פרסומים 2004

כנס הרצליה החמישי - 2004

- שמואל בר, ישראל אלעד-אלטמן, עוזי ארד, גדעון ביגר, אורלי לוטן, רחל מכטיגר | דצמבר 2004
  
  כנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).
  מסמכי הרצליה - כנס הרצליה ה-5 2004 | אסופה של תוכניות ההסדר העומדות על סדר היום הציבורי הישראלי לפתרון הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני. המסמך כולל ניתוח של תוכניות ההסדר השונות: הסדרי ביניים, הסדרי קבע של "שתי מדינות", של "מדינה אחת", אופציות ירדניות ותוכניות לחילופי שטחים. המסמך מכיל גם טבלאות השוואתיות של התוכניות השונות, מפות וטבלאות להערכת ההשלכות הדמוגראפיות האפשריות של כל אחת מהתוכניות.
  
  קרא/י עוד
- Uzi Arad, Shmuel Bar, Gidon Biger, Israel Elad-Altman, Rachel Machtiger, Orli Lotan | December 2004
  
  כנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).
  The 5th Herzliya Conference Working Papers | This document is a
  compendium of the extant peace plans for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document includes an analysis of the various peace plans: interim plans, permanent status plans, “two states” and “one state” solutions, “Jordanian options” and plans for territorial swaps. The document contains comparative tables of the various plans, illustrative maps and tables forecasting the Jewish and non-Jewish populations in Israel and Palestine in the event that the plans are implemented.
  
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- דוד ברודט | דצמבר 2004
  
  תקציר מתוך מסקנות צוות מעמד המוסד לביטוח לאומי בכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).
  
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- גבריאל בן -דור, עמי פדהצור, דפנה קנטי-נסים | דצמבר 2004
  
  דוח צוות חשיבה בכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).
  
  קרא/י עוד
- רפי מלניק | דצמבר 2004
  
  כנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (המרכז הבינתחומי).
  דוח צוות חשיבה - ראש הצוות: פרופ' רפי מלניק | חברי הצוות: לאה אחדות, ד"ר מישל סטרבצ'ינסקי, טומי שטיינר, ד"ר זלמן שיפר
  
  קרא/י עוד
- Shmuel Bar | December 2004
  
  מסמך עבודה מכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (הבינתחומי הרצליה).
  This paper was prepared and published about a month before the death of Arafat. It is based on a series of meetings with senior Israelis and Palestinians with in-depth knowledge of Palestinian society and politics. It proposes that the end of the Arafat era will also be the fall of the Old Guard leadership in the Palestinian national movement. The author inferred – as it turned out correctly – that Arafat would not nominate a successor even upon his death bed and that "black horses" – anonymous local Fatah and other leaders, will emerge out of the vacuum, to form the backbone of a new multi-polar leadership. If strong leadership does not take the reins after Arafat exits the stage, Dr. Bar foresees that Hamas may emerge as the only force on the ground with the power and structures necessary to appeal to the general public. In fact, it would seem that the younger generation of Hamas will be less than inclined to allow the representation of the Palestinian people to remain in the hands of Arafat's successors and will demand a piece of the leadership cake. Dr. Bar concludes that Israel will not benefit from the absence of efficient Palestinian leadership and therefore should take advantage of existing levers in order to influence the emergence of a future Palestinian leadership.
  
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- Eran Lerman | December 2004
  
  מסמך עבודה מכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (הבינתחומי הרצליה).
  The emergence of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship in the second half of the twentieth century is a singular event in modern international affairs. It is based on a dynamic and interdependent triangle of strategic cooperation, moral affinity, and Jewish power. However, while momentous developments took place elsewhere, the U.S.-Israeli special relationship fell into a "maintenance" mode. In the wake of U.S.-inspired plans for political and strategic change in the Greater Middle East (GME), the time has come for reconsideration. Israel should package a new set of initiatives under the concept of the S.R.I – Special Relations Initiative of 2005, in order to re-energize and refocus the Special Relationship, for the benefit of both sides. The author suggests some concrete actions in order to achieve this goal.
  
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- Shmuel Bar | October 2004
  
  מסמך עבודה מכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (הבינתחומי הרצליה).
  This study examines the characteristics of the Islamic regime in Iran as they pertain to its decision-making process and defense doctrine. Bar presents the Islamic regime in Iran as an enigma - a combination of an ideological revolutionary regime based on dogmatic religious principles, with a remarkable adaptability and realpolitik perception. Iran's defense and security policy, according to Bar, derives from a concatenation of geo-political, cultural, and religious factors. The Iranian self-image is of a nation heir to an ancient civilization which precedes Islam, but suffering from a sense of strategic disadvantage, victimization, isolation and historic injustice. These result in a siege mentality and a tendency to accept and entertain conspiracy theories in which Iran is a loner in a world of foreigners scheming to deprive it of its lawful rights and exploit it. Iran's dependence on oil exports only exacerbates its sense of national vulnerability and oppression by the West. As for Iran's decision-making process, Bar describes it as basically rational and pragmatic. Iran sees its security environment as one of instability and hostility, and the US is perceived as the chief ideological and strategic enemy but is also the object of popular admiration for its material success. Israel and the Jewish people are also viewed with both extreme hostility and high regard. Iran's perception of Israel as a threat is a main source of its security interests in Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Iran is resolved to achieve nuclear capability, which is the only non-conventional capability that can deter the US. Achieving this capability is perceived not only as a strategic exigency but also as a well-deserved membership card to a select club to which Iran deserves to belong.
  
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- Shmuel Bar | October 2004
  
  מסמך עבודה מכנס הרצליה החמישי 2004 המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה באוניברסיטת רייכמן (הבינתחומי הרצליה).
  his study attempts to decipher the Iranian negotiation code by analysis of key elements of Iranian worldviews, beliefs, communication conventions, social behavior, and cultural norms. According to Bar, the Iranian negotiating culture is deeply rooted in the Iranian national psyche, linguistic conventions, cultural habits and religious conventions. An analysis of the Iranian tendency towards mistrust and conspiracy theories suggests that arguments in the course of negotiations should be based on clear short-term incentives and threats, and not on incremental long-term confidence building. Negotiations, according to Bar, must achieve an acceptance by the Iranian side of the brute facts, rather than an understanding of the merits of the other side. It seems that Iranians have frequently seen back channels and secret negotiations as giving the other side an advantage.
  
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