At the Last Minute: The Prime Minister's Use of Authority to Change the Agenda at the Last Moment
By Ilana Shpaizman and Sharon Gilad
The New York Times published an article on how Prime Minister Netanyahu deliberately avoided ending the War with Hamas after October 7th to remain in power. One of the issues raised in the investigation is Netanyahu's use of last-minute agenda changes. For example, the report stated that six months into the war in Gaza, Benjamin Netanyahu prepared to end it. Negotiations were underway for a prolonged ceasefire with Hamas, and he was ready to reach a compromise. For this purpose, he required the Cabinet's support. To minimize opposition within the Cabinet, the issue of the ceasefire was deliberately omitted from the official agenda distributed to Cabinet members. The idea was to raise the issue at the last minute and thus prevent opposing ministers from coordinating their positions.
This tactic of adding or removing an item from the agenda at the last minute is not new and is not unique to Netanyahu, as we found in our article published in the Journal of European Public Policy. In a coalition government, the Prime Minister has the power to set the government's agenda. However, this power is not absolute, as the Prime Minister must consider the demands and issues raised by coalition partners. Given the limited agenda capacity, the Prime Minister must continually balance emerging problems, issues important to his party, and the priorities of coalition partners.
In Israel, in addition to the power to set the agenda of the cabinet meetings, the Prime Minister also has the power to add or remove items from the cabinet’s agenda at the last minute. This power was likely granted to allow flexibility in the government's agenda—for example, to extend deliberation on an issue that required more time or to deliberate an issue that arose at the last moment due to external events. The specific regulation allowing this amendment does not specify the conditions under which the Prime Minister may exercise this authority, thereby allowing the Prime Minister extensive discretion. Adding or removing an item at the last minute not only provides flexibility but also reduces opposition from coalition partners, as the short timeframe does not allow them sufficient time to gather information and to oppose the subject effectively.
Our study examined how Israeli Prime Ministers exercise this authority during crises. We expected that during a crisis, when public and media attention is focused on managing the crisis, less pressure would be applied to the Prime Minister by coalition partners, providing the Prime Minister with more room to maneuver and focus on crisis management or their priorities, thereby requiring less use of the authority to change the agenda at the last minute. In the study, we analyzed government decisions between 2014 and 2024 during three crises: Operation “Tzuk Eitan” in Gaza in 2014, the COVID-19 crisis, and the October 7th War. During this period, there were five different governments and three Prime Ministers (Netanyahu, Bennett, and Lapid).
The study found that, although all Prime Ministers extensively used the authority to change the agenda at the last minute during periods of stability, this use decreased significantly during a crisis. During a crisis, when Prime Ministers did exercise this authority, it was primarily (though not always) for crisis management. Additionally, we found that decisions involving budget allocations or the implementation of coalition agreements are more likely to be added to or removed from the agenda at the last minute. Finally, a significant share of the decisions added or removed at the last minute was initiated by the Prime Minister’s Office.
When comparing different governments, we found that Netanyahu's 37th government is an exception. After October 7th, Netanyahu increased his use of the authority to change the agenda at the last minute, as can also be seen in the examples from the New York Times article. Out of 483 government meetings held during the current government's term in the period we examined, Netanyahu changed the agenda at the last minute in 228 meetings. In 65% of the government meetings held since October 7th, at least one last-minute change to the agenda occurred. In contrast, before October 7th, last-minute agenda changes occurred in only 44% of the meetings.
These findings indicate that, unlike previous crises, during the October 7th War, pressures from coalition partners to promote their agendas did not decrease. Moreover, Netanyahu used his authority to change the agenda at the last minute not only to address the pressures of coalition partners but also to advance his political goals—namely, preserving the coalition. Therefore, decisions concerning the crisis were added or removed at the last minute, not to manage the crisis, but to manage the coalition.
Our study sheds light on how the Prime Minister uses their power to set the agenda. It shows how the Prime Minister can creatively exploit the authority given to them to set the agenda. By using an authority intended for exceptional cases, Prime Ministers can promote their priorities and manage the agendas of other ministers. In Netanyahu's case, the extensive use of the authority to change the agenda at the last minute is further evidence of the Israeli government's transition from a "Cabinet Government," where decisions are made collectively by all ministers, to a "Prime Minister's Government," where important decisions are made by one person.
Shpaizman Ilana, and Sharon Gilad. 2025. "At the last minute: The use of the prime minister's power to amend the agenda during a crisis," Journal of European Public Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2527321