What Have Israelis Learned from the War with Iran?

Prof. Asif Efrat

The military campaign against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, constitutes yet another chapter in an ongoing war that started in October 2023. But this campaign also has unique features: the audacity and military complexity of an operation conducted far from Israeli territory; close cooperation with the American military; and, of course — the paralysis of life in Israel for several weeks, the frequent air-raid sirens, and the prolonged hours spent in protected spaces.

We sought to understand what insights Israelis took away from this difficult episode. We did so through a survey conducted by the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility between April 13–19 among a representative sample of 1,379 respondents. The survey included the following question: What, in your view, is the most important lesson Israel needs to learn from the war with Iran? This was posed as an open-ended question, allowing each respondent to write whatever came to mind (or to leave it blank). The responses reveal a deep split between the political camps, as the examples below will show. Coalition supporters and opposition supporters went through the same experience of violent conflict with a foreign country, yet emerged from it with entirely different impressions and lessons.

We found that the two camps are fundamentally divided over the justification, scope, and timing of the use of force. Coalition supporters emphasized the need to use force with full resolve and strength: "Subdue enemies by force alone"; "Determination, disregarding the enemy"; "Press hard and don't let go. Fight Arabs like Arabs, not like Westerners"; "Be more assertive." In particular, they stressed the importance of acting proactively rather than reactively: "If someone comes to kill you, rise early to kill him first"; "Don't wait for threats to develop — deal with them at the outset."

Opposition supporters, for their part, do not reject the use of military means: "Go all the way with full force," wrote one of them. But they do express doubt about the wisdom and utility of applying force in the war against Iran. They believe it is unwise to start wars with no clear prospect of success, suggest learning what hubris is and what the sin of arrogance means, and demand "not to go to war unnecessarily just because it is politically convenient." For them, the question is not only how to fight, but whether and when to fight at all. In particular, they believe that going to war requires a sober definition of realistic objectives.

A further difference between the political camps concerns the question of the day after: how military victory is to be translated into strategic change. This question barely registers among coalition supporters, but it appears in the responses of opposition supporters: "You can't rely on the military alone — you need a political agreement at the end"; and "Tactical successes do not necessarily lead to positive strategic change."

It is reasonable to assume that the sentiments of opposition voters stem, to a large extent, from their deep distrust of the current leadership. In a survey we conducted in the fourth week of the war, only 17% of opposition voters said they trusted the government to manage the campaign. This is also reflected in the lessons they draw from the conflict. While criticism of the leadership is almost entirely absent from coalition supporters' responses, it occupies a central place in opposition supporters' reflections. And the criticism is sharp: a call to "stop lying to the public"; a demand for leaders with vision and integrity; and a requirement to restore public trust in the leadership "so that life-and-death decisions can be made here."

To be sure, there are some points of convergence between the two camps: in both, there is a desire for independence from the United States. For example, one coalition voter wrote that Israel must not "do everything according to America's tune"; an opposition supporter wrote similarly that one should not "follow the U.S. blindly."

But the overriding impression from reading the responses is one of parallel universes. People who lived through the same war and experienced the same feelings of fear and dread emerged from it with very different lessons. Coalition supporters believe Israel should trust in itself and in God, strike harder, and not yield. Opposition supporters concluded, by contrast, that Israel is less powerful than it thinks, and that if it goes into a military operation, it must do so on the basis of better planning and preparation of the home front. The war, then, did not create a shared narrative for the two camps, nor did it bring their perceptions of reality any closer. Each camp found in the war a confirmation of the view it already held before it began.