Concerned but not angry: What do Israelis think about immigrants from Israel?

Omer Yair, The Institute for Liberty and Responsibility

Concerns in Israel about a "brain drain," and in particular the emigration of educated, high-income Israelis, are not new. But public discourse on the subject seems to have intensified recently in light of data indicating that, since 2023, the trend of emigration from Israel has significantly increased, including among Israelis with academic degrees. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, more than 210,000 Israelis have left the country since 2023: about 70,000 Israelis per year. This is a substantial increase compared to the average departure in the years 2010-2022, which was about 40,000 Israelis per year. Furthermore, in 2024, more Israelis with academic degrees left Israel than returned to Israel.

How do Israelis evaluate the phenomenon of immigration from Israel in a time of political upheaval and war? What is the attitude of Israelis towards emigrants from Israel? These are the issues we examined in an online survey we conducted at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University in January 2026 - before the current war.

In the survey, which included a representative sample of 810 Israelis, we asked several questions about the phenomenon. First, we presented survey respondents with data from the Central Bureau of Statistics indicating that over 200,000 Israelis left Israel in 2023-2025 and noted that this is a significant increase in the number of people leaving Israel compared to the previous decade. We then asked them whether they thought this trend would continue over the past few years. A majority of the Israeli public - 60 percent - responded that they were certain or thought that the trend would continue, compared to only 23 percent who responded that they were certain or thought that the trend would not continue (the rest responded that they did not know).

We then asked survey respondents whether they were concerned about the phenomenon of “brain drain,” which was defined as the emigration of educated, high-income Israelis. Almost half of Israelis, 48 percent, indicated that they were concerned about the phenomenon, while a slightly smaller proportion, 44 percent, indicated that they were not concerned about it. We also asked respondents about the costs of emigration from Israel to Israeli society. Sixty-one percent of Israelis responded that emigration from Israel harms the Israeli economy to a large extent, 58 percent responded that Israel’s research and development capacity is harmed to a large extent by emigration, and 50 to 52 percent chose the same response regarding social cohesion in Israel and the Israeli security power.

Finally, we asked respondents whether they felt anger, disappointment, or understanding toward Israelis who are emigrating from Israel at this time. Only 21 percent of Israelis indicated that they felt anger toward the immigrants. A higher proportion, 38 percent of Israelis, felt disappointment toward the immigrants from Israel at this time, and no fewer than 55 percent felt understanding toward them.

It is thus clear that many Israelis are concerned about the brain drain from Israel, believe that the trend of increasing emigration from Israel is likely to continue in the coming years, and that emigration from Israel has high costs for Israeli society. Emigration is perceived by many as harming the economy, society, and security of the State of Israel. At the same time, many Israelis also understand those who are leaving, and a minority among Israelis feel anger toward emigrants from Israel.

We note that on most questions, there were small differences between Jewish and Arab respondents. However, we found large differences (30-40 percentage points) between coalition and opposition voters. More opposition voters believed that the trend of increased immigration from Israel would continue in the coming years compared to coalition voters. Coalition voters were also much less concerned about brain drain from Israel than opposition voters, and they estimated that the damage to the State of Israel in each of the aspects - the economy, security power, social cohesion, and research and development capabilities - was smaller compared to opposition voters. Coalition and opposition voters also substantially differed in their degree of understanding of the immigrants from Israel, but we found much smaller differences between the rival camps regarding feelings of anger and disappointment with the immigrants.

These gaps may stem from differences among the various camps in their assessment of the state of the country and their level of pride in the country in recent years. They may also stem from a perception among the different camps that a minority of immigrants belong to the camp supporting the coalition, or because coalition voters, at least these days, are more optimistic than opposition voters regarding the future of the State of Israel. Either way, we can hope that in the coming years the number of Israelis emigrating from Israel for various reasons will decrease, which is expected to lead to a decrease in public concerns about a brain drain, and to the strengthening of the State of Israel.

Since the survey was conducted, a war with Iran (Operation "Roaring Lion") and a campaign in Lebanon have begun, which have had a major impact on the home front and the lives of Israelis. Hence, it can be speculated that, given the need for recovery after the war, concern about a "brain drain" will only increase, and that, given the sense of threat during the war, the degree of understanding for those who leave may even increase.

Dr. Omer Yair is the research director and a research fellow at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University.