The Public Does Not Give a Blank Check for the Use of Force

By Asif Efrat

In a democracy, public support for the war effort is vital. How do Israelis form their position regarding war in different arenas? Do they automatically support the use of force for any purpose? Or do they think in an informed manner that considers the objectives of military force and its costs?

The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University examined this important question while focusing on the Syrian front. We wanted to know: To what extent do Israelis believe it is appropriate to use force against the threats emanating from this arena?

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, IDF forces have carried out strikes in Syria to prevent the new Syrian government from seizing the weapons left behind by the Assad regime and to distance the new government's forces from the border with Israel. The strikes are based on the perception of the new government as a security threat. Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed this perception two days after Assad's fall: The new government, in his view, constitutes a group of jihadists who might attack Israel. In the following months, Israel expanded the definition of its interests in Syria. The IDF carried out strikes as a counter-response to Turkish entrenchment in Syria and to protect the Druze minority in the country.

However, the strikes in Syria, aimed at protecting Israel's interests, involve high costs for the IDF, primarily the need for manpower and the risk to soldiers' lives.

How does the Israeli public deal with the tension between Israeli interests in Syria and the price involved in protecting them? We examined public positions in a survey conducted on May 12-15 among a representative sample of 803 respondents.

We presented survey participants with five objectives that Israel seeks to advance in Syria and asked which of the objectives would justify offensive IDF activity in Syrian territory. While Arab respondents expressed low support for the use of force for each of the objectives, the responses of Jewish respondents indicated a clear hierarchy of legitimacy for the use of force.

At the top of the hierarchy, from the perspective of the Jewish public, stands dealing with direct threats to Israel—or what might develop into a direct threat to Israel. Here, the use of force is perceived as legitimate. A large majority of 80% of Jews believe it is justified to use force to prevent terror attacks from Syria into Israel; 69% justify the use of force to prevent the new Syrian government from deploying troops near the border with Israel.

Lower on the hierarchy is an objective related to the military capabilities of the new government but not directly affecting Israel: preventing the new government from taking control of the weapons left by the Assad regime. 59% of the Jewish public believe this objective justifies the use of force.

At the lowest level, the one receiving the least legitimacy, are objectives not directly and clearly related to security interests. The use of force to prevent Turkey from deepening its influence in Syria receives 52% support; an identical support rate is given to offensive activity for the defense of the Druze in Syria. This means the public is divided regarding these objectives.

The survey data reveal that the public does not automatically grant support to the IDF's offensive activity in Syria. Israelis understand that the use of force exacts costs, and therefore, they distinguish between the different objectives of using force: offensive activity for the direct defense of Israel will be considered justified; offensive activity with an indirect or weak connection to Israeli interests is less justified.

It is worth noting the modest gaps in support for the use of force between right-wing voters and center-left voters in the Jewish public. For each of the five objectives, right-wing voters expressed stronger support for offensive activity than center-left voters, but only by a small margin. This means that support for the use of force is not a matter of right versus left. On both the right and the left, Israelis are not eager for battle and do not blindly support offensive activity; they weigh the justification for using force.

Our findings constitute a warning sign for the Israeli government as it continues and deepens military activity in Syria and other war arenas: public support is conditional. Israelis support the use of force that directly advances the defense of Israel; they are more skeptical about the use of military force for other purposes. The government should take into account the public's sentiments when sending the IDF into attack.

Prof. Asif Efrat is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University