki forbids killing them unless it is necessary.

Those permitting killing relied on the *hadith* conveyed by Saab Bin Juthama about an event in which women and children were residing with polytheists and could be harmed in a Muslim attack, and Muhammad said "they are part of them," and in another version, "they are of their fathers." In another instance, in an attack where children were in danger of being trampled by the Muslims' horses, Muhammad

186 The Sheikh Al-Maqdisi mujahidbag.maktoobblog.com/89/Cached *Journal of the Muslim Soldier*, No. 18.

187 The website details in the introduction the types of WMD and their destructive effects.

188 mujahidbag.maktoobblog.com/89/Cached *Journal of the Muslim Soldier*, No. 18.

189 Surat At-Tawba, Verse 5

was asked what to do, and he replied: "they are of them..." meaning that he did not forbid the attack despite the fact that the women and children could be harmed but he forbade it deliberately. Muhammad used to listen to the enemy's morning prayers and if he heard a call to prayer he did not attack. Those advocating the killing of women and children used the Khaybar massacre as justification, because they were not killed deliberately, but due to the circumstances and the constraints of battle. Therefore it is permissible if the enemy uses them as shields, even if it is not extremely necessary. The Maliki use this argument but condition the killing of women and children on the existence of dire necessity. Either way, the Muslim leader must decide, considering both benefits and drawbacks.

The Use of WMD against an Enemy Exploiting the Presence of Muslim Prisoners

When the enemy uses Muslim prisoners as shields in fortified posts to prevent Muslims from bombarding these sites, should the enemy be attacked? The answer is that if there is no danger to the Muslims if their enemy is not bombarded, despite the fact that otherwise the enemy cannot be overcome, no bombardment is to be undertaken. However, if there is concern but no tangible danger, the clerics disagree as to what course to take. The Hanafi and Shafi'i schools contend that the enemy may be bombarded even if Muslims are harmed. The Maliki and Hanbali schools contend that even if the enemy is dangerous, bombardment is not justified. According to another approach, it is better to abandon the conquest of a fort than to have Muslims unjustly killed.

Those permitting bombardment justify it by saying that the target is the enemy and not the Muslim, but al-Ozai'i asks how they can bombard if they cannot take aim [and risk harming Muslims]. Those permitting it claim that the enemy is the target, and if harming Muslims prevents an attack, jihad will be halted. The issue is the intention, and if the objective is to harm infidels despite the danger to Muslims, then it is permissible. Those opposing it cite to the Qur'an verse:

*"And if not for believing men and believing women whom you did not know that you might trample them and there would befall you because of them dishonor without your knowledge- [you did not harm them] so that Allah might admit to His mercy whom He willed. If they had been apart, We would have punished those who disbelieved among them with painful punishment."*¹⁹⁰

Those advocating against an attack also justify it by citing Muhammad's decision not to attack Mecca (because his entry into the city was prevented during the Hudaibiyyah treaty), fearing for the lives of the local Muslims. Therefore the decision must be made by the Muslim leader according to its severity, ramifications and the danger posed to the Muslims. If danger exists, the enemy must be struck even if there are Muslims present. Ibn Taymiyyah held the same opinion.¹⁹¹ In conclusion, adhering to the Islamic plan is more important than protecting a certain individual, as the infidels will kill this person anyway. His blood is less important than collective Islamic blood and unintentionally shedding it is a lesser evil. Bombardment must be carried out because jihad must not be stopped. The captive is a shaheed despite the circumstances of his death and he is not more important than the *mujahideen* who are killed in battle. Had the fort been abandoned, the Muslims would have been defeated and the foundation, unity and power of Islam would have been overthrown. The prohibition only relates to killing the enemy by fire, prohibited by Muhammad, who explained that only Allah can kill by fire. However, the use of non-conventional weapons is permitted. On the other hand, some who permit burning the enemy and his forts are also quoted. They contend that Muhammad did not forbid it and that it expresses his humility before Allah.

190 Surat Al-Fatĥ (The Victory), Verse 25.

¹⁹¹ Quoting Al-Fatawa Al-Kubra, Ibn Taymiyyah (3-553).

Summary

The Muslim Brotherhood approaches power, deterrence and the use of force in two ways, defensive and offensive. While neither is clearly defined by the Islamic ideologues or phrased in terms of deterrence, they do indicate a doctrine of covert deterrence. Both approaches are inspired by the legacy of Muhammad and express the desire to emulate and apply, in modern times, the stages of amassing power as they were formulated under Muhammad.

Radical Islamic ideology as propounded by the Muslim Brotherhood and its disciples generally follows a four-stage program of emulation and application aspiring to change the power and deterrent capabilities of a Muslim community or state operating according to the laws of Islam. Some approaches stress defense, focusing on the Islamic effort to construct internal power to signal that the community is strong and impervious to enemy threats. The doctrine is intended to deter the enemy from threatening Muslims by projecting an image of strength, that is, deterrence by *denial*.

The other approach stresses offense, but without dealing with its operative and practical realization. By projecting an image of Muslims able to respond disproportionately to an attack, they achieve deterrence through punishment. However, the Islamic concept represented by the Muslim Brotherhood does not deal with projecting determination to respond to the enemy after an attack, and thus there is another level, which can be called *deterrence by preemption*. It relies on the assumption that deterrence through punishment will not be credible unless the enemy has previously experienced Muslim force, at least to a certain degree. A display of force is supposed to be lesson for the enemy, a preview of what his fate will be if he harms Muslim interests.

There is also an offensive radical Islamic approach for an operative method to realize power and give Islam world domination, and presents a four-stage plan to retake lost Islamic power.

In Islamic historiography (which inspired examples for emulation) there is also an apologetic approach which represents the offensive approach as the result of military and political constraints resulting from the enemy's provocative actions or from the need to remove obstacles in the path of the *da'wah*, but not as an expression of an offensive doctrine resulting from Islamic religious ideology. Its theme is that if the enemy does not interfere with what the Muslims define as their own interests (including expansion and proselytizing), he will not be attacked.

The aggressive Islamic approach is thoroughly expounded in the writings of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue al-Ghadban and reflects an approach similar to that of Al-Qaeda. It proposes a framework for changes in Islamic deployment, power and deterrence, and infers changes in the Muslim's self image and in his view of the conflict between Islam and the rest of the world. The changes are accompanied by an increasingly hostile perception of the enemy, and especially of the Jews, who, as far as radical Islamic ideologues are concerned, are in a class by themselves.

According to this approach, the first two stages of the Islamic operative code are part of constructing the Islamic community as an enclave and founding the Islamic state (*micro-power*). Throughout that period deterrence is characterized by prevention and defense against the enemy's capabilities (*denial*): the Islamic state is in the process of gathering its resources and directing them inwardly, thus emphasis is placed on activities of the *da'wah* and community institutions, to which the main efforts are directed. At that point, power is amassed through restraint coupled with deterrence. Deterrence is achieved by projecting the determination to respond to an aggressor who initiates an action against Muslims. Its objective is to deter both the specific and potential aggressor, anyone who might interfere with Muslims' acquisition of power.

Restraint at this point is legitimized by the legacy of Muhammad, and includes a low profile and minimal friction with potential rivals.

At that stage the emerging Muslim state should preserve its deterrent reputation, which is still based on being perceived as defensive. In its response to aggression it is characterized not only by punishment, but by immediate, pointed revenge, and by action exemplifying the greater value given to Muslim than to infidel blood. That is done for purposes of deterring the enemy and raising the morale of the Islamic community.

Concurrently, the emerging Islamic state gathers a cadre of jihad fighters, a hard core of men with offensive military capabilities, although at this stage used to respond in defense. It is, however, the foundation of the aggressive approach, both as a deterrent and for preemption, and as part of the overall aggressive concept of spreading Islam. The hard core responds during the beginnings of the state and its institutions (micro-power). At a later stage, however, towards the actual founding of the Islamic state, the hard core of fighters initiate preemptive deterrent actions, even when in possession of information about the enemy's possible plans (*operational preemption*).

Deterrence during the micro-power stage is a combination of the psychological effect of projecting the willingness to respond on the one hand, and the actual response on the other. The transition from the end of that stage to an aggressive stage expresses an increase in self confidence, the transition to initiating an attack against a rival rather than defense, the elimination of enemy commanders on their own field, revenge for Muslim deaths, curtailing the enemy's forces and striking a blow to his economy and infrastructure. Those steps are intended to achieve deterrence in the classic sense, that is, direct influence on enemy forces.

The second stage in amassing power is founding the state and turning it into an established, powerful military state (*macro-power*). The situation changes, and from protecting the emerging community through deterrence, Muslims now take the initiative with the intention of attacking and deterring to enforce Islam's agenda on the enemy. At that stage the Islamic project undertakes a series of military raids, targeting killings, attacks and acts of revenge as *preemption* to frighten and convince the immediate population to convert to Islam, or to forcefully prevent the enemy from planning attacks in the future, or by using *punishment* as an additional element to deter hostile intentions.

The above are meant to influence rivals, reinforce alliances, weaken coalitions, strengthen morale within the Islamic state as an element of power and deterrence, and to expand the influence of the *da'wah*. For macro-power, as for micro-power, Islamic deterrence has the psychological element of readiness to take changes, respond and inflict pain, anchored in activities on the ground and the reputation acquired by Islam by previous harm done to the enemy by Muslims.

The transition from micro-power to macro-power is characterized by repeated assaults initiated by Muslims as part of the change in the concept of deterrence, and reinforces their reputation and deterrent capabilities, sometimes the result of a conspicuous show of force. The Islamic state initiates attacks to reinforce its reputation, is concerned about defeat and the lessening of its reputation, and exploits the deterrence acquired so far. The change aspires to *systemic power*, built on the use of deterrence amassed to weaken and frighten the enemy during an attack, to that the image of deterrence result from proven power and past experience, and will cause the enemy to surrender before he reaches the arena of confrontation.

The Islamic ideologues do not make do with psychological deterrence and the enemy's fear of Islamic power used against them but state that a continuing series of operative steps to convince the enemy of Islam's capabilities and thus reinforce deterrence.

Despite the emphasis on religious motivation, the writings of the radical Islamic ideologues indicate that in many cases their operative considerations incorporate power and deterrence, offense and defense, similar to the considerations of the West when dealing with like issues. In many instances they use modern idioms translated into Arabic. It is a question of Muslims with deterrent power seeking a permanent method to reinforce their power and deterrence in terms of feasibility accepted in the West, taking loss of reputation and manpower into consideration. As part of constructing an image and the deterrent power they are willing to take risks and initiate confrontations if they think they will win. They do what they can to strengthen their deterrent image through fraud and deceit to create an impression of the willingness to sacrifice and act in what might seem an irrational manner, but they are in fact sensitive to losses and defeat in battle which damage the reputation of Islam as a religion.