How the Opposition is Flattened – And the Knesset is Emptied of Substance

Dr. Shahaf Zamir

To understand how the Knesset has ceased to function as an oversight institution, we can only look at the recent weeks.
In one case, the coalition sought to advance Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi's Communications bill (Broadcast), but not in the Economic Affairs Committee, as the parliamentary work procedures typically require. The committee chair, MK David Bitan from the coalition and from Karhi's party, is perceived as not being "accommodating" enough. The solution was to bypass the standing committee and establish a special committee that will exclusively discuss the bill, headed by MK Galit Distel Atbaryan. In practice, the discussions are managed by the minister himself, opposition members are expelled from the meetings, or their speaking time is cut short, and the Knesset serves as a backdrop for a process managed outside its walls.

In another case, no less severe but with lower media attention, important standing committees such as the Health Committee and the Education, Culture and Sports Committee are paralyzed for lack of a chair. Since the Knesset members from Shas who headed them left when the party departed the coalition, no replacement has been appointed. The Knesset's legal advisor even warned the Knesset Committee chair that this constitutes a severe impairment of parliamentary functioning. The Knesset continues meanwhile for months, as if central committees can be paralyzed without consequences for oversight, legislation, or for public service.

These are not "isolated incidents." These are symptoms.
Every time the government in Israel advances a unilateral move, bypasses discussion, or tramples parliamentary norms, the same familiar question returns: "Where is the opposition"? But this question misses the real problem. The opposition may be weak, but the entire Knesset has ceased to fulfill one of its central functions: oversight of the executive branch.

This insight emerged as a central theme in a roundtable discussion held by the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University on September 7, 2025, with the participation of researchers, civil society figures, and former senior Knesset officials. The conclusion that emerged from the discussion was clear: the opposition's weakness is not merely a result of laziness or ideological division, but of deep erosion in the Knesset's status as an independent, supervisory, and representative institution.

In a democratic system, the legislative branch – as a collective body – is responsible for overseeing the executive branch. But this role is not reserved for the opposition alone. Coalition members are first and foremost elected representatives, not emissaries of the government, and are required to act for the public good and ensure that all government ministries perform their duties. In practice, this concept has completely eroded. The coalition views the Knesset as an arm of the government, and the opposition, given structural and political barriers, struggles to fulfill its role.

The Norwegian Law is a prime example of this. It was originally designed to allow coalition Knesset members to devote themselves to serious parliamentary work instead of ministers or deputy ministers who must split their time between the Knesset and their ministries. In practice, in its partial Israeli version, the law often serves to create political jobs and expand the power of party leaderships – without solving the workload problem, without strengthening oversight, and without changing the balance of power between the Knesset and the government.

Committee work – the heart of parliamentary oversight – also suffers from structural failures. When a committee chair and the minister of the supervised ministry belong to the same party, oversight may become comfortable, soft, or merely formal. In addition, in recent years, we have seen how committee chairs who display too much independence pay a political price. The removal of Yuli Edelstein from the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, after he tried to advance a military recruitment framework that did not align with the Prime Minister's wishes or those of the coalition partners, sent a sharp message to every committee chair: too much independence is not desirable.

One of the disturbing insights that emerged from the discussion we held at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility is that the Knesset has ceased to be the central arena of politics. It has become a means. Decoration. Members of Knesset take the podium not to change or comment on policy but to create a dramatic video for social networks. The quiet, professional, Sisyphean work of oversight is pushed to the margins.

Thus, it is unsurprising that oversight erodes. Parliamentary questions remain unanswered or are dismissed. Committee discussions are postponed or watered down. Ministers send junior and unprepared representatives. And the Knesset, instead of demanding accountability, grows accustomed to a secondary role.

When the Knesset does not insist on its powers, the government learns it has no real reason to be accountable. And when the opposition understands that even using the few tools at its disposal yields no results, it gives up in advance. Thus, a cycle of institutional weakness is created.

The danger is not theoretical. Weak oversight means a government that operates almost without brakes. When the Knesset fails to fulfill its oversight role, the public loses trust not only in the opposition but in the institution as a whole. It is thus unsurprising that trust in the Knesset is the lowest among all governing institutions in Israel. Politics then spills outside – to the street, to social media, to extra-institutional confrontations – and democracy erodes from within.

The discussion in the forum we held raised a series of essential proposals: sanctions against government ministries that do not respond to parliamentary questions, strengthening standing committees, limiting private member bills, mandatory attendance, and increased oversight of constitutional and sensitive issues. But the central conclusion was unequivocal: technical measures alone will not suffice. Without a deep cultural change of respect for the rules of the game, of understanding that the Knesset is not an arm of the government but an independent institution, and of willingness for real oversight even from within, no reform will hold.

The real question is not "where is the opposition". The question is whether there is still anyone in Israel interested in a Knesset capable of saying to the government: thus far and no further. If the answer is negative, it will not be the opposition that fails, but Israeli democracy itself.