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The International Protectorate “Toolbox” – Lessons from Kosovo

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This document includes the findings and conclusions of the taskforce. It is a draft for discussion purposes and reflects the opinions of the taskforce members only.
The International Protectorate “Toolbox” - Lessons from Kosovo

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The current Israeli public debate regarding policy options for resolving the current situation tends to focus on five main alternatives – a full reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza, a unilateral disengagement, a comprehensive peace agreement defining the Permanent Status, the creation of a provisional Palestinian state on limited and temporary borders, and the establishment of an international protectorate as an interim administration over the Palestinian territories. This paper focuses on the latter policy option, and aims to assess this relatively new “tool” for conflict management by presenting a closer look at a case frequently referred to as an example – the international mission in Kosovo. This international mission provides an example of the most comprehensive form of international intervention and administered governance with the variants of authority usually attributed to a sovereign power. The Kosovo experience is used to draw relevant lessons as to this new tool’s utility and potential contribution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Throughout the 90’s, international missions to conflict areas have continually taken on new responsibilities, which were hitherto reserved for sovereign powers. International peacekeeping missions, which were formally restricted to monitoring cease fires and securing humanitarian relief, have since taken on far greater challenges. Recent international missions to such conflict areas as Eastern Slovenia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan have shouldered operational responsibility in fields formerly the sole domain of sovereign authorities. Such spheres as law enforcement, provision of civil services such as health, education and welfare, fiscal and monitory management, public institution-building programs as well as media supervision have in recent years all been administered to differing degrees by international agents.

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1 This paper is based on analysis of both theoretical and empirical materials, as well as a study visit and personal interviews with international and local officials in Kosovo and Macedonia. Special thanks is given to Dan Atzmon for his research assistance and case study analysis.

International motivations

While the end of the cold war created anticipation for the withdrawal of Western attention from local conflicts, in actual fact growing globalization and changing normative trends have caused the Western world to step up its involvement in such areas. Changing conditions in the international environment have brought new threats to Western societies to the fore, stemming from both local conflicts and the failure of some sovereign states to adequately govern the territory under their control. Under these circumstances, the flow of illegal immigrants and refugees has increased significantly, terrorist and criminal actors have filled existing vacuums, while political pressures by domestic Diasporas and NGOs for intervention have grown. These factors have forced western policy makers to increase their involvement in various conflicts around the world.

Such realpolitik incentives were accompanied by, as well as reflected within, changes in international values and norms. The increase in emphasis on both collective and individual human rights, over the rights of sovereign states, has brought the Human Security Agenda to the fore. This discourse articulates the need for the state to undertake “sovereign responsibilities” towards its citizens on the one hand, while on the other calls on the international community to take on
the obligation of protecting any population suffering serious harm, such as large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing\(^3\).

Within this normative environment the right of ‘sovereignty’ is no longer automatically deduced from the right to ‘self-determination’. This has been clearly demonstrated in places like East-Timor and Kosovo, where the international community has formally set benchmarks for the accession to the status of independent statehood, until which time, the relevant international administrations were attributed full governing authorities.

Throughout the 90’s, such interests and norms have been continuously and progressively institutionalized in the global system, both through organizational changes in international organizations such as NATO, the UN, the World Bank and other aid agencies, as well as being enshrined in International law. These have since been reflected in the various policies applied during this period in conflict areas.

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3 The “Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, published by the Canadian Foreign Ministry, December 2001, defines a “\textit{Just Cause Threshold}” for international intervention as warranted following:

a) Large scale of life – actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a state failed situation; or

b) Large scale ethnic cleansing – actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
The International Protectorate of Kosovo

Background

How does an International Protectorate function in practice? The example of Kosovo provides the most extreme version of both military and civil international intervention. Its mandate covers the full spectrum of protectorate components, providing full and unconditional governing powers to the international mission established there.

Kosovo was (and still formally is) a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with a majority of Albanians (90%) demanding independence from the ruling Serbs. While the scope of this paper does not allow for a full description of the roots and causes of the conflict, it should be noted that the conflict over Kosovo embodies the full complexity of territorial conflicts – a legacy of historical heritage, ethnic hostility, religious (Christian-Muslim) division, and interdependence with other regional conflicts.

Throughout 1998 the then Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic launched large-scale military offensives against Albanian separatists in Kosovo, spurring reports of atrocities committed against Albanian civilians. The scope of humanitarian disaster – which included the death of more then 8,000 civilians, the displacement of over half of the population and vast destruction of homes and infrastructure – forced the reluctant US and Europe to intervene through NATO air attacks over Serb forces. The final surrender by Milosevic almost three months later, though not referring to Kosovo’s independence, was followed by a deployment of both security and civil international presence to Kosovo.

The Protectorate’s main components

Under UN resolution 1244, a NATO-lead special peacekeeping force was deployed to the area. The main objectives of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) which comprised 40,000 troops, was to deter any renewed hostility between Serbs and Albanians, to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and to establish a secure environment for the return of refugees.

In addition to the KFOR, an interim administration was established with full governing powers– the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK’s key objectives were – 1) to administer all essential public services such as health,
education, banking and finance, law and order as well as postal services and telecommunications; and 2) to develop democratic governing institutions, hold national and municipal elections, and most importantly to set benchmarks for the gradual transfer of governance to the locally elected powers. It is important to note that UNMIK holds full governing authority, and any gradual transfer of power is solely determined upon its assessment of local performance based on the said benchmarks.

From an organizational perspective UNMIK provides an operative umbrella under which different international organizations have taken the lead on four different spheres of governance, referred to as the ‘four Pillars’. Pillar I and II - ‘Police and Justice’ and ‘Civil administration’ are under the direct leadership of the UN, Pillar III – ‘democratization and Institution Building’ is led by the OSCE, and Pillar IV – ‘Reconstruction and Economic Development’ is led by the EU.

UN resolution 1244, which provided the source of the mandate, did not specify an ‘end date’ or a desired ‘end state’, i.e. the establishment of an independent state of Kosovo. Rather it called for the facilitation of a “political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status” meaning that final status would be determined through a political settlement with Belgrade. To date, three years later, a final status has not been declared. But most importantly, the completion of this mission is not only pending an agreed settlement, but also the success of the Kosovars to achieve the governing benchmarks set to them by the international mission – the principle of “Standards before Status”.

For more information see: http://www.nato.int/kfor/about.htm; http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm; http://www.osce.org/kosovo/

5 for the full text see appendix 1

6 In general, these include full compliance with and implementation of resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework. During April 2002, Mr. Michel Steiner, the UN administrator to Kosovo presented more specific benchmarks in eight different policy areas – functioning democratic institutions (efficiency, transparency, minority participation ...), rule of law (extremism not tolerated by mainstream, successful persecutions of crimes, international judges and police is supportive role only...), freedom of movement, returns and reintegration of refugees, economy (improved tax collection, regulatory framework, progress under privatization...), property rights, Kosovo Protection Corps (involvement in civil projects, minority participation and relations with all communities...), Dialogue with Belgrade (direct contacts on practical issues, business relations...).
Achievements, shortcomings and context of success

Can the mission in Kosovo be lauded as a success?

While the mission to Kosovo has not been completed as yet, it can already take credit for a number of significant achievements:

First, the Albanian separatist forces have been formally demilitarized, with most of their members integrated into formal institutions such as the Police force or the ‘Kosovo Protection Corps’\(^7\), while others received career retraining training and/or retirement programs.

Second, under UNMIK, three rounds of free elections were held, two at the municipal level and one at the national level for the national assembly. The self-governing institutions created, were designed on the principal of multi-ethnicity, i.e. institutional arrangements have been set so as to allow the reservation of seats for both Serbs and other minorities.

Third, the mission was able to induce a real – albeit formal – learning process of European standards of governance by virtue of having the power to design the governing institutions, set the benchmarks, formally evaluate the Kosovars’ performance, as well as overrule any local decisions they find unfit.

While these achievements are justly laudable, there remain certain issues of concern. First, it appears that the problem of organized crime remains an unmanageable predicament for both political and economic progress. The networks of arms smuggling, drugs and the “trade” in women (all areas exhibiting true multi-ethnic cooperation), to destinations across the Balkans and throughout Europe, have not been disabled, thus seriously undermining both political and economic progress\(^8\).

The criminal market does not only hinder real prospects for economic development and democratization in Kosovo, but also presents a real threat to political stability in neighboring states. Criminal interests in maintaining destabilized borders are said to have had a real catalyst effect on the violence

\(^7\) Although the Kosovo Protection Corps resembles an military institution and probably holds the most luxurious offices in Pristina, it is formally aimed exclusively at the provision of emergency civil assistance
\(^8\) While great efforts were put into economic reconstruction, the unemployment rate still stands around 60%. It should also be noted that the challenges to economic development stem not only from the needs of post-conflict reconstruction but also from the needs of transition in a post-socialist economy.
which broke out between Albanians and Macedonians in 2001, a situation which lead NATO and the OSCE to issue an additional mission to Macedonia to oversee the stabilization efforts there.

Another issue which remains open is the successful handing over of all authorities currently held by the international agencies to the local representatives. From a strategic point of view, an inherent tension exists between setting institutional standards and promoting local ownership of these processes. As a result, the process of handing over the reins of power in Kosovo has been gradual. On the one hand, a nationally democratically elected government is pressing for wider independence in domestic policies. The government currently has control of only 40% of the national budget, with UNMIK holding an overriding authority over the dispensing of funds. Moreover, the Prime Minister cannot sack a minister without the Commissioner’s approval. The same pattern operates at the municipal levels. Each municipality has an international administrator who has the authority to overrule and veto any municipal decision.

Examples of UNMIK’s administrators’ use of their powers to override local decisions run far deeper than issues relating to public resources. For example, the mayor of Dardana, a place considered a success story of multi-ethnic institutional cooperation, noted that his administrator even vetoed council decisions on street names. In a subsequent interview with the administrator himself, a young German man, he explained that the names chosen were of famous Albanian fighters and could easily have upset the delicate relations with the Serb minority in the area. A similar explanation was given to his veto of the local council’s initiative for a local celebration day, apparently also “accidentally” set on a day of remembrance for the Serb community. Still, this area is considered a success both for its multi-ethnic programs – a joint youth center, joint food market, and festivals – and for its multi-ethnic institutional cooperation. As opposed to other areas, the local Serbs there have agreed to participate in the municipal institutions including nominating a Serb Vice Mayor. Nonetheless, further efforts are still in need, as demonstrated by the fact that work meetings still require the presence of a translator, given that most of the local Serb minority do not speak Albanian.

Lastly, it remains to be seen whether the whole concept of attempting to develop European standards and models of government through the imposition of formal benchmarks had not set exaggerated expectations, and whether it represented the most effective methodology for reaching lasting stability? In other words does this example represent an operative and viable Exit Strategy?
The significant economic, religious and cultural gaps between those who set the standards and those who are to abide by them, are clearly demonstrated on all levels of institutions. Such gaps raise genuine doubts as to the stability of the institutional arrangements following an eventual departure of the international forces from the area, and whether the establishment of institutional arrangements which more closely resemble the traditional social institutions would offer a less ‘enlightened’ but more robust form of stabilization.

Finally, when analyzing Kosovo as a model to be exported to other conflict contexts, it is worthwhile to note the important issue of motivations – which make the context of success. From a local Albanian point of view, the international forces are perceived as the ones who saved their lives and freed them from a cruel and oppressive regime. From a psychological perspective this represents a positive starting point for a learning process. Moreover, the Europeans are able to provide a very big ‘carrot’ as an incentive – the potential integration into the EU. As a senior official of UNMIK emphasized “integration into Europe is the biggest drive… sticks have no utility”.

Relevant lessons for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

What can be learned from the example of Kosovo? Which of the international tools implemented there can be useful in Israel’s situation with the Palestinians? What results can be expected from such an effort? In attempting to answer these questions, both the probability of such massive international mission and the relevance and utility of its contents should be addressed.

Prospects

When examining the prospects for such a comprehensive mission, we must first assess the international motivations for taking on such a costly role. From a humanitarian perspective, the situation in the Palestinian territories, though extremely grim, is far from the ‘just cause threshold’ which would render such a mission clearly and immediately necessary. Furthermore, in assessing American and European interests relating to the conflict and the warring parties, none seem to approach the level of vested European interests in the Balkans which instigated the missions to Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, Australian interests which significantly contributed to the mission of East Timor, or American interests concerning Afghanistan. Under the current circumstances, an international
protectorate is not expected to be established without a clear Israeli-Palestinian initiative. Hence, under a scenario whereby both sides jointly or coordinately approach the international community for the establishment of some form of governing mission to the area, both the scope of the mandate and the overriding powers instated by it will undoubtedly be limited.

Assuming the unlikeliness of a full international protectorate formally established under the current circumstances, the question arises as to the possibility of its development on a more gradual basis. When observing the existing trends of international participation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one indicative trend that is often mentioned is that of *gradual internationalization*. Today, close to 1,000 international officials, from both governmental and non-governmental organizations, are assisting in all civil aspects of Palestinian lives. Moreover, following President Bush’s reform speech in late June the international community has also set out different frameworks for assisting and monitoring Palestinian reforms. The Bush Road Map presented in October also specifies for the first time the need for a formal third party role in monitoring and verifying the political process.

However, while the Bush Road Map does take third party role further than any previously formally defined, it still remains on *the monitoring or supervising level*. It is very important to understand the conceptual and operational gap between this apparent trend and a real international undertaking of responsibility over Palestinian civil and administrative capacities - *giving an international mission the power to override local decisions* (attributed to a protectorate). Hence, again, even a minimal version of a protectorate is unlikely to gradually come into existence, without a clear Israel policy initiative.

But is such an initiative conducive to resolving the current conflict? While the scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed assessment of possible international mandates, operational tasks or exit strategies, given the lessons learned from Kosovo and other cases, a general picture can be drawn as to the kind of objectives which are more and/or less likely to be achieved through the “protectorate toolbox”: 
**Law and order - Yes, Security Buffer - No**

Recent international missions have demonstrated considerable success in developing police and judiciary institutions. These capacities could be reconstructed, institutionally improved and upgraded in comparison to previous PA arrangements both in scope and standards of operation. However, international experience to date does not present a case in which international forces have had to confront a similar terrorist situation as the one facing Israel. If we look at the organized criminal networks of Kosovo as an example of a similar complexity of operations, NATO’s mode of operations there does not seem to present a preferable model for emulation. Moreover, serious doubt exists as to the international community’s willingness to take the political risks and pay the cost in human lives expected from operating a real buffer zone between the Israeli and Palestinian forces.

**Fight Incitement - Yes, Reconciliation - No**

The monitoring of media, education materials, election campaigns, as well as examples such as that of the street names in Dardana, showed a real international capacity for minimizing the level of incitement in Kosovo. Such important tasks could probably be implemented by an international mission in this region as well. However, it would be unrealistic to expect an outside party to affect the deep transformations in the psycho-political environment, which would herald the start of a real reconciliation process. Both current and historic animosity requires that such processes be accompanied by a real and steadfast commitment by both warring sides. Such a commitment is less likely to be forthcoming within a protectorate’s environment.

**Institutional capacity-building - Yes, Western standards - No**

Designing and constructing governing institutions has been achieved in a relatively effective manner both in Kosovo and in other cases such as East Timor. The reconstruction of Palestinian governing bodies, whether initially administered by an international agency or devolved to local representatives, can be expected to provide better institutional arrangements in terms of efficiency and accountability than did the PA. However, “rational” institutional structures are not sufficient for the achievement of ‘good governance’ which contains an equally important cultural facet. Even in the case of Kosovo, where the local society has a very large incentive for internalizing European standards of governance, a great deal of work
remains to be undertaken. No such incentives seem to exist for the Palestinians which would engender a real transformation and the political and social prices such a process would entail.

**Post-Arafat leadership - Yes, Democratization - No**

International missions have accumulated vast experience in building representative institutions and democratic election processes. Within such a system, and under a minimized incitement environment, an election process designed and supervised by an international governing body could promote the rise of a post-Arafat national leadership. Such a leadership is expected to have a stronger legitimacy base within the Palestinian society, as well as be perceived as potentially more trustworthy by the Israelis, then one achieved without an internationally supervised process. As for creating a genuine democratic system, just as in the case of governing institutions, proper and legitimate election processes would not be deemed sufficient to define a real democratization process, and thus should not be considered the formal benchmark for the mission’s success.

**Conclusion**

The international mission to Kosovo provides a fascinating example of the fullest and most outreaching model of international administration over a conflict area. While the Kosovo mission is yet to be completed, its experience shows that its biggest success has been in reconstructing the institutional framework within which public life and the underlying conflict are carried out. Although the redesigning of multi-ethnic representative bodies, the integration of former militants into the formal establishment and the construction of new governing institutions cannot be expected to bring a real end to the conflict, they did create the stable and constructive conditions necessary for a peace process. One assessment which can be made is that an international protectorate’s main strengths are not in solving the issues underlying a given conflict, but rather in redesigning the environment of constraints and incentives in which the conflict is played out. Such intervention can be seen as an ‘external shock’ which might succeed in upsetting the current dead-end cycle. However, we should not expect it to solve the underlying issues of the conflict, be it security-based or otherwise, but rather to create a new institutional and political environment within which endeavors for achieving a bilateral solution could be reinitiated.
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Appendix 1 – Security Council Resolution 1244

Resolution 1244 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,


Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
   a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
   b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
   c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international
civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

j. Protecting and promoting human rights;

k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.