War Without Trust and Without Oversight

Prof. Amnon Cavari, Institute for Liberty and Responsibility, Reichman University
(Originally published in Hebrew)

Governments need public trust—always, and especially during wartime. Such trust enables them to make difficult decisions, mobilize public support, and bear the heavy costs of prolonged conflict. In times of crisis, we often see an increase in public trust, commonly known as the “rally around the flag” effect. This was the case in the United States after the September 11 attacks, the most severe disaster to strike the U.S. since World War II. But this has not been the case in Israel, not after October 7, and not now following the military operation in Iran.

In surveys we conducted at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility over the last few weeks, we found that about one week after the outbreak of the war, 71% of the public supported it. Two weeks later, support for the war dropped to 65%. The entire decline is among the Jewish public. On the surface, the public supports the war, though less than at the outset, and remains supportive. However, alongside this support, the public does not trust those leading the war and does not believe the war will achieve its goals (to the extent goals have been defined). Thus, 54% of the public believes that the Prime Minister also considered personal motives in his decision to go to war, and a majority expresses serious doubts about the war’s ability to achieve its objectives. Only about 40% believe it is possible to significantly damage Iran’s nuclear capabilities, reduce the ballistic missile threat, or bring about regime change. Evaluations of government performance are also very low: the public gives it a failing grade (4.8 out of 10), and only one in four Israelis trusts the government. 

This is the defining feature of this war: support for the action, but lack of trust in its purpose and leadership. This lack of trust has direct consequences for the international and domestic arenas.

In the international and security arena, when public trust is low or eroding, public pressure to end the war increases. A government operating under constraints of legitimacy finds it difficult to sustain a prolonged campaign. It may be pushed toward premature termination while presenting a false image of achievement (as occurred in June 2025). At the same time, weak legitimacy can create the opposite temptation—to escalate the fighting to achieve a quick success that rescues the government from a dead end. Instead of measured policy, a reactive dynamic may emerge, driven by a desperate attempt to justify continued fighting. The expansion of the war into Lebanon raises concerns that such considerations are at play. If so, this aligns with research showing that leaders may initiate or escalate wars to deflect criticism on domestic issues. And examples are ample: discussion over the conscription law, failure to establish a state commission of inquiry, the continued attempt at judicial overhaul, and allocation of coalition funds.

On the domestic front, a government operating without public trust tends to view criticism as a threat rather than a legitimate part of democratic discourse. The signs here are clear: restrictions on protest, aggressive enforcement, and labeling criticism as treason. Public discourse narrows, and civic space erodes precisely when open debate about the goals and consequences of the war is most needed. Even if we accept that the war is justified, it is inconceivable that there should not be close oversight of government actions. According to international indices, since October 7, Israel has experienced a democratic decline, reflected in damage to governing institutions and individual liberties. In the absence of functioning institutions and freedom of expression, criticism diminishes, and democracy erodes.

But the problem is not only in government actions and its ability to suppress criticism—the broader political system is failing to generate an alternative. The opposition hesitates and at times even capitulates (or supports). At the same time, the media focuses on tactical details such as targeted killings, limited availability of shelters, and interception economics, instead of addressing fundamental questions. Indeed, the public gives the media a failing grade for its coverage of the government (4.4 out of 10). The result is a lack of political oversight, media criticism, and public scrutiny being silenced as much as possible.

The loss of trust in government during wartime has direct implications for public sentiment. In a March 2026 survey, we found that 66% of the public have little trust in the government’s ability to ensure their security, and 60% fear for their personal safety and that of their families. This is not surprising given the frequent runs to shelters (for those who have them) and the sense of helplessness in the face of threats from the north, east, and south.

The situation poses a political problem to this government, one that it does not appear to have a solution for. And when there is no solution, the temptation to escalate externally and internally increases. In such conditions, the public pays the price—on the battlefield, on the home front, in the economy, and in the ongoing erosion of personal and collective security.

Wars are supposed to create moments of national clarity: agreement on goals, trust in leadership, and willingness to bear costs. Here, the opposite is happening: the public does not trust those leading the war and does not perceive a clear purpose. This is not only a strategic problem but also a profound democratic failure. A state that enters war without public trust does not grow stronger; it erodes from within. That erosion is already visible, and it is more dangerous than ballistic missiles.