Israelis Give the War a "Failed" Grade
By Asif Efrat
After one year and four months, as the war comes to an end—at least temporarily—the time has come to conduct an assessment. What is the outcome of the war? How has the war affected the country's security and Israeli society? The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University asked a representative sample of 811 Israelis to assess the war's outcomes through a survey conducted by iPanel on February 9-12. The findings indicate disappointment and pessimism among Israelis both regarding the direct results of the war and its broader implications.
The disappointment with the war's outcomes emerges from the most basic question: Who won? Only 17% of Israelis—one-sixth of the public—believe that Israel defeated Hamas. Among right-wing voters, a higher percentage—31%—identifies victory (compared to 12% of center-left voters), but even here we're talking about a minority. Another expression of disappointment arises from the question: Were the war's objectives achieved? Only 10% of the public believes that Israel indeed achieved its war objectives. This means that, for the overwhelming majority of the public, Israel ends fighting of over a year without victory and without achieving the war's objectives.
The assessment of the war's long-term security outcomes is also not positive. First, Israelis are pessimistic about the likelihood of a future confrontation with Hamas. 63%—nearly two-thirds of the public—believe that such a confrontation will indeed come within five years. Second, only about a third of Israelis believe that Israel succeeded in restoring the deterrence capability that was damaged on October 7th. Third, a minority among Israelis (42%) believe that Israel's security situation is better than it was before the war. While this percentage is higher than the percentage of those who believe the country's security situation has worsened (32%) or remained unchanged (20%). Yet, if after a difficult and prolonged war less than half of Israelis see improvement in the security situation, this is another expression of dissatisfaction with how the military campaign ended.
Beyond the security implications, the war has brought about profound changes in Israeli society and politics. Here too, more Israelis identify negative changes. This is the case regarding the war's impact on the unity of Israeli society. The war was supposed to unite Israelis: it began as a defensive war against a cruel enemy that invaded the country's territory and carried out a barbaric massacre. The entire nation supported going to war under the slogan "Together We Will Win." But the unity quickly dissipated and turned into a series of disputes and accusations. After a year and four months, 40% of citizens think that Israeli society today is more divided than it was before the war, compared to only 29% who believe Israel is more united today and 27% who see no change.
But not only social unity was damaged; many Israelis believe that the democratic system was also harmed. Indeed, the war exposed fundamental flaws in Israeli democracy: imposing restrictions on freedom of expression and demonstration; a government conducting war without meaningful oversight by the Knesset or the public; a government that refuses to take responsibility for its failures by holding elections or establishing a state commission of inquiry—all of these show the fragility of our democracy. And indeed, nearly half the public—44%—think the democratic system today is weaker than it was before the war, compared to only 9% who believe democracy has strengthened and 37% who see no change.
In conclusion, Israelis look at the painful reality in a sober manner. They recognize that the war did not end in the desired victory and that another confrontation with Hamas is only a matter of time. Many Israelis identify the negative effects of the war in deepening social division and weakening democracy. A public discussion is needed about these effects and ways to address them. We must do everything to quickly rehabilitate Israeli society and democracy and prevent long-term damage.
The precondition for beginning the repair is replacing the government. Indeed, a government that conducted a failed war should pay the political price and end its tenure. This is how it was in the past: the Yom Kippur War sowed the seeds of the political upheaval of 1977. The failure of '23, like the failure of '73, should generate a strong public demand from the government: take responsibility, vacate your positions.
Prof. Asif Efrat is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University