What Did You Do During COVID-19? Government Ministers' Involvement in the First Wave of the COVID-19  Crisis 

 Ilana Shpaizman 

During a crisis, the public experiences great anxiety alongside uncertainty. These feelings were especially strong during the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis in Israel, when information about the pandemic and ways to cope with it was scarce. During such periods, the public expects the government—the Prime Minister and ministers—to mobilize and do everything possible to manage the crisis and minimize damage. We expect ministers to be involved in the crisis management, to initiate solutions, and, in general, to be involved in policymaking. 

However, previous studies have shown that this is often not the case. During periods of stability, only some government ministers are intensively involved in policymaking in their departments. Most ministers let the bureaucracy manage the ministerial affairs and intervene only when problems arise that require their involvement. Furthermore, most ministers rarely engage in matters within the purview of other ministers.

Does this trend change during a crisis, particularly one as severe as the COVID-19 pandemic, such that ministers become more involved in both issues directly related to their departments and in general government policymaking?  

To answer this question, in an article published in the European Journal of Political Research, I examined the level of involvement of government ministers during the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis (March–May 2020) in Israel. I divided the ministers into three categories: Ministers who are responsible for issues that directly address the crisis (e.g. the Minister of Health), ministers responsible for issues that partly address the crisis (e.g. the Minister of Education) and ministers that do not have any connection to the crisis (e.g. the Minister of Environment). In the crisis, the level of involvement of cabinet ministers increases, we should expect that all ministers will increase their level of involvement during a crisis compared to periods of stability, and the ministers who are central to the crisis management will increase their involvement even more. 

The full protocols of cabinet meetings remain classified, so the available information is based on partial protocols published by the Government Secretariat and on government decisions that have passed. Despite the missing information, existing materials allow for an examination of ministerial involvement during the first wave of COVID 19. 

On a positive note, the cabinet as a whole was more active during the crisis than before it. It passed more decisions and met more frequently. Additionally, the ministers directly responsible for crisis management were more involved in policymaking when examining government decisions than they had been prior to the crisis. For example, the Minister of Health passed approximately 50 decisions, compared to about three in the three months preceding the pandemic. Finally, ministers increased their attendance at government meetings; while some only attended half of the meetings before the crisis, there was nearly full attendance during the crisis.

However, when looking beyond government decisions, which can be seen as policymaking the ministers must do in order to manage the crisis, and beyond attendance, the resulting picture is somewhat bleak. Most ministers were not involved in issues outside their ministry’s jurisdiction. During the cabinet’s deliberations, they hardly participated, asked no questions, nor commented on issues. This finding can explain the lack of alternative policy routes that challenged the perception of the Ministry of Health during the first wave. This pattern was found not only among ministers who had little to do with the crisis management, but also among those more central to the crisis. For instance, Education Minister Rafi Peretz did not express his position in any deliberations, either on his ministry's topics or on others. Lastly, most ministers who were central to the crisis management did not actively participate in the cabinet’s deliberations,  allowing the professional bureaucracy to present the ministry's position. Even though the Minister of Health was responsible for many government decisions, he hardly presented any of them to the other ministers. 

In sum, the ministerial involvement during the first wave of COVID 19 crisis was low. High involvement was evident only when it did not require much effort (attendance) or when the ministers had little choice, as is the case with the cabinet decision-making. 

These findings align with the State Comptroller's report on the first and second waves of COVID 19 in Israel, which found that only one action scenario was presented to the ministers, and they did not challenge it. The Education Minister's lack of involvement helps explain, among other things, the problems in the education system's functioning during the crisis and the delayed reopening of middle schools.

In a democracy, there is an unwritten contract between citizens and the public. Citizens elect representatives, and those representatives act to promote the citizens' interests. During a crisis, this contract becomes even more significant. If, as found in this study, most ministers were not involved in managing such a severe crisis, it may indicate a serious problem in accountability and have implications for public trust in elected officials.

Should the protocols of the "Corona Cabinet" (established from the third wave onwards) be published, it will be possible to examine whether ministerial involvement changed under the power-sharing government of Gantz and Netanyahu or the "Change Government" of Naftali Bennett.

Dr. Ilana Shpaizman is a lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

This post is based on the article: Shpaizman, Ilana. "Duty calls but not for all: The policy involvement of cabinet ministers during crisis." European Journal of Political Research.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12518