When Deterrence Backfires: 
House Demolitions, Palestinian Radicalization, and Israeli Fatalities

Michael Freedman and Esteban F. Klor

Conflict points around the world involve government forces fighting terrorist groups. In this type of warfare, there is a danger that counterterrorist efforts may backfire, providing ammunition for additional cycles of violence. This seems especially relevant for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is marked by repeated cycles of violence.

In a recently published article in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, we discuss the dangers of counterterrorist efforts backfiring and leading to additional cycles of violence. Specifically, we study the use of selective and indiscriminate house demolitions by Israel during the Second Intifada and find that indiscriminate counterterrorism can lead to political radicalization among the Palestinian population, which in turn leads to an increase in terror attacks. Our article concludes that indiscriminate measures of counterterrorism may not be effective in curtailing future attacks and suggests the need for more targeted approaches.

Our article begins by discussing the prevailing view in the conflict literature that selective measures of counterterrorism are more effective than indiscriminate ones.   These terms are based on Kalyvas (2006), who defines a given policy as selective if that policy targets opponents on an individual level (such as drone strikes), versus policies that are less selective (such as curfews). According to this view, indiscriminate measures may backfire and lead to an increase in violence, while selective measures should not. 

We then review the empirical literature on this topic, which is divided into two different approaches. The first focuses on whether selective and/or indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to the radicalization of the population, while the second tests whether selective and/or indiscriminate forms of counterterrorism are effective in curtailing future attacks. These studies have produced contradictory evidence, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between counterterrorism and retaliatory violence.

To address this gap in the literature, we evaluate the relationship between counterterrorism and future levels of violence using data from Israel's use of house demolitions during the Second Intifada (2004-2005). We exploit the temporal and spatial variation of this policy to assess its impact on Palestinians' political views and future terror attacks. 

We focus on two main types of house demolitions that Israel carried out: punitive and precautionary house demolitions.  Punitive house demolitions are directly targeted against terror operatives.  Following Kalyvas’ (2006), we classify punitive house demolitions as a selective policy of counterterrorism.  In contrast, precautionary house demolitions target houses located in certain areas for military purposes, irrespective of their owners’ behavior.   We classify precautionary house demolitions as an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism because this policy targets a group, regardless of the actions of the afflicted individuals.   

We find that punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism, do not lead to a change in political views among the Palestinian population. However, precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism, do lead to an increase in radical political opinions. 

Building on that analysis, we find that political radicalization induced by indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to an increase in future terror attacks. This indicates that counterterrorist acts can have an effect that goes beyond militant groups, and that their impact on the civilian population matters for the evolution of the conflict over time. Overall, our analysis provides empirical support for the mechanism behind the positive correlation between indiscriminate counterterrorism and future levels of violence. 
We concentrate here on a particular conflict and a particular time period, and one should be cautious when generalizing our results to other contexts.  That said, we believe that the broader message of this study is relevant for conflicts elsewhere.  House demolitions are one example of a type of violence suffered by civilians in the course of counterterrorism.  Similar types of violence include actions such as drones, targeted assassinations, and missile strikes.  The efficacy of these counterterrorism actions is the subject of current policy debates in other conflicts around the world.

Thus, we conclude that indiscriminate measures of counterterrorism may not be effective in curtailing future attacks and suggest the need for more targeted approaches. We also suggest that policymakers should consider the potential unintended consequences of indiscriminate counterterrorism when designing counterterrorist strategies.

Dr. Michael Freedman is an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa (http://mfreedman.mit.edu/)

Prof. Esteban Klor is a Professor of Economics at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (https://scholars.huji.ac.il/eklor/home)

The post is based on this article:

Freedman, M., & Klor, E. F. (2022). When Deterrence Backfires: House Demolitions, Palestinian Radicalization, and Israeli Fatalities. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221139432